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The primary objective of this work has been in testing the global 
hypothesis that technology licensing (the purchase and sale of 
technology as an alternative to that of goods), is used as a tool 
in the diversification strategies of small manufacturing firms.
The research suggests that diversification does commonly occur 
in such firms and that technology licensing can be a factor in this.
Diversification emerged as important at the median of the small firm 
scale (100-200 employees). Such firms were found to diversify 
substantially more than either very small or medium sized firms, 
although very large firms also exhibited a high degree of 
diversification.
Technology licensing was shown to be used by a minority of small 
firms. Of those which had utilised inward licensing to obtain 
new products or processes, a majority had done so reactively, 
usually to overcome product line deficiencies. Where outward 
licensing or both inward and outward licensing had been utilised, 
it had generally been used more proactively, frequently as part of 
a longer term strategy of product and market diversification and 
as a means of conserving scarce resources for more profitable use 
elsewhere.
It is considered that the empirical evidence supports the views of 
previous workers, that smaller manufacturing firms can be divided 
into sub-sets of proactive and reactive groups and that the 
hypothesis upon which the study was based was mainly substantiated 
in the case of companies which had used outward licensing or both 
inward and outward licensing. In the case of inward licensing 
companies it is considered that the hypothesis is incompletely 
substantiated, in that a large majority of inward licensing 
appeared to be wholly reactive and could only be encompassed 








CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
A Technology Licensing 2
B Objectives of the Thesis 3
C Hypothesis Considered 5
D Thesis Structure 5
E Use of the Thesis 9
CHAPTER 2 - SMALL FIRMS AND THE FORMULATION OF
BUSINESS POLICY 10
A Introduction 11
B Characteristics of Small Firms 16
1. Definitions 16
2. Small Firms in British Manufacturing Industry 17
3. Ownership and Legal Status 18
4. The Financial Characteristics of Small Firms 19
C The Formulation of Business Policy 21
1. Introduction 21
2. Factors Impinging Upon Policy Decisions 22
3. Policy Making Structures and Firm Size 25
4. Development of New Product Policies by
Small Firms 30
5. Product Life Cycles and the Implementation
of Business Policy 37
D Other Small Company Policy Issues 48
1. Introduction 48
2. Role of the 'Corporate Plan' 49
3. Factors Pertaining to Flexible Response 50
4. Reactive and Proactive Factors - Market Control 53
5. Comparative and Absolute Advantage 54
6. Licensing in the Development of New Product
Strategies 57
7. Conclusion 58
E A Measure of Small Firm Flexibility 60
1. Introduction 60
2. Method 61
3. Results, Interpretation 65















Expenditure on Capital, Research 
cind Development and Stocks/Work in 
Progress as a Percentage of Output 
Attributable to Small Firms 
Regression Analysis Output: Capital 
Expenditure
Regression Analysis Output; R & D 
Expenditure
Regression Analysis Output: Stocks 
and Work in Progress 
Regression Analysis Output: Capital 
Expenditure, R & D, Stocks and 
Work in Progress
Industry Data - Capital Expenditure
Industry Data - Stocks/Work in Progress
Industry Data - Employment
Industry Data - Net Output
Company Size:Capital Expenditure:
Stocks and Work in Progress,
Employment, Net Output as follows:
Appendix 2.4a Leather Goods
Appendix 2.4b Timber and Furniture
Appendix 2.4c Metal Goods
Appendix 2.4d Clothing and Footwear
Appendix 2.4e Bricks/Pottery/Glass
Appendix 2.4f Paper/Printing/Publishing 
Appendix 2.4g Instrument Engineering




Appendix 2.4m Metal Manufacture
Appendix 2.4n Shipbuilding
Appendix 2.4o Electrical Engineering



























CHAPTER 3 - DIVERSIFICATION AND THE SMALL FIRM 109
A Introduction 110
B Strategic Diversification - A Theoretical Framework 111
1. Definitions 111
2. Diversification Pressures 114
3. Types of Diversification 117
4. Review of Definition of Diversification
Types 122
5. Potential Advantages of Diversification
Strategies 123
C A Review of the Empirical Evidence on Diversification 126
1. Introduction 126
2. Reasons for Diversification 129
Page No
3. Measuring Diversification 131
4. The Extent of Diversification 136
5. Large Company Diversification 139
6. Small Firm Diversification 141
7. Factors Explaining Diversification 142
D A Study of Small Firm Diversification 144
1. Background 144
2. The Small Firm Study 147
3. Method - Data Collection 148
4. Data Presentation 150
5. Data Analysis and Results 151
6. Postulations Based on the Results 166
E Conclusions 171
Appendices to Chapter 3 173
Appendix 3.1 Small Firm Sample - Company Size:
Number of Firms 174
Appendix 3.2 Small Firm Sample - Company Size:
Numbeis of Product Groups I 175
Appendix 3.3 Small Firm Sample - Company Size:
Numbers of Product Groups II 176
Appendix 3.4 Small Firm Sample - Company Size:
Numbers of Firms in 1 and 4+
Product Groups 177
Appendix 3.5 Small Firm Sample - Company Size:
Moving Average of Percentages in
Product Groups 178
CHAPTER 4 - TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INNOVATION AND NEW
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL FIRMS 179
A Introduction 180
B Technology Sources and Resources 183
1. The Technology Life Cycle 183
2. Sources and Development of Technology 186
3. Diffusion of Technology 193
C The Management of Technology in Small Firms 199
1. The Technological Environment of the
Small Firm 199
2. The Process of Technology Management
in Small Firms 201
3. The New Product Development Process in
Small Firms 205
D Risk, Growth and New Product Development 210
1. Measurement of Risk 211
2. Growth Characteristics of Small Firms 213
E Conclusion 218




CHAPTER 5 - TECHNOLOGY LICENSING - SCOPE,SCALE AND
RATIONALE 223
A Introduction 224
B Literature Review 228
C Alternative Strategies in Technology Sale 232
1. Patent Sale 233
2. Divestment of Companies or Divisions 234
3. Contractual Sale 235
D The Strategic and Economic Rationale for
Outward Licensing 236
1. Profit and Associated Factors 237
2. Political Factors 239
3. Geographical Factors 240
4. Anti-competitive Factors 242
5. Tax Related Factors 246
6. Sociological and Policy Factors 248
7. Resource Factors 249
8. Transfer Cost Factors 251
9. Product Specific Factors 252
10. Other Strategic Factors 252
E Alternative Strategies for Technology Purchase 254
1. Product Purchase 255
2. Company Acquisition 255
3. Key Personnel Acquisition 256
F The Strategic and Economic Rationale for
Inward Licensing 258
1. Development Cost Factors 259
2. Speed Factors 261
3. Technology Push 263
4. Diversification 264
5. Other Strategic Factors 265
G The Scope of Technology Licensing 266
1. United Kingdom and International Trade
in Technology 267
2. Licensing Returns 270
H Large and Small Firm Licensing 273
1. Policy Factors 274
2. Information Provision and Resource
Availability 275
I Conclusion 276
CHAPTER 6 - TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND STRATEGIC PRODUCT
PLANNING IN SMALL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 279
A Introduction 280
B Technology Licensing and Small Firms 281
(Some Evolving Hypotheses)
1. Internal Considerations 284
2. External Considerations 295-
Vll
Page No
C. Modelling the Licensing Process in Small Firms 304
1. Licensing Trigger Signals 304
2. The Operation of Licensing Markets 307
3. Licensing in Small Firms - A Decision Model 309
D. Strategic Licensing Process in Small Firms
(Empirical Evidence) 313
1. Introduction 313
2. Research Evidence 314
3. Data Presentation and Analysis 319
4. Testing of Hypotheses 340
E. Conclusions/Discussions 358
Appendices to Chapter 6 371
Appendix 6.1 Inward Licensing Cases 372
Appendix 6.2 Outward Licensing Cases 415
Appendix 6.3 Inward/Outward Licensing Cases 457
Appendix 6.4 'Random' Licensing Cases 503
Appendix 6.5 Summary Case Analysis 553
Appendix 6.6 Swedish Case Studies 594
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSIONS 597
A. Introduction 598
B. Review of Technology Licensing in a Business Policy 
Context 599
C. Conclusions of Adopting a Case Approach 603
D. Technology Licensing and Business Strategy in the
Small Firm - Conclusions 606
1. The use of Technology Licensing as an
Alternative Strategy 606
2. When Technology Licensing is Used 609
3. How Technology Licensing is Used 613
4. The Success of Technology Licensing as a
Business Strategy 615
E. The Practical Use of Technology Licensing 618
1. Inward Technology Licensing 618
2. Outward Technology Licensing 621
F. Possible Further Work 623
G. Final Thoughts 627
Bibliography I 629
Bibliography II 639





Recent Government policies on the stimulation of business activity 
have concentrated on the development of new industries to replace 
the old, new enterprises to replace recession hit firms and an 
emphasis on the role that smaller firms may be able to play in 
developing new employment opportunities. Industrial policy has 
also concentrated on the development of new technologies to replace 
outmoded or obsolescent techniques.
However, while Government proposes the formation of new enterprises 
and the development of new technologies and products, there is less 
empirical evidence on the success of methods designed to promote 
such regeneration. It is the purpose of this thesis to explore 
one small facet of the innovation 'spectrum', namely the 
diversification and new product strategies of smaller firms with 
particular reference to the use of inward and outward technology 
licensing a g r e e m e n t s . W h i l e  such purchase and sale of technology 
is probably accepted practice within larger organisations, the 
processes of which have been explored by several authors, its 
role in the new product and market development strategies of 
smaller firms appears to have received more scant attention. It 
is therefore to this sector that the thesis is devoted.
1. Throughout this thesis, a 'licence' is defined as the purchase 
under contract (by a licensee), of the rights to use the intellectual 
property of another individual or organisation (the licensor). A 
fuller definition of 'licensing' is made in Chapter Five.
—2 —
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
The thesis reports upon an examination of the new product and market 
development processes in smaller firms where licensing agreements 
have been an integral part of such developments. A core technique 
was the use of 'in-depth' case studies to define company objectives. 
Specifically, the following objectives were set;
1 To explore the policy making processes in smaller
firms to identify key variables within the new 
product development process.
2 To measure the role and scale of diversification
within smaller manufacturing firms to determine 
whether such firms do carry out diversification 
strategies.
3 To identify the scope of technology licensing in
the product and market strategies of smaller firms.
4 To consider whether technology licensing is a
suitable method for market realisation by such 
firms.
It was not an objective to consider only what might be considered 
'high technology' companies. While such firms clearly are an 
important sub-sector, they may not always be typical of companies 
in the small firm sector as a whole. Rather, it was an objective
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to consider a cross section of small manufacturing firms to define 
how they used licensing and whether greater use could be made of 
the technique in the small firm sector.
The author's interest in the use of technology licensing arose, 
initially, during employment in a medium sized manufacturing company 
in the building products industry, in 1977. It was observed that 
diversification into new fields of activity could be very difficult 
to manage, when new skills had to be learned, even where sufficient 
funding was available to promote the process. In this instance, 
'in-house' development was utilised to develop a new and different 
product for a new market. However, introduction of the new 
product was much less successful than the potential market and 
product characteristics indicated were possible. This experience 
was not immediately translated into a recognition that technology 
licensing could have been relevant, but following commencement of 
the Masters Degree in Business Administration at Bath University, 
and an increasing interest in the technology policies of small 
firms, a deeper interest in licensing was provoked. The Leverhulme 
Trust provided funding for a two year research programme into the 
practical use of technology licensing by small firms, led by 
Julian Lowe. This thesis, studies for which were carried out in 
parallel with the 'Leverhulme' research, considers the subject of 




It is an objective of this study to consider the role that 
technology licensing plays in the diversification strategies of 
small and medium sized firms. The study is therefore structured 
to explore, first, the global hypothesis that technology licensing 
is used as a strategic tool in the diversification strategies of 
such firms. Exploration is made to define whether smaller firms 
do develop strategies intended to diversify their product lines; 
to define the effect of the technological areas in which they 
operate, upon those strategies and thirdly; to explore the role 
that technology licensing has within those strategies. Within 
the last area of study, comprising Chapter Six of this thesis, 
certain hypotheses are tested. These are explored within that 
chapter.
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is divided into two major sections to facilitate 
exploration of the hypotheses suggested above. The first section 
(Chapters 2 - 4 )  deals with the technological environment of the 
firm with particular reference to the way it operates within that 
environment, in developing policy, and in putting strategic plans 
into operation through diversification into new areas of 
technological expertise. This section endeavours to define the 
particular technological characteristics of smaller manufacturing 
firms in relation to their ability to react to and exploit changes
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in the marketplace. Studies are made to define the scope and 
importance of diversification in smaller firms and to measure the 
flexibility of such firms in their new product strategies.
Part Two of the thesis, (Chapters 5 - 7), comprises an exploration 
of the strategic role of licensing in all companies followed by an 
analysis of the role that such licensing plays in the new product 
and diversification strategies of smaller firms. Empirical 
evidence is presented in Chapters Two, Three and Six to support 
the hypotheses generated. The structure of the thesis is as 
follows
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Chapters Two, Three and Four provide evidence for the thesis, 
running in parallel with each other. Chapter Five sets the 
licensing 'scene' while Chapter Six can be seen as an integrating 
chapter, pulling together evidence from both Part I and Part II of 
the thesis. The chapters are structured internally as follows:
Chapter Two considers the characteristics of small firms pertinent 
to the subject matter of the thesis. Empirical evidence is 
presented to demonstrate the product and market movements of a 
sample of small firms over a ten year period, to measure their 
flexibility in taking advantage of opportunities,and to define 
those industries where small firms appear to play a particularly 
important role.
Chapter Three explores the diversification decision process in 
firms and investigates why diversification may be relevant in the 
small firm as well as in larger firms. An empirical analysis is 
made of the diversification levels of a sample of smaller firms to 
explore the strategic implications for such firms in endeavouring 
to develop out of their current market segments.
Chapter Four considers the technological and innovation environment 
of smaller firms and investigates the impact of these upon the new 
product development process,with particular emphasis on the risks 
that smaller firms open themselves to by entering new and different 
markets. The main emphasis of Part I is in identifying those factors 
pertinent to the use of licensing per se by small firms.
—7—
In Part II, Chapter Five explores the strategic and economic 
rationale for the use of technology licensing in both large and 
smaller firms. Previous studies of the utilisation and extent of 
technology licensing are reported on, and a review of the current 
literature on the subject is made.
Chapter Six explores,in depth, the role of technology licensing 
in the context of strategic product planning in small manufacturing 
companies. Case studies of forty small companies are reported. 
Models of the licensing decision process and the operation of 
licensing markets are proposed. Hypotheses based upon the earlier 
chapters, previous work in the field, and deductions from an 
initial sample of technology licensing case studies are then 
tested. Chapter Six endeavours to integrate work in previous 
chapters in considering strategic licensing in smaller firms.
Chapter Seven comprises a short conclusion to the thesis with a 
brief review of some of the problems, advantages and results of 
undertaking the study in the form presented.
Background material and other relevant information not included 
in the thesis text has been appended to each chapter as necessary, 
rather than in a separate 'appendices' section at the back of 
the thesis. This convention was adopted for easy reference and 
as an alternative to the inclusion of numbers of statistical 
tables and diagrams within the text. The appendices comprise, 
therefore, an important part of each chapter and should be used 
in conjunction with it.
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Lastly, the bibliography appended to the thesis as a whole 
comprises two parts. Bibliography I lists those references which 
provided background material for the study and have been quoted 
within the text. The greater number of papers that were referred 
to or utilised during the course of the research but are not 
specifically quoted in the text comprise Bibliography II. It was 
the author's intention that the two bibliographies should provide 
a comprehensive listing of recent works pertaining to technology 
licensing.
E. USE OF THE THESIS
It became clear during the course of investigations carried out 
for this thesis that there was a degree of ignorance within many 
small firms' management about the potential use of technology 
licensing. Within the population of small firms a large majority 
had made no use of the technique. While this made the collection 
of data more difficult, it also suggested a need for more sources 
of information on the subject. As a result of the research 
carried out under the Leverhulme contract, referred to above, 
several papers and two books on the subject of technology licensing 
were published jointly with Julian Lowe. The papers and books 
are referred to as relevant within the body of the thesis. It 
is hoped that the books in particular will prove to be useful to 
management in smaller firms considering the practical use of 
technology licensing, while this thesis may be of value in 
consideration of the role that technology licensing can play in 
developing longer term strategies for its use in smaller firms.
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CHAPTER 2
SMALL FIRMS AND THE FORMULATION OF BUSINESS POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
It is a major objective of this chapter to consider the small
firm/^^ per se, to highlight some of the features that may be
related to the use of licensing by such firms. Several authors
have suggested that the characteristics of small firms differ both
(2)
in scale and scope from larger firms and it is intended to 
explore these small firm specific factors and define the role that 
they might play in such firms* policy making processes, with 
particular reference to the use of technology licensing.
Recently,public interest in the contribution that small firms (SFs) 
can make to the economic activity of the industrialised countries, 
has grown. Over the same period, however, small firms in Britain 
appear to have been responsible for a shrinking percentage of gross 
national output. The interest in SFs has led to a situation where 
they are frequently cited as being of critical importance to 
national recovery by such influential bodies as the CBI, and the 
UK government.
Such faith in SFs in the national economy appears to be based
(4)
to a large extent on their perceived role as job creators and
1. 'Small firm' in this context relates to small manufacturing 
businesses (less than 200 employees) except where this is 
explicitly stated not to be the case. Where appropriate, 
evidence pertaining to small and medium sized firms is also 
presented.
2. Bolton J E, 'Small Firms' Report of the Committee of Inquiry 
on Small Firms', HMSO 1978, Cmnd 4811
3. 'A Call for Positive Discrimination', Report in Financial 
Times, 13 February 1981, on small firms
4. Ganguly, P 'Major Share of Job Creation is by Small Firms' 
British Business, HMSO 1984
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as 'seedbed e n t e r p r i s e s ' f r o m  which larger enterprises may one
day grow. While there is no doubt that many SFs have developed
over the years into large, successful companies, the number of such
'growth' companies in relation to the total population of SFs
may be s m a l l . T h e  current concentration upon the role of
smaller firms in the development of new economic activity may,
therefore, to a certain extent, be based more upon the success
of particular enterprises rather than on more broad based statistics.
There is scane evidence that small firms do have advantages over
larger firms in certain circumstances - for example in some service
industries, and they have also been suggested to be responsible
for spearheading new inventions/technologies in some cases. Where
substantial development work is integral to the new product process
(4)however, smallness per se may be a distinct disadvantage.
One purpose of this chapter is to consider the small firm in 
relation to its potential for growth and development^^^ to endeavour 
to define whether such potential is, in fact, being utilised by a
1. 'Enterprises into the Eighties' 'A Confederation of British 
Industry Smaller Firms Council Discussion Document, CBI - 1978
2. Ray, G and Hutchinson, P.J. (1983) The Financing and 
Financial Control of Small Enterprise Development. Gower 
Studies in Small Business.
Of an initial sample of 676 companies going 'public' between 1969 
and 1973, the authors defined only 149, or less than a quarter as 
being 'small rapid growth companies'. Since companies going 'public' 
are, presumably, 'successful', this figure probably overstates the 
percentage of growth companies in the small firm sector as a whole.
3. See for example. Mason C M. 'The Development of New Manufacturing 
Firms'. International Small Business Journal 3.2, 1984. In
this authors sample of small firms he found "a small group of 
high fliers" accounting for less than 10% of the total sanple.
4. Hawthorne, E.P. 'The Management of Technology*, McGraw Hill 1978
5. For an exploration of the investment behaviour of small firms 
see Hankinson, A. Doctoral thesis, Bath University 1977. 'The 
Investment Behaviour of Smaller Manufacturing Business Units 
in the Plymouth area 19 70-1975'
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majority of smaller firms. It is probably also important to 
elucidate those factors which might give smaller firms a comparative 
a d v a n t a g e o v e r  their larger counterparts. Within these 
factors the formulation of policy and the implementation of 
strategies to fulfil those policies may be important.
The recent history of the British economy encompasses a change
from slow growth through a period of rapid retrenchment, several
(2)
years of low level activity and a return to slow growth. In 
the change from growth to retrenchment, SFs may have been 
particularly vulnerable to the greater power of larger firms 
as customers and suppliers. However, one effect of the recession 
may also have been to make larger firms withdraw towards their 
'core' a c t i v i t i e s . I n  such cases, therefore, the market 
segments in which SFs are able to compete successfully may have 
increased in size as larger firms shed more peripheral activities. 
The 'small firm' as sub-contractor, licensee or independent 
supplier may therefore have gained an advantage in some instances 
and in some sectors.
1. Small firms may be less successful at certain things than 
large firms in absolute terms but may have a comparative 
advantage if the larger firms choose not to carry out those 
functions themselves because they feel they may make better 
use of their resources elsewhere. This concept is explored 
in greater detail below.
2. Financial Times, 19 March 1982
3. Through promoting management buyouts of unprofitable 
subsidiaries, or other divestment activities. See for 
example Chiplin B and Wright M. 'A New Lifeline for Industry' 
Accountancy, December 1981 and Birley, S. 'Success and 
Failure in Management Buyouts'. Long RangfcPlanning, Vol 17 
No 3, 1984
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The change from a slow growth to a non-growth or 'retrenchment' 
economy may also have had structural effects upon the 'small 
business sector' as a whole, in addition to affecting specific 
small companies. In growing market segments, competitive pressures 
might have been masked. However, as a result of the recession 
competitive pressures may have increased, for smaller firms, 
forcing them to search out opportunities on a more flexible basis. 
Such pressures might be anticipated to have increased the 
propensity of smaller firms to search for and enter new market 
niches with different products and to consider the use of new 
techniques, such as technology licensing, to obtain the products 
to carry out this process. As a major part of this chapter an 
empirical stuc^ is made to determine how important product/market 
flexibility had been in a sanple of smaller firms.
Secondly, exploration was made of the conparative importance 
of smaller firms across the full range of manufacturing industry.
Lastly, this chapter considers some of the features of small 
firms that may have direct relevance to their use of technolgoy 
licensing. Since licensing can clearly come about as a strategic 
choice, where alternative methods for obtaining technology are 
available, it is probably also important to explore the development 
of policy formulation in small firms. A second area of study
1. In terms of employment and output related to Research and
Development expenditure and capital expenditure per employee,
—14—
consists of evaluating whether such firms do have potentially 
greater flexibility than medium or large firms, which might 
increase the usefulness to them of licensing per se.
An exploration is therefore made within this chapter of the 
formulation of business policy in all firms, and the specific 
small firm factors which may impinge upon this process. A major 
aim of the chapter is to define whether in principle the strategic 
objectives of smaller firms can be changed more quickly than in 
larger firms.
-15-
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL FIRMS
1. Definitions
Several authors have remarked upon the difficulty of defining the 
precise meaning of a 'small f i r m . A  major problem relates 
to the very diverse sectors in which small firms operate. While, 
within manufacturing sectors,such measures as turnover or number of 
employees may yield an accurate comparison, it is probably 
unrealistic to endeavour to apply such measures across service 
sectors. For the purposes of this thesis, where licensing within 
manufacturing industry has been a main area of study, numbers of 
employees seemed a reasonable measure to use. This classification 
has not however, been used dogmatically, particularly in the 
empirical work, where an upper limit of 200 employees has been 
used as a guideline only.
Statistical means for defining 'small companies' may in some cases 
be less useful than other measures in understanding policy making 
structures. Behavioural definitions have also been suggested.
1. Botton, J E. 'Small Firms - Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry on Small Firms', HMSO 1978. op.cit.
The 'Bolton' report defined small firms in two ways. An 
"economic definition" encompassing firms with small market 
shares, managed by their owners and independent, and a 
"statistical definition" - firms with less than 200 
employees.
2. Bannock, G. 'The Economics of Small Firms'. Blackwell, 
1981
-16-
One definition which has not, to the authors knowledge^ been
proposed before, but which seems both logical and useful, defines
the transition frcsn a small firm as "that point at which a personnel
manager is recruited". This could also be a useful definition
in the context of technology licensing, since it is an instance
(2)
of the development of 'functional specialisation* , paralleling 
the recruitment of specialised licensing personnel to carry out 
that function.
2. Small Firms in British Manufacturing Industry
While the decreasing proportion of output accounted for by small 
firms appears to have been an historical trend^ , there are
(4)
some reasons for believing that this trend may now have ceased.
The anticipated advantages of 'bigness* have not always been 
realised through economies of scale, and the recent recession may 
have made some of the larger firms look again at their strengths 
and weaknesses and decide to concentrate more on * core * strengths 
while divesting non-mainstream activities. Such changes might 
lead to opportunities for smaller firms to act as suppliers or
1. Bossons, W. University of Bath Management School, Personal 
communication to the author, January 1982
2. See for example, Wyatt, S. 'The Role of Small Firms in
Innovative Activity*. SPRU Sussex, 1982
3. The Bolton Report, op.cit, for example showed this decline
continuing to at least 1968
4. Economist article, 'Britain's Small Businesses',
29 September 1979
5. Financial Times - Small Businesses Report on Management 
Buy-Outs, 3 June 1981
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sub-contractors to larger firms. The effect of this changing 
climate on the policies of small firms might be anticipated to 
be a long term process however.
3. Ownership and Legal Status
One of the major definitions of the small firm made by the Bolton
c o m m i s s i o n ^ w a s  that the firm was "owner managed". This
definition may be an important factor in considering how smaller
firms are controlled, particularly with regard to policy decisions
made by owner managers. It may be useful to consider the
rationales behind decision making by such individuals. The
Bolton Committee found that independence was a major factor
influencing small firms owner/managers. The typical 'entrepreneur'
however may have different objectives to fulfil. In his study
(2 )
of rapid growth companies, Ray showed that both the objectives
1. Bolton, J E, 'Small Firms', op.cit.
2. Ray, G H and Hutchinson, P J. op cit.
The authors showed clear differences between growth and non­
growth firms; the results of which are precised in the 
table below:






Delegated structure Direct owner managed

















and methods of achieving those objectives, were different for 
'entrepreneurs' than for other owner managers. In particular, 
'entrepreneurs' were prepared to relinquish equity holdings in 
their firms. This suggested that such individuals were prepared 
to accept outside influences more readily than other owner 
managers. Such influences could lead to the use of new techniques 
such as technology licensing as alternative methods of profit 
maximisation. However, in other smaller firms, the acceptance of 
such techniques might be less important.
4. The Financial Characteristics of Small Firms
It is prc±>ably not relevant in this thesis to explore the role 
that financial constraints might play in the start-up of small 
businesses. Clearly however, sources and availability of finance 
are likely to have an important bearing in some cases on the 
decision by established small companies to use inward licensing 
in their new product policies rather than attempting to develop 
new products‘in-house'. Equally, the use of licensing 'out' 
may be affected by the firms requirement for quickly generated 
cash flow. The ability of small firms to raise finance for
1. See for example 'Sargant Florence' The Logic of British and
American Industry'. Routledge 1953. The author suggested that 
one reason for poor UK industrial performance was the large 
proportion of UK output controlled by family firms where profit 
maximisation was not the major objective.
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innovation may be limited in such cases , and any method of
reducing this limitation might be anticipated to be welcomed.
(2)
Several studies have suggested a low level of expenditure on 
innovational activities by small firms in general. However, a 
small proportion of small firms do appear to be highly innovative^ 
and in such firms the easy availability of finance may play a 
crucial r o l e . L i c e n s i n g  of products or process technology 
by reducing expenditure on 'in-house' research and development 
might, therefore, be potentially attractive to those small, 
rapidly expanding companies with severe liquidity problems.
1. Binks, M. Lloyds Bank Review, October 1979
The conundrum facing small firms is summarised by Binks 
statement 'The smaller the firm, the larger the proportional 
increase in capital base required to respond to an increase 
in demand but the lower its ability to command loan and 
equity finance'. This probably applies equally to the 
new product development decision.
2. Bolton, J E. 'Small Firms,' op.cit.
3. Innovation in Small and Medium Firms. Report by OECD,
February 1982.
This report suggests that only 'from 10-20 per cent of small 
companies are engaged in turning out new products'.
4. Ray, G H and Hutchinson, P J. op.cit.
The authors found that small firms which were most innovative
and had rapid growth were also likely to have the severest
cash flow problems.
5. Ray, G H and Hutchinson, P J. op.cit.
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C. THE FORMULATION OF BUSINESS POLICY
1. Introduction
The concept of business 'policy' is subject to a number of
definitions. Ansoff^^^ relates it to strategy in terms of its
role in the decision making process. For the purpose of this
thesis, policy is considered to relate to the character or nature
that the company wishes to adopt, while strategy is understood
to relate to the means employed in realising this character.
Strategic planning implies major long term changes in the way that
(2)
the organisation operates. Policy statements are probably
usually of long term implication, defining the position of the 
firm within its environment. There are probably at least three 
major factors in any policy analysis, the firms' objectives, 
the methods by which those objectives will be attained and the 
constraints upon those objectives. At an operational level 
tactical decisions can be arrived at within broad strategic 
objectives, to develop particular proposals. In practice, the 
policy development of the company may be constrained by the 
objectives of top management while strategy and tactics may be 
developed at lower management levels in the organisation.
1. Ansoff, I. 'Corporate Strategy'. Pelican Books, 1965
Ansoff suggested that ".... the meaning of policy is seen to
be distinct and different. Policy is a contingent decision 
where strategy is a rule for making decisions. Thus while 
implementation of policy can be delegated downward, implementation 
of strategy cannot, since last minute executive judgement
will be required."
2. Moyer, R. 'Strategic Planning for the Small Firm'. J Small 
Business Management, July 1982.
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The formulation of business policy has been explored by many
a u t h o r s . T h e  major objective of the study being undertaken
here is to define, briefly, how policy might be defined, to explore
how this might relate to the situation of the smaller firm and
how such policy might be translated into the development of new
product strategies. It is suggested that the process involved in
many smaller firms might arise in a more ad hoc manner than
in larger organisations. However, some small firms clearly do
develop formal strategies while some larger firms probably have
none. Other authors have classified companies to overcome size
(2 )
related definitions. In the context of this study, such
classification is probably useful in defining sub-sets of firms 
with similar policy making structures.
2. Factors Impinging Upon Policy Decisions
Development of a 'business policy' by smaller firms is likely to 
be constrained by the environment in which they operate. The 
resources such firms can employ to undertake particular functions 
are also likely to impinge upon the strategies followed.
1. See for example,
Thomas, R.E. 'Business Policy, Philip Allen Publishers, 1977
Ansoff, H.I. 'Corporate Strategy' Penguin, 1968
Ackoff, R. *A Concept of Corporate Planning', Wiley, 1970
2. See for example Carter, C.F. and Williams, B.R.
'Industry and Technical Progress' Oxford University Press, 1957 
The authors suggested three types of firm, parochial, 
progressive and adaptive to describe different cultures 
within the firm.
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strategic development may therefore, usually be subject to the 
definition of realisable objectives contingent upon the means 
available to the firm and the constraints impinging upon it.
The more precisely the objectives of the firm can be stated, the 
more accurately can strategy be defined to fulfil those objectives. 
A primary objective of all companies is clearly to survive within 
their competitive environment. The 'robustness' of the firm, or 
its ability to survive in an environment where changes and threats 
develop through competitive pressure, economic factors and 
technological change may be a pre-requisite for the other strategic 
functions of the firm. However, survival should probably also be 
balanced against risk, since no business operation can be totally 
risk free.
Growth is frequently cited as an important strategic objective for 
firms. In this context growth may be important as a defensive 
mechanism against competitive rivalry. However, growth is probably 
often perceived to be an important function in its own right.
This may be particularly important for the smaller firm which 
may be relatively 'unstable' because of the narrowness of its 
product lines , its lack of resources and its poor control over 
external environmental factors. In such cases, diversification away 
from very small market sectors and narrow product lines, may be 
important strategic objectives in decreasing risk profiles and 
overcoming growth barriers. Reaction to opportunities that arise, 
while not fitting any strategic objective apart from survival and 
growth, may also be an important means of development.
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Adequately and realistically defined objectives are likely to 
take account of the means and constraints that the firm is subject 
to. The means available may include both physical and human 
resources. For the smaller firm, the sum availability of such 
resources may be more restricted than in the case of larger firms. 
However, it is suggested that reallocation of such resources to 
different or new tasks may be facilitated in smaller firms in 
some part, because of the lower degree of functional specialisation 
than in larger concerns.
1. Wyatt, S. op.cit.
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3. Policy Making Structures and Firm Size
As firms grow in size, their policy making and management structures
clearly have to evolve to take account of the increased complexity
of the operations over which they have control. The number of
s t a k e h o l d e r s i s  likely to grow and the amount of information
impinging upon particular policy decisions may also increase.
Thus the firm is likely to become subject to an input of new ideas
and techniques in line with the increase in its size. Pressures
to diversify both physically and functionally, and utilise new
techniques such as technology licensing, may arise from within the
firm through pressures to extend product lines or markets, or
externally as proposals from third parties, suppliers or
customers. However, many smaller firms may be ill equipped
(2)
to evaluate such information realistically.
Growth is likely to bring an increase in the number of individuals 
involved within the firm and hence an increase in the complexity 
of its corporate culture. The number of skills that are available 
to it internally may also increase. Such development may also 
lead to an increase in the number of new ideas that arise within
1. Stakeholders are defined as all individuals and institutions 
having a 'stake' in the business, i.e.owners, managers, 
suppliers, customers etc.
2. See for example, Videm, J. 'Communicating Technology Knowledge 
to Small and Medium Sized Companies'. International Small 
Business Journal, 3.1.1984.
The author suggests that "in many smaller companies the 
managers lack the competence and the resources necessary to 
acquire future oriented background information about 
markets and technology".
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the firm. This may be important in defining how policy structures 
develop within a growing firm and be relevant in identifying 
whether the use of techniques such as technology licensing usually 
arise as an internally based strategic decision process or as the 
result of external stimuli.
The experience of those in charge of company policy may comprise 
the most important single influence upon the company's strategic 
development. Each individual is likely to bring to the firm an 
accumulated experience which may complement other individuals' 
skills within the organisation. However, it is clear that every 
firm develops its own culture, style and e t h o s u n i q u e  to 
itself and probably comprising more than the sum of its 
constituent parts. Consideration of this culture may be crucial 
in developing strategies for company development, whether this is 
a formalised process or not.
Ih many cases very small firms do not appear to undertake formal
(2)
strategic planning . One individual owner manager may control 
all the functions of the firm, both in its day to day operations 
and longer term development planning. Since all strategic 
functions are subsumed within one individual, the opportunity
1. Edwards, J.P. (1977) Strategy Formulation as a Stylistic Process, 
International Studies of Management & Organisation. New York.
2. Rice G. and Hamilton, R. Decision Theory and the Small 
Businessman'. American Journal of Small Business.
July 1979
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cost^^^ of understaking any non-mainstream activity, such as 
technology licensing, may be high. Thus potentially profitable 
activities may not be undertaken.
While concentration of decision making in one individual may tend
to make the small firm more flexible and may lead to effective
long term planning, even though this may not be formalised, such
concentration may also exert a limiting influence upon the firm.
Clearly, as the firm grows in size, both the organisational and
policy making structures have to be adapted. This change has been
characterised as development of the organisational structure from
(2)the highly centralised 'hub and wheel' type to a structure
where profit or investment centre managers have a degree of 
autonomy. Such decentralisation might be anticipated to lead 
both to an increase in the use of new and different techniques 
(such as licensing) while decreasing the potential for effective 
strategic management
1. Opportunity cost is frequently employed in the context of 
investing physical resources in projects. Utilisation of 
resources in one project prevents their use in other 
projects which might yield a higher return. This is an 
opportunity lost.
The time of the Chief Executive in smaller firms may be a 
particularly valuable resource that can be employed in 
various functions only at the cost of ignoring other 
functions. In the hierarchy of importance in the functioning 
of the firm, day to day administration may be perceived to 
be more important than longer term planning, licensing, or 
other non-mainstream activities.
2. Lievegoed, C.L. 'The Developing Organisation'. Tavistock, 1973
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However, development of a hierarchical structure to levels of 
strategic planning, administration and o p e r a t i o n , m i g h t  lead 
both to an increase in the effectiveness of strategies to fulfil 
policy objectives and to an increase in the development of new 
techniques per se.
As the size of the organisation increases, more specialists are 
likely to be recruited, adding more 'experience' to the firm, 
while at the same time reducing the opportunity cost of top 
management carrying out non-mainstream activities. This might 
suggest that both 'top down' and 'bottom up' pressures would 
arise to develop new sources of expertise and the utilisation of 
innovative forms of business development. It might, therefore, 
be anticipated that there may be a minimum firm size below which 
both diversification and the use of licensing would be likely to 
be too costly in management time for the smaller firm to undertake 
successfully. If this is the case, there may be a threshold 
above which smaller firms may be more likely to utilise such 
techniques.
1. Anthony, R.N. and Dearden, J. 'Management Control Systems'
4th edition, R.D. Irwin, 1980
2. Threshold firms can be defined as those firms which have 
reached a plateau in their development. This plateau can
be organisationally or technologically based and conforms to 
the transition from hub and wheel to differentiated management 
structures, from non-diversified to diversified product lines 
etc. These transition points may overlap with each other .
3. Steed, G.P.F. (1982) 'Threshold Firms' - Backing Canada's 
Winners. Science Council of Canada. Background Study 48.
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A threshold firm may have reached a managerial, technological or 
financial threshold, requiring resources or reorganisation in one 
of these areas to continue to grow. Managerial restrictions could 
arise if owner managers were unwilling to relinquish any control ' 
over the decision making processes within their firm. Technological 
thresholds might arise as a failure of the firm to c±>tain sufficient 
resources to compete further in its current markets. Licensing of 
technology 'in' might be one method of overcoming this threshold, 
as could diversification into another market. Financial restrictions 
could arise as the result of the reluctance on the part of owner 
managers to relinquish equity holdings to release funds to allow 
their firms^ to develop. All these factors suggest a strategic 
as well as an economic element in the overcoming of threshold 
barriers .
It is therefore suggested that the development of policy making 
structures in conjunction with an increase in firm size is likely 
to be an important factor in understanding the use by smaller 
firms both of technology licensing and in the development of 
diversification strategies. However, such strategies may also 
depend to an extent on the characteristics of the company product 
lines and the markets into which those products are being sold.
It may, therefore, be instructive to consider the characteristics 
of particular product types in more detail through consideration of 
product management per se within the strategic management process.
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4. Development of New Product Policies by Small Firms
Two underlying instincts of small company managements were
suggested to be indepdence and g r o w t h . P o s s i b l y  a majority
of small firms appear content merely to survive, fearful of the
changes that may be required of them and the risks they may run
(2)
in any policy of growth or diversification. For such firms,
the management of technology portfolios and the development of 
new product policies may frequently be more reactive than 
proactive processes. A policy of survival may involve the 
smaller firm, at some point, in a search for new products 
because of ageing product portfolios or through other external 
pressures over which it may be able to exert little control. 
More active, growth based firms, in contrast, probably develop 
more proactive new product policies.
Actualisation of new product strategies however, may be a 
complex process in which the advantages of 'in-house' new 
product development over the purchase of technology or products
1. Bolton, J.E. 'Small Firms'. Report of Committee of 
Inquiry on Small Firms, op.cit.
The Bolton report showed that a desire for continued 
independence was the major factor behind decisions made 
by many small firm managements.
2. Hankinson, A. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Bath, 1977.
Hankinson for example, found that profit optimisation was 
not a goal of the majority of small firms, (even though 
this was often stated to be the case)
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from outside the firm may be difficult to evaluate. Current 
technological and design competence may play a more important 
role in the decision to innovate in a particular direction than 
purely marketing considerations would suggest. The firm may 
therefore be constrained to an extent by its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Realistic recognition and evaluation of technological 
competence may be important, particularly where diversification 
is being contemplated. Defining such competences however, may 
be difficult for small firm managements.
Possible pressures leading smaller firms to develop new products 
are explored below in the context of their source and impetus.
Such pressures can probably be divided into those emanating from 
outside the firm and those emanating from within it.
4a. External and Environmental Factors. External forces over 
which the small firm has no control may be important in determining 
the new product development (NPD) policies of a majority of small 
firms. While the role of ad hoc meetings and approaches by 
external bodies has already been mentioned, other external factors 
likely to be important in the NPD decision include general economic 
conditions, large company competitive pressures, market pull and 
technology push factors.
1. A further exploration of market pull and technology push 
forces is made in the context of 'technology' in Chapter 4
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Cyclical economic forces may, in some instances, stimulate small 
firms to consider developing new products. In times of recession 
the need to develop new products, symptomised by falling sales in 
long running product lines, may become more apparent.
Conversely, rising economic activity may also lead to an increasing 
demand for new products, allied to a greater ability by customers 
to pay for enhanced products. Both these pressures might be 
anticipated therefore to lead to an increase in NPD activity.
Competition from other firms may also increase during recession.
In expanding markets, larger firms may be content to ignore
small market segments and concentrate their strengths in other 
(2)
areas. In recession however, smaller market segments may beccane
more attractive as a method of utilising spare capacity.
This would tend to increase larger firm pressure on small firms.
Recession may also decrease competition from larger firms in
some cases, however, as non-core and subsidiary activities are 
(4)divested.
1. CBI, 'Industrial Adaptation in the West Midlands'
CBI publication, January 1982. This CBI survey found that 
the 1980/81 recession had stimulated new product development 
in many smaller firms where little NPD had previously been 
carried out.
2. Their comparative advantage lying in other areas.
3. See for example Binks, M and Jennings, A. 'New Firms as a 
Source of Industrial Regeneration'. Paper presented to
the Sixth National Small Firms Policy and Research Conference 
University of Durham, 1984
4. An increase in divestment by larger firms of unprofitable or 
non-integrated divisions algo appears to be the result of 
recessionary pressures in some instances.
See Scibor Rylski M. 'How to Innovate', New Scientist 
7 January 1982
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Market pull factors, as suggested above, may favour smaller firms 
in competition with larger firms. Smaller firms may be able to 
respond more quickly to market opportunities than large firms and 
may also be more likely to recognise such opportunities. Evidence 
of a market need may also reduce the risks involved in developing 
a new product. Recognition of a market need is, probably, also 
more likely by smaller than larger company managements. The 
smaller firm's management is likely to be closer to the markets 
and customers it serves than larger firm decision makers, divorced 
by layers of administration from final users of its products.
Technology push factors have frequently been cited as leading to
new product d e v e l o p m e n t . W h e r e  costs of innovation are high
however, technology push factors are probably less relevant to
many smaller firms. In such instances smaller firms may only be
able to exploit technologies by licensing or other joint ventures
(2)
with larger firms.
1. See Chapter 4
2. Bolton, J.E. 'Small Firms'. Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry on'Small Firms, op.cit.
(a) The 'Bolton Report' stated (page 53), "Possibly a majority 
of innovations, therefore, arise from a little understood 
process of movement of people: through small firms being 
acquired by larger firms or acquiring licences from them:
by staff leaving one company and joining another...."
(b) The 'Bolton Report' also quoted a study by Langrish, 
Gibbons and Jevons (Quoted in M Gibbons, and D S Watkins - 
Innovation and the Small Firm, R & D Management, January 1971) 
stating that of 158 important technical ideas contributing
to the innovations which won the Queens award for technological 
innovation in 1966/67, 102 originated outside the firm.
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4b, Internal and Firm Specific Factors. Decisions by smaller 
firms to develop new products are likely to reflect the unique 
characteristics of those firms and the historical pressures that 
have led to current market positions. Historical factors will 
have shaped the current product portfolio and the style and 
e t h o s o f  the firm. Internal pressures impinging upon the new 
product decisions of the firm may also be a reflection of such 
historical factors. Firm specific and internal factors are 
considered under the following headings: size specific factors, 
company type and product portfolio factors.
Decision making processes in small firms may differ markedly
(2 )
from those in larger concerns. This may be particularly
important in the decision to develop new products, which may 
also be constrained by the capacity of the firm to carry out 
research and development 'in-house'. The resources available 
in smaller firms for such research are clearly likely to be 
less extensive than those available to larger concerns.
R & D may, therefore, be more 'development' than 'research' 
based,concerned with improving particular products rather than 
as an ongoing process. Lack of resources in the R & D field 
may also be more of a constraint on the innovation process than 
in invention. Many inventions may, therefore, go undeveloped 
in smaller firms through a lack of resources and available skills.
1. Thomas, R.E. 'Business Policy', Philip Allen Textbooks, 1977
2. Bolton, J.E. 'Small Firms'. Report of Committee on 
Small Firms, op.cit.
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An inability to evaluate opportunities 'in depth' through a 
shortage of resources in the organision, could also be important 
in some instances.
The style and ethos of the firm may also have an effect on its 
new product development profile. It was suggested above that 
some small firms may develop new products as a response to outside 
stimuli rather than through any strategic planning process. This 
might suggest a classification of smaller firms into two groups - 
the fast growth, professionally managed firm, probably comprising 
only a small proportion of the total population of small firms, 
and the majority of small firms comprising those which react to 
change and pressure as it arises. The latter may be less likely 
to carry out strategies for optimising their potential.
While the former group may usually have a continuing commitment 
to the development of new products, the latter firms may arrive 
at the new product development decision in a much less planned 
and 'reactive' manner.
Product portfolio pressures may force the firm into the new 
product development process. Factors leading to a decision to 
develop new products might include a realisation that product 
lines are too narrow, leading to a desire for risk reduction 
through diversification, or the perception by managements that 
products are obsolescent. While the concept of the product life 
cycle is probably not universally accepted, and may not be
1. Hankinson, A. op.cit.
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applicable in every case, technological advance can clearly render 
products obsolete in some c a s e s . T h e  risk to the smaller firm 
in concentrating upon only one product line is therefore likely 
to be considerable. Pressure to develop new strategies may arise 
suddenly, after long periods of unplanned growth which have led to 
narrow product portfolios or, conversely, to too diversified 
growth leading to an unbalanced product portfolio. A study of 
the range of diversification levels in a sample of smaller firms 
comprises an integral part of Chapter 3.
The percentage of small firms engaged in developing and introducing
(2)
new products at any one time is probably relatively small.
Many smaller firms, particularly those operating in small market 
segments, geographically restricted, or otherwise protected 
markets, may have no immediate impetus to new product development. 
The ability of small firms to undertake the development of new 
products may also be restricted by their technical competence.
In such cases purchase of technology under contract may be one 
method of overcoming restrictions, allowing new product areas 
to be entered more easily .'
1. Kotler, P. 'Marketing Management'. op.cit. Prentice Hall 1976.
"The product life cycle is an attempt to recognise 
distinct stages in the sales history of the product."
2. OECD report on Innovation in Small and Medium Sized Firms, 
op.cit.
This report suggests that only 10-20% of small firms are 
engaged in new product development.
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One 'in-house' factor that may be crucial in the successful 
introduction of a new product to a firm is the 'product 
champion'. It is suggested that such individuals play a
major part in overcoming resistance to change and introducing and 
implementing development of new products within the firm. The 
position of the product champion within the hierarchy of the firm 
may be particularly relevant in the acceptance of the product by 
company management.
5. Product Life Cycles and the Implementation of Business Policy
Formulation of an effective product policy may be problematical
for smaller firms with small product portfolios. The objective
of such a policy may be to keep an efficient mix of products in
terms of age, complexity, market and technology profiles. To
achieve this consistently may be difficult in view of the low
(2)
functional specialisation of most smaller firms. Diversification
into new markets or the utilisation of new process techniques 
might be anticipated to be particularly risky for smaller firms.
To overcome the difficulties of developing effective new product 
strategies, various techniques have been proposed to assist 
companies in analysing and controlling their product portfolios.
1. Kotler, P. 'Marketing Management', op.cit.
"....most new product ideas do not get anywhere without 
a product champion.'
2. Wyatt, S. op.cit.
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In the context of this thesis the concepts of the product life 
cycle and the 'experience curve' may be important. Both of 
these concepts probably have relevance to the use of licensing, 
and the role of diversification utilising licensing techniques. 
However, a possible weakness of techniques such as product life 
cycle analysis may be that while evaluation of current product 
portfolios may be effective, definition of suitable strategies 
to overcome identified deficiencies may be more problematical.
The Product Life Cycle
The product life cycle is a familiar c o n c e p t t h a t  has been 
subject to a varying degree of 'popularity' both in its acceptance 
and in its use. It is probably a simple concept to apply to many 
products since the volume of sales of some products do follow a 
pattern that can be broken down into introduction, growth, maturity 
and decline. It is not an objective to explore in detail the
arguments for and against the use of 'life cycle theory' here, 
since this has been adequately covered e l s e h w e r e . I n  the 
context of this thesis however, the life cycle concept is 
important, and relevant both to the use of licensing by smaller
1. See for example:
Kotler, P. 'Marketing Management' Prentice Hall, 1976 
Staudt, T.A. and Taylor, D.A. 'A Managerial Introduction to 
Marketing', Prentice Hall, 1976
2. See Figure 2.1
3. See for example:
Polli, R and Cook V. 'Validity of the Product Life Cycle' 
Journal of Business, October 1969.
Porter, M.E. 'Competitive Strategy', The Free Press, 1980
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firms and the utilisation of diversification strategies in such 
firms, since 'life cycle pressures' have been suggested as reasons
for the use of technology licensing within some companies (1)
It is suggested that life cycles pressures may be responsible 
for triggering firms' consideration of both inward and outward 
licensing in their product and market strategies, and for 
diversifying into new fields. However, this may often be a 
reactive rather than a proactive process.






1. See for example:
Kotler, P. 'Marketing Management' Prentice Hall, 1976 
Staudt, T.A. and Taylor, D.A. 'Managerial Introduction to
Marketing', Prentice Hall, 1976
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A major objection to the use of the product life cycle lies in 
defining,for particular products, when any particular stage has 
been reached. The introduction of new technology for inclusion 
in, or in the production of, a particular product, could change its 
characteristics, leading to a different classification within the 
life cycle. Technology licensing could in principle be important 
in this process in obtaining product or process technology, thus 
changing the length of time that product remained in any particular 
stage of the cycle.
A strategic objective of many firms might be anticipated to be a 
portfolio of a 'mix' of products at various stages of the product 
life cycle, with an emphasis on stages 1 and 2. This might allow 
planned replacement of obsolescent products. However, it has 
been suggested that many smaller firms carry out no such policies 
and that investment in the development of new products arises in a 
reactive 'crisis management' sense, rather than as part of a 
planned strategy.
(2)
Work by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) suggests a 
framework of product matrices to assist firms in defining the 
position of products in their portfolios. This suggests products 
can be classified through an analysis of their market share and 
the characteristics of the market as stars (S) - fast growing 
market leader products with high cash requirements to finance
1. Hankinson, A. Investment Behaviour of Smaller Firms.
Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Bath, 1977
2. For example see: Day, G.S. 'A Strategic Perspective on 
Product Planning' Journal of Contemporary Business, Spring 1975
—40—
growth; cash cows (C) - dominant though mature products generating 
large amounts of cash; problems (P) - rapid growth products with 
high level of product competition leading to high cash requirements; 
and dogs (D) mature products with small market shares.
The importance of the BCG analysis in the context of this thesis 
is in its potential impact upon small company decisions to diversify 
and/or licence 'in' or 'out'. If products can be classified as 
cash generators or users, decisions on the utilisation of licensing 
may be facilitated. Cash users could be licensed 'out' to 
become cash generators while licensing technology 'in' might also 
convert cash users to cash generators in some cases. In the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 6, study is made of the practical 
implications of this process in small firm licensing. Initially, 
however, it is relevant to consider how the BCG analyses could 
relate to licensing within the product life cycle groups above.
Products at the Research and Development stage, high cash users,
potentially provide a supply of licensed products. High research
and development costs may force a company to reconsider its
product development strategy. However, others may possess the
resources to develop that product f u r t h e r , t h u s  the potential
to license 'out' may exist. Conversely a smaller firm might
consider licensing 'in' a part developed product from another
firm that had decided to abandon further development of a product
(2 )
because of poor 'fit' with organisational objectives.
1. The implications of this are considered in detail in Chapter 6.
2. Possibly a large firm.
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Licensing 'in' of 'Star Products' for the smaller firm is 
likely to be problematical. If another company lacks the resources 
to develop the product it is unlikely that most smaller firms 
would possess those resources. However, the product profile might 
be very similar to company products, leading to a good fit with 
marketing or production skills, a lowering of costs to the purchasing 
firm and hence a successful product. Conversely, the potential 
for a smaller firm to license a 'star' product 'out' is likely to 
be high, and could be an attractive strategy if 'in-house' resources 
were not available to develop the product to its full potential.
'Cash Cow' products could be attractive to smaller firms to 
license 'in' if suitable licensors could be f o u n d . H o w e v e r ,  
licensing such a mature product 'in' could also be problematical 
in view of the dangers of obsolescence. However, as a short term, 
crisis measure, such a licensing agreement could be effective in 
quickly improving company cash flows. For licensing 'out'
'cash cow' products may be attractive to licensees, but less 
attractive to small conpany licensors, if the dangers of setting 
up a competitor in the market are considered. However, out- 
licensing a mature product could be an effective strategy in 
increasing its already high cash generating effects and in 
providing further resources for new product development.
1. Possibly from a company in a foreign market, which did not 
intend to export that product.
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'Dog' products clearly have little potential for inward licensing, 
unless they can be used to fill a gap in a product line, thus 
generating potentially higher incomes for the licensee than 
the licensor was able to achieve. In general however, such 
products are probably unlikely to be attractive to license in. 
Conversely, it might be anticipated that licensees would be 
difficult to find for 'Dog' products. However, licensing into 
other markets should be a method of improving their performance. 
This could be particularly true for markets less technically 
advanced than the licensors, and protected by tariff barriers.
Out-licensing may be a method of upgrading a 'Dog' to a 'Cash 
Cow ' categoristion within that market.
The BCG model clearly does have application in the analysis of 
products with regard to their licensing potential. This is 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6. It does seem possible 
that BCG/licensing analyses could be used in some cases to assist 
smaller firms in successfully managing their product portfolios 
with the strategic objective of raising the profitability of 
particular products.
The Experience Curve
Development of the analysis of product market share as a proxy 
for the accumulated experience of the producing company within 
that market suggests that a relationship can be established 
between unit costs and accumulated production volume. The Boston
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Consulting Group (BCG)^^^ suggests that since price levels within
market segments tend to be similar for similar products, profitability
(2)
of a particular company is likely to rest upon cost levels.
The relationship suggested is demonstrated in Figure 2.4 below, 
and subsumes a learning function, specialisation and economies of 
scale. As total units of output or 'experience' increase, unit 
costs decrease by a constant percentage, usually stated to be 
between twenty and thirty per c e n t . T h e  implication of this 
finding is that if a company can become dominant within its 
market segment it can reap high profits, as Figure 2.5 suggests.
It is probably unnecessary here to review the validity of the 
'experience curve' in detail. Several studies have reached 
broadly similar conclusions with regard to its u s e . O n e  of 
the major objectives of inward licensing agreements is clearly 
to obtain the 'know-how' of the licensor company. In the 
context of this thesis such purchase of experience is likely 
to move the profit position of that firm, with that product, 
down the experience curve as shown in Figure 2.5. It may be 
relevant therefore to consider the use of licensing as a competitive 
tool which might allow smaller firms to break through both size 
and research expenditure thresholds and to compete successfully 
with other, larger firms,
1. Boston Consulting Group. 'The Experience Curve Reviewed: Why
does it work.' BCG publication, 1974
2. Johnson G and Schoies, K. 'Exploring Corporate Strategy*
Prentice Hall, 1984
3. Conley, P. 'Experience Curves as a Planning Tool'
IEEE Transactions, June, 1970
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Figure 2.4 The Experience Curve
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D. OTHER SMALL COMPANY POLICY ISSUES
Introduction
It has already been suggested that the environment in which 
small firms are operating may be becoming more competitive, 
particularly for firms in innovative industries. A possible 
reason for this may be the increasing costs of new product 
development. Small firms may however, have certain advantages 
which may make them able to overcome such problems to an 
extent. Small firms may be able to fill gaps in markets where 
larger firms are unwilling to become involved. Larger firms may 
have reasons for not wishing to expand into other small sectors. 
Innovation, for example, may be an unattractive option to a 
monopolistic large company, making reasonable p r o f i t s . A n y  
major innovation within the industry may make its present 
capital investment obsolete. In industries where most products 
are specialised and are produced in small quantities, customised 
for particular requirements, the SF may, however, be able to 
compete on more equal terms with larger firms able to call on 
greater resources.
It is therefore, one purpose of this section to endeavour to 
define which policy issues are important in a further understanding 
of small firms’ competitive positions, with particular regard to
1. A Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy, Cmnd 7198, 
HMSO, May 19 78
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the effect these policy issues may have on any decision to 
employ other peoples (licensed) technology.
2. Role of the 'Corporate Plan'
Most small firms probably do not have a written corporate plan. 
However, the absence of such a plan may indicate a lesser 
requirement for planning in the smaller firm rather than any lack 
of planning. Larger firms probably have to organise their 
resources on a more structured basis. A requirement for greater 
co-ordination and planning may therefore be more a reflection of 
the larger firms’ requirement for time, in moving into new areas. 
In industries where product life cycles are measured in years, 
changing operational direction is likely to be a lengthy process. 
The smaller firm in general is probably not subject to the same 
level of constraints. Corporate 'plans' may frequently exist 
in SFs but not in a structured form. However, it has also been 
suggested^^^ that many .small firms innovate through necessity 
rather than planning. However, many SFs may also be able to 
react quickly to take advantage of opportunities in the market 
place. In this process, licensing might be one method of 
obtaining a new technology quickly.
1. Bolton, J.E. 'Small Firms' op.cit
2. OECD Report - op.cit. "SFs ....  are driven to it
(innovation) by rising costs and unexpected competition"
3. CBI Report - op.cit.
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3. Factors Pertaining to Flexible Response
If changes in the market place are increasing comparative pressures 
upon smaller firms, what factors might be favourable to them in 
meeting the challenge of increased competition? It is suggested 
that potentially, SFs may be more flexible than larger firms in 
meeting changing conditions and pressures. If this is the case, 
small firms may be able to react to increasing competition or 
other factors by switching their resources more quickly than could 
large firms. Such potential flexibility might come about through 
several factors.
(i) Product Market Mobility
Many small firms supply markets in which their market share
is extremly s m a l l . T h e y  may therefore have a relatively
small 'investment' in that market. The study carried out to
(2)
measure the extent of diversification in small firms 
suggested that many SFs do appear to operate in several 
different markets and this might suggest that entry by them 
into new (and by inference also exit from old) markets may 
be a relatively 'costless' process in many cases. If only 
a small market share is aimed for by the company, particularly 
in those cases where investment in capital equipment is low, 
it is suggested that many small firms may find moving from
1. OECD - Small Firms and Innovation, op.cit.
2. See diversification. Chapter 3
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one product/market to another relatively easy, particularly 
where major skills lie in marketing related disciplines 
rather than in any particular technological expertise. In 
such instances, licensing 'in' of a product might be one 
method of acting flexibly, particularly where the product 
in question did not require further development for 
exploitation within the new market.
(ii) Overheads/Investment
It was suggested above that small investment in capital 
equipment might make smaller firms potentially more flexible 
than larger firms with large capital investment. Smaller 
firms may in any case be less willing to seek capital for 
investment purposes when labour can be substituted.
For labour intensive firms there may be an ability to move 
that labour into other activities at a relatively low cost. 
This could be particularly important if the skill level 
required for the new activity was also relatively low.
(2)
Since smaller firms tend to have less labour organisation 
than larger firms, such a shift into new activities might 
be more easily accomplished.
1. For example the garment industry is characterised by small 
low wage companies, employing casual labour and with low 
capital intensity, but able easily to move from one product 
line into another as fashion changes dictate.
2. Bolton, J.E. "Small Firms' op.cit.
"....  a very much smaller number of small than large firms
are unionised."
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Smaller firms may also be more efficient in their use of 
manpower than larger firms. This could arise because 
management of a small company is likely to have 'in depth' 
knowledge of the functions being carried out by each employee, 
There may therefore be less likelihood that people will be 
'carried' by the company. As size rises, this may become 
less t r u e . S e c o n d l y ,  smaller firms are probably less 
likely to have sufficient funding available to hold (for 
example) large stocks of material or work in progress.
(iii) Speed of Decision
Many independent small firms as defined above are owner 
managed. In such firms, the amount of consultation needed 
within the firm before particular decisions are made is 
likely to be less than in larger organisations where 
investment or new product proposals may have to be 
channelled through several 'decision making' structures 
in the firm. In the former case, the decision maker may 
also often be the project initiator. Potentially, therefore, 
the SFs reaction time to particular proposals is likely to 
be shorter than in larger organisations.
1. As size rises, the number of non-productive employees is 
also likely to increase. This concept corresponds to the 
suggestion above of a particular size being reached before 
a personnel manager is recruited, at which point the number 
of 'indirect' staff may increase sharply.
2. A converse possibility of this is that larger firms may gain 
increased flexibility by being able to tap new sources of 
finance, credit, etc. and to enter markets that, as a SF, 
they might not have been able to tackle.
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(iv) Market and Technology Pressures
While it was suggested above that SFs may be potentially 
more flexible than larger firms, external economic 
pressures may also force them towards acting in a flexible 
manner in p r a c t i c e . S u c h  market push pressures may 
also be heightened by 'technology puli' factors as a 
result. An increase in the number of programmable machine 
tools and robots seems likely to reduce the costs of 
short production runs in specific a r e a s . S u c h  
techniques might be anticipated to reduce the advantages 
of 'mass production' processes, and widen the product 
scope of smaller firms in competition with larger concerns.
4. Reactive and Proactive Factors - Market Control
It was suggested above that many larger firms might find it 
difficult to move quickly from one market to another because of 
investment in current markets. However, since many such firms 
have large market shares they may be able to control market 
pressures in some cases. In those industries where several large
OECD Report - op.cit.
2. CBI Report - 'Industrial Adaptation in the West Midlands'
January 1982. CBI West Midlands Region, op.cit.
3. Economist, 29 August 1981, Robots are Coming to Industry's Service
"...for others (small firms) robots are forming the cornerstones
of flexible manufacturing systems. These are combinations of 
robots and computer controlled machine tools which bring the 
benefits of automation to the production of small batches of 
parts"1
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firms predominate (e.g. the cement industry) , larger firms may 
be able to exert considerable c o n t r o l . S u c h  proactive behaviour 
is probably not usually open to smaller firms operating in more 
oligopolistic markets. They may therefore be forced to develop 
more reactive strategies except in those cases where they have a 
large market share of a small market. Even in these instances, 
however, predatory behaviour by larger companies may force a 
change in direction. Lack of any control over markets may be an 
incentive for the smaller firm to search for products in which 
control might be enhanced. This might lead to diversification 
into small market segments where it could build up a relatively 
large market share. An alternative strategy might consist of 
entry into a market where a large number of similarly sized firms 
were competing on equal terms. Such pressures might suggest that 
SFs might be less likely to enter markets in which one or more 
large firm already had a large market share, unless the market 
could be further segmented to give the SF a comparative advantage. 
In entering such market segments, licensing might be considered, 
since for very small market segments 'in-house' development costs 
might be greater than the profit potential for particular products.
5. Comparative and Absolute Advantage
If SFs do endeavour to ensure stability, as suggested above, by 
entering markets over which they might exert some control, it 
might be anticipated that they would be heavily represented in
1. 'A Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy'. Cmnd 7198, 
HMSO, May 1978, p.14
-54-
those markets where they might have either an absolute or a 
comparative advantage over larger firms. Such representation might 
occur as a strategic decision by SFs to enter such markets or occur 
through market forces effectively denying their entry into certain 
markets.
In exploiting comparative advantage, smaller firms may be able to
operate successfully in markets where larger firms do not wish to
become involved for reasons which might include the opportunity
cost of c a p i t a l . S m a l l  market segments might not be
attractive to larger f i r m s . W h i l e  larger firms could
successfully compete against small firms in those market segments
they might have little reason to do so if their total return was
(4)
likely to be small. Large scale capital investment by large
firms in particular products and market sectors may mean that 
they may find it more profitable to develop current product lines 
than innovate into other small market segments. Such market 
segments might be anticipated however, to be more attractive to 
smaller firms. Recent divestment decisions by larger companies.
1. Thus by entering a small market segment the larger firm 
may forgo more profitable opportunities elsewhere.
2. G G Daggit - Research and Development for Full Employment 
New Scientist, 7 January 1982, p.9.
Daggit uses the term 'comparative dynamic advantage' to 
describe the process of choosing goods that others will not 
be able to produce for some years. In the terminology adopted 
here this would be defined as 'absolute advantage'.
3. OECD - op.cit.
4. General Electric Corporation of the US, for example, is 
quoted as not considering any market in which a turnover of 
more than twenty million dollars cannot be quickly achieved.
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characterised by management buy-outs and sales of 'non-core'
activity subsidiaries may be increasing the scope of potential
operation of small f i r m s . S u c h  sales may not be confined to
operating divisions but could incfclude specific technologies under 
(2)
licence. However, successful development of a previously
small market segment by small firms might cause reappraisal and 
entry by larger firms in some instances. The microcomputer 
market was characterised by small innovative entrepreneurial 
companies whose success in developing applications for the new 
machines caused larger companies such as to enter a
market in which they had, hitherto, not operated.
While comparative advantage may work to a small firms advantage 
in some cases, there is clearly always a possibility that larger 
firms may enter their market sectors at any time. This might 
make smaller firms with one successful product rather vulnerable. 
In some other sectors however, SFs may have an absolute advantage. 
Such markets may be characterised by a degree of specialisation 
or customer service that the larger company may be unable to 
provide at an economic cost. In such instances it is probably 
unlikely that larger firms will try to enter the market. Such 
markets may, however, be characterised by high levels of 
competition and low levels of market control .
1. See for example. Management Buy-Outs - A Growth Business,
FT Report, 1 May 1981
2. See Jasper, D.P. 'Technology Audit' in Lowe J and Crawford N K 
Innovation and Technology Transfer for the Growing Firm 
Pergamon Press, 1984
3. Financial Times, A Success Story that Surprised the Giant,
G de Jonquieres, 18 January 1981.
Small companies utilising the latest technology and spearheaded 
by such firms as Apple Microcomputer, built up a market worth 
more than a thousand million dollars a year in the USA before 
large companies such as IBM entered the market.
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6. Licensing in the Development of New Product Strategies
Although flexibility may be a potential advantage for smaller 
firms, it is probable that many such firms do not act in a 
particularly flexible manner. In such firms, flexibility may 
only be demonstrated in response to an external stimulus. The
use of licensing might be one response to an external theeat
or opportunity impinging upon the firm .
If one objective of policy formulation is to make the firm more
r o b u s t a n d  to protect it from the vagaries of external forces
over which it has no control, then possibly licensing should be
considered as one of a number of options in developing new
product and market strategies. Licensing may enable the smaller
f i m  to consider products that it would otherwise be unable to
exploit, because of their high development costs, and therefore
break through some of the marketing and operating thresholds
(2)
tending to confine it to particular products or markets. 
Consideration of the licensing 'in' option in a small firm 
context might increase the options available to the SF both in 
the development of new products and new markets. However, the 
management costs of following the licensing option may be high for 
small firms. In certain instances therefore, the opportunity
1. Robust here is defined as "the ability to withstand sudden, 
unexpected change".
2. Hawthorne E.P. 'The Management of Technology', McGraw Hill, 1978
3. In several cases encountered by the author, there appeared 
to be no 'surplus' management time available to enter lengthy 
licence negotiations even where such agreements might be 
'profitable ' in the long term.
-57-
cost of utilising such management resources may outweigh! the 
benefits. Where licensing 'out' is considered, however, it 
might be likened to the sub-contracting of the export function, 
and hence be viewed as a resource conservation process in some 
cases. Such a process may enable some small firms to enter 
markets that they would otherwise be unable to enter using normal 
'export' procedures.
It is pr(5bably unrealistic to suggest that licensing might be of 
value to a majority of smaller firms. In many instances such 
procedures will not be appropriate. However, for certain smaller 
firms a consideration of licensing might be realistic as part of 
the development of new product policies, particularly where 
innovation into new product areas is being suggested. Sucii 
consideration might be anticipated to increase the number 
of alternative strategies available and hence increase the 
chance that one of those strategies would be successful.
7. Conclusion
Policy formulation may, in practice, be an inappropriate term 
to describe the process whereby many small firms react to and 
develop within their environment. While a small minority of 
such firms may adopt a structured approach, in most instances 
'policy' is probably formulated either explicitly or implicitly
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by no more than one or two individuals on an ad-hoc basis 
It is suggested that in the latter group of conpanies, licensing 
may frequently arise in a reactive manner rather than as part of 
any strategic planning process.
In conclusion, it has been an objective in this chapter to 
consider the role of flexibility, comparative advantage and other 
factors pertaining to small firm operations. It is suggested 
that licensing may have a role in enhancing such flexibility. 
However, it is also apparent that there is little data available 
about small firms’ flexibility in practice. The following sub­
chapter therefore endeavours to explore whether a sample of 
small firms did in fact utilise flexible response in their 
product market policies.
1. Ray, G.H. op.cit.
2. Hankinson, A. op.cit.
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E. A MEASURE OF SMALL FIRM FLEXIBILITY
1. Introduction
The number of available empirical studies into the performance of 
small firms as distinct from more theoretical papers describing 
such firms does not appear to be very great. While numerous 
authors have written about SFs, measurements of their success in 
specific market sectors are not generally a v a i l a b l e . A  lack 
of information, therefore, makes it difficult to measure the 
actual flexibility of small firms in formulating their business 
policies. It was suggested in the previous section that the 
potential for small firms to act in a flexible manner by moving 
in and out of particular products and/or markets might be one 
of their major strengths. It is therefore a purpose of this 
section to endeavour to measure whether such flexibility has 
apparently been utilised in a sample of such firms.
Three separate sectors make up this study as follows: Empirical
(2 )
studies making use of governmental statistical data; Analysis 
of other published data classifying small f i r m s a n d  industry 
case studies. The latter study was intended to demonstrate the
1. CBI - Enterprise into the 80s - op.cit.
"Apart from the Bolton report there remains relatively little 
research and information on smaller firms in the UK so that 
reliable up-to-date statistics are often not available."
2. Census of Production figures for 1976. Department of Industry
3. 'Kompass', Kompass Publishers Ltd, 1981
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way in which small firms have been able to compete in specific 
market sectors, in part by their speed of response and general 
flexibility.
2. Method
A. Census of Production Analysis
The Department of Trade and Industry Census of Production
statistics^provide a useful source of data on the employment,
output, capital expenditure and total stocks and work in progress
attributable to different sizes of firms, broken down by industry.
This information can be complemented by data from other sources,
notably the survey on Research and Development expenditure
classified by industry and published as Business Monitors by
(2)
the Department of Industry.
It was the objective of this part of the stu(%r to carry out three 
linked analyses of the statistical data. These were as follows:
Output in an Industry Attributable to Small Firms 
Analysis of the Census of Production (COP) figures 
was made to define in which industries small firms 
were responsible for a large percentage of the output.
1. Business Monitor PA 1002, 'Analysis of Establishments by 
Size of Employment, HMSO, 1981
2. Business Monitor, M014, HMSO 1981
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Industries were ranked by the proportion of net output 
attributable to small firms. The results of this analysis 
comprise Appendix 2.1
Analysis of Relevant Factors
In conjunction with the industry ranking made above, 
investigation was made of those factors which might be 
responsible for, or affect, the proportion of net output 
attributation to small firms within an industry. Factors 
considered included Capital expenditure. Research and 
Development expenditure, and expenditure on Stocks and 
Work in Progress. These factors were tabulated against 
the net output data in Appendix 2.1.
The three factors above were then regressed against the 
net output data using the 'Minitab Package' for 
regression analysis. Results from this analysis are 
shown as appendices 2.2A, 2.2B, 2.2C and 2.2D.
Industry by Industry Analysis
Industry by industry analysis was made of the three 
factors noted above to define percentages attributable 
to all the size ranges within the industry. Thus the 
percentage of total industry output (for example) 
attributable to firms in six size ranges was made. The
1. Ryan, T A and Joiner, B L (1976) 'Minitab Student Handbook* 
Duxbury Press (Massachussets)
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data for this analysis comprises Appendices 2.3A to 
2.3D and the analyses are displayed as histograms in 
Appendices 2.4A - 2.4R. These cover all manufacturing 
industries classified under the Standard Industrial 
Classification.
B. Empirical Small Firms Analysis
Entries in published business directories of companies provide 
one method of analysing the development of particular companies 
over time. However, there may be disadvantages in using such 
data. First, since entry is by subscription, companies make the 
decision whether or not they wish to have a directory entry 
and are therefore self-selected. Secondly, publishers of such 
directories may round statistical data up or down to fit their own 
classifications and thirdly, the data may not always be presented 
in a way which allows simple analyses to be carried out. However, 
directories do provide a large sample of data that has been 
collected and collated over a period of time.
In the case of this analysis, the Directory 'KOMPASS' was
used as a data source to define the numbers of companies moving
in and out of particular product markets. A sample of two hundred
(2)




of firms were taken from each industry in a ratio corresponding 
to the importance of that industry in terms of its output as a 
percentage of total industrial output. A sample of one hundred 
larger f i r m s w a s  used as a Control/Comparison sample. The 
product and market classifications made by KOMPASS for the small 
firm sample were used to denote the number of market groups in 
which the companies were operating over a ten year period 
(1971-1981). Analysis was then made of this data to measure 
the changes in the markets that the firms were operating in.
The objective of this study was to measure whether smaller firms 
were actually operating in a flexible manner by moving into 
or out of product areas over time.
C. Industry Case Study Analysis
For the purpose of considering the ability of small firms to act 
flexibly within particular industries, three case studies, of 
the microcomputer, machine tool and petrol distribution and 
retailing industries were made. The objectives of choosing these 
three particular industries were: to choose three very different 
industries; to identify both traditional successful, traditional 
declining and 'new' industries ; to define industries in which 
small firms were strongly and poorly represented and to define 
industries encompassing both manufacturing and distribution
1. 201+ employees
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activities. The objective of the case studies was not to carry 
out 'in depth' analyses of those industries, but to consider the 
role of smaller firms within a representative sample of industries.
3. Results, Interpretation
A. Census of Production Analysis
The analyses of the Census of Production figures which comprise 
appendices to this chapter suggest that smaller firms do have an 
important role to play in many industries. In some industries they 
are responsible for a majority of the industry output. The 
results of the analysis are reported and interpreted below.
Output in an Industry Attributable to Small Firms 
The output analysis showed that in four industries, 
leather, timber, metal goods and clothing, small firms 
accounted for more than forty per cent of total output.
In the case of leather and timber, the proportion was 
roughly seventy per cent in each case. This suggests 
that in these industries, small size is not a 
disadvantage and that smaller firms can compete 
successfully against larger firms. This may be due to 
a large number of small market segments in which smaller 
firms may be able to operate as a result of comparative 
advantage. An alternative possibility is that smaller 
firms may have an absolute advantage in offering
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services that larger firms could not easily provide 
in such sectors.
Analysis of Relevant Factors
It was suggested above that smaller firms may have a 
comparative or absolute advantage in those industries 
where they are responsible for a h i ^  percentage of 
output. Factors that might explain these output levels 
could include high labour, low capital and research 
and development intensity. High labour intensity might 
make it easier for smaller firms to enter and grow 
within those markets but would also probably reduce any 
advantage larger firms might have through economies of 
scale. Conversely, where high research and development 
expenditures were present as in the case of chemicals and 
electrical engineering, the percentage of small firms 
was low. This situation might also be anticipated to 
apply in those industries where stocks and work in 
progress expenditures were high, such as the coal and 
shipbuilding sectors.
The regression analyses of output against research and 
development expenditure, capital expenditure and costs 
of stock and work in progress, comprising appendices 2.2A 
B, C, and D provide only limited support for the proposal 
above. Results showed little correlation between the 
amount of output accounted for by small firms on an 
industry basis and any of the three factors except research 
and development.
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Research and Development expenditure was found to be 
negatively correlated with the proportion of output 
accounted for by small firms within each industry. The 
amount of variability explained by this factor was 
36.2 per cent after adjustment for degrees of freedom 
compared to 13.5 per cent for capital expenditure and 
14.0 per cent for stocks and work in progress. This would 
tend to support the theory that in some industries research 
'threshold' barriers do exist which small firms may find 
difficult to overcome. However, it may be necessary to 
treat this result with a degree of caution since 
classification of 'Research and Development' es^enditure 
in smaller firms may be problematical .
It is, perhaps, surprising that capital expenditure is 
not correlated with the percentage of small firms net 
output within industries. However, since there may be 
economies of scale in the purchase of capital equipment 
tending to favour larger firms requiring particularly 
expensive capital equipment, this result may not be 
unreasonable. It is suggested therefore that the figures
1. See for example, Wyatt, S. op.cit.
Wyatt suggested that "Another explanation (of small firms* 
apparently higher proportion of innovations than larger 
firms) .... is that there is a lower degree of functional 
specialisation in small firms, so that a higher proportion 
of innovative activities occur outside what is defined as 
R & D activities". If some R & D in small firms does go 
unrecorded this would tend to make R & D expenditure 
appear proportionately more important in larger firms.
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for capital investment should also be treated with some 
caution. The 'capital' equipment purchased by smaller 
firms may not always be comparable with that purchased 
by larger firms.
Two industries stand out as having high expenditures 
on stocks and work in progress (more than one hundred 
per cent of net output annually). These are the coal and 
shipbuilding industries and in these industries small 
firms clearly have little part to play except as sub­
contractors to larger concerns. Indeed it seems likely 
that the 9.5% and 14.6% of net output attributable to 
small companies in these industries respectively, can 
be mainly attributed to sub-contracting in each case.
If these industries are excluded however, the variability 
between smaller and larger concerns becomes less 
apparent, while the regression analyses indicate that 
such expenditures on these factors do not provide a
barrier to small firms' operation in those markets.
\
Industry by Industry Analysis
The second major analysis was of various factors against 
six employment size bands within industries. No data was 
available on an employment size basis for research and 
development expenditures but percentage employment, net 
output, stocks and work in progress and capital expenditure 
per head were plotted for all sixteen Standard Industrial 
Classifications. The results of this analysis are plotted 
as histograms in Appendices 2.4A - 2.4R.
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The results showed no clear correlation between capital 
expenditures and the size of firms within industries.
Indeed in several industries, notably food, drink and 
tobacco and chemicals, smaller firms appeared to be more 
capital intensive than larger firms. This is interesting 
in suggesting that capital expenditures may not be a 
barrier to the entry of smaller firms in these industries. 
Conversely however, high capital expenditures in smaller 
firms might be viewed as a necessary means for them to 
compete successfully with larger concerns in these 
industries.
Work in progress and stocks in larger companies were higher 
for nearly all industries. However there were important 
exceptions to this, notably bricks, pottery and glass 
and coal and petroleum. In several industries the largest 
companies appeared to carry substantially less stocks and 
work in progress than medium and medium/large companies. 
This case was seen in all industries except leather, 
mechanical engineering, textiles, chemicals, metal 
manufacture, shipbuilding and vehicles and suggests that 
the largest companies handle their stock and work in 
progress more efficiently than the medium sized firms.
It would be possible to postulate that the smallest firms 
have to be efficient users of stock to survive while the 
largest firms have shareholders seeking profitability, 
and hence manage their operations with the objective of 
being efficient.
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The medium and large/medium sized firms might be less 
open either to cost pressures or outside influences. 
This postulation would tend to conform to the views of 
Sargant F l o r e n c e n o t e d  above, on the efficiency of 
medium sized, family owned firms.
In the case of employment, low capital intensive industries 
had a high proportion of personnel in smaller firms, as 
might be anticipated. Thus in the leather goods and timber 
and furniture industries, more than fifty per cent of 
personnel were employed in firms with less than one hundred 
people. Conversely, in the highly capital intensive 
industries of vehicle manufacture, and shipbuilding, the 
very large firms accounted for a majority of employment. 
This might be anticipated. However, it is interesting to 
note that in several industries very small, medium and 
very large companies appeared to be over-represented, 
while small/medium and medium/large companies were under­
represented in employment terms. This might suggest that 
in many industries the very small firms were able to fill 
tiny market niches, though unable to develop through 
small to medium size, while medium/large companies were 
effective targets for takeover by very large companies, 
thus removing them as independent concerns. This 
postulation clearly has to be highly tentative at this
1. Sargent Florence, op.cit.
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stage however, but the data does suggest that further 
work in this area could be valuable.
The figures for output followed those for employment to 
a great extent. However it was interesting to note that 
in many industries the industry percentage employed 
divided by the percentage of output at that size range 
changed from a negative to a positive figure as size of 
firm increased. In mechanical engineering, for example, 
very small firms (1-99 employees) accounted for 24.4% 
of employment and 20.8% output, while very large firms 
accounted for 25% employment and 25.6% net output. Clearly 
scale economies may have an influence upon these figures, 
but it may be relevant to note tho6e industries where 
smaller firms appeared more efficient (i.e. more percentage 
output than employment) such as bricks, pottery, glass and 
food.
B. Small Firms Analysis
The small firms analysis utilising published i n f o r m a t i o n o n
small firms (directory entries) was designed to measure the 
movement by small firms in and out of product markets. A ten year
period was chosen as the basis for a sample of 200 small firms
1. Kompass, op.cit.
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and 100 larger firms. Product groups in which the firms were 
operating at the beginning and end of this period were noted and 
analysed. 'Movement' was defined as a firm either entering or 
leaving a product market as defined in the directory. The results 
of that analysis are tabulated below.
TABLE 2.1
Small Firms Product Change Over Ten Years
Small firms Large firms
Numbers % Numbers %
Original sample 
(1971) 200 - 100
Sample after 10 years 
(1981) 101 50 57 57
Dropped out (a) 99 50 43 43
Change in product 
groups (b) 43 43 18 31
(a) No longer listed
(b) Increase, decrease, or change, in product groups
In the product group analysis, small firms had changed groups 
substantially more than the larger concerns. With caution it is 
possible to say that these movements do demonstrate a greater 
mobility by some small companies in moving from product to
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product and market to market than their larger counterparts. 
However, the change in number of firms that were no longer listed 
in KOMPASS was also greater for the smaller than the larger firms. 
This would suggest that larger firms may be more 'stable' than 
smaller firms.
The results of the small firms analysis are probably not conclusive 
in demonstrating greater flexibility among small than large firms. 
However, the figures do suggest that many smaller firms do move 
into or out of particular product areas over time.
4. Industry Case Studies
In the sectors above, the suggestion was put forward that SFs 
might potentially be able to act in a flexible manner. Statistical 
data was presented to reinforce this suggestion. Such evidence
however, may be at best confirmatory and at worst misleading.
In specific industries, however, small firms have undoubtedly played 
an unequivocally important role. For the purpose of this thesis, 
the microcomputer, machine tool and petrol retailing industries 
are considered to demonstrate the role of small firms in very 
different product markets. It is not an objective to make in- 
depth analyses of those industries however.
1. Necessarily aggregated into industry groups which may, in some 
cases, obscure the role that small firms play in smaller market 
segments.
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A. The Microcomputer Industry
The microcomputer industry is one of the fastest growing young
industries in the w o r l d . F r o m  a standing start in 1977 it
has developed to an annual turnover figure of several billion
dollars. While large corporations, particularly IBM, have
historically dominated the computer industry, in microcomputers
it was initially the small firms who responded to a need,
created, developed and supplied the market. Today, while many
small companies still operate in the microcomputer field,
(2)
large concerns dominate the industry.
The fundamental development leading to the formation of the
industry was the development of the microprocessor in the mid
1970s. In this development SFs played a relatively minor role
In the application of the microprocessor, its incorporation in
consumer and industrial products however, small companies took
a lead. The development of so called 'personal' computers ^
led to the development of small business systems, continually
increasing in power and sophistication and decreasing in price.
Most of the larger companies did not, in the first years of the
(4)
process enter the market at all. This decision may have been
1. Financial Times Report, 21 August 1981
2. Although in the case of (for example) Apple Computer, this
was a small company which has now grown to be large
3. This term first appeared in 1975/76
4. Financial Times Report, 18 January.1982
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due to a consideration that the 'hobbyist' market would not be 
a big enough segment for them to operate in at a profit. The 
smaller firms had also begun to pioneer new methods of marketing 
computers in which most of the larger firms were unversed. 
However, as the industry grew in size, larger firms began to 
consider entry.
In 1981 several of the larger, mainframe coinputer manufacturers
entered the market, in some cases licensing microcomputer designs
(2)
in from smaller firms. This market entry was compounded by
an increasing number of smaller concerns also entering the 
market. While many of the smaller concerns endeavoured to 
exploit small market niches, others aimed at producing general 
purpose machines, with the result that by 1983 technological 
excellence was being compounded as an arbiter of success by 
marketing skills and the availability of resources to enable 
long term price wars to be successfully fought. This led to the 
demise or takeover of many of the smaller companies. Several 
of the larger companies were also forced to abandon the market 
with heavy losses. By the middle of 1984, International Business 
Machines (IBM) had established itself as market leader with 
many of the small and medium sized firms struggling to compete.
1. Microcomputers were often sold through retail outlets. Also, 
'packaged software', applicable to many customers began
to play an increasingly important role.
2. Financial Times, 15 September 1981, 'ICL to broaden product 
range'. ICL set up several licensing agreements, notably 
with Three Rivers Ltd in the US and Fujitsu in Japan.
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Industry analysts suggested that IBMs success stemmed mainly 
from its ability to guarantee long term service for its products 
rather than from technological or cost criteria.
The microcomputer industry attracted many small entrants before 
attracting larger concerns, when the size of the market had been 
established. In the early stages of the industry's development 
larger firms could have entered the market but chose not to do 
so, probably because they perceived that the size of the market 
was too small. This allowed smaller firms to dominate initially. 
As the structure of the industry became clearer, notably in 
relation to the methods by which microcomputers were marketed 
and as the market grew in size, the larger companies entered, 
driving many of the smaller firms out.
The history of the microcomputer market probably follows a
classic pattern for the development of new industries. Early
development by smaller firms but eventual domination by larger
concerns. Smaller firms do still appear to have a role within
the microcomputer industry however, in filling small, specialised
market niches, and in providing supporting services to the
(1)larger firms.
1. See for example. Cave, A. 'Banking and Finance'. Financial 
Times 2 3 April 1985. "Faced with IBMs mounting dominance 
of the business personal computer market, other manufacturers 
have sought out niches where they hoped to survive with little 
or no compétition".
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B. The Petrol Retailing Industry
The petrol distribution and retailing market has become
increasingly competitive since the 1 9 6 0 s . T h e  industry is
dominated by large, vertically integrated companies and might,
therefore, not appear to be a market in which smaller firms would
usually be able to compete successfully. However, during the
1960s and the early 1970s, the market was the subject of substantial
structural change. This change was catalysed by the entry of
new companies into the market. While many of these companies were
subsidiaries of already existing large international oil companies,
a proportion comprised small, independent new entrants to the
industry. Several of the independents were diversifying from
(2)
other retailing activities. Over a ten year period the 
independents increased their market share from less than two 
per cent to more than five per cent. A response from the larger 
oil companies to this increase was to endeavour to 'buy-out' 
the independents and as a result of such takeovers, the market 
share of the independents did fall back in 1973. However, 
during the 1970s as feedstock prices increased and supplies 
became less secure, smaller companies regained and surpassed 
their previous market share taking advantage of the extreme
1. 'Petrol Prices on the Slide' Sunday Times, 17 January 1982
2. Lowe, J.F. 'Competition in the UK Retail Petrol Market 
1960-1973. Journal of Industrial Economics, March 1976
3. Fewer Petrol Stations but Smaller Companies Benefit'
Financial Times, 2 March 1982
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price sensitivity of the market by purchasing petrol at its 
cheapest supply point.
The success of the independent companies demonstrated that 
smaller concerns can compete with larger concerns in certain 
market places. The larger firms were probably restricted in 
their ability to compete on price terms with smaller firms, 
because of their vertically integrated high capital investment 
structure, leading* to a requirement for a minimum return to 
cover such i n v e s t m e n t . A  surplus of cheap, refined gasoline 
from sources outside the UK market place provided a supply 
source for smaller firms to exploit.
Although the petrol retailing industry, based upon service 
rather than manufacturing skills probably utilises little 
technology licensing, the purpose of this study was to demonstrate
that smaller firms can compete successfully with larger firms 
in some cases by operating flexibly and quickly to take advantage 
of opportunities in the market place. In this market smaller 
firms have exploited an absolute advantage - cheaper sources of 
petrol supply, to compete with larger firms.
1. Sunday Times 14 March 1982.
'Battling well on an Oily Wicket'
"Smaller companies .... have smaller overheads and are able 
to make money while the majors, saddled with refining costs 
are making losses."
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C. The Machine Tool Industry
The Machine Tool Industry provides an interesting example of a
market where small firms may have exploited a comparative advantage
in competing with larger concerns. The industry is probably not
one which is particularly suited to mass production techniques
even for 'standard' machine tools. Many of its member companies
(2)
are therefore small, exploiting small market segments . It is 
an industry in which there appears to be an increasing amount of 
technical change.
The machine tools industry probably provides a relatively accurate 
barometer of world manufacturing trends since it occupies a 
'core' area of most manufacturing activity. The industry appears 
to be characterised however, by a highly cyclical demand for 
its products. In such conditions small firms might be anticipated 
to be disadvantaged through resource constraints preventing quick 
expansions of capacity in times of high demand while also lacking 
the ability to underwrite losses during low demand cycles. 
Stockpiling of finished products to take account of such cyclical 
market movements might also be unattractive to smaller firms for 
the same reason. However, smaller firms appear to have overcome 
such problems, and maintain a major role within the industry.
1. Financial Times Survey 23 April 1980
2. Census of Production Figures - Business Monitor 1980 
Metal Working Machine Tools' HMSO
3. Business Monitor 1980 - Department of Trade and Industry
In 1978 small companies (0-200 employees) were estimated to 
account for 36% of net output in the industry. Firms 
smaller than 300 employees were responsible for nearly 
50% of industry output. HMSO
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While the cyclical nature of the industry and the way it is 
structured may have disadvantaged small firms in some cases, 
flexibility may have been a major factor in their favour. 
Specialisation by small firms in very small market sectors and 
the specialisation of groups of companies in larger sectors may 
have led to the concentration of production of particular machine 
types in particular c o u n t r i e s . I n  the newer machine tool 
markets such as robotics, a continuing requirement for close 
collaboration between manufacturer and buyer may have reduced 
scale economies to some extent. This might be responsible for 
the large number of licensing agreements in this field as 
robot manufacturers seek local partners to provide high levels 
of service in their own markets.
The machine tool market is considered to demonstrate how 
smaller firms can operate successfully in market segments 
characterised by a high requirement for service backup. In 
such segments a degree of flexibility may be required to take 
advantage of new opportunities within the market.
1. Financial Times 'Report on the Machine Tool Industry'
23 April 1980.
"Small companies ....  have retained a degree of flexibility




It has been a major objective in this chapter to define and 
describe the environment in which small firms operate, and to 
explore some of the factors impinging upon the development of 
policy making processes in such firms. It seems probable that 
many smaller firms do not approach policy formulation in a 
particularly proactive manner, but may develop through more 
reactive strategies in which the potential to act quickly in a 
flexible manner may be important.
However, it seems likely that although, potentially, smaller firms 
can act very flexibly, to take advantage of market opportunities, 
a majority probably do not usually act in this manner unless 
prompted to do so by outside stimuli powerful enough to initiate 
such developments. It seems clear that a large number of smaller 
firms are content to exploit small market segments with low 
potential for development. Such strategies may lead to over 
dependence on small numbers of product lines, vulnerable to 
external developments in technology, marketing techniques or 
competition. Diversification away from such dependence may, 
however, also carry its own risks. In conditions of increasing 
competition, some smaller firms may be forced to consider such 
diversification however. A consideration of some of the 
practical aspects of this process in smaller firms comprises 
part of the following chapter.
Lastly, it was suggested that consideration of the Boston
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Consulting Group model for product analysis could be useful in 
an exploration of the potential for utilising technology licensing 
in the exploitation and development of the product portfolio in 
some smaller firms. However, identifying products suitable for 
exploitation by smaller firms could be problematical in some cases.
While some smaller firms probably have an absolute advantage over 
larger firms in the provision of service intensive 'products' 
most such firms probably develop strategies to exploit a 
comparative advantage in small market segments. In this process 
the use of technology licensing may be valuable in some instances. 
Further exploration of this factor is made in depth, in Chapter 6.
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APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
APPENDIX 2.1
EXPENDITURE ON CAPITAL, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND 
STOCKS/WORK IN PROGRESS AS A PERCENTAGE 

















LEATHER 72.2 5.70 0.08 65.58
TIMBER 67.7 5.77 0.04 45.9
METAL GOODS 44.7 6.26 0.59 47.53
CLOTHING 43.7 3.08 0.08 40.65
BRICKS 36.3 8.22 0.77 28.08
PAPER 34.2 5.96 0.27 28.18
OTHER MANUF 32.6 7.10 1.52 36.08
INSTRUMENTS 32.4 5.65 2.50 58.95
MECH.ENG 30.7 6.16 1.57 64.84
TEXTILES 30.6 7.46 0.92 53.88
FOOD 24.0 8.39 1.10 47.69
CHEMICALS 16.9 15.60 6.78 48.88
METAL MANUF 16.2 23.12 1.20 74.10
SHIPS 14.6 8.72 1.11 168.19
■ ELEC.ENG 12.7 6.17 7.01 57.43
COAL 9.5 9.98 5.23 134.72
VEHICLES 7.5 6.93 2.94 79.82




NET OUTPUT IN SMALL FIRMS: CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
nobrief 
—  resr cl 1 c2
the regression eoucition is 














the St. dev. of v about regression line is 
s = 17.28
with ( 17- 2) = 15 degrees of freedom
r-souared = 18.9 oercent
r-souared = 13.5 oercent. adjusted for d.f.
analysis of variance
due to df ss MS'=ss/df
regression 1 1045 .1 1045.1
residual 15 4476 .5 298.4
total 16 5521 .6
Xl V ored. V St.dev.
row c2 cl value Dred. V residual St.res.
1 5.7 72.20 35.40 4.81 36.80 2.22r
2 5.8 67.70 35.28 4.78 32.42 1.95
3 6.3 44.70 34.43 4.58 10.27 0.62
4 3.1 43.70 39.95 6.37 3.75 0.23
5 8.2 36.30 31 .03 4.19 5.27 0.31
6 6.0 34.20 34.95 4.70 -0.75 -0.05
7 7.1 32.60 32.97 4.32 -0.37 -0.02
8 5.6 32.40 35.49 4.84 -3.09 -0,19
9 6.2 30.70 34.60 4.62 -3.90 -0.23
10 7.5 30.60 32.35 4.25 -1.75 -0.10
11 8.4 24.00 30.73 4.19 -6.73 -0.40
12 15.6 16.90 18.21 8.00 -1.31 -0.09
13 23.1 16.20 5.13 14.43 11.07 1.17
14 8.7 14.60 30.16 4.21 -15.56 -0.93
15 6.2 12.70 34.59 4.61 -21.89 -1 .31
16 10.0 9.50 27.97 4.49 -18.47 -1.11
17 6.9 7.50 33.27 4.37 -25.77 -1 .54
r denotes an obs. with a large st. res.
X denotes an obs. whose x value gives it large influence.
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APPENDIX 2.2B
NET OUTPUT IN SMALL FIRMS: R & D EXPENDITURE
nobrief 
—  r e g r  c 1 1 c3
the regression eoiiation i 














the St. dev. of v about regression line is 
s ~ 14.84
with ( 17- 2) = 15 degrees of freedom
r-souared = 40.2 oercent










re s i d u a l 15 3301 .3 220.1
total 16 5521 .6
xl V Dred. V st .dev.
row c3 cl val u e  Dred. v residual St.res.
1 0.08 72.20 40.93 4.77 31.27 2.23r
2 0.04 67.70 41.14 4.82 26.56 1.89
3 0.59 44.70 38.26 4.27 6.44 0.45
4 0.08 43.70 40.93 4.77 2.77 0.20
5 0.77 36.30 37.32 4.12 -1.02 -0.07
6 0.27 34.20 39.94 4.57 -5.74 -0.41
7 1.52 32.60 33.39 ' 3.68 -0.79 -0.06
8 2.50 32.40 28.26 3.70 4.14 0.29
9 1.57 30.70 33.13 3.66 -2.43 -0.17
10 0.92 30.60 36.53 4.00 -5.93 -0.42
11 1.10 24.00 35.59 3.88 -11.59 -0.81
12 6.78 16.90 5.86 8.69 11.04 0.92
13 1.20 16.20 35.07 3.82 -18.87 -1 .32
14 1.11 14.60 35.54 3.88 -20.94 -1.46
15 7.01 12.70 4.66 9.03 8.04 0.68 :
16 5.23 9.50 13.97 6.45 -4.47 -0.33
17 2.94 7.50 25.96 3.93 -18.46 -1 .29
r de n o t e s an obs. w ith a large st. res.
X d e n o t e s an obs. w h o s e  X v a l u e  gi v e s  it large i n f l u e n c e .
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APPENDIX 2.2C
NET OUTPUT IN SMALL FIRMS: STOCKS & WORK IN PROGRESS
nobrief 
—  regr cl 1 c4
the r e g r e s s i o n  e o u a t i o n  is 















the St. dev. of v a b o u t  r e g r e s s i o n  line is 
s = 17.25
with ( 17- 2) = 15 de g r e e s  of f r e e d o m
r - s o u a r e d  = 19.2 o e r c e n t
r - s o u a r e d  = 13.8 oe r c e n t .  a d j u s t e d  f o r  d.f. 
a n a l v s i s  of v a r i a n c e
due to df ss MS =S5/df
r e g r e s s i o n 1 1059 .9 1059.9
res i d u a l 15 4461 .7 297.4
total 16 5521 .6
xl V ored. V st. d e v ,
row c4 cl val u e ored. V r e s i d u a l S t . res.
1 66 72.20 30.51 4.19 41.69 2.49r
2 46 67.70 34.89 4.67 32.81 1.98
3 48 44.70 34.53 4.59 10.17 0.61
4 41 43.70 36.06 4.98 7.64 0.46
5 28 36.30 38.87 5.91 -2.57 -0.16
6 28 34.20 38.84 5.91 -4.64 -0.29
7 36 32.60 37.08 5.29 -4.48 -0.27
8 59 32.40 31.99 4.22 0.41 0.02
9 65 30.70 30.67 4.19 0.03 0.00
10 54 30.60 33.12 4.33 -2.52 -0.15
11 48 24.00 34.50 4.58 -10.50 -0.63
12 49 16.90 34.23 4.53 -17.33 -1.04
13 74 16.20 28.61 4.37 -12.41 -0.74
14 168 14.60 7.64 13.05 6.96 0.62 X
15 57 12.70 32.32 4.24 -19.62 -1.17
16 135 9.50 15.10 9.39 -5.60 -0.39 X
17 79 7.50 27.54 4.56 -20.04 -1.20
r d e n o t e s an obs. w i t h  a large st. res.
X d e n o t e s an obs. w h o s e  X va l u e  g i v e s  it large i n f l u e n c e .
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APPENDIX 2.2D
NET OUTPUT IN SMALL FIRMS 
(Capital Expenditure, R & D Expenditure, Stocks & Work in Progress)
nobrief 
—  re;r cl 3 c2 c3 c4
the regression eouation is 


























the St. dev. of v about regression line is 
s = 13.77
with ( 17- 4) = 13 degrees of freedom
r-souared = 55.4 oercent










M S = S S / d f
1019.0
189.6
further analvsis of variance
















xl V ored. V S t . dev.
row c2 cl value ored. V residual st.res.
1 5.7 72.20 41.18 4.69 31.02 2.40r
2 5.8 67.70 44.10 4.69 23.60 1.82
3 6.3 44.70 41.08 4.18 3.62 0.28
4 3.1 43.70 47.33 5.56 -3.63 -0.29
5 8.2 36.30 41.18 4.96 -4.88 -0.38
6 6.0 34.20 45.49 5.14 -11.29 -0.88
7 7.1 32.60 37.98 4.24 -5.38 -0.41
8 5.6 32.40 32.00 4.09 0.40 0.03
9 6.2 30.70 34.57 3.72 -3.87 ' -O'. 29
10 7.5 30.60 37.60 3.76 -7.00 -0.53
11 8.4 24.00 36.82 3.86 -12.82 -0.97
12 15.6 16.90 5.68 9.54 11-22 1.13 X
13 23.1 16.20 18.14 12.27 -1.94 -0.31 X
14 8.7 14.60 19.17 11.02 -4.57 -0.55 X
15 6.2 12.70 12.74 9.32 -0.04 -0.00
16 10.0 9.50 5.40 8.38 4.10 0.37
17 6.9 7.50 26.03 4.15 -18.53 -1.41
r denotes an obs. with a large st. res
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
-88-
APPENDIX 2.3A
Industry Capital expenditure per head (£s*) by firm size
1-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 IK-ljK 1|K+
Employees
Leather Goods 230 325 237 —  JiO
Timber/Furniture 319 311 326 356 232 100
Metal Goods 328 321 356 311 332 314
Clothing Footwear 87 85 99 102 100 88
Bricks, Pottery, Glass 660 547 545 721 522 488
Paper, Printing, 
Publishing
356 429 375 378 597 328
Instrument Engineering 224 283 246 265 414 324
Mechanical Engineering 346 338 372 345 409 392
Textiles 319 348 302 346 300 395
Food, Drink, Tobacco 743 768 636 560 599 624
Chemicals and Allied 826 2960 1242 1244 850 2228
Metal Manufacture 543 683 782 454 642 2299
Shipbuilding 240 234 140 173 267 456
Electrical Engineering 327 351 329 358 349 344
Coal and Petrol 1750 1250 1744 3790 "f— 2951-— ►
Vehicles 313 354 374 286 378 396
Source - Census Returns 1976
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APPENDIX 2.3B
Industry Stocks and WIP per head £s by firm size
1-99
Employees
100-199 200-499 500-999 IK-liK 1ÏK+
Leather Goods 2609 2750 3550 4158 ■ '
Timber/Furni ture 2211 2630 2730 2845 4434 2687
Metal Goods 1807 2295 2512 3132 3836 3371
Clothing/Footwear 925 1090 1300 1465 1680 1504
Bricks, Pottery, Glass 1726 1753 2240 2236 1996 1982
Paper, Printing 
Publishing
1322 1811 2074 2230 2450 1747
Instrument Engineering 1946 2797 2914 2782 4514 3506
Mechanical Engineering 2153 3108 3758 4220 4188 5513
Textiles 1963 2249 2397 2604 2403 2901
Food, Drink, Tobacco 2336 2993 2794 3691 5616 4262
Chemicals and Allied 4158 4788 5295 5494 4283 5856
Metal Manufacture 2567 3000 3432 4750 5308 5463
Shipbuilding 1781 2654 3672 3580 6870 9129
Electrical Engineering 2076 2402 2808 3313 4026 3429
Coal and Petrol 14000 25750 45888 26420 — 37638-— ►
Vehicles 2215 2366 2932 3069 3378 4944
Source - Census Returns 1976
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APPENDIX 2.3C
Industry Employment - % employment by size
1-99
Employees
100-199 200-499 500-999 IK-l^K 1|K+
Leather Goods 57.6 18.9 18.9 4 # w?
Timber/Furniture 52.2 17.8 16.3 8.1 2.5 2.9
Metal Goods 38.1 12.6 17.2 14.7 7.6 9.6
Clothing/Footwear 31.8 14.8 22.9 14.0 5.3 11.0
Bricks, Pottery, Glass 21.5 11.2 17.7 16.6 9.8 23.5
Paper, Printing, 
Publishing
29.3 11.8 22.8 12.9 6.5 16.6
Instrument Engineering 21.7 11.0 17.4 19.0 10.9 19.6
Mechanical Engineering 24.4 10.2 16.5 16.0 7.4 25.0
Textiles 17.9 14,4 22.6 14.1 8.9 22.0
Food, Drink, Tobacco 14.3 8.0 17.0 15.7 7.9 36.8
Chemicals and Allied 10.9 6.9 15.2 14.8 10.0 42.2
Metal Manufacture 11.4 7.0 14.4 11.0 8.2 47.8
Shipbuilding 10.2 4.6 6.0 8.4 7.3 63.4
Electrical Engineering 9.4 5.0 12.6 14.3 6.4 52.2
Coal and Petrol 10.2 5.7 25.6 17.6 — 40.0— »
Vehicles 5.4 3.4 6.1 5.4 5.7 73.9
Source - Census Returns 1976
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appendix 2.3D
Industry Net output by firm size
1-99
Employees
100-199 200-499 500-499 1K-1|K liK+
Leather Goods 54.7 17.5 22.0 7J. /
Timber/Furniture 49.7 18.0 17.3 8.8 3.2 2.9
Metal Goods 32.3 12.4 17.0 17.8 10.2 10.2
Clothing/Footwear 29.5 14.2 23.5 14.3 6.0 12.4
Bricks, Pottery, Glass 23.5 12.8 18.5 15.0 7.7 22.5
Paper, Printing 
Publishing
23.4 10.8 24.4 13.8 8.1 19.5
Instrument Engineering 20.1 12.3 16.5 18.3 14.6 18.0
Mechanical Engineering 20.8 9.9 17.4 17.8 8.3 25.6
Textiles 16.6 14.0 21.9 14.3 8.6 24.6
Food, Drink, Tobacco 15.1 8.9 16.0 13.8 7.6 38.8
Chemicals and Allied 10.0 6.9 16.7 14.0 7.0 45.0
Metal Manufacture 9.4 6.8 13.3 11.3 12.5 46.7
Shipbuilding 9.7 4.9 6.7 7.7 8.3 62.4
Electrical Engineering 8.0 4.7 12.4 14.8 8.0 52.1
Coal and Petrol 4.3 5.2 27.7 12.6 -*— 50.
Vehicles 4.6 2.9 5.5 5.2 5.3 76.5
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It was suggested in the previous chapter that small firms might be 
able to act flexibly in quickly taking advantage of opportunities 
that arose. Consideration of the methods by which such opportunities 
could be exploited were explored. Exploitation of new opportunities 
however, suggests movement either into new markets utilising existing 
expertise or the development of current markets utilising new 
expertise. Both these alternatives suggest a diversification away 
from 'core' skills within the firm and towards the development of 
strategies to define best methods of managing such diversification.
An examination of such strategies is, therefore, relevant in the 
scope of this thesis.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, examination is made 
of the theoretical framework within which companies might consider 
diversifying into new products or new markets. Examination is made 
of some of the 'models' that have been put forward to explain how 
firms diversify. Secondly, the empirical evidence for diversification 
in firms is reviewed. Thirdly, study is made of the extent of 
product and market diversification in a sample of smaller firms, 
utilising data obtained from published sources.
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B STRATEGIC DIVERSIFICATION - A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Definitions
It is frequently suggested that manufacturing firms either expand 
or contract, that it may be difficult for a company to attain a 
certain size and continue to operate at that size. For many firms 
a policy of growth is probably, therefore, an integral part of 
their strategy. Alternative methods of growth are to move into 
areas of the market place that the company has not operated in 
before, and with which it may be unfamiliar or to further develop 
current market segments.
Corporate growth by development into new markets, using new 
products, can, broadly speaking be defined as 'diversification'. 
However the differences between growth, integration of operations, 
and true diversification may not be so clear. While a large 
company launching a new product into a new market is clearly 
diversifying, the movement by a small firm from its one major 
product into another product, albeit in the same market, may not be 
classified as 'diversification' at all, even though the firm may be 
utilising new production and other skills.
The term 'diversification' as described above, is probably therefore, 
misleading to an extent. To encompass the product/market 
developments of both large and small companies may require a more 
broadly based definition. One way of defining the problem lies
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in considering diversification as a method of reducing 'risk'.^^^
It would appear to be the case that concentration in one product,
market, or in the case of the larger firm, industry, is inherently
a risky strategy since problems beyond the firms control in the
market may adversely affect it. Development of new products with
different characteristics for the markets in which the firm is
currently operating, i.e. a strategy of product diversification,
or the penetration of new markets with the firms present product
range, i.e. a strategy of market diversification, may overcome this
problem. If the concept of risk reduction is a valid one to apply
to diversification strategy then the concept of creating a portfolio
of 'investments', in this case products, may lead to a reduction
in that risk. A portfolio can be defined as "a combination of
assets providing the highest possible return for any degree of
risk."^^^ For the small firm, therefore, adding additional
products to its range may increase its assets and reduce its risks.
In the same way, a large firm moving into new industries is also
carrying out the same process. In both cases, the portfolio
e f f e c t p r o b a b l y  operates to reduce the risk while tending to
stabilise the potential return. It is probably for this reason
that evidence suggests that while giant firms have on average a
lower mean profit rate than small/medium sized firms, their
profit level variability is also less, suggesting a trade-off
(2 )
of profit against stability of return. The 'portfolio effect',
can therefore be used to define any product/market development by
1. Weston, J F and Brighams, E F. 'Managerial Finance' 1979 
Holt, Reinhart and Winston
2. Ansoff, H I (A) 'A Model for Diversification'. Management 
Science, July 1958
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a company to reduce its risk, as 'diversification'. This model 
must be compared to the more traditional models proposed by such 
authors as Ansoff, which are described below.
(1)Ansoffs definition of diversification, first proposed in 1958 
suggests that a fim/s operations in the market can be defined in 







1. Ansoff, H I (A) 'A Model for Diversification' Management 
Science July 1958
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In the model, firms are defined as operating a product/market 
strategy in which the product mission of the company, or the job 
which it is endeavouring to do, is fulfilled by its product 
lines. Ansoff further breaks down product characteristics to 
physical or measurable characteristics and performance 
ch aracte ristics.
Within the product mission described, the manufacturer probably 
has three choices. Firstly he can expand his present range of 
products within the same market thus further developing his 
current product mission. Secondly he can expand the uses for 
which his products are designed thus fulfilling a further product 
mission in a mew market. The third alternative, developing new 
products for a new market(s) is defined by Ansoff as 'diversification' 
While this definition is probably applicable to the larger company, 
its applicability to the small company, the subject of this thesis, 
is perhaps more problematical.
2. Diversification Pressures
Firms are likely to diversify for many different reasons. The 
diversification decision may be arrived at as the result of careful 
review of a firms' policies, strengths and weaknesses. In other 
instances, however, diversification may be forced on a firm by 
factors lying outside its immediate control.
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A n s o f f defines the outside stimuli described above as 'triggers 
to change'. Many stimuli may be responsible for the diversification 
decision and force a review or a reappraisal of the method in 
which the firm operates. Some triggers that might lead to a 
decision to diversify might be;-
Product reaching the end of its life cycle, sales 
dropping off/Technological obsolesence 
Increase in competitive pressures in a market where 
the firm has been pre-eminent hitherto
- Impact of safety legislation leading to a potential 
narrowing of the market or reduction in its size
- A decision to try to overcome a large seasonal 
fluctuation in sales
The trigger to change is likely to have the greatest impact when 
a large change in market/product relationships becomes apparent 
to company management. Management may then be forced to undertake 
immediate action to diversify away from the external threat. By 
reducing its dependence on the endangered market the firm may 
increase its chances of survival.
Smaller firms may be at an advantage in reacting to change, in that 
the speed of reaction, i.e. in appraisal of situations and 
development into new fields may be faster than in the larger firm 
in some cases. Lower capital intensity, greater labour/job mobility
1. Ansoff, H I (A) op.cit.
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within small companies and the smaller incidence of trade union 
demarcation lines may enhance this. Larger companies with 
specialised personnel and entrenched bureaucracy may therefore 
take longer to react to trigger signals than smaller concerns.
While there may be a large number of reasons for the diversification 
decision these can probably be grouped into major sub-headings. 
Staudt^^^ writing in Harvard Business Review suggests a hierarchy 
of six major sub-groups for the diversification decision. He 
itemises these as follows in ascending order of importance.
Survival - The continuation of the firm in its 
present form, by reaction to an outside threat.
Stability - To eliminate potentially dangerous 
changes in the market, thus allowing for more 
accurate planning.
- Productive Utilisation of Resources - To maximise 
the firm's potential such that resources owned or 
managed by the firm produce the highest possible 
return.
Growth - To expand the operations of the company 
into new areas of business and to increase the 
return for the company shareholders.
Miscellaneous - Many separate factors but 
including maximising tax advantages and other reasons.
1. Staudt T A 'Program for Product Diversification'. Harvard 
Business Review, Nov/Dec 1954
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Such a hierarchy of reasons for undertaking a diversification 
programme would suggest that such a programme could be either 
reactionary, as a response to outside stimuli, or as a result of 
evolutionary pressures within the firm.
3. Types of Piversification
Where a company has decided or been forced to the conclusion that
it must diversify, decisions must be made on the directions that
diversification should take. Ansoff^^^ considers that
diversification can be classified into horizontal diversification,
lateral diversification (which Ansoff further divides into
concentric and conglomerate diversification as described below)
and vertical diversification. Some authors would, however,
probably describe vertical diversification, i.e. towards the
source of raw materials from which the goods are made or towards
the final product consumer as "integration" rather than
diversification. However, in empirical work it has usually
"proved impossible to distinguish systematically between vertical
(2)
integration and diversification" Utton further conplicates
the issue by defining diversification into "broad" and "narrow" 
spectrum. Narrow spectrum is defined under this convention as 
diversification by a firm along a narrow front into industries
1. Ansoff, H I. op.cit. (A)
2. Utton, M A (A) Large Firm Diversification in British 
Manufacturing Industry. The Economic Journal, March 1977
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"apparently remote" from the firms primary activity. Narrow 
spectrum diversification therefore, broadly follows Ansoffs 
Horizontal and Vertical diversification while broad spectrum 
more closely conforms to his conglomerate diversification. For 
the purpose of this thesis the older (Ansoffian) terminology is 
adopted except that vertical integration is accepted to be a 







Vertical Diversification or integration








Vertical Diversification (or integration) is defined as a movement 
either up or down the supply line of raw materials to final 
consumers. The term integration then, defines the process of 
integrating the business in terms of moving the firm into the 
business of supplying itself with materials and acting as its own 
customer for the intermediate goods produced. Vertical integration 
suggests diversifying the firm away from where it used to operate 
however, even though the new areas of operation may utilise 
previously developed skills and experience. To describe it as 
diversification therefore seems reasonable within this context and 
also within the concept of "risk reduction" as defined above.
Examples of confiete vertical integration (from raw materials to 
end users) are probably extremely rare since the skills involved 
at the extreme ends of the supply line are likely to be very 
different. Vertical integration on a large scale is therefore 
probably the prerogative of giant companies able to utilise the 
outputs of primary material plants while at the same time being 
able to sell final products to consumers on an equally large 
s cale.
Horizontal Diversification is used to describe the process whereby 
new products are introduced to the finrfs product portfolio within 
its current marketing expertise. Such developments might come 
about through 'in-house' R & D, licensing, or the purchase of 
other companies. While horizontal diversification into new product 
areas is likely to require changes in production technology these
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may be balanced by the similarity between the marketing operations 
required. In this case therefore, one factor in the product 
marketing mix is being held constant, as in the case of vertical 
integration or diversification.
Concentric Diversification can be defined as diversification where
the new area of operation is similar to the old in one or more ways,
for example through technology used, marketing methods etc.
Thus concentric diversification may include both horizontal and
vertical diversification in some cases. In such instances products
may be developed that are comparable with the original product
line. In this case concentric diversification parallels horizontal
diversification. Concentric diversification may also evolve from
(2 )
technical complementarity where, for exanple, the skills of two 
groups of engineers are merged to form the know-how required to 
develop into a new area of technology. Concentric diversification 
is also analogous to Utton's narrow spectrum diversification (which 
also embodies horizontal and vertical diversification.)
Conglomerate Diversification might be described as the most radical 
diversification strategy since in this case the products into which 
the firm is diversifying may bear little resemblance either in
1. Ansoff, H I  (C) Corporate Strategy. McGraw Hill 1965
2. Steiner, G A. 'Diversification Planning' in Corporate 
Strategy and Innovation, Ed. Rothberg, 19 76
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production/distribution or marketing terms to current product 
ranges. Conglomerate diversification is considered to be analogous 
to the 'broad spectrum' diversification of Utton.
While conglomerate diversification might be anticipated to be more 
difficult and problematical than concentric diversification and 
therefore less likely to be undertaken by firms, this does not 
always appear to be the case. A n s o f f s u g g e s t s  several reasons 
for this. Firstly, the company may have the broad policy objective 
of 'developing profitable opportunities', thus undertaking new 
business wherever this may be found. Secondly, the capabilities 
of the firm may be too highly specialised or too obsolete to make 
it possible to diversify vertically or horizontally into related 
fields. Thirdly, the finjs depth of conpetence may be too shallow 
to offer opportunities for synergy. Any diversification in these 
cases would therefore have to be of a conglomerate type. Fourthly, 
it might be a strategic decision by company management to enter 
entirely new fields of operation, not based upon current strengths.
The advantages of conglomerate diversification might be several. 
Firstly, the overall profitability and flexibility of the firm 
may be improved through acquisition or development of companies 
or products in industries which have better growth or profit 
characteristics than those of the acquiring firm. Secondly, the 
conglomerate firm may have potentially greater access to sources 
of finance because of its greater contacts and spread of
1. Ansoff, H I (A) op.cit
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activities and this may lead to a more stable earnings potential 
throughout. Thirdly, the 'robustness' of the firm may be
improved because of its greater spread of activities so that it 
may be better able to continue to grow when cyclical fluctuations 
in particular markets take place. It may be able therefore, to 
act to reinforce success in any one of a broader range of product 
areas than undiversified firms. Such firms may also be more 
likely to be exposed to a larger number of potentially profitable 
projects than undiversified firms. Despite its potential dangers, 
conglomerate diversification appears to be a growing method of 
development, particularly for larger firms.
4^ Review of- Definition of Diversification Types
While the previously quoted 'Ansoffian' terminology has been
adopted as a standard in many papers investigating and describing
diversification strategies over the past twenty years, it is
clear that its use and applicability in particular empirical studies
(2)
has been less useful. While it may be useful to describe
product/market developments in terms of concentric, conglomerate 
diversification etc. relating such terms to the actual experiences 
of companies in practice, may be problematical. The separate
1. Utton, M A (A) op.cit
2. An investigation of empirical studies of diversification is 
made in the second part of this chapter.
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concepts of 'narrow' and 'broad' spectrum diversification as 
suggested by U t t o n m a y  be more useful in these cases. Such 
terms encompass most product/market developments by companies 
without being particularly restrictive. The use of the portfolio 
concept of 'risk reduction' may also be helpful in analysing 
firms actions in developing diversification strategies.
A more practical approach to defining levels of diversification, 
possibly less prone to measurement problems, may be the use of the 
concept of market diversification rather than product diversification 
By defining closely the market(s) in which the firm is engaged, 
and measuring developments in and movements out of that market, a 
picture of the diversifying activities of that firm could be 
built up. This approach would appear to be inherently more 
objective than measuring product development and then endeavouring 
to define that development in terms of horizontal, vertical, 
concentric or conglomerate diversification.
5. Potential Advantages of Diversification Strategies
Successful diversification may be a particularly difficult process 
to carry out. However, the major advantages of successful 
diversification are suggested to be: first, a more 'robust' 
organisation possessing a greater range of skills and greater
1. Utton, M A (A) op.cit.
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growth potential. 'Robustness' in a company is suggested to 
describe the strength of that company in meeting and reacting to 
threats or changes in its environment. Thus the effect of a 
change in the structure of one of its markets might be less 
profound than would be the case if the organisation was concentrated 
in one field. 'Robustness' might protect the firm from external 
factors that might otherwise be very damaging to it. Such factors 
might include the effects of product liability legislation or a 
change in consumer preference for a product.
The second major advantage of a successful diversification policy 
is suggested to be the development of a greater range of skills 
such that the firm is in a better position to exploit new ideas 
when these arise. Such skills might allow the firm to make better 
use of 'bought in' technology through licensing or other methods.
A broadening of the skill base may also lead to a greater pool of 
available knowledge within the firm when any new project is 
proposed. This suggests that higher skill levels would allow more 
accurate evaluation of new opportunities.
Lastly, by being diversified, a company must possess greater 
growth potential than it would have if it were concentrated in one 
particular industrial sector or with one product range. By 
operating in a large number of markets, the diversified firm may 
have the opportunity to direct resources to support developments
1. Alternative strategies in obtaining new technology are also 
discussed in Chapter Five.
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in those market segments that are growing. The xandiversified 
firm may, however, be restricted to its current market segment, 
in which the growth potential may be low.
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c. A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIVERSIFICATION
1. Introduction
The published works on diversification can be broadly divided into 
the theoretical and the practical. Many authors in the 1950s and 
the early 1960s concentrated on the reasons why companies might 
diversify. In particular, A n s o f f a n d  Staudt^^^ identified 
and codified reasons why companies might wish to diversify. 
Suggested definitions and the way such diversificationary processes 
came about were explored above. While potential theoretical 
frameworks for diversification were thoroughly explored at this 
time, the number of authors exploring the data from a practical 
viewpoint was relatively small. Two major exceptions, however, 
concern the work of Gort ^ ^^  in the USA and Amey ^ ^^  in the UK.
1. Ansoff, H I (A) op.cit.
2. Ansoff, H I (B) Strategies for Diversification. Harvard
Business Review. Sept/Oct 1957
3. Ansoff, H I (C) 'Corporate Strategy'. McGraw Hill 1965
4. Staudt, T A 'Program for Product Diversification' Harvard
Business Review, Nov/Dec 1954
5. Gort, M. Diversification and Integration in American 
Industry. Princeton University Press, 1962.
6. Amey, L R. 'Diversified Manufacturing Businesses'
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. 1964 (A)
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More recently, the thrust of study into the extent and process
of diversification has swung more towards a practical exploration
of the scope and role of diversification in manufacturing industry.
Three major studies by Gorecki^^^ Hassid^^^ and U t t o n h a v e
been carried out over the last ten years. These works have been
complemented by several other probably less important studies, of
(4)which the work by Stubbs is probably the most useful.
The works by Gorecki, Hassid and Utton may be regarded^^^ as 
being of 'keynote' quality. Gorecki has concentrated on an inter­
industry analysis of diversification across the full size spectrum 
of companies to ascertain the effect, respectively, of technology, 
product differentiation, research and development, industry growth 
and concentration in determining the extent of diversification.
1. Gorecki, P K (A) An Inter-Industry Analysis of Diversification 
in the UK Manufacturing Sector, 1975^ Journal of Ind.Economics
2. Hassid, J (A) Recent Evidence on Conglomerate Diversification 
in UK Manufacturing Industry. Manchester School of 
Economic and Social Research, 1975
3. Utton, M A. (A) op.cit.
4. Stubbs, P C .  An Investigation of Diversification Patterns 
and Trends in UK Manufacturing Industry. SSRC Report 
December 1978
5. Devine, P J., Lee, N., Jones, R M and Tyson, W J. 'An 
Introduction to Industrial Economics' George Allen and 
Unwin, 1979.
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Hassids study concerned itself with measuring firms* rates of 
growth against degrees of diversification. Utton on the other 
hand in his study of large companies in the UK concentrated on 
the effects of diversification upon competition and in devising 
techniques whereby diversification could be measured. Using these 
measures, the extent of diversification in major industries was 
studied.
Most workers reviewed broadly agree that the level of
diversification in the UK economy as a whole is increasing.
The importance of this process appears to be increasingly recognised
as an important phenomenon worthy of more intensive study in the
future. However, gaps within the accepted knowledge of the extent
and process of diversification are still very great. One particular
weakness in the published evidence is a concentration of studies
of the large firm sector at the expense of medium sized and smaller
firms. Few studies appear to have been made of diversification
in the small firm sector per se. One of the major reasons for this
may be the paucity of published statistics which could be used to
measure diversification levels in small firms. Census of production 
(2)
figures classify enterprises into the industry which accounts 
for the largest proportion of their employment while identifying 
firms as 'specialised' or 'diversified'. 'Specialised' firms are 
defined as being active only in their primary industry, while
1. Devine, Lee, Jones and Tyson, op.cit
2. UK Census of Production
-128-
'diversified' firms are classified into their primary industry 
with the rider that they are ' active ' in other industries. The 
census figures do not differentiate between firms widely diversified 
or narrowly diversified.
The census figures, like those of the UK Business Statistics office 
industry statistics are based upon the 'plant' or unit of production. 
Diversification within plants is ignored. The effect this might 
have on measurement of diversification in small firms (often with 
only one 'plant') is explored in greater depth later in this chapter. 
Its effect may have led researchers within this field to concentrate 
their studies on the large firm sector, at the expense of the small.
2. Reasons for Diversification
Although, as suggested above, diversification may now be recognised 
as a widespread, and important phenomenon, attempts to measure the 
reasons for and scope of diversification by companies have been made 
infrequently. The most often cited reasons put forward to explain 
pressures to diversify have been "stability, profitability and 
growth, or some combination of these"
1. Devine, Lee, Jones and Tyson, op.cit,
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- stability
The potential vulnerability of a firm operating in one market to 
cyclical fluctuations within that market would indicate that a 
search for stability might be one of the major advantages of a 
decision to diversify. Measurement of this factor has however 
apparently proved difficult. The only study reported, was that 
of H a s s i d w h o  endeavoured to measure the change in rates of 
growth in 'diversified' and 'undiversified' enterprises (subject 
to the problem of census statistics described above). Hassid 
reported that there was no apparent relationship between the extent 
of diversification and profit stability for industries from which 
firms diversified (i.e. their primary industry). For industries 
into which firms diversified however, there appeared to be a 
positive correlation between diversification and profit stability. 
This would seem to indicate that diversification might be seen by 
companies as leading to stability. One method of achieving such 
stability would be to diversify into industries more stable than 
the firn/s primary industry and Hassid's results would tend to 
confirm that such movements do in fact take place.
- Profitability
While most of the empirical studies in diversification have 
endeavoured to measure the effect of diversification upon 
profitability, no concensus appears to have emerged. Indeed, the 
evidence is frequently conflicting. Growth cut of a sector in
1. Hassid, J (A) op.cit.
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which a firm has a large market share would appear, potentially to 
be more likely to lead to expansion and greater profits, than 
endeavouring to increase market share in a primary industry. Hassid 
found no relationship between profitability and diversification for 
industries from which firms had diversified and a negative relation­
ship between profitability and diversification for industries 
into which firms had diversified. Some evidence was reported, 
however, that diversified firms have a smaller spread of profitability 
between high and low profits, suggesting that diversification may 
help smooth variability of profits over time.
Growth
The desire for growth, suggested above as a possible major reason 
for diversification pressure has also been associated with 
diversification by several authors. The results of empirical tests 
however appear to have been, in the main, inconclusive. While 
Hassid found a strong positive correlation between growth and 
diversification^Amey^^^ found no tendency for more diversified 
firms to grow faster than undiversified ones.
3. Measuring Diversifications
The difficulties of accurately measuring 'diversification' have
1. Hassid, J (A) op.cit
2. Amey, L R. op.cit.
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already been discussed in previous sections. Firstly, what is 
meant by 'diversification'. Two meanings have been suggested by 
Devine et a l . Firstly, a measurement of the proportion of the 
firms involvement in activities outside its main activity (as used 
in C.O.P. figures). Secondly a measure of the number of industries 
in which the firm is active. However, both these measures are 
subject to serious objections. While the first gives an indication 
of the importance of non-primary activities, it suggests no measure 
of the range of those activities. The opposite problem occurs for 
the second method. A firm with five products of which one comprises 
eighty per cent of output is clearly diversified to a different 
extent than a firm with five products, each of which contributes 
twenty per cent of output. The second method outlined above could 
not differentiate between the two companies. Ideally both methods 
should be used in conjunction, but problems in the way available 
data is presented are suggested to make this impracticable.
A second major problem in measuring diversification lies in the 
nature of the available data. Major sources used for measuring 
diversification in the UK have been census of production figures 
and statistics compiled by the Department of Industry from 
individual firms. These latter figures are the basis for statistics 
issued in UK Business Monitors, etc. Such sources appear to be 
flawed in two ways. Firstly, the data collected for statistical 
purposes is limited in its public availability (for reasons of 
confidence the UK Department of Industry refuses to release certain
1. Devine, Lee, Jones and Tyson, op.cit.
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information) to a classification based upon the 'main activity' of 
each 'plant'. (A plant is defined as an establishment which could 
comprise a company with one factory, or a subsidiary factory of a 
group). Thus a company producing goods in the proportion 2X to lY 
in one plant would be classified under industry X. If the company 
had two plants producing X and Y in the same proportions, the 
plants would be separately classified in industries X and Y 
respectively. The implications of this method of data collection 
and presentation are particularly profound in the case of the 
small company which, because of its size,is more likely to possess 
only one plant, however diversified its products may be. Thus the 
number of plants imposes a maximum figure on the level of 
diversification that can be measured. The more plants a firm 
possesses, the greater its apparent degree of diversification 
(depending on how the output of each of those plants is classified 
and the classification used). Since the numbers of plants as 
suggested above is likely to be connected to the size of the firm, 
size and diversification may appear linked, with diversity varying 
on the basis of the output classification. This factor might 
partly explain the inconclusive results found by researchers in 
this field when trying to correlate diversity with profitability, 
growth etc. While some researchers have recognised that the plant 
is probably not the most suitable basis for measuring diversity, 
little weight has been given to this. G o r e c k i h o w e v e r ,  suggests
1. Gorecki, P K (B). 'A Problem of Management, from Plants to 
Enterprises in the Analysis of Diversification' A Note. 
Journal of Industrial Economics, March 1980
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that census techniques "typically understate the degree of enterprise 
diversification", so the problem does appear to have been recognised 
in this instance.
A second flaw in the sources of diversification statistics may lie 
in the variation in the way levels of aggregation have been used, 
i.e. the number of groups of 'industries' used to classify activities. 
Since "measurement of the extent of enterprise diversification 
depends crucially on the level of aggregation used"^^^ this may 
lead to problems in analysing the trend of diversification. 
Disaggregation to a large(r) number of product groups is likely 
to lead to an apparently larger degree of diversification than 
if only a small number of groups is used. An emphasis on product 
rather than market classification might also tend to lead to a 
greater apparent degree of diversity. Problems of measurement, may, 
therefore, make it difficult to come to definitive conclusions 
regarding diversification. They may also lead to problems in 
comparing the results of different empirical studies with each 
other.
Of the techniques used by researchers to measure diversity in 
practice, that used by U t t o n i s  probably the most widely 
accepted. To a degree,Uttons technique overcomes the measurement 
problem described above. Utton bases his measure on the 'enterprise 
cumulative diversification curve' as described below.








Industries in which firm is active (ranked in importance)
The analysis used by Utton is based upon an area measurement 
defined as twice the area above the 'diversification' curve and 
can be expressed as ^
W = 2 - 1
i=l
Where Pi is the proportion of the firm's activity in the ith 
industry and i is the number of industries in which the firm is 
active. w is therefore a weighted average index where a score 
of 1 will occur for a firm completely specialised (i.e. in one 
industry) and where a score of (say) 5 is equivalent to that firm 's 
operating equally in five different industries (although it might 
be operating in many more), but with a very small percentage of 
output in each. However, the objection noted above, namely that 
the data used was based on 'plant' statistics^still applies.
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G o r e c k i a s  noted above, studied this problem by attempting to 
measure the accuracy of 'plant' data as a reflection of the 
enterprise^ actual output. His conclusions implied that "enterprise 
diversification measures released by census authorities typically 
understate the degree of enterprise diversification". The method 
of presenting data from government sources had a large effect on 
the accuracy of the results, with particular weight being given to 
variability introduced by disaggregating output to a greater number 
of product groups. At all levels of aggregation, shortcomings in 
actual compared to predicted values were seen. More accurate 
measures of output than 'plant' statistics would therefore seem 
necessary before any fully acceptable measures of diversification 
can be made.
4. The Extent of Diversification
While the problems associated with the available data have been 
explored above, there would seem to be no reason to doubt the 
accuracy of the data at a purely 'plant' level. The census 
classification of 'specialised' or 'diversified' conpanies on 
the basis of their employment in particular industries may 
therefore be a valid measure, particularly for those larger 
companies operating a number of plants. The analysis of the 
census figures over time has however, once again, led to unclear 
results.
1. Gorecki, P K (B) op.cit.
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Hassid^^^ and Amey  ^ using data for 1958, 1963 and 1968 found 
the following results:
TABLE 3.1
Percentage ratio of secondary to total output: average for 
UK manufacturing industry_____________________________________






The table suggests no clear trend in the degree of diversification 
over time for UK Manufacturing Industry. However, between 1958 
and 1968 the basis upon which statistics were collected was 
changed, and if this is taken into a c c o u n t i t  does appear that 
the level of diversification is increasing over time. In view of 
the problems mentioned above, however, drawing conclusions from 
these figures would probably be unwise.
1. Hassid, J (B) Diversification and the Firmes Rate of 
Growth. Manchester School of Economic & Social Research, 1976
2. Amey, L R. op.cit
3. Devine, Lee, Jones and Tyson, op.cit.
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The study by U t t o n u s i n g  unpublished data provided by the UK 
Business Statistics Office may be the most detailed investigation 
carried out to measure the extent of diversification in the UK. 
Utton carried out studies into the diversity of the largest 200 
UK manufacturing firms. While the statistics he used are subject 
to the objections noted above, particularly with reference to the 
use of the 'plant' as the basic unit, this factor may not be so 
inç)ortant in the case of large firms, since it might be anticipated 
that large firms would be more likely to carry out separate 
activities in separate plants. Utton's main finding was that the 
average share of total employment accounted for by the 200 firms* 
primary activity was 57% and the average for the three largest 
industries was 80%.
Coal and chemicals, textiles, metal manufacturing and electrical 
engineering were found to be highly diversified while vehicles, 
instrument engineering and shipbuilding were found not to be so 
diversified. However, it would probably be unwise to regard these 
results as conclusive since "there is reason to suppose that in 
the first three groups above, some of the secondary industries
(2)
represented vertical integration rather than diversification."
The measure of diversification used probably affects the final 
result. While H a s s i d f o u n d  the metal manufacture and coal and
1. Utton, M A (B) 'Diversification and Competition'. 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 
Economic Journal, August 1978
2. Devine, Lee, Tuson and Jones, op.cit
3. Hassid, J. (B) op.cit.
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petroleum products groups as being highly diversified, he 
disagreed with Utton in finding electrical instrument engineering 
to have approximately the Scune degree of diversification. This 
conflicts with Utton's evidence where these industries were placed 
at opposite ends of the diversification spectrum.
The most recent 'in-depth' study of UK manufacturing diversification 
reviewed as part of this study, was made in 1978 by Stubbs who, 
once again used data supplied by the UK Business Statistics Office. 
His major findings were that diversification appears to be 
increasing, with an orientation towards growth rather than 
increasing profits, in both the 'broad' and 'narrow' spectrum sense.
In conclusion diversification appears to be an increasingly
(2)
important factor in UK manufacturing industry . Nearly all 
writers however equate size and diversity either explicitly or 
implicitly. This connection may be true for larger companies; 
there appears to be little published material available reporting 
the diversity of medium and small companies.
5. Large Company Diversification
From the studies that have been carried out into diversification, 
it does appear that, at least at the level of medium to large
1. Stubbs, P C., op.cit
2. Although the apparently growing numbers of management buyouts 
and divestments in the 1984/85 period suggests that further 
empirical work on changes in diversification levels over this 
period would be useful.
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companies, size and degree of diversification are related. Both 
Gort^^^ in the USA and A m e y i n  the UK found this relationship, 
Utton's study of the largest 200 UK manufacturing firms showed a 
clear relationship as shown in the table below.
TABLE 3.2
Diversification and size among the 200 largest manufacturing 







1 - 50 3.85 14.29 1.00
51 - lOO 3.33 16.67 1.00
101 - 150 2.94 12.50 1.00
151 - 200 2.63 8.33 1.00
1 - 200 3.23 16.67 1.00
* Note - Measure of diversity used is the 'W index where W 
equals the degree of diversity on the scale of W = 1 for 
undiversified enterprise to W = n for enterprise diversified 
into n industries. (equally) (3)
The results reported by Utton are, in general, confirmed by the
(4)
work of Hassid who found that "the average ratio of primary to 
secondary employment increased systematically with size to a
1. Gort, M , op.ci t 
2 . Amey, L R . op. ci t
3. Utton, M A. (A/B) op.cit.
4. Hassid, J. (B) op.cit
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maximum of 22% in firms with over 5000 employees." There appears 
to be, therefore, a degree of agreement that diversification 
increases with firm size, particularly in the case of the larger 
firms.
6. Small Firm Diversification
There appears to be a paucity of papers exploring the levels of
small firm diversification. Nearly all the studies that have been
carried out into diversification appear either to ignore small
firm diversification altogether (for example, by taking a sample
of companies excluding small firms), or analyse their degree of
diversification in the same way as for large firms. It has already
been noted that the data used in most studies appears to be based
on 'major activity at plant level', thereby "ignoring any
(?-)
diversification within the plant". (Utton) It would probably
be unwise therefore, to come to any conclusions regarding the 
degree of diversification in small firms. The stu<^ reported below 
endeavours to explore this area taking into account the Bolton 
Committee Findings that the average number of 'plants' per
small enterprise in manufacturing UK industry is 1.3 (UK) and
1.5 (US).
1. Bolton, J E 'Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Small 
Firms. HMSO Cmnd 4811, 1971
2. Utton, M A (A) op.cit.
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7. Factors Explaining Diversification
Three major factors that have been suggested as being potentially 
correlated with degree of diversity in manufacturing industry 
have been cited as advanced technology, size and industry. 
'Advanced technology' is defined as areas where the R & D to sales 
ratio is high, the numbers of scientists/researchers is high etc. 
Such factors have consistently been related to the degree of 
diversification. Amey and Hassid^^ ^^  found, using the
census statistics for 1963 and 1968 that between one fifth and 
two thirds of all the variation in the extent of diversification 
could be 'explained' by variations in the number of technical 
personnel. One interesting conclusion of Hassid's work may be 
the implication that an increase of 10% in the employment of 
scientific manpower is associated with an increase of 3-4% in 
the index of diversification. This might suggest that there are 
more opportunities in science based industries for diversification 
and that firms with high R ^ D capabilities may be in a better 
position to exploit those opportunities than firms without such 
capabilities. Utton^^^ codified this relationship as "an 
increasing importance attached to R & D is likely to bring with 
it an increase in diversification". Utton sees the diverse 
company as being better able to exploit any 'breakthrough ' in 
R & D which may or may not be in the original research area.
1. Amey, L R. op.cit.
2. Hassid, J. (B) op.cit.
3. Utton, M A. (A) op.cit
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Clearly, a wider range of products already being sold increases 
the chance that the new product will, potentially, fit into the 
product line, and hence will be absorbed into the firms product 
portfolio rather than be shelved or sold to another firm under a 
licence or other agreement.
A relationship between size and diversification has already been 
noted. However, size may not always be a good guide to the 
degree of diversity. As Utton points out in his study, even in 
the largest companies within each group there was always at least 
one firm that operated only within one (three digit) industry. 
Growth to giant size may therefore not always correspondingly 
result in the development of diversified activities. Subject to 
the reservations expressed in the previous section however, size 
would appear to be a useful pointer to diversity.
The industry in which companies operate is probably related to 
the degree of diversification. This subject has been explored 
above. However, the results reported are to a degree ambiguous 
in that different researchers classify different industries as 
diverse and undiverse. Clearly however, some industries are more 
diverse than others, with general agreement amongst workers 
that coal and chemicals and metal manufacture are subject to 
more diversification than other sectors. This may be related to 
diversification opportunities being more readily available in 
industries close to these sectors.
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D. A STUDY OF SMALL FIRM DIVERSIFICATION
1. Background
The diversification alternatives open to small firms may differ in 
scale and type from those opportunities open to the larger 
c o m p a n i e s . T h e  number of products sold by the small company 
may be less than for larger companies, and in this sense the small 
firm may be starting from a less diversified base than some larger 
companies. Small companies markets may also be more concentrated 
(even if in diverse industries) than in the case of the larger 
firms. Within such concentrated markets however, smaller firms may 
be specialised (with one small market niche in which they have a 
relatively large market share), or be operating in conditions of 
high competition (with extremely small market shares).
Dependence on a small number of products may make the small firm 
more likely than its medium or large sized competitors to consider 
diversification. Small market niches are likely to have a 
relatively low potential for growth and may be prone to cyclical 
changes in demand. Such movements might be anticipated to make 
the firm consider diversifying into new products/markets.
Pressures on those small firms in the more competitive markets 
may be conditioned by a desire to specialise, or to enter other 
markets of a similar type to those in which they already operate, 
in order to grow.
1. Mason, R S. 'Product Diversification and the Small Firm' 
Journal of Business Policy, Vol.3, No.3, 1973
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Since the smaller firm may have less resources to devote to new 
product development than larger firms, the risks of broad 
spectrum diversification are likely to be greater for the small 
than the large firm and this might be expected to lead to pressure 
to diversify into activities close to present areas of competence^^^ 
Thus in view of the risks involved,the most viable diversification 
alternatives open to the small firm might be expected to be of low 
capital intensity and in areas reasonably close to its competence 
either in production or marketing terms. Large capital intensive 
projects would clearly be inappropriate for such firms in any 
diversification strategy. Entry by the small firm into new markets 
might therefore be expected to be on a small scale and to be of 
low cost in most cases.
It may be inappropriate to apply the concepts of vertical,
horizontal, concentric and conglomerate diversification too closely
to the diversification activities of small firms. For a small
firm considering taking on a new product to complement its current
single product line, any new product would be a 'diversification'.
In terms of the product choices made by small companies wishing
to diversify. M a s o n s u g g e s t s  the factors in the table below
as the new product performance criteria that small firms should
consider. These are compared to the same criteria as viewed from
(2)
the large company viewpoint. Brioni defines such comparisons 
as "the product scope of interest".
1. Mason, R S. op cit
2. Brioni, J M. 'Corporate Market Planning'. Wiley Marketing 
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The criteria upon which a small company might decide to adopt a 
new product may also be different from those of the larger firm, 
and the table suggests alternatives for this. W e b s t e r r e l a t e s  
such new product analysis by means of criteria to a suggestion 
that small supply or production oriented firms desiring growth 
through product diversification should consider first the 
adoption of product imitation as a strategy, followed by new 
product development, vertical and then horizontal acquisition.
In common with many writers in 'diversification', however, Webster 
does not attempt to relate his model to empirical data and any 
conclusions based on the model must therefore be somewhat tentative
There is little empirical evidence to define the methods, successes 
and failures of small firms in developing diversification strategies. 
It is an intention of the following study to explore such strategies 
with the objective of both measuring and endeavouring to explain 
the levels of diversification in a sample of small firms.
2. The Small Firm Study
It has already been hypothesised that small firms may be able to 
diversify more easily than large sized firms in certain instances. 
However, to investigate the levels of diversification in small
1. Webster, F A. 'A Product Diversification Growth Model' 
American Journal of Small Business, April 1977
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firms it was necessary to collect empirical data on which an 
analysis could be carried out. The problems of utilising 
governmental statistical data have already been described. It 
was clear therefore that these sources would not be suitable for 
an analysis of small firm diversification. A more direct method 
of collecting data was therefore employed to attempt to answer 
the following questions.
(i) What is the extent of diversification in small and 
medium sized companies?
(ii) Is size correlated with diversification in the 
small/medium size firm sector?
(iii) Are diversified and non-diversified small firms 
concentrated into different industries?
(ivj What factors appear to be related to diversification 
in small/medium sized firms?
3. Method - Data Collection
Five hundred randomly chosen small (10-200 employees) and medium 
(201-1000 employees) sized companies were analysed for their 
degree of diversification by their product classification in the 
reference book 'Kompass'^^^ which classifies more than
1. Although the 'KOMPASS' data provided a potentially large sample 
for the study, the following data déficiences were recognised. 
First, that the sample was 'self selected' (since entry in 
the reference book is by subscription) and second that not 
every company entry was updated every year. This might suggest 
that the most 'entrepreneurial' companies would be relatively 
overpresented in the sample.
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thirty six thousand UK companies by product group and geographical 
location. Within Kompass, product/industrial group classification 
is into one of thirty headings. When sectors such as Business and 
Professional Services, Banking Finance, etc. are excluded, a total 
of twenty two industrial groups remain. These groups comprised 
the basis of the diversification measure used in this study. A 
further sample of 50 large companies, (1000+ employees) obtained 
by reference to 'The Times 1000' companies, was analysed in the 
same way, to complement the main sample.
Each sample company was chosen within the following parameters :
(a) That the company was independent, i.e. not owned by another 
company or part of a larger group
(b) That it had no more than lOOO employees (for the main sample)
The large companies, chosen on the basis of the Times list of lOOO 
largest companies were selected as follows. Each twentieth company 
within the list was included in the sample to give a spread from 
giant to medium size. Where a con^any was not involved in 
manufacturing industry, the next company on the list was included 
in the sample. The entire spectrum of company size was covered 
within a total sample of five hundred and sixty nine companies.
For each company the following information was collected:
(a) The number of employees
(b) The number of product groups into which it was classified
(c) The actual product groups into which it was classified
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Since the product group classifications in 'Kompass' relates to 
actual products produced by the companies and listed in the same 
publication it is considered that this data should be extremely 
accurate. However, in terms of its statistical usage it is 
recognised that the measurement was of numbers of industries into 
which each company was classified. No measure was made of the 
relative importance of each product or product group to the 
company in terms of percentage of output etc.
4. Data Presentation
The objectives of this part of the investigation, as noted above, 
comprised two major themes. Firstly, to discover the relationship, 
if any, between the size of companies (measured by the number of 
product groups in which they were operating), The second objective 
of the investigation was to discover if diversified and non­
diversified firms were concentrated into particular industries.
The data presented in Appendices 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 relates to the 
first objective while that in Appendix 3.4 relates to the second.
- Appendix 3.1 - Companies classified by size
This appendix comprises a breakdown of the sample of 
569 companies by size (number of employees)
Appendix 3.2 - Companies by size/product group 
This appendix classifies the sample group into numbers 
of companies operating in 1,2,3,4,5,6, and 7+ product 
groups, i.e. l e a s t  ^ most diversified
-150-
Appendix 3.3 - Companies - percentages/product groups 
This appendix classifies the sample in the same way as 
appendix 3.2 but breaks the numbers down in terms of 
percentages of companies at the different size ranges 
operating in 1,2,3 etc. product groups 
Appendix 3.4 - Companies in 1 and 4+ product groups 
This appendix extracts from the main sample those 
companies operating in only one and more than four 
product groups and classifies them by number and 
product group.
The data presented in these appendices is the basis for the
analyses and tabulations carried out below.
5. Data Analysis and Results
A. Diversification and Company Size
The data presented in Appendix 3.2 was first plotted to give a 
visual impression of the differentiation of company size by number 
of product groups in which firms were operating. The large spread 
of company size in the sanple, from very small to giant company 
necessitated plotting the data on a logarithmic scale. This is 
presented in Figure 3.4 below.
Initial examination of the data showed that for all size ranges 
there were a large number of companies that were not diversified.
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Figure 3.5 Percentage in 3+ Product Groups
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2+ GROUPS - PERCENTAGE vs. NOS. EMPLOYEES
the regression equation is
y = - 284, + 201. x1 - 38. 2 x2
+ 2.31 x3
st. dev. t-ratio =
column coeff icient of coef. coef/s.d.
- -284. 112. -2.53
x1 c3 201.2 61.0 3.30
x2 c4 -38.2 10.6 -3.59
x3 c5 2.310 0.595 3.88
the st. dev. of y about regression line is
s = 14.3
with ( 39- 4) = 35 degrees of freedom
r-squared = 42.4 percent
r-squared = 37.5 percent, adjusted for d.f.
analysis of variance
due to df ss ms=ss/df
regression 3 5267. 1756.
residual 35 7151. 204.
total 38 12417.
further analysis of variance
ss explained by each variable when entered in the order given





Xl y pred. y st.dev.
row c3 c2 value pred. y residual st.res.
1 3.00 28.0 37.5 10.7 -9.5 -1.01 X
2 3.40 39.0 48.7 6.7 -9.7 -0.77 X
26 5.83 0.0 47.0 2.9 -47.0 -3.36r
38 8.29 84.0 72.2 7.0 11.8 0.95 X
39 8.99 95.0 112.4 12.6 -17.4 -2.58rx
r denotes an obs. with a large st. res.
X denotes an obs. whose x value gives it large influence.
XI = log number of employees Log x
X2 = log number of employees squared (log x) ^
X3 = log number of employees cubed (log x) ^
Y " Percentage of firms operating in 2 or more product groups
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3+ GROUPS - PERCENTAGE vs. NOS. EMPLOYEES
the regression equation is 


























the st. dev. of y about regression line is 
s - 14.8
with ( 39- 4) = 35 degrees of freedom
r-squared = 46.5 percent
r-squared = 41.9 percent, adjusted for d.f.
analysis of variance
due to df ss ms=ss/df
regression 3 6633. 2211.
residual 35 7646. 218.
total 38 14279.
further analysis of variance
















xl y pred. y st.dev.
row c3 c2 value pred. y residual st.res.
1 3.00 11.0 16.8 11.1 -5.8 -0.59 X
2 3.40 13.0 24.9 7.0 -11.9 -0.92 X
35 6.91 57.0 23:2 4.8 33.8 2.42r
38 8.29 68.0 58.2 7.2 9.8 0.76 X
39 8.99 81.0 99.2 13.0 -18.2 -2.61rx
r  denotes an obs. with a large st. res •
X denotes an obs. whose X value gives it large influence.
Note
XI = log number of employees Log x
X2 = (log number of employees) squared (log x) ^
X3 = (log number of employees) cubed (log x) ^
Y = Percentage of firms operating in 3 or more product groups
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However, this tended to obscure the fact that in particular size 
ranges the number of firms that were highly diversified varied 
substantially. It was considered that statistical analysis of 
the data would be obscured by the degree of 'noise', i.e. the 
random dispersion of non-diversified companies over all size 
ranges. Consequently it was considered that a more meaningful 
evaluation could be achieved by creating a statistic from the 
data taking account of this factor. By looking at the proportion 
of diversified firms (2 or more product groups, 3 or more product 
groups) existing in different size categories, it was possible to 
overcome this problem.
A problem with the way in which data is collected and aggregated 
(by Kompass) is that firms are classified to particular size groups 
(to the nearest ten employees for example). This leads to apparent 
peaks and troughs as can be seen in Appendix 3.3. Consequently it 
was necessary to use moving averages over two size intervals to 
remove fluctuations and more closely show the trend line. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Appendix 3.5 and plotted 
as Figures 3.5 and 3.6 below.
Interpretation of Results
Numbers of companies operating in 2+ and 3+ product groups and 
comprising the data in Appendix 3.5 were regressed against company 
size. Results of this analysis are prsented in Tables 3.4 and
3.5 below. As mentioned above, the key paramenters of regression 
equations are
(a) the coefficients of determination r^ (or corrected for degrees 
_2
of freedom r )
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(b) The coefficients of independent variables and the degree of 
confidence that we have that these are good predictors of the 
shape of the regression line, i.e. the respective t ratios 
(coefficients divided by their standard errors)
(c) Analysis of variance due to regression residuals, comprising 
the sums of squares of deviations.
The regression equation in cubic form gives a good explanation of 
the relationship between firm size (measured by numbers of employees) 
and the degree of diversification (measured by the proportions of 
firms operating in two or more and three or more product groups). 
Indeed the t ratios of the coefficients and the analysis of 
variance all yield very similar results at both 2+ and 3+ product 
group points. It is also significant to note that there is a better 
fit at the 3+ level than at the 2+ level. This is considered to 
be important because it seems reasonable that operation by firms 
in 3 or more product groups represents a commitment to much 
greater diversification than operation in two or more product 
groups.
- 2
If the coefficient of determination, in this case r , is looked 
at, it can be seen that in both 2+ and 3+ cases, over 41% of the 
variation in the dependent variable (degree of diversification) 
can be explained by the size variables (numbers of employees).
The cubic form was found to give significantly better results 
than either the quadratic or the quartic form of the equation.
The increase in the coefficient of determination is not badly 
affected by the reduction in numbers of degrees of freedom occuring 
through the use of more independent variables.
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However the coefficient of determination could have been affected
by problems of multi colline arity. In this case, since the
independent variables are based on the same statistic some degree
of multi colline arity must be expected. This could increase the 
- 2
value of r even though movements in the independent variables 
were not good as explanations of the degree of variability in the 
dependent variable. However, in this case it can be seen that the 
t ratios are all in excess of + 1.96 and are also of the same sign 
This would indicate that multicoULnearity is not a serious problem 
here and has not artificially increased the coefficient of 
determination. An analysis of variance would also reinforce the 
hypothesis that the degree of variability of the data outside the 
predicted regression plane is relatively low.
Further analysis of the observations where the predicted and 
actual values are very different appears for the most part to be 
due to inperfections in the way the data was collected. As noted 
above, the Kompass data presentation rounds the statistic 
'number of employees' to the nearest ten, with, in some cases 
further rounding to a larger value. This inevitably leads to a 
certain degree of distortion with numbers of companies 'grouped' 
into particular size bands.
In conclusion, the results presented here lead to the conclusion 
that the relationship between size and diversification very 
broadly fits : the cubic form. The requisite regression parameters 
can be seen to be all consistent and stable.
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B. Product Groups - Least and Most Diversified Firms
The objective of analysing product groups containing least and 
most diversified firms as described above was to define the 
industries, if any, where diversification appeared to be 
particularly prevalent and those in which it did not appear 
prevalent. The results of the analysis are presented in Appendix 
3.4 in which the conpanies are classified by the product groups 
in which they are active.
The data in Appendix 3.4 was plotted as the histogram below. Those 
industries in which more than five per cent of the sample were 
active were then tabulated as Table 3.6.
TABLE 3 .6
Undiversified Groups
(Konpass Product Group 
Classification)
Diversified Groups
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From these groupings, three types of industries can be identified:
(i) Type A which includes product Groups 23,24 and 34 where 
there are :-
Low numbers of diversifiers 
High numbers of nonrdiversifiers
(ii) Type B which includes product groups 30,35, 37 and 40 
where there are:-
High numbers of diversifiers 
High numbers of non-diversifiers
(iii) Type C which includes product groups 38 and 39 where 
the re are : -
High numbers of diversifiers 
Low numbers of non-diversifiers
The product groupings are shown in Table 3.7
The three types of industries A,B and C can be analysed in 
several ways. Firstly, in terms of industry age, there would 
appear to be a correlation between Type A groups and age. All 
the groups in this type belong to the relatively 'old' 
technologies with a long history and where the pace of 






24 - Footwear and Clothing
35 - Basic Metals
Type B
Groups
30 - Rubber & Plastics
35 - Métal Products
37 - Electrics and Electronics
40 - Machinery and Equipment
Type C Groups j 38 - Transport Equipment
39 - Scientific and
Industrial Instruments
Type B contains industries which combine both new and 
traditional aspects, i.e. they span a wide age spectrum. The 
groups 'Machinery and Equipment' and 'Metal Products' which 
accounted for the largest individual percentages in both 
diversified and undiversified groups cover a particularly wide 
range.
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Type C, covering transport and scientific and industrial 
equipment covers both Aerospace and the Car Industry, i.e. both 
'new' and 'mature' industries, making aggregation more complex 
to analyse. However it is clear that both groups within the type 
are 'young' industries in conç>arison with type A.
By comparing the three types of industries with the intensity of
Research and Development carried out, it is clear that there is a
relationship between research intensity and diversification.
While the industries in the first group have low research intensity
the industries in the second and third groups have a much higher
intensity. This would indicate that diversification and research
intensity are correlated, and supports the results reported by
Amey ^ in his study of the 1958 census of production figures and
(2)
Hassid in his study of the 1963 and 1968 figures. These 
researchers found that between one fifth and two thirds of the 
variation in the extent of diversification as measured by the ratio 
of secondary to total output could be 'explained' by variation 
in the technical personal ratio as suggested above.
Table 3.8 sets out the industry groupings by Research and 
Development expenditure.
1. Amey, L R. op.cit
2. Hassid, J. (B). op.cit
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TABLE 3.8




R&D as % 
of Sales ( 2)
23 Textiles 0. 39
I 24 Footwear &
Clothing 0.04
34 Basic Metals 0. 4 ( 3)
30 Rubber and Plastics 1.31 ( 4)
II 35 Metal Products 0.27
37 E le Ctrlcs/Ele ctroni cs 3. 80
40 Machinery & Equipment 0.87
38 Transport 3.56 ( 5)
III 39 Scientific and
Industrial Instruments 1.58
1 Excludes Government funded R & D throughout
Notes : 2 Figures from Business Monitor MO14 1978
3 Combines Ferrous/Non Ferrous Metals
4 Includes man made/synthetic rubbers and plastics
5 Includes Aerospace and Vehicles
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6. Postulations Based on the Results
The results suggest that there a correlation between company 
size and the number of product groups in which individual firms 
operate. While the result tends to confirm on a macro scale 
(i.e. to 10,000 plus eicployee firms) that diversification 
increases with size, it also suggests that small companies between 
80 and 200 employees show a relatively high degree of diversification 
as compared to both very small (less than 80 employees) and medium 
sized (200 - 1000 employees) companies. This would tend to support 
the theory suggested above that small firms may find it more easy 
to enter and leave markets in a flexible way, than larger firms 
which may have a greater investment in plant, machinery, stocks 
etc. If this proposal is correct it would tend to suggest that 
as company size increases (over, say, 150 enployees), the degree 
of diversification may fall off. The study may, therefore also 
reflect the life history of the 'average' company (or aggregated 
company) . This could be explained in terms of the plotted data 
on the graph (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7
Dive rs i f i cati on
Size (Time)
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In Section A, the company might start life as the result of 
entrepreneurial activities in one specific product, developing 
by diversification into new markets at an early stage. The costs 
of entering or leaving a market may be low at this stage since 
the scale of activities may be small and resources can probably 
be switched fairly rapidly from product to product, market to 
market. Investment in plant/machinery etc may be small and the 
success of the firm may depend more on marketing than production 
skills.
In Section B, the expansionary process (in terms of the number of 
product areas into which the firm has diversified) ceases as the 
skills and areas in which the firm is most successful become apparent. 
Technology licensing might be used at this point to increase the 
number of products in the area in which the firm intends to 
concentrate. Flexibility offered by this and other methods of 
product introduction may be iirportant factors in the firms 
concentration into particular product areas. At the same time, 
those of the diversified activities which have become peripheral 
may be dropped, while concentration on main activities continues 
and intensifies. The number of product groups in which the 
company is operating, falls, leading to the situation at ' C .
In Section C which includes companies with more than 200 but less 
than lOOO employees, the capital intensiveness of the firm may 
increase as compared with its previous level. Each activity may 
account for a large proportion of the total activity of the firm.
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Heavy investment in plant/machinery, training etc. may lead to 
a reluctance to enter new markets since the cost of obtaining a 
'worthwhile' market share (synonymous with the share in the 
primary product group) may be high. As size increases, however, 
and market shares grow, further pressures to diversify may appear 
again from two directions. Firstly, further expansion within the 
market may become more difficult and secondly the ability of the 
company to raise funds may be enhanced (due to its greater size 6tc) 
At this point the diversification process may become more simple 
due to the firm's ability to buy whole ranges of products (as viable 
companies) rather than having to develop them 'in-house'. The 
' costs ' to the company^ in management time, of purchasing a company 
may be relatively small, since the purchase will also transfer the 
purchased conpan.y's management to the purchasing company.
In Section D, the process described above may continue until at 
the end of the scale giant conglomerate companies are effectively 
operating as investors, rather than managers, with companies as 
the basic investment unit. This 'portfolio' effect was discussed 
above and can be seen in the case of some multinational firms 
where the parent company exercises financial rather than managerial 
control over operating units. The behaviour of the company at 
this stage may be likened to that of an investor who has diversified 
away as far as possible his unsystematic risk (i.e. that of 
concentration on one market(s)) leaving only the systematic risk 
(i.e. that of the failure of the whole system) . (Figure 3.8) .
1. Weston, J F and Brighams, E F. op.cit.
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Figure 3.8





Number of securities/companies/products 
in portfolio
Sburce; Weston and Brighams op.cit
The diagram would suggest that further diversification beyond a 
certain point, in terms of numbers of products in a particular 
group, or total numbers of industries in which the firm is 
operating, will not further reduce risk levels. Too great a 
spread of activities may actually increase risk because of the 
lack of central or 'core' activities in which the firm is 
particularly skilled. The portfolio effect may well be important 
in reducing both the systematic and non-systematic risks that 
the company is running. From this point of view a varied portfolio 
of products would be an advantage. Within this product or 
'activity' portfolio, methods of gauging the risks of new projects 
will also be relevant. This may be particularly important in the 
case of diversification. It is suggested that for each project.
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the risk/return equations, i.e. (greater risk - greater return) can 
be sub-divided into three types of risk. These can be defined as 
Research and Development, Production and Marketing Risk.
Briefly, the Research and Development risk-return line can be 
defined as a spectrum running from the low risk low potential 
return of 'applied' research such as product improvement, to the 
high risk high potential return of 'pure' research. Likewise, the 
Production risk return line can be defined as covering the spectrum 
from the present production competence of the firm, to areas where 
it has no skill and where production techniques are more complex 
than its present skill. The marketing risk-return line differs 
from the other two categories in that it may be more difficult to 
measure. The risk return line in this case can be defined as 
covering the range between the firms present marketing competence 
and very different goods in different markets.
An analysis and study of risk under the three headings above 
comprises a separate section of this thesis.
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E. CONCLUSIONS TO CHAPTER 3
The objectives of this chapter were to describe the theoretical 
framework for diversification, to review the existing studies that 
had been carried out into diversification, to identify those areas 
which had been adequately covered by researchers and to identify 
those other areas where tlie diversification process was not fully 
understood. The review suggested that there may be more work 
necessary before the complex nature and full scope of diversification 
in UK manufacturing industry is fully understood. It was clear that 
those researchers who had carried out work in the field had often 
been forced to use non-primary data in their studies. This had 
led to conflicting results being reported by different authors. The 
review also indicated a gap in diversification studies, namely, the 
small and medium sized firm sector. Few references to empirical 
work on the extent of diversification in small firms was found.
The study carried out during the investigation into small firms 
diversification suggested an apparent correlation between company 
size, as measured by numbers of employees and diversification 
measured by product groups in which the firms were operating.
The relationship took the form of an S shaped curve rather than 
a linear relationship between size and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . T h e  
S shaped curve could be divided into four sectors. Small firms.
1. This result was also suggested by Hankinson, A. 'Investment 
Behaviour of smaller manufacturing companies' Unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis, Bath University, 1977
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where the proportion of those diversified firms was rapidly 
increasing, small to medium sized firms where the proportion 
stabilised and began to decrease, medium to large firms where the 
proportion fell then began to rise and lastly large firms where the 
proportion of diversified firms increased to one hundred per cent.
'ihe suggested relationship between size and degree of diversification 
may be inportant in that it does not wholly confirm the work of 
earlier researchers in the field. While they found a direct 
relationship between increasing size and increasing diversity, these 
results would suggest that the relationship may be more complex.
Further analysis of the collected data indicated that diversification 
was more prevalent in small companies in certain industries, than 
in others. The figures suggested that a high research intensity 
provided a good guide to those industries in which diversification 
was likely to be inportant. While the scope of the study was not 
large it is suggested that the reported results may be important in 
a greater understanding of the degree to which (small) firms 
diversify.
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NUMBERS OF FIRMS MAKING UP SAMPLE
Numbers Company Size Numbers
of Firms (Employees) of Firms
12 241 - 260 12
42 261 - 280 3
45 281 - 300 10
24 301 - 320 1
40 321 - 340 0
25 341 - 360 16
10 361 - 380 7
16 381 - 400 6
12 401 - 500 16
31 501 - 600 7
9 601 - 700 8
16 701 - 800 9
13 801 - 900 0
13 901 - 1000 7
28 1001 - 1500 8
13 1501 - 2000 13
9 2001 - 4000 12
15 4001 - 8000 10











FIRMS CLASSIFIED BY NUMBERS OF PRODUCT GROUPS IN
WHICH THEY OPERATE
Total
Employees 1 Gp 2 Gp 3 Gp 4 Gp 5 Gp 6 Gp 7 Gp+ Firms
0 - 10 10 2 12
11 - 20 29 7 4 2 - - - 42
21 - 30 24 16 3 - 2 - - 45
31 - 40 11 7 3 2 1 — — 24
41 - 50 16 8 9 3 2 2 - 40
51 - 60 9 7 5 - 3 1 - 25
61 - 70 2 3 3 1 1 - - 10
71 - 80 8 4 2 2 - - - 16
81 - 90 - 6 2 2 2 - - 12
91 - 100 10 7 7 5 1 1 - 31
101 - 110 1 2 4 1 1 - - 9
111 - 120 7 2 - 4 2 - 1 16
121 - 130 7 2 3 1 - - - 13
131 - 140 5 5 2 - 1 - - 13
141 - 150 12 6 2 8 - - - 28
151 - 160 4 2 3 4 - - - 13
161 - 170 2 3 2 1 1 - - 9
171 - 180 7 4 2 2 - - - 15
181 - 190 1 2 — — - - - 21
191 - 200 10 6 4 1 - - — 2t
201 - 220 3 1 2 - - - - 6
221 - 240 5 - 1 1 - - - 7
241 - 260 6 5 1 - - - - 12
261 - 280 3 - - - - - - 3
281 - 300 7 3 - - - - - 10
301 - 320 1 - - - - - - 1
321 - 340 1 - - - - - - 1
341 - 360 8 7 1 - - - - • 16
361 - 380 7 - - - - - - 7
381 - 400 3 1 - 2 - - - 6
401 - 500 8 6 - - - 1 1 16
501 - 600 6 1 - - - - - 7
601 - 700 3 4 1 - - - - 8
701 - 800 4 2 1 - 1 1 - 9
801 - 900 - - - - - - - 0
901 - 1000 3 - - 1 - 1 2 7
1001 - 1500 3 1 - 1 - - 3 8
1501 - 2K 4 2 3 2 - - 2 13
2. IK - 4K - 2 2 4 2 - 2 12
4. IK - 8K 1 1 1 2 2 - 3 10
8. IK - 12K - 1 - - - 1 1 3
12.1K+ — — — - - - 11 11
Totals 250 138 73 52 22 8 26 569
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app e n d i x 3.3
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS OPERATING IN
VARIOUS PRODUCT GROUPS
Company Size Percentage of Firms Operating In
(Employers) One Product Two or More Three o]
Group Product Groups Product
0 - 1 0 83 17 0
11 - 20 69 31 14
21 - 30 53 47 11
31 - 40 46 54 25
41 - 50 40 60 43
51 - 60 36 64 36
61 - 70 20 80 47
71 - 80 50 50 25
81 - 90 0 100 50
91 - 100 32 68 45
101 - 110 11 89 67
111 - 120 44 57 45
121 - 130 54 46 30
131 - 140 38 61 23
141 - 150 43 62 23
151 - 160 31 69 54
161 - 170 23 77 44
171 - 180 47 53 26
181 - 190 33 67 0
191 - 200 47 53 25
201 - 220 50 50 33
221 - 240 71 29 29
241 - 260 50 50 8
261 - 280 100 0 0
281 - 300 70 30 0
301 - 320 100 0 0
321 - 340 100 0 0
341 - 360 50 50 8
361 - 380 100 0 0
381 - 400 50 50 33
401 - 500 50 50 12
501 - 600 85 15 0
601 - 700 38 62 12
701 - 800 44 56 33
801 - 900 0 0 0
901 - 1000 43 57 57
1001 - 1500 38 62 50
1501 - 2000 31 69 54
2001 - 4000 0 100 83
4001 - 8000 10 90 90
8001 - 12000 0 100 67
12001+ 0 100 100
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APPENDIX 3.4
FIRMS OPERATING IN 1 AND 4+ PRODUCT GROUPS
Product Group Firms Operating Firms Operating
Classification in 1 Product Group in 4+ Product Groups
Kompass Description No. Percentage No. Percentage
No. of Total of Total
14 Mining 2 1 _ 2
20 Agriculture/Food 7 3 - -
21 Beverages 4 2 - -
23 Textiles 24 10 4 2
24 Footwear/Clothing 17 7 3 1
25 Wood 2 1 6 2
26 Furniture/Fittings 12 5 10 4
27 Paper & Board 8 3 6 2
28 Printing/Publishing 11 4 7 3
29 Leather & Fur 3 1 1 1
30 Rubber & Plastics 14 6 21 9
31 Chemicals 10 4 7 3
32 Petroleum & Coal - - 2 1
33 Non Metallic Minerals 7 3 11 4
34 Basic Metals 15 6 10 4
35 Metal Products 30 12 45 19
37 Electrical Equipment 18 7 25 10
38 Transport Equipment 12 5 16 7
39 Scientific Instruments 9 4 24 10
40 Machinery & Equipment 36 14 37 15
50 Construction Supplies 9 4 — —
Totals 250* - 242*^
♦Total of 250 companies 
#"*Total of 82 companies classified into 242 product groups
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APPENDIX 3.5
MOVING AVERAGES OF PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS
OPERATING IN VARIOUS PRODUCT GROUPS
Company Size Percentage of Firms Operating in
(Employees) One Product Two or More Three oi
Group Product Groups Product
0 - 2 0 72 28 11
11 - 30 61 39 39
21 - 40 51 49 16
31 - 50 42 58 35
41 — 60 38 62 39
51 - 70 31 69 40
61 - 80 38 62 35
71 - 90 31 69 31
81 - 100 30 70 31
91 - 110 27 73 51
101 - 120 32 68 52
111 - 130 48 52 38
121 - 140 46 54 27
131 - 150 41 49 32
141 - 160 39 61 41
151 - 170 29 71 47
161 - 180 37 63 34
171 - 190 44 56 23
181 - 200 46 54 21
191 - 220 48 52 26
201 - 240 61 39 31
221 - 260 58 42 16
241 - 280 60 40 7
261 - 300 77 23 0
281 - 320 73 27 0
301 - 340 100 0 0
321 - 360 53 47 6
341 - 380 65 35 5
361 - 400 76 24 16
381 - 500 50 50 18
401 - 600 61 39 9
501 - 700 60 40 7
601 - 800 41 59 24
701 - 900 50 50 25
801 - 1000 43 57 57
901 - 1500 43 57 50
1001 - 2000 33 67 53
1501 - 4000 16 84 68
2001 - 8000 5 95 81
4001 - 12000 0 100 82
8001 - 20000 0 100 93
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CHAPTER 4
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INNOVATION AND NEW PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL FIRMS
A . INTRODUCTION
•'Technology' is a term that is probably particularly difficult to 
define. In its widest sense it can be used in an all embracing 
sense to cover all knowledge that is utilised in the production of 
goods and s e r v i c e s . I n  the context of this thesis a definition 
of technology is important because of the wide variety of 
information that can be transferred under licence agreements, 
whether these comprise patented products or processes, 'know-how'
or the right to use a particular trade name or industrial
^ . (2) 
design.
The methods by which smaller firms generate and utilise 'technology' 
are likely to be important in consideration of such firms propensity 
to utilise the tramsfer of technology under licence. In this 
context it is suggested that smaller firms may have an important 
role to play in stimulating the use of new technological processes
even if they do not possess the resources to bring those processes
to fruition in every c a s e . I t  is probably important therefore
1. 'Technology' ‘(Science of) - Practical or industrial art Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary. 1982
2. Technology is therefore used here in its widest sense to 
cover science, the engineering required to translate scientific 
advance into new products, the design process necessary to make 
those products attractive to consumers and the application
of those products by consumers.
3. See for example Advisory Committee on Applied Research and 
Development. 'Industrial Innovation', HMSO, 1978
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to differentiate between embodied and unembodied 'technology' in 
the context of technology transfer under licence. In the case of 
'embodied' technology, the 'technology' can be considered as 
part of a machine or other piece of equipment. While the technology 
that is the basis of that machine may be relocated from the 
manufacturer to the buyer and hence the technology is transferred, 
this is not usually considered to comprise technology transfer as 
it is defined here. Transfer of embodied technology probably 
does not usually confer upon the buyer any ability to re-use that 
technology beyond its function within the equipment in which it 
is embodied.
Unembodied technology however, is considered to comprise any 
intellectual property that can be described and transferred as a 
concept or set of instructions. This transfer may confer upon 
the buyer the ability to use the technology for his own purposes, 
whether that be as process technology in producing goods with 
the information transferred or embodying it within his own 
products. This is probably an important differentiation, since it 
is usually the latter category of technology that is transferred 
under licence. One case in which embodied technology could be 
considered to comprise part of a licence agreement however, might 
be where a machine is provided by the seller of the technology 
such that the buyer may utilise it to exploit a process (i.e. 
unembodied technology) which the seller is making available to 
the buyer under licence.
The objective of this short chapter is to define technological
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change and the transfer of new technologies arising as a result 
of that change in the context of the small firm, and to relate it 
to the major subjects of this thesis, diversification and 
technology licensing. It is considered important to define 
technology and its diffusion separately from the issue of 
innovation in the smaller firm. It is probably valid to separate 
a classification of technology, and the development of strategies 
for exploitation of a technology portfolio. This chapter, 
therefore, considers the potential sources of 'technology', its 
development and diffusion, and its application through the 
various stages of the 'technology life cycle'.
Exploration is made of the technological environment of the small 
firm in conjunction with consideration of the more practical 
aspects of innovation and new product development in smaller firms. 
It is the objective of the chapter to place the utilisation of 
technology in smaller firms in the context of their use of 
licensed or bought in intellectual property. In the context of 
the case study approach comprising a major part of the empirical 
work in this thesis, definition of precisely what 'technology' 
may be involved in transfer under licence is considered important. 
The potential sources of 'technology', its management and 
e3q)16itation, is therefore considered below.
1. Ford, D. 'Taking Technology to Market'. Harvard Business 
Review, March/April 1981
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B. TECHNOLOGY SOURCES AND RESOURCES
1. The Technology Life Cycle
Consideration of the development processes of new technology
suggests a parallel process in some respects to the product life
cycle c o n c e p t . T h i s  might suggest a multiple stage process.
(2 )
Tisdell for example, defines four stages in the life cycle of
a technology, namely invention, innovation, diffusion and
replacement. It is probably useful therefore to consider the
differences between ’invention' and ’innovation’ and to explore
how the processes of diffusion and replacement might come about.
While invention is defined as "the creation of an idea or concept",
innovation is "the use of that idea or concept in the production
(2)
of new goods or services." ’Innovation’ therefore, probably
1. Explored in more detail in Chapter 2.
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comprises the more practical aspects of new product development, 
and this is discussed in more depth below.
It is the objective of this chapter to try to define technology 
in terms of how the smaller firm might manage exploitation of its 
technology most effectively. The technological environment of 
many smaller firms may in any case be different from that in some 
larger firms operating monopolistically in particular markets, 
and able in part to control the direction of technological 
development by applying resources in a particular way. It is 
suggested that most small firms probably have a much smaller 
control over their technological environment than such larger 
concerns.
'Invention* suggests the conceptualisation of new ideas for
products and processes which may not require the expenditure of
large resources in their definition. However, the 'prospective
u t i l i t y ' o f  an idea may have little commercial value until
the process of innovation has been completed and that idea
translated into a commercially viable product. Since smaller
firms clearly have less resources in total than larger firms, it
may be for this reason that such firms are frequently considered
12)
to be good inventors, but less successful innovators. A
larger firm may be more willing to support relatively speculative 
innovatory activities with the long term objective of improving
1. Tisdell, C.A. op.cit.
2. Bolton, J.E. Committee of Enquiry on Small Firms, HMSO, 1971
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technology portfolios while most smaller firms might be unable or 
unwilling to commit resources to this p r o c e s s . M a n y  small 
firms might therefore be anticipated to consider alternative 
methods of exploiting their inventions as well as through the 
development of new products or processes, particularly if that 
technology did not conform to current product portfolios. Sale 
of such technology under licensing or other agreements could be 
one method by which this could be achieved.
The concept of 'diffusion' or the pressure on a technology to be 
transferred from company to company and country to country is an 
important issue in this thesis, since licensing is one method by 
which diffusion can take place. The diffusion process is probably 
subject to many forces including a requirement by end users for 
more efficient production processes, and competitive pressures. 
These are discussed at greater length below. However, it is 
probably also in^ortant to consider how rates of diffusion could 
be governed not only by the advantages of that technology over
current technology, but also by the requirements of potential
. . ^ (2) 
recipients.
Replacement, the last stage in the technological life cycle as 
defined above, is considered to describe the process whereby new 
techniques supersede older technologies. Replacement however
1. A distinction might be made here between 'pure' and 'applied' 
research.
2. Thus companies with high investment in current technologies 
might be less likely to seek out new more conpetitive technology 
than companies with no existing capital investment of this type.
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may proceed at different rates in different markets. Technology
that is obsolescent or obsolete in one market or country may have
a useful life in another market or c o u n t r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y  where
(2 )
this market is 'protected' in some way. Replacement is likely
to be a continuous, long term process, rather than an immediate 
change, unless developments in technology give such a great 
advantage that production using the old technology becomes 
uncompetitive.
2. Sources and Development of Technology
The literature describing potential sources, and suggesting 
development theories of technology is voluminous and detailed.
(4)
Particular works can probably be defined as keynote articles. 
However, empirical studies relating to actual innovational activity
1. Thus many licensing agreements concern the transfer of labour 
intensive or 'uneconomic' technologies into low.labour cost 
markets.
2. i.e. through tariff barriers on other market distorting 
mechanisms. Such barriers can clearly provide opportunities 
for out-licensing 'older' technologies to such markets.
3. Tisdell, C.A. op.cit. see also the Pilkington case reported 
in Chapter Five.
4. See for example, Jewkes, Sawyers and Stillerman. 'The Sources 
of Invention' London. Macmillan
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appear to be less frequently a v a i l a b l e . T h e  reasons for this 
may include the difficulty, noted above, of measuring 'technology' 
in any meaningful manner and of defining closely enough any 
particular innovation, in order to measure its development and 
diffusion.
Sources of technology can probably be sub-divided into four parts: 
individuals; small companies ; large companies; and governmental^ 
quasi governmental and other sources. Clearly there may be many 
methods for smaller firms to exploit such sources of technology 
from outside the firm to complement any policy of 'in-house' 
development. In the context of this thesis it is probably important 
therefore to consider how effective each of these sources may be 
in the development of new technology, and how such sources may be 
exploited as a source of licensed products for smaller firms.
Role of Individuals
Historically, individuals appear to have been very important in
(2)
developing and 'championing' new technologies. Although
individuals probably do still have a part to play in such
1. BoyIan, M.G. 'The Sources of Technological Innovations' in 
'Research, Technological Change and Economic Analysis', Ed. Bela 
Gold, Published Lexington Books, 1977
BoyIan suggests that:- 'Generally, studies relating to actual 
innovational activities are relatively few, often based on very 
small samples of data, and offering results that are frequently 
in conflict."
2. See for example, Jewkes, J Sawyers, D and Stillerman, R^ op.cit.
-187-
developments in many cases, the proportion of new developments 
attributable to them has, since 1930 at the latest, undergone a 
sharp d e c l i n e . T h i s  phenomenon is probably linked to 
expenditure, since the costs of research and development leading 
to major new technologies has markedly increased over this 
period as technological complexity has grown.
As an external source for new technology, individual 'inventors'
probably are not usually a suitable source of new technology for
smaller firms. While larger firms may have the resources to
evaluate and if necessary develop new ideas submitted in prototype
or conceptual form by individuals, smaller firms may have less
(2)
resources to commit to such processes. Many inventors may
under estimate the amount of development work involved in 
commercialising their ideas and may be reluctant to abrogate 
control over their product/project to others.
Individuals may however be more important in developing industrial 
design expertise and it is perhaps relevant to note that most 
industrial design consultancies are small firms which appear to 
have developed around the skills of one gifted individual.
1. Tisdell, C.A. op.cit.
2. Freeman, C. 'The Economics of Industrial Innovation' 
Penguin, 1974
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Role of Small Firms
Small firms do appear to produce a larger proportion of new
inventions than their size would seem to w a r r a n t . I h i s  may
be important in view of empirical evidence that most small
manufacturing companies carry out very little research and
(2)
development (R & D) work. However, in view of the lower task
differentiation in such firms, such evidence should probably be 
viewed with a degree of caution and it seems possible that many 
smaller firms claiming to carry out no 'R & D' do carry out some 
product development work short of research.
While small firms have been suggested to be good inventors, their 
role in innovation may not be so successful. High cost development 
of new technology may not be an attractive option to smaller firms,
even if the technology under consideration has a high chance of
success. The opportunity cost of developing such technology may 
be too high for successful product implementation. Such
considerations might be anticipated to increase the propensity of 
smaller firms to license part developed technology 'out' to larger 
concerns, for further development and market launch. However, 
such views may be somewhat simplistic in light of the empirical 
evidence available on the interaction between large and small firms
1. Bolton report, op.cit.
2. Rothwell R and Zegveld W. 'The Role of Small Manufacturing
Enterprises in Innovation'. Frances Pinter, 1982
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in developing, exploiting, and diffusing new technology.
Smaller firms may exploit either comparative or absolute 
(2 )
advantage in exploiting small market segments because of their 
closeness to the markets concerned which may enable them to 
identify and act quickly to fulfil market needs. This might 
suggest that the extent of formal or informal collaboration 
between small and large firms could be an important factor in 
the rate of technology diffusion, and the esqjloitation of such 
marke t se gmen ts•
Role of Large Firms
Large firms probably account for a majority of the R & D 
expenditure in the 'advanced' c o u n t r i e s . M u c h  of this 
expenditure may lead to developments which for strategic or 
marketing reasons may not be commercialised. Some larger firms 
may therefore be considered as a potential source of unused or 
under-exploited technology and might therefore appear to be a 
potential source of technology for smaller firms to exploit.
1. Rothwell, R. 'The Role of Small Firms in the Emergence of New
Technologies' OMEGA, Vol.12, No.l. 1984
Rothwell suggests that a much more dynamic and interrelated process 
occurs with small firms acting to incorporate and utilise the 
results of research by larger companies and developing markets 
for the innovations concerned in many cases.
2. As discussed in Chapter Two.
3. Rothwell R and Zegveld W. op.cit. suggested that large firms
(5000+ employees) accounted for 60% of R & D expenditure in
the 'advanced' countries.
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Smaller firms might find exploitation of small market segments 
utilising such purchased technology to be feasible propositions. 
However, in view of the transaction costs involved, some larger 
firms might find the option of transferring technology to smaller 
firms through licence or other agreements to be problematical and 
unattractive alternatives. Exploitation of embodied technology 
h o w e v e r , o r  in the development of 'add-on' p r o d u c t s t o  
products produced by largei; firms could provide a means for 
effective joint exploitation by large and small firms around a 
•core' technological expertise.
Development and diffusion of new technologies may therefore consist 
of an interrelated process involving both large and small firms 
in many cases. This might suggest a 'cascade' approach in which 
larger concerns developed a base technology for a particular 
purpose but where smaller firms then developed further applications 
for the technology and extended its utilisation into new markets .
1. As for exanple in developing applications around micro­
processors or for plastic products around new plastics per se.
2. As for example in the development of 'plug compatible' 
products for IBM micro-computers, such as printers and interface 
units.
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The Role of Government and Quasi Government Bodies 
Government and quasi government bodies are also responsible for 
a substantial proportion of R & D expenditure in Great Britain. 
While a majority of such expenditure can be allocated to defence 
and defence related areas, the public utilities, government 
research organisations and the Universities etc. all contribute 
to the national fund of technology through utilisation of public 
funds. Small firms can benefit from such research through 
licensing 'in', and by joint ventures with such bodies as British 
Technology Group in some cases. In a majority of instances 
however, government organisations do not appear to have been
(2)
highly proactive in their sale of technology to small firms.
Many smaller firms may not be aware of the opportunities available 
from 'public sources' in this way. However some Governmental 
and Transnational organisations have recently commenced 
initiatives in an endeavour to correct this apparent market 
failure.
1. Business Monitor, 'Industrial Research and Development 
E:q>enditure and Employment', M014 Business Statistics Office 
1978.
Government expenditure 29% 1978
Finance by Government of 
R & D e:q>enditure in private
industry 32% 1978
2. Bowler, J.E. in 'Technology Licensing and the Small Firm' 
Lowe J and Crawford N (eds) . Gower Press, 1984
3. See Appendix 4.1'Grants From Europe for Small Firms'
The measures under 'Licensing Initiatives' have recently been 
set up by the Department of Trade and Industry. Work resulting 
from the ' Leverhulme ''study reported in Chapter 6 was used 
in this programme.
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3. Diffusion of Technology
Diffusion of technology can probably take place through both formal 
and informal channels. In the context of this thesis, informal 
diffusion is used to describe the transfer of knowledge through 
public media while formal diffusion is used to describe the 
transfer of technology through the movement of people or equipment. 
As suggested above, 'technology' can be embodied in machinery or 
comprise designs, techniques or other less definable concepts.
Smaller firms may have an important role to play in the process of 
technological diffusion in acting to take advantage of new 
techniques. It is suggested that many 'start-up' companies may 
be the result of technology diffusing from a larger company where 
an individual within that company has been unable to gain 
acceptance for his idea within the larger firm, and hence sets 
up his own organisation to exploit that idea. In this context it 
is valid to consider what pressures might impinge upon the 
diffusion process, the development of that process, and any 
barriers that might lead to a reduction in the diffusion of 
technology per se.
1. See also Teece, D.J. 'Technology Transfer by Multinational 
Firms.' The Economic Journal, June 1977
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Pressures Towards Diffusion
Clearly technology does not diffuse without an impetus, but rather
as the result of specific pressures which might include economic,
technical or sociological pressures. Historical communication
barriers to the dissemination of information on new technological
developments have probably been largely eliminated within
particular cultural groups (by radio/television/jet flight etc.)^^^
However, improved communications informing potential recipients
of new technologies, will probably give no impetus to their
(2)
diffusion unless an economic rationale also exists. Where the
economic rationale is low therefore, the pressure towards 
diffusion may therefore be weaker and the balance of 'user puli' 
to 'technology push' may change leading to a slower diffusion of 
that technology.
'User puli' describes a situation where potential users of a 
technology or a product recognise the benefits of that technology 
and attempt to obtain it. Pressures towards 'user puli' may arise 
through the demonstrated benefits of the new technology and its 
potential as a competitive weapon or as a result of other 
pressures arising as internal or external trigger signals within 
the firm. Such pressures could arise through strategic decisions
1. Barriers of communication between different language and 
cultural groups clearly still do exist however, although such 
barriers may not be as powerful as hitherto.
2. Although since the amount of information available has also 
increased, the difficulty in actually identifying technology 
suitable for local exploitation may have increased in some 
cases.
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to diversify into new areas, competition from rivals or the 
increasing obsolescence of products within the company's product 
portfolio. In the case of the smaller firm, user pull may be an 
important pressure towards the transfer of intellectual property 
under licence agreements. In such instances, inward licensing might 
be perceived in some cases as a potential method of overcoming a 
short term product requirement without necessitating costly and 
time consuming research and development programmes 'in-house'.
'Technology push', an alternative pressure towards the diffusion 
of a technology^ may occur when a new technology can be demonstrated 
to be so superior to currently available techniques that companies 
are forced to use it or risk being overcome by competitors utilising 
the new techniques. This would suggest that the more s\:ç)erior is 
the technological advance, the faster will be its diffusion.
However, even in those cases where a new technology is demonstrably 
superior to current techniques, its rate of diffusion may be 
reduced by the reluctance of some companies with high investment 
in current technologies to re-equip with the new technology.
This might suggest that in some cases new companies entering the 
market might have an advantage in being able to utilise immediately 
the new technology, and benefit from lower production costs 
inherent in its use.
Diffusion may not always occur even in cases where both user pull 
and technology push effects are apparent. The reasons for this
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may be several. In the context of an exploration of
behavioural factors impinging upon technology diffusion, ignorance 
of new techniques and managerial inertia may be inç>ortant factors 
in the use or non-use of technology licensing to obtain new 
techniques. In terms of the strategic objectives of the smaller 
firm, an effectively functioning information system to highlight 
new relevant technologies within the current market, and within 
markets likely to impinge upon current activities, would seem to 
be inportant.
Process of Diffusion
Clearly a variety of alternatives are likely to exist for the 
effective diffusion of both embodied and un-embodied technology. 
These may include contractual transfer or acquisition of 
intellectual property, non-contractual transfer and the movement 
of personnel.
Acquisition or contractual transfer of technology may encompass 
a spectrum of activities including the purchase of technology 
embodied in goods, in machinery to make those goods, licensing 
agreements to purchase intellectual property and acquisition of
1. Tisdell, C.A. op.cit. suggests:
(a) ignorance or lack of knowledge about the availability 
of the new technique
(b) managerial inertia (sleeping managers)
(c) uncertainty about future demand for products to be 
produced using the technique
(d) technological uncertainty
(e) labour fears and trade union resistance
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companies utilising a particular technology. In many cases
however, diffusion may arise as a process of imitation rather than
through contractual or other formal means of diffusion. Within this
process, information may be transferred as a result of publicity
in free sources such as published information. Information obtained
from 'free' sources may be sufficient in some cases for the firm to
imitate the product directly and, in the case of patented
(2 )
information to design around the patent. However,
information of this sort may be supported by the movement of
personnel and the latter may indeed be one of the most important 
methods of diffusion of technology. Non-contractual transfer
may be particularly important where non-patented technology is 
involved and it is in this case that the movement of personnel
(4)
may be particularly important in diffusing technological skills.
1. An exploration of alternative strategies for obtaining new 
technology in practice is made in Chapter 5.
2. Clearly one method of copying already existing (particularly non­
patented) technology is to recruit personnel from the original 
intellectual property holder.
3. Although imitation or copying of a product is clearly one 
method whereby technology is diffused, for the imitating firm, 
contractual transfer of technology (i.e. by taking a licence) may 
often be cheaper than attempting to copy a technology. There is 
also some evidence (presented later) that some licences are agreed 
to by licensor firms under duress, i.e. by the threat of imitative 
behaviour. On the other hand, in some industries (e.g. toys)
the response of firms to pressures of imitation is to licence 
widely at an early stage in the product life cycle, to maximise 
returns on that technology.
4. In 1975 the author was employed in the largest replacement
window and door company in the UK. This company had been founded




While complex embodied technology can probably be transferred 
reasonably easily from one environment to another without the 
transfer of high level skills, the transfer of non-embodied 
technology may require the parallel transfer of high level 
operating skills. Agreements to transfer such technology may, 
therefore, be costly to the transferor and unattractive in some 
cases unless a large potential market can be exploited. A 
diffusion barrier of this type might work to the detriment of 
smaller firms seeking to transfer technology from larger firms 
through licence agreements.
A further barrier to the simple transfer of complex technology 
may involve defining precisely what is to be transferred. Much 
technology probably involves a complex relationship between 
machines and non-quantifiable 'skills' which may have been 
learned over a long period by the machine operators. Similarly, 
transfer of research results or experimental stage production 
processes, from a laboratory to a full scale industrial process 
may also be problematical to an extent. Low level skills in 
recipient firms may exacerbate such problems, as may cultural and 
linguistic barriers in other cases. It seems probably therefore 
that unless the technology involved has great advantages over 
existing techniques, the barriers to its diffusion may reduce 
the pace of the process. For smaller firms such barriers may 
prove difficult to surmount in the short term.
1. Since smaller firms, even if successful, might be unlikely 
in many cases to generate sufficiently large scale royalties to 
justify the larger firms' transaction and opportunity costs 
(in management time ètc.)
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c. THE MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY IN SMALL FIRMS
Achieving successful management of the technology portfolio may be 
a more difficult process for smaller than for larger firms.
While the decision making structures within such firms may be less 
than in some larger firms, the impetus to manage the technology 
portfolio may also be less than in larger firms where size per se 
may lead to a requirement for methods of strategic technology 
management to be developed. It is suggested therefore that 
technology management could arise in such firms as the result of 
crisis control processes rather than as part of a planned 
strategy in many cases. Such crisis induced actions could come
about through changes in the technological environments of small 
firms over which they might have less control than larger firms.
1. The Technological Environment of the Small Firm
The technological environment of the small firm may differ from the
(2 )
situation in larger firms. The capabilities of the latter to 
devote larger resources to particular technological projects 
may enhance their chances of success in chosen technologies.
1. See for example Hankinson A. op.cit. Investment Behaviour of 
Small Manufacturing Businesses.
2. Hawthorne E.P. 'The Management of Technology* McGraw Hill 
1978
3. The larger firm may therefore possess the potential to enter 
areas not open to smaller firms. Clearly however, resources 
alone cannot guarantee the success of any new product project.
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Small firms may, therefore, find it difficult to compete in 
innovation against larger firms with bigger resources. This factor 
clearly reduces the range of options that are open to many smaller 
firms and may restrict such firms to particular market areas .
The smaller firm may, therefore, have to concentrate its 
technological abilities in areas where it will not be disadvantaged 
by resource limitations. The use of industrial design, for 
e x a m p l e t o  improve a products appearance and incremental 
improvements to already existing technologies, may fall within the 
capabilities of many small firms such that they may not be 
disadvantaged in competition with larger firms. In developing 
such incremental improvements smaller firms may have advantages 
over larger firms ' processes, since their managements may be 
closer to their markets and final customers than larger concerns.
Small firms probably possess skills that differ in both scope and 
scale from those present in larger firms. The nature of those 
skills and the nature of 'small firm' technology may also differ.
It has already been suggested that many small firms exist through 
'comparative' advantage in exploiting small market segments that 
may be unattractive to larger firms as well as 'absolute' 
advantage in other markets. In the latter instance, the 
technologies in which they operate may be unattractive to larger
1. Design would appear to be an area in which small firms have 
an absolute as distinct from a comparative advantage over large 
firms.
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firms as too 'craft' intensive or too service intensive. Such 
technologies may involve a high proportion of 'unembodied' 
technology i.e. they may be highly skill intensive •
2. The Process of Technology Management in Small Firms
Formulation of technology policy in particular small firms is 
likely to be subject to analysis of the strengths and weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats impinging upon those small firms per se, 
and their own particular capabilities. This process may not occur 
in a structured way in many small firms however. Technology 
policy and new product policy may not always coincide. While 
technology is probably defined by the core strengths of the firm 
in terms of its technological capabilities, new product policy 
suggests utilisation of those capabilities to produce a range of 
products pertinent to the available technological skills.
The external technological environment clearly plays an important 
role in the process of technology management within smaller firms. 
Management may need to define whether the company has the 
capability to become a 'technological leader' or whether a 
strategy of utilising already available technology and/or imitating 
technology developed by others might be more appropriate. The 
latter strategy might appear less risky for particular smaller 
firms, with finite resources conferring an ability to enter larger
-201-
numbers of product areas with equivalent resources.
Concentration on becoming expert in one particular field and
devoting resources to this strategy may have negative implications
for some smaller firms. First, in entering new fields resources
may not be sufficient fully to develop alternative technologies.
Definition of the resources required may be difficult prior to
implementation. Second, outstanding success in a particular
technology may encourage unwelcome attention from larger concerns
in some cases. Such 'concern' might include market entry or
(2)
predatory acquisition by such firms. Protection of
successful technological developments may also be difficult for 
the smaller firm to undertake successfully. While patents may 
provide protection in principle, the costs of protecting those 
patents may require large resources, often beyond the scope of 
smaller concerns. If such resources are not available,
patenting may be worse than useless in providing no effective 
protection, while drawing the attention of potential competitors 
to the technology involved and also providing a blueprint for 
imitation. A strategy of secrecy, the protection of 'know-how' 
and the use of registered design may be more successful.
1. Development of a 'core skill' however, may be important
in defining the potential of new products in the context of the 
company, whether those products are within current product lines 
or comprise diversification into other areas.
2. This might suggest that too great a success might be dangerous 
in creating external threats to the firm. In terms of independent 
survival a more 'low key' approach might be more appropriate in 
some instances. However it is also clear that some small firm 
managements do develop strategies to 'build up the business and 
sell out'
3. See for example, Roos M.J. 'The Workmate Case' in Lowe J and 
Crawford N K. 'Innovation and Technology Transfer for the Growing 
Firm, op.cit.
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Recognition of technological strengths and weaknesses may be 
difficult for many smaller firms. This may be particularly 
pertinent in the case of diversification strategies, where the 
choice between product or market diversification may be difficult 
to make. Technology audits may, in some instances, be helpful in 
defining directions for the firm to take. In larger firms such 
technology audits may take the form of highly structured processes. 
In the smaller firm however, such processes are probably likely to 
be less formal but may still be useful as processes in defining 
areas of interest with potential for further development.
Technology audits may also be necessary in consideration of the 
sale of technology where a definition of the intellectual property 
to be transferred, is required. Clear and unequivocal specific­
ations of exactly what the technology comprises are clearly 
necessary in licensing agreements, for example, both at the 
negotiation stage and at the point of transfer. Without such 
specifications potential purchasers of intellectual property
may be unable to assess the technology accurately while potential
(2)
sellers may be unable to price their technology accurately. 
Technology assessment may be difficult however, particularly where 
much of the technology is not embodied in machinery etc. but 
comprises less tangible 'know-how'.^
(1)
1. Jasper D P ' Technology Audit' in Lowe J and Crawford N K 
Technology Licensing and the Growing Firm, op.cit.
2. See for example (a) Contractor F J and Root F R. Negotiating 
Compensation in International Licensing Agreements. Sloan 
Management Review, 1981. and (b) Finnegan, M.D. and Mintz, H.H. 
Determination of a Reasonable Royalty in Negotiating a License 
Agreement'. Licensing Law and Business Report, June/July 1978
3. Teece, D.J. op.cit.
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While explicit and implicit strategic decision taking may be 
necessary to define the direction that technology management should 
take in particular small firms, the management process within such 
firms is also likely to require action at several levels. Since 
the resources available to smaller firms are generally likely to be 
less in both proportionate and absolute terms than those available 
to larger firms, management of such resources is probably even 
more important to such firms.
Strategic technological development can probably be considered as a
cascade of a c t i v i t i e s . S m a l l  firms are unlikely to be able to
carry out all technology management activities 'in-house' and may
therefore be forced to sub-contract some functions 'out' or forego
them altogether. The employment of specialist personnel such as
patent agents, lawyers, licensing executives etc. may not be cost
effective for such firms and 'in-house' expertise in these areas may
therefore not be available. Small company managements may also
not have the necessary time to devote to developing such skills.
This suggests that technology management in smaller firms may occur
as a result of external stimuli in many cases rather than as part
(2 )
of a longer term strategy.
Development of effective technology management structures through 
policy formulation, identification of strengths and weaknesses, 
development and control, is probably a highly complex function.
1. Encompassing Policy Formulation, Identification of core technological 
skills arid the development of strategies to build upon such skills and 
management of new product/market development and diversification processes
2. The implication of this process as it might relate to technology 
licensing is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Most small firms may not have the capability to develop such 
structures effectively. However accurate identification of 
technological strengths and control over technology portfolios 
is likely to be an important factor in success. Recognition that 
the environment in which many small firms operate may be difficult 
for them to evaluate and the limitations that this imposes may be 
difficult for them to define however, potentially leading to 
technological management by default in some cases or through 
crisis control, rather than as part of a planned strategy in others
Development of a strategy to manage the technological resources 
of the smaller firm, suggests a further consideration of how 
those technological resources should be translated into the 
development of new products for existing markets, or the 
development of new markets for existing products, or both.
Clearly, firms have a choice between relying upon current 
technology in developing improvements to product ranges, or 
developing away from current product ranges by diversifying into 
new areas. It is therefore to the more practical aspects of 
product management and new product development in the context of 
the small firm that consideration is now made.
3. The New Product Development Process in Small Firms
The literature on potential strategies for new product development 
is extensive. Techniques for firms to identify new courses of 
action and develop new products by reviewing existing strengths
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and weaknesses, carrying out 'gap analysis' developing
new product selection criteria, are examined in depth. The
(2)
development process per se is also described in many publications.
It is not an objective here to develop these issues in any depth 
however, since they are clearly adequately covered elsewhere.
The purpose of this review is, rather, to consider new product 
development (NPD) processes as they may be followed by smaller 
firms in the light of the characteristics of such firms and 
pressures impinging upon them in the areas of diversification 
and new technology implementation. Most new product development 
is usually considered to be a relatively risky process, even 
for those firms with professional, experienced, managements. The 
role and reduction of risk in the NPD processes are therefore 
explored in some depth below. Risk may arise at several points 
in the chain of activities leading to the introduction of a 
new product. These are therefore also examined below.
It has been suggested that many smaller firms may be better at 
'invention' than 'innovation' and that the number of new 
product ideas emanating from such firms may be higher than in
1. See for example Thomas, R.E. 'Business Policy'
Philip Allan publishers, 1977
2. See for example Rothberg, R. 'Corporate Strategy and Product 
Innovation', The Free Press, 1976.
Rothberg suggests that:- "The Process of innovation is normally 
conceptualised as a series of six phases: Concept Generation, 
Screening, Business Analysis, Development, Testing and 
Commercialisation."
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larger firms. In the case of firms run by owner managers
the number of decision makers involved in the new product decision 
process may be less than in larger firms. This might suggest that 
decisions on new products might take place more quickly than in 
larger firms in many cases. However, any decision to enter new 
product or market areas is clearly also likely to be constrained 
by resource considerations. Once again, smaller firm managements 
may be well placed to define the ability of their firms to 
undertake particular projects, in view of their more intimate 
knowledge of their firms* abilities. However, their ability in 
screening new product ideas for market potential may be less than 
in larger firms with greater functional specialisation and access 
to sources of market expertise.
Initial screening of ideas to define those with the greatest 
potential, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of 
smaller firms is likely to be critically important. This procedure 
is likely to be particularly important in decisions to diversify 
into new products or new markets by the smaller firm. In those 
industries where research and development threshold esqjenditures 
are high, small firms may act in a conservative manner in 
considering new product ideas. A failure in developing a new 
product would be likely to be more serious than in a larger firm 
with greater resources. In industries with low research and 
development expenditure thresholds, smaller firms might be
1. Bolton, R. 'Report of Committee of Enquiry on Small Firms' op.cit
2. Rothberg, T 'Corporate Strategy and Product Innovation' op.cit
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anticipated to carry out a wider spread of new product 
developments however.
While idea screening can provide small firms with a shortlist of 
potential new products which they may be able to develop technically, 
technical success per se clearly cannot ensure the commercial 
success of a new product. The next stage of the NPD process is 
therefore business analysis, the estimation of future potential 
sales, marketing costs, profits etc. In this process small firms 
may well be at a disadvantage since their 'in-house' expertise 
may be less than for larger firms able to afford specialist 
marketing departments to carry out such calculations.
Explicit or implicit idea screening can clearly assist in the 
identification of potentially good new product ideas. However, 
development of such ideas into product prototype form may be
I
costly, and failure to predict such costs adequately could be
problematical for smaller firms with restricted resources. Most
prototype developments probably do not lead to commercially
(2)
successful products. Even where a product is potentially
commercially successful however, lack of resources may prevent 
its successful exploitation in some c a s e s . H i g h  cost, high
1. It was suggested in Chapter 3 that many very small firms 
were relatively undiversified but that as firm size increased so 
extent of diversification increased to a peak at approximately 
150 employees. This would probably correspond to the point at 
which 'in-house' skills in analysing the potential of new products 
was also increasing.
2. Kôtler, P. 'Marketing Management' Prentice Hall, 1976 
The familiar 'decay' curve described by Kotler of idea to new 
products suggests a ratio of one successful product to fifty ideas.
3. The implications fot outward licensing by smaller firms through 
such problems are considered in Chapter 6.
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risk new product developments are, therefore, probably unattractive 
to a majority of smaller manufacturing companies.
Even in those instances where new products are successfully developed 
technically by smaller firms, the risks attendant upon their 
exploitation may be greater than for larger firms with resources 
adequate to market to a wide variety of potential buyers. This 
might suggest that methods of imitation or inward licensing could be 
attractive to smaller firms as an alternative. Evaluation of 
marketing costs based on the products' previous history could 
be facilitated in comparison with 'in-house' products with no 
previous marketing history. Identification of potential buyers 
of that product would also be facilitated.
-209-
D. RISK, GROWTH AND NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Some characteristics of small firms, the role and management of 
technology in such firms and possible diversification structures 
have been defined and ejq>lored above. The earlier part of this 
chapter explored pressures leading to innovation and new product 
development. Innovation however, suggests change, and change in 
operating procedures and the introduction of new products and 
techniques may in the short term appear to be a riskier alternative 
than continuing current policies, unless external pressures force 
such changes. The risks of not innovating however, may lead in 
the longer term to stagnation and eventual crisis, particularly 
in industries where the rate of technical change is relatively 
high. Small manufacturing firms are probably less robust than
larger firms because of the dangers of technological advance 
making their restricted product lines obsolescent or uncompetitive. 
This might be anticipated to lead to pressures to diversify to 
reduce such risks. It is suggested therefore, that as a survival 
strategy the pressures on smaller firms to diversify may be 
greater than those impinging on larger firms in some instances.
1. Conversely however, it is clear that many small firms have 
operated successfully in one product area with one product line 
over an extended period, without carrying out substantial 
'innovation'. Such firms may however be subject to a degtee 
of risk from technological developments and market entry by 
competing firms.
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Reduction of risk is clearly likely to be a major implicit objective 
for small manufacturing firms. The purchase and sale of technology 
may reduce risk levels and enhance the flexibility of small firms 
in several ways. A policy of 'in-house' R & D for example could be 
more risky for smaller firms^than for larger firms.
since the number of new product projects would be likely to be less. 
The portfolio theory would suggest that in this case, smaller firms 
would be running greater risks. Reduced risk however, also suggests 
reduced potential r e t u r n . F o r  smaller firms the advantages 
of reduced risks might be greater than the penalty of reduced 
return however.
1. Measurement of Risk
The risk/return equation noted above appears to be a well 
developed concept. Measurement of possible risk/return levels 
and its practical use may be more problematical however. Other 
authors have tried to model the risk process as it applies to 
the small firm by breaking down 'risk' into component parts and
1. Weston and Brighams op.cit.
-211-
exploring each of these separately. (1) (2)











From Hawthorne E.P. op.cit
1. Hawthorne E.P. 'The Management of Technology' McGraw Hill, 1978 
Hawthorne for example uses the technology or product market matrix 
as a base model (as explored in Chapter 3 above) but substitutes 
'Risk' for 'Diversification'. He suggests that the further away 
from its own technological or market knowledge a firm moves, the 
greater its risk becomes in these areas. Hawthorne also introduces 
another risk classification which he defines as 'operating risk'
to include all the non-technology/non-market factors affecting the 
operation of the firm,and concludes that smaller firms can only 
safely and realistically take on one major risk at any one time. 
Such firms are thus restricted by a growth barrier or threshold, 
through which it may be difficult for them to break. This can be 
demonstrated graphically as in Figure 4.1
2. Shah K and La Plaça P.J. 'Industrial Marketing Management' 1981 
Shah and La Plaça further break the risk categories into marketing, 
competition, financial, business portfolio and regulatory risks in 
the context of overall business strategy.
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If the concept of a 'growth barrier' as suggested by Hawthorne 
is accepted as valid it is probably useful to consider how smaller 
firms might break through such a barrier. For those firms 
exploiting small, specialised market sectors in which they may be 
dominant, diversification into other market segiænts may be 
difficult. Substantial resources may be required both to develop 
new technology and to exploit the new market through unfamiliar 
marketing means. The use of inward technology licensing to 
overcome both 'technological' and 'marketing' risks might be 
successful in some instances. While the costs of 'in-house' 
research and development costs could be reduced, purchase under 
contract would also be likely to provide access to marketing 
information from the licensor firm. Development of strategies to 
utilise inward licensing might, therefore, allow some smaller 
firms to compete with larger firms in those cases. In this 
context it may therefore be useful to explore the characteristics 
of smaller firms in relation to their growth potential.
2. Growth Characteristics of Small Firms
The 'risk factors' noted above may have an important role in 
defining the growth characteristics of the population of smaller 
firms. Where threshold expenditures are h i g h t h e  proportion 
of small firms in a particular market might be expected to be low.
1. Where expenditure on any phase of business development is high 
enough to exclude a proportion of the total population of firms, 
ie. Research and Development, Marketing etc.
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This would suggest a possible classification for small 
manufacturing companies based on their market and growth character­
istics. Such a classification might also suggest directions in 
which smaller firms might need to develop in order to grow. The 
matrix below proposes four categories of small firms within this 
classification in the context of their use of inward and outward 
technology licensing or other sources of bought in expertise.


















WIDE Non specialised Non specialised
COMPETITION but product market oriented
oriented
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Companies in Category A might comprise those in small market 
niches where the market had low growth potential. Such firms 
probably of the 'parochial' type in many c a s e s m a y  have 
problems in diversifying out of their market niches and crossing 
threshold barriers to diversify into other markets using current 
product lines or into other product lines utilising their own 
market expertise, because of a lack of 'in-house' R & D to 
develop such products. Such firms may have been expansionist 
at earlier stages of their development, but having failed to cross 
market barriers may have retreated into a policy of market 
satisficing. Their vulnerability to larger competitors breaking 
into their markets and to the new risks of obsolescence of 
current product lines however, may make them the subject of a 
high degree of inherent risk. Development of new products or 
into new markets by such firms may be likely to arise in a 
reactive manner, as the result of an external trigger signal, 
rather than through internal strategic choice in many cases.
Category B companies currently achieving and seeking high growth 
rates, may have reached, or be reaching growth barriers as 
proposed above. Continuation of growth may, therefore, require 
diversification away from current small market niches either 
into other small niches or into larger market segments. Many 
firms in this category could probably utilise technology licensing
1. Carter S F and Williams, B.R. op.cit.
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to obtain products to enter new markets or to exploit 
geographically distant or artificially protected markets in 
which they had previously been unable to compete. Inward 
licensing might in some cases also enable such firms to obtain 
technology to enter market segments dominated by larger competitors 
using the licensors technology based on marketing strengths to 
compete. Category B companies may comprise many very small or 
recently launched conpanies which have developed their initial 
produce line towards its maximum sales potential.
Category C companies with low growth rates and operating in 
oligopolistic markets, probably comprise a majority of small 
firms competing in non-specialist areas such as sub-contract work 
for other conpanies. Many of these firms could also be of the 
'parochial' type. Alternative strategies could include develop­
ment into new product areas to build on 'in-house' fabrication skills 
to provide an 'own brand' product. An alternative strategy could 
include development into new product, process or skill areas, once 
again possibly through the use of licensing. However, a change 
from low growth sub-contracting skills to higher growth manufacture 
might be difficult for such firms to achieve successfully in many 
instances, without the injection of R & D expertise or marketing 
skills.
1. Carter S F and Williams, B R. op.cit
-216-
Category D companies probably comprise a majority of the 
companies that were identified as 'diversifying' in a previous 
chapter. Seeking high growth through expanding market opportunities 
without having to develop high risk technologically based products, 
such companies might be expected to be the highest users of 
technology licensing in an endeavour to increase their market 
coverage at the lowest possible cost. With veil developed marketing 
skills, many such companies could probably utilise inward licensing 
in a highly proactive manner if 'in-house' R & D skills allowed 
the 'tailoring' of licensed products to fit their markets.
Strengths in the field of industrial design (for example) and 




It was a major objective within this chapter to identify potential 
sources of technology for smaller firms and to define the 
technological environment within which such sources could be 
tapped. The process by which technological developments might 
diffuse into smaller firms was explored. Identification of 
'core' technological skills and the development of strategies to 
build a portfolio of products upon those skills, was suggested to 
be a potentially problematical area for smaller firms with low 
degrees of functional specialisation. Smaller firms might 
therefore be subject to a greater degree of 'risk' than many 
larger firms.
In conclusion therefore, it is suggested that as a reaction to the 
real or perceived risks of growth, some smaller firms may react 
negatively, by retreating into their own small market niches 
and foregoing the potential benefits that such growth might bring. 
Development away from core skills may, therefore, only take place 
if an outside stimulus powerful enough to change company policy 
occurs. This might suggest that a classification can be made of 
smaller firms to identify those which are content to exploit 
small market niches and those which are able or wish to develop 
strategies to exploit new market areas. The implications of such 
a classification are discussed above.
This chapter was therefore intended to provide a linking role in 
drawing upon the empirical evidence on small firms and
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diversification presented in the two previous chapters, and 
introducing the concept of technology licensing as it could apply 
to the situation of smaller firms developing new technology 
policy. Development of strategies to 'manage' technology however, 
may occur as an implicit rather than an explicit process in many 
cases. The market areas in which many small firms operate may, 
therefore^ arise as the result of outside influences or events 
impinging upon the firm, in addition to the development of new 
product strategies within the firm.
In the following chapter it is an intention to consider in some 
detail the role that technology licensing might play in the 
spectrum of methods for market exploitation by firms and the 
reasons for its use. It is intended that this analysis will draw 
upon the previous three chapters to provide the basis for a 
study in Chapter 6 of the strategic use of technology licensing 
by smaller firms.
-219-
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TECHNOLOGY LICENSING - SCOPE SCALE AND RATIONALE
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of the previous chapters was to explore the 
relationships between the small firm and its environment and to 
endeavour to define important policy issues and pressures 
impinging upon it. Exploration was made of the impetus within such 
firms to innovate and diversify. The purpose of this chapter is 
to define the scope and scale of and the strategic and economic 
rationale for technology licensing and to explore its role in the 
strategic technological development process. Possible reasons 
for the use of licensing in all firms are considered and comparison 
made between the use of licensing in large and small companies.
Study is also made of the alternatives to technology purchase and 
sale in all companies.
The term 'licensing' is an imprecise one covering a spectrum of 
activities from the purchase of rights to use a character (toys) 
through the purchase of product and process technology, to the 
transfer of complete factories to produce goods. The movement of 
people, which is undoubtedly a major source of 'technology transfer' 
cannot be classified under the heading of licensing, and is 
therefore not considered in detail here, although clearly such 
transfers can and do form an important part of licensing agreements 
in particular cases. Broadly, it is suggested that 'licensing' 
can be sub-divided into the transfer of a 'product'
1. Which could include character licensing and manufactured products
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a ' technology ' ^  or a ' p r o c e s s ' I n  a previous chapter, the 
'transfer of technology by contract' was suggested as being 
synonymous with licensing and this is the definition that is 
adopted here.^^^ Any product, technology or process can probably 
be transferred if enough resources are devoted to it. However, 
the rationale behind such a transfer will include both a 
strategic and an economic factor. The latter factor might 
include problems of description, distance, culture etc. which 
might restrict such transfers unless an over-riding strategic 
impetus also existed.
In view of the increasing pace of technological change, it might 
be anticipated that the strategic use of technology licensing 
would assume an increasingly iavortant role in the technological 
development of both large and small firms. In industries where 
product, technology and industry life cycles are becoming shorter 
the problems of survival for all firms are likely to become more
1. Which might be a new product but could include an improvement
to an existing product.
2. Which could be the technology necessary to make a product.
3. Other authors use other definitions, for example:
(a) Contractor F J. op.cit. suggests that licensing is 
"The transfer of technology for compensation"
(b) Kingman Brewster. 'Antitrust and American Business Abroad' 
McGraw Hill, New York, 1958
(Licensing is) "the transfer of intangible property rights 
such as patents, trademarks, secret processes or 
technical information"
However, both these and other definitions are fairly close 
to that adopted here.
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acute. In these cases a strategy of minimal technological 
development may be particularly risky. Since technology 
licensing is primarily reactive rather than anticipatory, it 
might be assumed that it could provide a strategy for companies 
that were not technological leaders in some cases. This could 
be important in the case of smaller firms, unable to devote large 
resources to the development of new products and/or processes.
Such reactive strategies however, could be dangerous in some 
instances in leaving the firm open to major technological 
developments by other firms. Such developments might make the 
company’s products obsolescent and might not give enough time 
for competitive products to be developed. This could be 
particularly relevant in the case of the smaller firm competing 
with a larger concern where investment might be seen more as 
crisis m a n a g e m e n t ^ r a t h e r  than as part of a longer term 
strategic process.
(2 )
Licensing is a major factor in world trade which appears to 
have received little study or empirical investigation. This is, 
perhaps, surprising when the potential significance of 
transferring technology in this way is considered in a strategic, 
economic and sociological sense. A review of the literature on 
technology licensing pertaining to these topics comprises the 
first section and an integral part of the third and fifth sections 
of this chapter, although the available literature is probably
1. Hankinson, A. op.cit.
2. Suggested to account for approximately 10% of total trading 
activity by revenue - see Contractor F J, op.cit.
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neither extensive nor complete in its coverage of the subject.
The specific subject of this thesis, technology licensing in 
smaller companies, appears to have been particularly poorly 
investigated.
The use of technology licensing in companies*product and market 
diversification strategies can be divided into the use of licensing 
'in' and licensing 'out'. Such a dichotomy is probably necessary 
by virtue of the different rationales and techniques involved in 
company policy decisions to diversify into new products by 
licensing 'in' and into new markets by licensing 'out'. The 
impetuses behind and reasons for such decisions are likely to be 
different in each case.
While this chapter comprises a study of the use of technology 
licensing in its strategic and economic context, the separate 
but parallel policy issues arising in large and small firms, 
pertaining to licensing activity are also considered. Analysis 
is also made of the potential alternatives to the use of 
licensing in technology purchase and sale. A detailed analysis 
of the use made by small firms of inward and outward licensing 
is made in the following chapter through consideration of case 
study and other material.
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B . LITERATURE REVIEW
The reasons for integrating a literature review of publications 
pertaining to the use of licensing are threefold. First, to 
introduce and explore the subject of technology licensing per se. 
Second, to explore some of the empirical work that has been 
undertaken in this area and third, to consider that empirical work 
in the context of a major subject of this thesis, namely technology 
licensing as it relates to the smaller firm.
In the context of any review 'technology licensing' should
probably be differentiated from 'technology t r a n s f e r ' . W h i l e
a relatively extensive literature, mainly concerned with the
problems and opportunities for transferring technology to third
world countries exists, information on licensing per se appears
relatively sparse. Information on the use made by smaller firms
of technology licensing appears particularly poor, although some
authors have concentrated upon the use of licensing in such 
(2)
firms. Frequently, reference to the use of licensing in smaller
firms is reported in the context of studies covering all firm 
sizes.
1. Within the literature, technology transfer is generally used 
to describe flows of technology from advanced to developing 
economies. The term therefore has political and social 
connotations that are distinct from the economic and strategic 
factors under consideration here.
2. See for example, Svensson, B. Success and Failure in Technology 
Import Through Licensing in Smaller Firms. Discussion Paper 
University of Linkoping (Sweden) 1982
3. See for example, Carstairs R T and Welch L, 'A Study of 
Outward Foreign Licensing of Technology by Australian Companies' 
Discussion paper prepared for the Australian Industrial 
Property Advisory Committee 1981.
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A further weakness in the available literature appears to occur in
the number of studies of inward rather than outward licensing.
Clearly, for every outward license there exists a corresponding
inward license. However, while the strategic rationale behind
the use of outward licensing has been explored in a number of
(1)studies , exploration for the role of inward licensing in the 
development of new product and market strategies appears to be 
less well covered.
It is an objective of this brief review to introduce some of the 
recent, more important studies into the use of technology 
licensing. Further exploration of these studies is made in the 
rest of this chapter. An analysis of the literature does suggest 
that technology licensing may not have been explored in as much 
depth as some other areas of economic activity and to an extent 
the literature appears to be more noteworthy for its omissions 
than its analytical content.
Many marketing and business policy textbooks mention the use of 
licensing in passing, as one of a number of options open to
(2)
companies intent on extending their product lines or markets. 
However, the role and extent of licensing in an economic sense 
does not appear to have been explored in depth, although its
1. See for example Wilson, R W. 'The Sale of Technology Through 
Licensing'. Unpublished PhD Thesis University of Yale, 1975
2. For example see Kotler, P. op.cit.
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value in trading terms is apparently g r e a t . P r o b a b l y  the
most analytical contributions on the subject have been made by
Contractor, Telesio, Wilson and Baranson who have carried out
(2 )
specific studies into the use of licensing per se. The study 
by Contractor of licensing practice in multinational firms in the 
United States is probably the most detailed and useful study of 
these. The other studies also look at the use of licensing in 
the context of the multinational or large scale enterprises.
While Wilson's and Telesio's studies of USA companies consider the 
use of licensing as a whole, Baranson and Teece consider more 
specific factors - Baranson the strategic advantages to firms of 
following the licensing option and Teece the costs and benefits 
involved in drawing up agreements to develop licensing strategies.
Earlier works based on empirical studies include investigations
1. Considering the importance of licensing as a source of economic 
activity (cash flows of $14 billion in 1980 according to 
Contractor), the number of studies is very small.
2. Contractor, F J. 'Compensation and Costs in International 
Technology Licensing'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University 
of Pennsylvania, 1980
Telesio, P. 'Licensing Policy in Multinational Enterprises' 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. University of Harvard, 1978
Baranson, J and Harrington, A. 'Industrial Transfer of Technology 
by US Firms under Licensing Agreements'. Developing World 
Industries and Technology Incorporated. 19 77
Wilson, R W. op.cit.
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by Lovell and Elkin . While Lovell's 1968 study of 165
licensing executives is devoted entirely to licensing by US companies, 
Elkin's study of 32 firms in 1970 covers, by contrast, only British 
licensing practice. This national factor is a feature of the 
literature which is perhaps surprising when the international 
character of the subject is considered. The literature is further 
reviewed below in the context of an exploration of reasons for 
licensing and the volume of licensing activity. Consideration is 
made of the strategic and economic rationale for both inward and 
outward licensing.
1. Lovell, E B. 'Domestic Licensing Practices'. NY National 
Industrial Conference Board Inc. 1968
2. Elkin, J. United Kingdom Foreign Licensing. Unpublished 
Thesis, Brunei University (UK) 1970
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c. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES IN TECHNOLOGY SALE
In the context of a study on technology licensing, it is probably
important to consider what alternative strategies might exist
for firms wishing to sell technology per se as an alternative to
selling goods embodying that technology, and the reasons behind the
development of such strategies. Sales might take place for strategic,
technological or market based reasons. In the first instance,
company objectives might be inconsistent with development of a
particular technology as the result of a change of strategic
objectives, development into new technological areas, or as the
result of a takeover or other change in company status. Technology
based reasons might include product or process development costs
increasing beyond company resources, a failure to breach threshold
Research and Development barriers or as the result of the
(2 )
development of 'spin-off' technologies as a by-product of
research into mainstream company technologies. Market based 
reasons might include a decision to exit a market because of 
increasing competition, or through development of new strategies 
in which a particular market becomes less important to the firm. 
Decisions to sell technology, however they arise,suggest the 
development of strategies to implement those decisions which might 
differ from strategies for product sale in some cases.
1. See Chapter Four.
2. Defined as a technology which the firm is unable or 
unwilling to exploit itself.
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Within a strategy of technology sale several potential alternatives 
are likely to exist, of which licensing may be an important method. 
Other alternatives could include the sale of patents, the sale 
of companies or divisions of companies, and the sale of expertise 
in the form of contract Research and Development expertise or 
secondment of key personnel under contract or through consultancy 
agreements.
1. Patent Sale
As a strategy for exploiting an existing portfolio of technologies, 
the sale of patents, as distinct from the sale of rights to use 
those patents, (i.e. a licence agreement) may be the most appropriate 
method in some cases. This may be particularly relevant in the 
case of rationalisation or reorganisation where a company
wishes to exit a technological area altogether, while endeavouring 
to obtain some return on its previous investment in that technology 
but without having a division or unit incorporating that 
technology that can be sold as a going concern. The advantages 
of selling patents are likely to be resourse related - a purchaser 
will pay for the patents while the costs of renewing the patents 
in question will then fall upon the purchaser, removing an ongoing 
charge from the seller. As an alternative to allowing a patent to
1. Freeman, B (Patents and Licensing Manager, Inperial Tobacco). 
Personal Communication to the author. Imperial Tobacco 
ceased paper and board making and sold all its patents 
in that field to a small company for exploitation.
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lapse, consideration of patent sale might appear to be an important 
strategic choice in some instances.
2. Divestment of Companies or Divisions
The sale of companies or divisions of companies suggests a 
'portfolio' approach to developing technology strategies for 
the firm, mirroring to some extent the use of outward licensing 
for particular products or processes. In many cases such sales 
may take place as part of a rationalisation process encompassing 
divestment of non-mainstream activities by sale or management 
b u y o u t . S a l e  might be considered where new management, taking 
control as the result of a takeover, wished to develop different 
strategic goals than the previous management. In other cases 
sale might be forced upon a firm through external pressure such 
as poor profitability. In such instances technology sale might 
be made solely to release resources for other activities. 
Development of promising technology leading to a requirement for 
Research and Development resources beyond the scope of the 
parent company might also suggest sale of a company as a 
'technological unit'.
1. See for example 'Divestment and Structural Change in UK
Industry' by Chiplin B and Wright M in National Westminster 
Bank Quarterly Review. 1980
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3. Contractual Sale
Sale of technology in the form of contractual obligation to 
other parties to develop new products or processes, or to overcome 
technological problems may also be an important method of exploiting 
technological strengths. For larger firms with costly Research 
and Development facilities, the use of those facilities under 
contract to others may be advantageous in some instances although 
there may also be dangers in providing such expertise to potential 
competitors. Some small and medium sized firms have developed 
strategies based upon a movement from the production and marketing 
of goods to provision of a mix of goods and technological services. 
Lastly, other companies may offer their technological expertise 
solely as a service to other users. Contract Research Companies 
and Design Consultancies provide examples of this method of 
technology exploitation.
Possibly a realistic strategy for technological ejq)loitation might 
lie in a consideration of several of the alternatives suggested 
above. Larger firms can possibly view both their technologies 
and their subsidiary companies or divisions as part of their 
technology portfolio and exploit their strengths by the sale or 
purchase of complete technological units. For the smaller firm, 
technology sale may be more restricted. In the context of this 
thesis, detailed exploration is now made of the strategic and 
economic rationale for outward licensing as an alternative to the 
other available options for technology sale.
1. For example Lotus cars, which moved from manufacture to the 
development of a Contract Research and Development capability 
for other companies in the Motor Industry.
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D. THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR OUTWARD LICENSING
Market exploitation can probably be considered as a spectrum of
activities ranging through direct and indirect export, licensing,
joint ventures and direct investment. Choice of a particular
method of market exploitation is likely to be affected by size,
resource and policy factors particularly to each firm, and factors
specific to the innovation or technology in question. Within
the spectrum of activities, the extent of licensing may be
conditioned by the strategic objectives of the firm, the potential
of the alternatives and the characteristics of the relevant
technology. The total volume of licensing may however, also be
(2)
affected by sociological and other factors.
For the purposes of this thesis the strategic and economic 
rationale for outward licensing is explored under the following 
headings: Profit and Associated Factors; Political Factors;
Geographical Factors; Anti-Competitive Factors; Tax Related 
Factors; Sociological and Policy Factors; Resource Factors;
Transfer Cost Factors; Product Specific Factors and other 
Strategic Factors.
1. Kotler, P. op.cit.
2. Non commercial factors probably also impinge on the volume 
of licensing. International bodies such as the UN and OECD 
have three motives in encouraging the use of licensing and other 
co-operative activities. A political rationale - to reduce 
international tension by increasing co-operation; an economic 
rationale - to use global resources better; and a geopolitical 
rationale - to redistribute wealth by transferring technology 
from developed to developing countries. These issues have
been touched upon above but are not directly relevant in the 
context of this thesis and will therefore not be explored 
further here.
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1. Profit and Associated Factors
Profit, a major driving force behind economic activity is clearly 
also a major impetus to licensing agreements. However, allied
to the profit motive per se may be other factors which are explored 
below. The licensor company by sub-contracting its production 
and marketing to a local company is, by agreement, sharing the 
profit potential of that market. However, the potential of the 
market may (or may not) be more effectively realised by the local 
licensee than the licensor could by direct export or by other 
m e t h o d s . T h e  realisable total profit may be higher in some 
cases under a licensing agreement than through direct export.
The total potential size of the market may also be important in 
the profit maximising licence decision.  ^  ^ For small markets 
the potential maximum profit may not be worth the costs of 
setting up an export organisation or direct investment by the 
licensor. Local licensees may, however, be able to exploit small 
market segments successfully and profitably. In larger markets 
by contrast, higher levels of competition might also make the
1. Telesio, P. op.cit. Telesio postulates that profit
maximisation is always the underlying rationale behind all
licensing activity. However, this statement is of little
practical help in understanding the licence decision.
2. Kotler, p; op.cit. Licensing is suggested to be only one of
a continuum of methods by which a market can be exploited. 
Other methods include Indirect Export, Direct Export, 
Licensing, Contract Research, Management Contracting, Joint 
Ventures and Direct Investment.
3. Elkin, J. op.cit.
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potential profit for an exporting firm low. In such cases, the 
potential profit from direct investment or export might also be 
low in comparison with the potential income to be derived from 
a licensee already established in that market and with secure 
channels of distribution. In such cases, firms may be prepared
to accept only a proportion of the potential profit from that 
market. Even in less competitive situations, the licensor company 
may receive only a relatively small proportion of the total profit. 
Wilson for example suggests that licensors typically obtain no
(2)
more than 25% of the expected profit from any particular market.
This 'profit' figure does not include the costs of setting up 
any licensing agreement. Howevef, the opportunity cost^^^ of 
setting up an export or direct investment operation in the market 
may also be high, particularly for smaller firms with limited 
resources and possibly more profitable investment opportunities 
elsewhere. In such instances licensing may be an attractive 
alternative strategy for market exploitation in some cases.
The realisable profit for the licensor may be higher than through 
other methods of market exploitation. Even larger firms with 
extensive resources may find it difficult to exploit every potential 
market. In some cases licensing may therefore be a method of 
obtaining a profit at a low cost to the licensor in those markets
1. Telesio, P. op.cit. Telesio shows for example that Pilkington 
Glass was forced into the licence route in some markets by 
pressure of local competition.
2. Wilson, op.cit. Wilson estimated from case studies and other 
material that licensor income from products fell within a 
range of 20 -33% of the profit from that market.
3. Which may be low in comparison with direct export,commission 
or organisational costs.
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which he would otherwise not enter. In such cases, licensing may 
be a profit maximising strategy in the context of the global 
operation of the firm. However, several authors have noted that 
rational profit maximisation may not be possible in the context of 
the uncertainties associated with individual p r o j e c t s a n d  this 
would indicate that other factors may possibly be at least as 
important as profit maximisation in an understanding of the 
licensing decision within the firm.
2. Political Factors
Political factors probably play a large part in many licensing
decisions. Third world, developing and many socialist countries
may import technology rather than goods in order to protect and
(2)
promote indigenous industry and to preserve foreign currency.
The tariff barriers raised as a result of such policies may make 
direct export uncompetitive or unprofitable for firms endeavouring 
to exploit such markets. Economic exploitation of markets in 
these instances can therefore probably come about only through 
manufacture of goods within the tariff barrier, under licence 
agreements, joint ventures or direct investment. Conversely, some 
advanced countries also raise formal and informal tariff barriers 
to protect and promote specific industries; such policies may 
lead to an increase in collaborative ventures to overcome these 
barriers in some cases.
1. Freeman, C. 'The Economics of Indsutrial Innovation' op.cit.
2. Elkin, J. op.cit.
3. As recent investment and collaborative decisions by some 
Japanese firms in Europe show.
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In overcoming politically motivated barriers to direct export,
direct investment may be considered if sufficient funding is
available. In such instances licensing may be an alternative
that is considered only as a last r e s o r t . T h i s  may be
particularly true for multinational firms able to afford the high
(2 )
initial cost of direct investment. However, where funds are
restricted, the licensing option may be more attractive as a 
method of obtaining a return from an otherwise closed market.
This might suggest that larger firms would be less likely to 
choose the licensing route to market realisation than smaller 
firms unless other factors such as cross-licensing agreements 
were also involved.
3. Geographical Factors
Geographically related reasons are, probably, a major factor in 
the decision of some firms to license out rather than to 
exploit markets by export. Transport costs can comprise a 
major price disadvantage for manufacturers of products that are 
bulky or high weight/low v a l u e . E v e n  for lower weight/
I
higher value products, the cost of transporting the product to 
distant markets may make it uncompetitive and hence the 
exploitation of those markets uneconomic. In firms (probably
1. Carstairs, R T and Welch, L. op.cit.
2. Telesio, P. op.cit.
3. For example in the chemical industry, high transport costs for
fertilisers and some low cost/high weight products may be
responsible for the high incidence of cross licensing seen in
the industry.
4. Pilkington Bros. Ltd. case study 1977 by J Quinn. The Amos 
Tuck School of Business Administration, New Hampshire
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mainly the smaller ones) unwilling or unable to consider other 
forms of market exploitation such as joint ventures or direct 
investment, licensing might prove an attractive alternative for 
reasons that have been noted above.
Defining the volume of licensing due solely to the negative 
influence of transport costs may be difficult however, particularly 
where other factors are also involved. None of the empirical work 
recently carried out appears to have attempted to disaggregate 
this particular factor. It might be expected that the volume of 
licensing for any particular product might be a function of its 
weight/bulk:value ratio and the propensity of the firm to exploit 
the market through other methods than direct exporting. It is 
probably a major omission that none of the authors quoted above 
has considered the effects of product size per se and geographical 
restraints on the total volume of l i c e n s i n g . T h i s  can 
perhaps be explained however, by considering the conpanies comprising 
the samples used in the studies by Wilson, Teece et al, who 
considered licensing in the context of multinational companies.
Such companies probably have the resources available to be able 
to decide between direct investment and the use of licensing
1. Elkin, J. op.cit. page 121. Elkin mentions geographical 
location as being important in some cases, but does not 
attempt to quantify such pressures.
2. Wilson, R.W. op.cit. page 79. Wilson studies the effect of 
geographical market segmentation based on product and market 
factors in the context of oligopolistic rivalry between firms.
He points out that while geographical restrictions may not be 
explicitly written into many licensing agreements it may be 
implicitly understood by both parties that geographical 
segmentation exists due to the nature of the product and this 
may have an important anti-competitive effect, as explored below.
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in any particular case, and this is indeed the choice suggested 
by several researchers in the field. Smaller firms, the subject 
of this thesis, may have a different choice between direct or 
indirect export of their products, and licensing, since their 
resources would not usually be large enough to consider direct 
investment. This is probably important in understanding the 
rationale of small companies in their use of outward technology 
licensing and is further considered in the empirical work and 
case studies below.
From a strategic point of view a distant licensee would probably 
be more attractive than one close to the licensors' home markets 
since the danger of introducing a competitor to those markets 
would exist. Licensor control over licensee use of technology 
may be difficult to exercise and hence the risk to the licensor 
of surrendering his technological lead to his licensee may exist. 
Such lack of control over intellectual property may partly 
explain the relatively low incidence of UK/European licensing 
amongst smaller firms.
4. Anti-competitive Factors
The use of licensing and cross licensing agreements as an 
anti-competitive weapon in the creation of cartels to prevent 
the entry of outside companies into an industry is probably 
widespread. Governments and groups of
1. See Chapter 6
2. Wilson, R.W. op.cit. Wilsons main thesis is that licensing 
is used by large firms in this way.
3. The pharmaceutical industry has been suggested to be one 
example of cross-licensing activity leading to lower 
competition in particular markets
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g o v e r n m e n t s c l e a r l y  suspect that licensing can be and is
being used by multinational companies in this manner, as recent
(2)
legislation indicates. While anti-competitive laws are
probably aimed mainly at multinational enterprises, to prevent 
collusion in market sharing and price fixing agreements
which are perceived to be against the public interest, the
creation of such legislation may also have important restrictive 
effects on the scope and volume of licensing in smaller companies, 
Clauses forbidding market sharing may lead to a reluctance by
smaller firms to consider selling technology at all, since
even in their home markets their resources may not be sufficient 
to compete against larger foreign competitors willing and able 
to subsidise prices to obtain market share in the longer term.
Such issues may be particularly pertinent in the transfer of 
technology by smaller firms to third world countries where 
fears of setting up competitors able eventually to undercut the 
licensor in his own market may be particularly prevalent. It 
is postulated therefore, that one result of such legislation 
might be a diminution in the total volume of international 
technology licensing.
Wilson provides a thoughtful discussion of many of the major 
issues involved in potentially anti-competitive behaviour through 
licensing. In particular, he made a comparative evaluation of
1. EEC/OECD
2. Although the recent (1984) European Commission Licensing 
guidelines have waived restrictions for smaller firms*
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the determinants both of R & D spending and licensing. His 
results suggested that whilst licensing was generally related to 
oligopolistic rivalry, the rate of technical change and the 
complexity of the product (as this relates to the number of 
product configurations possible with a given input), also had a 
substantial inpact. In the case of complexity this was negatively 
related to licensing but positively related to R & D effort.
He suggested that this was because R & D effort for products 
with complex configurations was often aimed at imitation of a 
varied set of differentiated products and the ability of the 
firm to do this reduced the demand for licensed industrial 
property.
In addition, Wilson was able to show that an industrial property 
system which was inadequately policed, and could not secure 
industrial property holders from imitation, was also likely to 
affect the level of licensing in various ways. It is suggested 
that an inability to police and enforce property rights in 
particular markets may have very significant consequences for 
small firm licensing in particular. Wilson suggests that cross­
licensing may enhance the ability of firms to control market 
variables such as price, product quality and the number of 
competitors and entrants to an industry. Control of entry by 
competitors into a market may indeed be a crucial factor in the 
total quantity of licensing, by raising the costs of market 
entry to competitors. Such costs could make market entry
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for non-cartel firms more difficult since licensee firms within 
the cartel could always commence production effectively at a 
later point on the 'experience curve' and would therefore be 
able to charge lower prices to deter entry by competitors. 
Clearly it could be in the interests of larger firms to utilise 
such agreements strategically, and this may in fact be an 
important method of diversifying into new products within their 
own markets, through cross-licensing agreements with competitor
companies. There is some evidence that such agreements may be
^ (2) widespread.
T e l e s i o b y  contrast suggests that cross-licensing can be
in the public interest by reducing parallel development costs
associated with particular technologies. His study draws a
distinction between the patent pools of the past,dedicated to
market sharing, and present day cross-licensing arrangements
(4)
dedicated to technological advancement. He also draws a
distinction, based on empirical work between those firms 
utilising outward licensing solely as an alternative to direct 
investment and those other firms which, in addition, license
1. Boston Consulting Group 'The Experience Curve Reviewed'
BCG Publications, 19 74
2. Case study evidence does exist. For example 'Intel and 
Motorola in Bubble Memory deal' - Financial Times 19.6.82 
This cross-licensing agreement is quoted as "an effort on 
behalf of the Americans to fend off growing Japanese 
competition"
3. Telesio, P. op.cit.
4. It must be recognised however, that the mode of study used 
by researchers in studying licensing agreements, usually 
questionnaire and interviews, are unlikely to reveal anti­
competitive behaviour. Statistical analysis of published 
data might be expected to be more enlightening. The study 
by Telesio developed in this direction, results, however, in 
no conclusion on anti-competitive behaviour.
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to obtain access to licensee technology through 'grant back' 
agreements. Many of these firms are concentrated in the chemical, 
pharmaceutical and electrical machinery i n d u s t r i e s . T h i s  
may be an important finding in considering anti-competitive 
behaviour since accusations of cartel management and anti­
competitive behaviour have been made against these industries 
in the past.
In conclusion, anti-competitive behaviour by larger firms in 
the use of cross-licensing is probably widespread. However, 
proof of this contention is difficult to show,although in^ortant 
apocryphal and case study material does exist. The response 
of governments to perceived anti-competitive behaviour of this 
sort is to pass legislation outlawing market sharing, price 
fixing and component sourcing agreements. This legislation may 
have a 'knock-on' effect for smaller firms, reducing the 
protection they might seek in outward licensing. The effect 
on smaller firms may therefore be a reduction in the amount of 
outward licensing they carry out. This subject as it relates 
to smaller firms is considered later in the empirical work.
5. Tax Related Factors
A detailed consideration of the role of taxation in the 
rationale for outward licensing is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. There are important and complex issues involved, and
1. Telesio, P. op.cit.
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case law is constantly changing the legal status of payments
under licensing agreements. Under most national legal
conventions, taxation of earnings under licence agreements can
be considered as contiguous with taxation on the earnings of
(2)
other forms of market exploitation. However, in two areas,
other factors may apply.
There is some evidence to suggest that royalty payments from
developing countries and to smaller companies may be effectively
taxed at a lower rate than payments in other cases. Contractor
for exanple, hypothesises that remunerations under licensing
agreements from developing and Eastern European countries are
more likely to be paid as fees for technical assistance than
as royalties on output, due to problems in those cases of
auditing output by licensees.^ I t  is postulated that smaller
firms may also, in some cases, receive a substantial proportion
of their total licence income as consultancy and assistance
fees rather than in the form of royalty payments on licensee
production. Such payments might have an important role to play
in the viability of some licence agreements and would tend to
be the cause of an understatement of the value of the agreement 
(4)
to the licensor . Such hidden licence income would be
1. For example see papers in 'Domestic and International 
Licensing of Technology' December 1980/January 1981.
New York and San Francisco
2. Contractor, F.J. op.cit.
3. Contractor, F.J. op.cit.
4. See Appendix 5.3 for example, Lowe J and Crawford N K 
'Outward Licensing as a Marketing Strategy - An Analysis 
of Returns'. Discussion Paper - Bath University, May 1983
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extremely hard to quantify accurately. The extent of such 
payments in the context of small firms per se is considered 
further in the empirical work.
6. Sociological and Policy Factors
It is probably difficult to identify the effect of sociological 
factors in the policy making of multinational firms. Survival, 
profit maximisation and pragmatism have all been suggested as 
major forces impinging upon decision makers in such firms.
Policy decisions in such firms are possibly based more on 
available resources than on any idiosyncracies of management.
In smaller firms however, particularly those which are owner 
managed, 'personality' factors may take on more importance.
The rationale for outward licensing in small firms may therefore 
be at variance with the rationale in larger concerns in some 
cases.
It has already been suggested above that many smaller firms 
value independence above other factors. This might be important 
in the formulation of market exploitation strategies by small 
firms,since utilising licensing as a means of exploiting a 
foreign market could give the licensor company greater control 
over that market in some cases than could direct export, 
utilising agents. It is suggested that a licensee company
might be more likely to try to exploit the market fully than an 
agent would. Exporting might require further expansion of
production, sales and marketing facilities leading to an increase
in the size of the enterprise, complexity of management
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structures and hence to a diminution in direct management 
control of parts of the enterprise. The response of smaller 
firm owner managements to the choice between expansion through 
export with less control and foregoing the benefits of such 
expansion might, therefore, be the latter rather than the former 
in some cases. Market exploitation through licensing agreements 
might be an attractive alternative as a method of exploiting 
technology without the need for growth in manufacturing per se.
7. Resource Factors
The ability of firms to exploit markets in particular ways may 
also have an important effect on the total volume of licensing 
activity. While multinational firms may have the choice of 
market exploitation between export, direct investment or joint 
ventures (including licensing agreements), the choice facing 
smaller firms is probably limited to direct exporting or 
licensing agreements, because of a lack of financial, technical 
and managerial resources required by other methods. Even multi­
national firms resources are not infinite h o w e v e r , a n d
licensing might be attractive as an alternative to direct
(2 )
investment in home markets where the opportunity costs of
1. Larger firms clearly have the ability to raise funds in the
marketplace for good projects. However, their resources of
skilled manpower and trained management may be less extensive
and this may be a limiting factor on the number of operations 
they could carry out at any one time.
2. Teece, D.J. op.cit. p.54. Teece further considers that large
firms' transfer costs may be lower than for smaller firms' and 
this would tend to enhance the ability of such firms to
carry out transfers.
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direct investment might be high, or other barriers to direct 
export exist.
Financial restrictions may be more acute for smaller firms, unable
to raise money on capital markets, than for larger firms. Where
exporting to particular markets is restricted in this way therefore,
licensing may be an attractive alternative method for the smaller
fiirm to exploit that market. Such pressures would probably tend
to increase the amount of licensing activity in the small firm
sector as a whole and might be expected to make the value of
particular licences to small firms proportionately more important
than to larger firms. Once again, however, the opportunity cost
of small company management undertaking licensing work might be
(2)
a restricting factor in some cases.
Trained personnel are, possibly, the most valuable resource of 
many smaller firms. Optimal application of this resource by 
applying it in a particular way may be crucial for the company's 
success. The opportunity cost of employing technical personnel 
in any particular application probably represents, therefore, a 
critical calculation for many smaller firms, even where such an 
estimate is not formally made. Licensing agreements with long 
term requirements for technical personnel and relatively long 
term paybacks through royalty agreements leading to a worsening 
in cash flow characteristics may represent a major reallocation
1. Carstairs, R T and Welch, L. op.cit.
2. This issue is further explored in the empirical work in 
Chapter 6.
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of resources and an unacceptably high opportunity cost for the 
smaller firm. In contrast to the financial restrictions noted 
above this would probably tend to decrease the total volume of 
licensing in the small firm sector. Once again an exploration 
of this factor comprises part of the empirical investigations 
below.
8. Transfer Cost Factors
A measure of the cost of transferring technology from one entity 
to another is clearly likely to be important in understanding 
the rationale behind technology l i c e n s i n g . T e c h n o l o g i e s  with 
low transfer costs might be anticipated to be particularly 
important in the total volume of licensing activity. However, 
the status of the recipient firm may also be inportant in the 
case of transfer. In this, negotiation and search costs may be 
an important imponderable factor. Search and negotiation costs, 
possibly involving large inputs of management time^ may affect the 
profitability of any licence agreement. The costs of transfer 
may also be related to the ease of defining the technology to be 
transferred. Thus where licensing involves mainly 'embodied' 
technology in the form of drawings, capital equipment or other 
easily definible technology, transfer may be more simple than 
where intangible skills of 'know-how' is involved. 'Disembodied'
technology comprising 'know-how' and other less easily definable
1. Teece, D. op.cit. for example in his study of Multinational
Corporations and Transfer Costs states "It is plausible that a 
dominant consideration in the international transfer of 
technology is the cost of transfer"
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intellectual property may be more difficult to transfer and is 
also probably more difficult to itemise prior to transfer, so 
that both licensor and licensee companies may have difficulty in 
specifying precisely what is to be transferred and hence in 
pricing the licence accurately.
9. Product Specific Factors
Certain products are probably affected by fashion or other market 
factors to a large extent. Where product life cycles are short, 
market penetration and profit maximisation by home based production 
and export may be difficult to achieve. In such cases, licensing
particularly for smaller firms may be a realistic method for 
exploiting particular markets. Instances of product specific
factors impinging on the licensing decision probably also occur 
in industries where the rate of technological change and 
innovation is particularly fast. In such instances market 
exploitation may require production facilities near the market 
for success.
10. Other Strategic Factors
While all the factors noted above impinge upon the decision to 
license 'out', they may in some cases be overridden by strategic 
considerations which could also be related to the economic 
implications of new product development. For smaller firms, selling 
the licence rights to a product could be particularly important
1. In the toy industry for example, licensing appears to be very 
widespread, probably because the life cycle of a particular 
product may be very short. Fulfilling market demand may be 
difficult for smaller firms, leading to the extensive use 
of licensing.
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as a method of recouping development costs. In the case of some 
firmsfsuch development costs could inpose a heavy burden leading 
to a crisis sale of technology under l i c e n c e . H o w e v e r ,  it 
seems likely that in many instances, the use of outward technology 
licensing in the exploitation of a foreign market may arise as 
a "second line or residual international marketing mode because
(2)
external pressures constrained or prevented the use of exporting." 
This might suggest that the use of outward licensing may be a 
reactive rather than a proactive strategy in many instances.
1. For example, the case of Dragon Computers in the UK which was 
forced to sell its profitable microcomputer to cover losses 
incurred elsewhere, just as that product was producing a high 
return in early 1984.
2. Carstairs, R T and Welch L. op.cit. In their study of 
outward licensing by small/medium and large Australian 
Corporations, these authors found that licensing was often 
used as a 'last resort' strategy.
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E. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR TECHNOLOGY PURCHASE
Factors affecting the strategic impetus towards technology sale 
through licensing, the sale of patents of operating units and 
through contractual Research and Development agreements have been 
considered above. In view of a major thesis objective of 
considering inward licensing in the smaller firm, consideration 
must also be made of the alternatives to such licensing. 
Technology purchase might take place because of an inability 
to generate suitable new technology within the firm through 
cost or other resource limitations or through a recognition 
that technology purchase might be more cost effective than 
'in-house' development in particular cases, even though adequate 
resources were available in the firm.
Within a strategy of technology purchase, several alternatives 
exist, mirroring to an extent the avenues for technology sale 
explored above. However, potential alternatives for technology 
purchase are probably greater than for technology sale, including 
inward licensing, the use of contract Research and Development 
or Design expertise, acquisition of companies and the recruitment 
of suitably qualified personnel.
1. While the recruitment of personnel is not 'technology transfer' 
per se, under the definition for 'technology' adopted in 
Chapter 4, such recruitment would confer upon the recruiting 
firm, the ability to utilise new technological expertise.
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1. Product Purchase
Purchase of technology through the use of contract Research and 
Development or by utilisation of contract design companies could 
be an alternative strategy to the use of technology licensing 
or company acquisition in some cases. As a complement to 
existing 'in-house' skills, purchase of technological skills in 
this way could overcome gaps within the firms' technology 
portfolio. Organisations offering contract services in the 
United Kingdom include the Research Associations, where 
collaborative and pre-competitive research may also be carried 
out, in addition to other commercial organisations. For the 
smaller firm, purchase of contract Research and Development 
expertise may be a realistic method of product or process 
development. However while licensed products can be evaluated 
on the basis of their record to date the potential of contract 
research may be less easy to evaluate prior to project completion. 
A strategy of contract research to further develop inward 
licensed products might be one method for product portfolio 
development.
2. Company Acquisition
Purchase of technology through the acquisition of other (smaller?) 
companies with particular technological skills is one alternative 
to technology licensing or other forms of technology purchase.
Such purchase may be advantageous to companies in providing not 
only technological but also other skills associated with that
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technology such as marketing or other customer related 
disciplines. Purchase of a company allows immediate entry to 
the new market. However, unless the company being purchased 
complements the already existing company management structure 
and operating style, there may be problems in assimilating the 
acquisition. Such problems could include a difference in company 
c u l t u r e a n d  the obtaining of other, miscellaneous activities 
associated with the purchased company, which might not be 
relevant to the purchasing company's strategic objectives.
This situation might be contrasted with purchase of a technology 
under licence where a much more specific and definable 
intellectual property could be purchased. For larger conpanies 
able to operate with a devolved management style, such concerns 
might be less relevant than in the case of smaller firms with a 
more participative management structure.
3. Key Personnel Acquisition
The recruitment of suitably qualified personnel may be one 
method of developing new technological skills and as an alternative 
or complement to inward licensing may be a viable strategy.
Where non-patented or patentable technology is involved, 
recruitment of such personnel may assist in diversification into 
new areas of expertise. Even where entry to a market dominated
1. Thomas, R.E. Business Policy - op.cit.
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by patented products is involved, designing around such patent 
protection is likely to be assisted by personnel skilled in those 
areas of expertise.
For larger firms, diversification into new technological areas 
by acquisition of smaller companies skilled in those areas is 
clearly a major alternative to the use of technology licensing 
or other forms of technology purchase. Many larger companies 
have developed in this way.^  ^ For the smaller firm, development 
through acquisition may be less feasible than technology purchase 
through other methods. In the context of the strategic 
opportunities available to both large and small firms and 
the opportunity costs of developing particular projects,
consideration is now given to the strategic and economic 
rationale for inward licensing as an alternative to other 
available options for technology purchase, explored above.
1 For example, Rio Tinto Zinc pic, where the author was 
employed between 1975 and 1979. In 1983 this company 
owned 534 subsidiary companies throughout the world.
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F. THE STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INWARD LICENSING
The strategic and economic rationales for companies licensing
'in' probably differs from the rationales for licensing 'out'.
While licensing 'out' can be seen as a market diversification
process in many cases, licensing 'in' is probably more commonly
used as a method of product diversification. For smaller firms
licensing 'in' could probably also be an important crisis
prevention technique in some cases enabling a product or process
to be introduced quickly. Many companies act as either
licensees or licensors suggesting different strategies within
the two groups of firms. The literature describing the
reasons for and process of licensing 'in' appears to be even
(2)
less extensive than that for licensing 'out'. This may be
because licensing 'out' is a recognised method of market 
development while licensing in is evaluated as a crisis process 
or failure on the part of the licensee, to develop his own 
technology. Licensing 'in' is a function that is difficult to 
classify within the firm. Unlike outward licensing it does not 
fall within either the marketing or Research and Development 
function.
1. Hankinson, A. op.cit.
2. Several studies treat licensing as if it were a process in 
which the licensor was always proactive, with licensees as 
passive partners. See for example, Telesio, P. op.cit and 
Wilson, R W . op.cit. The empirical work described in 
Chapter 6 below would indicate that in many cases it is in 
fact the licensee who is the proactive partner, particularly 
in the case of smaller firms.
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The strategic and economic rationales for inward licensing 
probably also differ in several respects, within companies, from 
the process of licensing 'out'. There are however, considered to 
be several areas in which licensee and licensor rationales may 
coincide. These might occur for example in attempts to overcome 
tariff barriers, geographical barriers, or in the organisation of 
market sharing/cartel arrangements. Factors specific to inward 
licensing may be classified under the following headings - 
Development costs; Speed? Technology Push; Diversification 
Factors and Other Strategic Factors.
1. Development Cost Factors
Product development costs for many technologies, as suggested in 
previous chapters appear to be increasing over time. Such cost 
increases may prove to be a substantial barrier to smaller firms 
unable easily to raise development finance. The result of 
such processes may be to reduce the capability of smaller firms to 
enter new markets by the introduction of new products . 
Technological progress in the microcomputer markets (for example) 
demonstrates this process.
Even larger companies may find it difficult to spend enough to
(2)
stay above technological thresholds in all their technologies.
1. See for example Financial Times, 21.5.82, 'Big Boys Muscle 
in on Minicomputer Market'
2. Steed, G op.cit.
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In such instances, inward licensing may appear an attractive
alternative to 'in-house' R & D in some cases, particularly
(1)where a specific innovation is required. Such licensing
activity suggests, however, that there is no market conflict 
between licensor and licensee, which in the case of multinational 
firms may frequently not be the case.
Many smaller firms, concentrating on 'national' markets, may be 
less likely to be competitors with potential licensees than larger 
firms. In addition, development costs may be so high in some 
cases that 'in-house' development of particular technologies may 
be impracticable for them. In such cases, inward licensing may 
be a suitable alternative method of obtaining that technology.
It is suggested therefore, that the use of inward licensing 
can, in principle, extend the technological capability of smaller 
firms into areas they might otherwise not be able to enter.
The rationale of both large and small firms in inward licensing to 
overcome Research and Development costs may, therefore, be 
different. While larger firms may be able to take a longer
term strategic view that licensing 'in' provides a cheaper way of 
entering a new market than 'in-house' development, smaller firms 
may be forced to this conclusion by other factors.
1. Teece, D J. op.cit. p.19. "From the buyers point of view it is 
clear that transfer is often the least expensive method of 
acquiring access to an innovation".
Teece also states that ........ (licensing) "is perhaps the
lowest risk route to the acquisition of technical ability 
and excellence in manufacturing".
—260—
If their strategy is to break into new markets where there 
are high threshold development costs, the only way of overcoming 
these costs may be to collaborate with others who have the 
resources to develop the technology in question. In such cases 
the smaller licensee may be able to offer local marketing 
expertise to its larger licensor, in exchange for a transfer of 
technology.
A strategy of survival, which may be a major impetus for many 
small firms, could also lead to the use of licensing to overcome 
research and development costs. Such reactive licensing, to 
meet external threats or take advantage of opportunities, could 
provide such firms with a method of competing with larger rivals, 
at a smaller cost than 'in-house' development. The implications 
of this are explored in more detail in the following chapter.
2. Speed Factors
Companies may require technology quickly for several reasons. 
Realisation that a product is becoming obsolete; Introduction of 
a new product by a competitor; Changes in legislation for 
pollution control or safety standards or increasing customer 
resistance, may all be factors leading to a requirement for new 
product introduction.
While, as noted above, the Product Life Cycle concept is not 
universally accepted, products do become obsolescent in particular
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instances and are superseded by improved technology. In such cases, 
particularly where management has miscalculated the rate of 
technological change, a gap may arise between the launch time 
for new 'in-house' developed products and the realistic life span 
of current product l i n e s . L i c e n s i n g  can provide a product 
to fill both the time and the market gap in some cases. For 
smaller firms subject to high sensitivity to and less control 
over market forces, licensing may provide enhanced flexibility 
in the introduction of new products to replace ageing product 
lines in particular cases.
Similarly, competitive pressures lead to a realisation by management 
that lead times on 'in-house' developments may be unrealistically 
long if market developments are to be countered. Once again, 
licensing can provide the speed and flexibility to overcome the 
time problem in principle.
Lastly, introduction by government agencies of legislation may
have important negative effects on firms'product lines. Such
cases could occur in the pollution control, pharmaceutical and 
( 2)
other industries, but could apply equally to safety regulations
1. Sunday Times 15.11.81, p.61. British Leylands Triumph Acclaim, 
manufactured under licence from Honda was introduced only 
18 months after agreement was reached to license. An 'in-house' 
designed car would have taken four years to bring to production.
2. See for example Financial Times 29.6.82. 'Men and Matters'
This case describes the banning by UK health authorities of 
small amounts of chloroform in 'Victory V  lozenges, leading to 
a change in formulation followed by customer resistance and a 
drop in sales of 25%.
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introduced to protect consumers in toys, paint, food and other 
industries. Where legislation is introduced,technology may have 
to be acquired quickly so that products can remain "within the 
law". Licensing could have a major role to play here in 
transferring technology to overcome such problems.
3. Technology Push
The concept of technolgoy push has been explored in some depth 
above. Introduction of a new technology may supersede existing 
techniques in a major or a minor way. However, replacement of 
existing plant might not always be necessary as the result of the 
introduction of a new process or technology by a competitor. In 
many instances, production utilising existing technology might 
still be cheaper than purchasing new technology, since the 
existing plant could already have been amortised, and could 
therefore be viewed as a sunk cost while production under the 
new technology would have to be priced to take account of the 
cost of new machinery. However, in other cases the new technology 
might be so superior that the older technology was rendered 
o b s o l e t e . S u c h  instances of revolutionary technology change 
may however be relatively infrequent. More frequently, the 
improved technology can give a long term advantage to its owner 
that competing firms must try to overcome. In such cases.
1. As for example in the case of the introduction of the 
transistor as a replacement for valve radios.
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licensing 'in' from that competitor where possible, may be more 
advantageous than attempting to design around the technology.
This would particularly apply where the potential licensee had 
no conflict in his markets with the licensor.
Lastly, customer resistance to a product may occur through 
changes in fashion or for other non-technical reasons over which 
the firm may have no control. Such changes in demand are probably 
particularly difficult to plan for. Specific industries may be 
particularly prone to changes in fashion. The toy industry, for 
example, is suggested to be particularly 'fashion conscious' 
as suggested above. In such industries exploitation of a 
product over a short life cycle may be enhanced by the utilisation 
of licensing agreements. The potential for licensing 'in' in 
such industries is therefore likely to be high.
4. Diversification
Diversification through inward licensing may be unusual in the 
case of multinational firms able to acquire technology through the 
purchase of complete companies rather than purchasing the 
technology alone. In such companies, a 'portfolio' of companies 
rather than technologies may be built up, as the structure of many 
'conglomerate' firms suggests. The choice for diversification in 
such firms may therefore be between 'in-house' R & D and
1. As for example in the Pilkington float glass process. This 
case and the importance of licensing to the company is 
further explored on page 272.
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company purchase. Smaller firms probably have a different choice, 
between 'in-house' development or technology purchase via licensing 
or other co-operative agreements. An exploration of the utilisation 
of licensing in the diversification strategies of smaller firms 
forms a major part of the empirical work below.
5. Other Strategic Factors
Licensing 'in' as a strategy can be explored in the context of 
the short term or long term development of the company. In the 
short term it may provide a company with the ability to overcome 
a particular technological problem or product portfolio 'gap' 
at lower cost than 'in-house' development, and in a shorter time 
scale. As part of 'crisis management' therefore, and within a 
strategy of survival, inward licensing may be important to large 
and small firms in some cases. As a longer term strategy, 
licensing 'in' may also be important to both larger and smaller 
firms. For larger firms such licensing could be important within 
a strategy for the utilisation of cross-licensing agreements with 
other companies to achieve a higher technological capability 
than would otherwise be the case. The smaller firm might benefit 
by inward licensing carried out to overcome threshold barriers 
that would otherwise prevent it from entering particular markets.
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G. THE SCOPE OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING
Probably any technology that can be defined either explicitly or
implicitly can be licensed. However, factors such as the
transferability of the technology per se and the status of the
recipient of the technology are probably more important in
defining the level of licensing activity in practice. Because
of the nature of the available s t a t i s t i c s ^ , disaggregating
the returns due to licensing from other sources of economic
(2)
activity can be difficult.
In particular countries and industries the use of licensing 
may be more widespread than in others, since the requirement for 
and transferability of different technologies may differ, as 
will such factors as the history of collaborative agreements and 
ease of access to advice about the technology transfer process. 
However, in light of the objectives of this thesis, it is 
probably important to define the levels of trade in technology 
per se and the potential returns accruing to such trade.
1. Until 1970 the UK Department of Trade kept detailed statistics 
of licensing activity. These now appear aggregated into 
broader statistics. See for exanple, 'British Business' 
12.6.81, Payments and Receipts on Overseas Royalties. h m sO
2. Definition of what comprises a 'licensing agreement' may also 
be difficult. While licensing of patents clearly accounts 
for a substantial proportion of licence income, the licensing 
of 'know-how' and income defined as consultancy or aid fees 
is less easily measured. For this reason much licensing 
activity may go unrecorded in the statistics.
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1. United Kingdom and International Trade in Technology
Internationally, receipts due to licensing activity comprise only 
a small (though growing) proportion of the total trade in goods 
and services. Statistical evidence on the total amount of 
licensing is, however, difficult to obtain. Few national statistical 
offices record licence income and expenditure separately.
However, while licensing receipts may account for only a small 
proportion of total trade receipts, they may comprise a dis­
proportionate proportion of profit within particular industries
(2)
and at a company level. Conversely the costs to a licensee
industry or company may comprise a high percentage 'tax' upon 
profit levels. A consideration of the profitability of
licensing activity as a whole may therefore be pertinent in 
considering the strategic and economic importance of licensing 
per se.
An in depth exploration of the UK national and international 
trade in technology is only relevant in this thesis, with its 
emphasis on the strategic use of licensing by smaller firms,as a 
background to the environment in which such companies must operate.
An analysis of UK trade in technology was, however, made as part
1. In the UK however, licensing receipts and expenditures 
are listed separately.
2. Pilkington Bros. pic. accounts 1980/81/82. Licensing 
income accounted for an average of 47% of the total profits 
over this period. See page 272..
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of the Leverhulme project referred to above.
Other authors have carried out major research in analysing the
(2 )
flow of technology royalties between countries over time , and
these suggest that the UK performance in its technology balance
has been relatively good in comparison with other major
industrialised nations. However, this conclusion in view of an
(2)
apparently declining performance in UK innovative activity , 
does require explanation. Davies and Rosser suggest that the 
explanation lies in past economic strength, the time lag effect, 
a shift in production from the UK to overseas, leading to a 
reverse flow of profits, or to a perception of the UK as a 
'technology middleman*, importing from advanced countries and 
exporting to developing countries.
Historically, licensing has probably been used by some countries 
as part of a strategic process of technology management. The 
Japanese,for exanple, used licensing in a highly proactive manner, 
to reconstruct and develop their industries after the second
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K. Technology Licensing and 
British Industry. Paper presented to Small Business 
Conference in York, 1982.
2. Davies H and Rosser N. 'International Trade in 
Technology - A Survey' in Technology Licensing and 
the Growing Firm by Lowe J and Crawford N K. Pergamon 
Press, 1984.
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world war. Such licensing activity in monetary terms was
probably not a particularly significant factor in total trade 
terms. Its economic significance however, in fostering the 
growth of m o dem industry in Japan is incalculable.
Study of the Japanese use of licensing has been made by several 
authors in some d e t a i l . A n  analysis of its extent and 
importance are beyond the scope of this thesis however, with 
its theme of the smaller firm, and will not therefore be 
considered further here.
It is also clear from the statistics that a majority of 
licensing is carried out between companies in the developed 
countries rather than between developed and developing countries. 
Of the remainder, possibly a majority occurs between large multi­
national firms and firms or governments in less developed 
countries. This is probably important in the context of the 
study here, into the licensing activities of smaller firms.
1. See for example Tsurumi Y, 'Technology Transfer and 
Foreign Trade - The Case of Japan' unpublished PhD 
thesis. Harvard Business School, 1968.
Japan used selective technology licensing agreements to 
promote particular industries. This led to a severe 
negative balance of payments on the technology account. 
In 1980 however, on new licence agreements. Japan swung 
into balance (of 38.6 million pounds). See Financial 
Times 12.6.81 reporting statistics by the Japanese 
Economic Journal.
2. Contractor F. op.cit. Contractor suggests that three- 
quarters of all licensing activity is carried out 




Licensing activity can be viewed in terms of an agreement between
licensor and licensee to exploit a particular market using the
licensors technology and the licensee's production and marketing
skills. The licensor is thus exploiting the fruits of his
research and development expenditure through the licensee. Analysis
of the returns to licensing can therefore be made in two ways : as
a measure of the return made by the licensor on his R & D
expenditure, or as a measure of the proportion of profit from
that market obtained by each of the two p a r t i e s . I n  this
process the pricing of the licence is clearly a critical factor,
(2)
which can prove to be problematical in many cases.
Analysis of returns to licensing as a proportion of the cost to 
the licensor of carrying out R & D may be difficult to ascertain, 
particularly where company R & D expenditures are not disaggregated 
to particular projects. A further complication can arise when 
exploitation is made by the licensor of the technology in its 
home market through the production of g o o d s . H o w e v e r ,  the 
marginal profit obtained by the licensor can be very high if the
1. With the assumption made that the liconsae exploits the market 
equally as effectively as could the licensor through direct 
export.
2. Finnegan, M B and Mintz, H H. 'Determination of a Reasonable 
Royalty in Negotiating a Licensing AGreement'. Licensing 
Law and Business Report (New York) 1978
3. Since in this case development costs may be viewed as expenditure 
that would have been made whether or not licensing of the technology 
was made. Returns to licensing could therefore be offset against 
negotiation and administration costs only, clearly giving a
much higher apparent return than if R & D costs were also taken 
into account.
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transaction and support costs involved in the licence agreement 
are not too h i g h . I t  seems apparent therefore that profitability 
can only realistically be calculated on the basis of particular 
cases and in the context of each agreement being subject to 
licensor policy factors being taken into account.
Analysis of the proportion of returns divided between licensor and
licensee provides, perhaps, a more fruitful method of ascertaining
the profitability of licensing in general in comparison with
direct exploitation of a market by means of export. Even here,
however, non-monetary returns such as cross-licence agreements or
provision of reciprocal facilities etc. may provide a 'hidden*
income or advantage to the licensor. In the case of smaller
firms as suggested above, such income may be concealed as
consultancy or expense fees or payment for technical assistance.
rather than in monetary payments as royalties or fixed fees
(2)
subject to taxation. Wilson suggests that licensors typically 
obtain 25% of the total profit obtained by the exploitation of 
a licence.
1. Contractor F J. op.cit. Contractor suggests a potential 
return of 4500% and this is supported by the empirical 
work reported below.
2. Wilson, R W. op.cit.
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It is clear that in some cases licensing can be extremely 
profitable to individual f i r m s . I n  the case of Pilkington 
Glass a relatively small firm in world terms, licence income was 
almost as important as trading profit in the success of the 
company between 19 79/80 and 1983/84.
A detailed investigation of the profitability of licensing as 
it relates to the small firm sector lies outside the scope of 
this thesis. This subject was investigated as part of the
(2)
empirical studies under the Leverhulme project. This study
suggested that the decision to utilise outward licensing in 
smaller firms usually occurred following development of a 
successful product rather than as part of a planned strategy 
prior to that produces development. Returns accruing to such 
products as a percentage of transaction costs could be high, 
averaging more than two hundred per cent.
1. See for example Pilkington Bros pic. Report and Financial 
Statements Year ended 31.3.84. Licensing income over a 
five year period was recorded as:
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Sales £m 629 787 959 1022 1214
Trading Profit £m 49 48 27 41 77
Licence income £m 37 35 39 28 24
2. Lowe J and Crawford N K. 'Outward Licensing as a Marketing 
Strategy - An Analysis of Returns' Paper presented at 
Conference on Technology Licensing, Bath University,
May 1983.
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H. LARGE AND SMALL FIRM LICENSING
It was suggested above that multinational and other large firms 
may consider the licensing option as a matter of course in their 
policy, strategic and tactical decision making. Licensing 
departments staffed with licensing executives and patent lawyers 
can provide for such firms a pool of experience that is a 
continuing resource. Continuing consideration of the licensing 
option per se is therefore probably part of the ethos and 
culture of many such firms. Licensing departments are probably 
necessary for large conglomerate or multinational concerns 
transferring intellectual property both within and outside their 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . S m a l l e r  firms, however, probably frequently 
have little prior experience of licensing and therefore little 
'in-house' expertise. They may therefore have difficulty in 
identifying suitable skills to call upon in the negotiation of 
licence agreements. The process by which such firms decide to 
utilise licensing is explored in some depth in the following 
chapter, with particular reference to its role in strategies of 
diversification. Few studies appear to have been undertaken 
in the past into the use of the licensing option by smaller 
firms.
1. Indeed, receipts for related (i.e. inter-firm) transfers
accounted for more than 50% of receipts and 80% of expenditures 
on royalties in the Uk in 1979 and this would indicate that 
larger firms carry out the majority of licensing activity. 
Source - British Business 12.6.81.
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Differentiation of the rationale, utilisation and process of 
licensing in larger and smaller firms is probably important in 
defining the special problems and advantages that impinge on 
such firms. Differences between large and small firms in 
licensing policy can be considered under two headings - Policy 
Factors and Information Provision and Resource Availability.
1. Policy Factors
A major objective of many smaller firms has already been suggested 
to be survival and i n d e p e n d e n c e , with profit maximisation as 
a secondary objective. Larger firms probably have different 
priorities based in part upon their different stakeholder profiles 
While profit maximisation is clearly an objective in larger firms, 
it is possible that the maximisation of managerial remuneration 
and position may be an equally important factor in understanding 
the rationales of large company management. This factor may also 
be important in understanding the different licensing objectives 
of large and small firms. While small firm managements might 
perceive such agreements as reducing control of their technology 
portfolios, larger firm management might see licensing (particularly 
'cross-licensing') as a method of increasing the 'robustness' of 
their firms against outside pressures.
See Chapter 2.
-274-
2. Information Provision and Resource Availability
Many larger firms have licensing departments devoted solely to 
the exploitation of their technology portfolios,and the transfer 
of technology into and out of the organisation. Such departments 
provide the resources to carry out licensing that may not be 
available in the smaller firm, with its concentration of 
functions in a smaller number of individuals. Within the larger 
firm, therefore, technology licensing may be considered as 
normal practice. In smaller firms this may not always be the 
case.
The presence of a licensing department probably stimulates the 
use of the technique within larger firms. The opportunity cost 
of technology licensing may also be higher in small than in large 
firms. This might suggest that agreements between large and 
small firms could be beneficial to both parties in exploiting 
the legal and licensing skills of the larger firms in transferring 
technological skills to and from smaller f i r m s . H o w e v e r ,  the 
evidence suggests that such transfers can be problematical in 
some cases.
1. Lowe J and Crawford, N.K. Licensing Between Large and 




It has been a major objective within this chapter to review the 
strategic and economic role that technology licensing can play in 
the product and market development policies of all firms.
The factors that might cause smaller firms to consider and use 
licensing are explored in Chapter 6. It is clear that technology 
licensing is an important area of economic activity that has, 
possibly, not received sufficient attention in the literature. 
Statistics defining the volume of resource flows pertaining to 
its use are therefore either lacking in detail, incomplete or 
are subsumed within other statistical data.
The majority of licensing is clearly carried out by larger 
conç>anies, often transferring technology between divisions 
within the firm, but across national boundaries in many cases.
In the context of this thesis, such transfers are only directly 
relevant in a consideration of developing knowledge of licensing 
techniques. Since the skills of individuals play a large part 
in successful licensing, the effect of large firm licensing in 
increasing those skill levels may be important in promoting the 
use of licensing amongst smaller firms. Technologies may be 
licensed out from larger companies, while personnel may change 
employment from large to smaller concerns.
The scope of technology licensing has been shown to encompass a 
wide variety of industries. Many of these are the 'high 
technology' research intensive industries where licensing can
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be used to exploit technical advantage without the need to enter 
markets directly, through export. It is suggested that such 
licensing can be used to overcome tariff barriers. It is also 
clear however, that much licensing is not in the high technology
industries, and this may be important in defining the strategic
role that licensing can play. Export of intellectual property
to third world countries endeavouring to raise their levels of
technological expertise may account for many such transfers where 
obsolescent or labour intensive techniques are transferred.
The scale of technology licensing both amongst small and large 
firms may be growing. As communication methods increase in 
effectiveness and levels of competition increase, it might be 
anticipated that the scale of technology licensing might also 
grow as companies used licensing and cross-licensing agreements 
as a strategic tool to compete on an international scale. In 
some industries, where process licensing is important, such as 
pharmaceuticals, it appears that this situation has already been 
reached. Larger firms may seek to exploit markets dominated by 
strongly entrenched competitors by co-operating with them through 
cross-licensing arrangements.
A further rationale for the use of licensing, particularly 
amongst smaller firms, may be the increasing cost of surmounting 
threshold levels of research and development. Licensing may 
extend the ability of such firms to compete in markets through 
the introduction of products that could not be developed 'in- 
house' because of resource limitations. This would also suggest
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increased co-operation amongst firms in areas beyond licensing 
such as co-operative research and development programmes^ 
prior to product commercialisation. Such development suggests 
that the most suitable way of considering licensing is as a 
strategic tool, conferring enhanced flexibility and a 
competitive advantage to the firm in some cases. It is to the 
issues that surround strategic licensing in smaller firms that 
the following chapter is devoted.
1. As supported for example through the ALVEY scheme in the 




TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND STRATEGIC PRODUCT PLANNING 
IN SMALL MANUFACTURING COMPANIES
A INTRODUCTION
The first part of this thesis considered the small firm under the 
headings of 'Business Policy', 'Diversification' and 'Technological 
Change'. The major objective of the analyses carried out in these 
sections was to build a base upon which the utilisation of 
technology licensing (TL) could be considered.
Part II of the thesis is divided into two parts. First, an 
exploration was made in Chapter Five of Technology Licensing per se. 
It is the objective of this chapter to draw information from the 
preceding work in a consideration of the strategic issues impinging 
upon the utilisation of TL within smaller firms. The chapter is 
structured around an initial evaluation and summary of the factors 
that might affect the development of product and market strategies 
within small firms and the relationship these factors might have to 
the use of TL.
Various hypotheses evolve from earlier work reported on in the 
thesis and a preliminary examination of some early case studies of 
TL. Further empirical work to test these hypotheses was carried 
out through case studies of the remainder of a forty case sample.
These were small and medium sized firms which had utilised inward 
or outward TL in their new product and market development. The 
empirical studies consider whether larger numbers of small 
manufacturing firms could utilise TL and endeavour to identify 
those practical barriers that might prevent them from doing so 
in the context of the hypotheses generated below.
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B TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND SMALL FIRMS (Some Evolving Hypotheses
What are the factors that suggest the use of TL over other forms 
of market realisation for small firms ? Identification of such 
factors and exploration of the development of a business and 
technology strategy integrating the use of TL is considered below.
It was suggested in Chapter Two, that one of the major competitive 
advantages of smaller firms was an ability to react quickly to 
environmental changes. Such flexibility might be a function of 
size, and, possibly, lower capital intensity. This might lead to 
the potential for resources to be reallocated from one activity 
to another quickly. Flexibility was also suggested to encompass 
the faster integration of techniques and hence TL might be 
anticipated, in principle, to be quickly accepted by small firms.
It is probably pertinent to consider those issues that might affect 
the process of strategic decision making through evaluation of 
internal and external pressures upon the firm. Each pressure is 
likely to have an effect upon the firm but may also be inter­
connected with other pressures. Such pressures can be illustrated 
diagramatically (Figure 6.1 below). It is suggested that certain 
of the pressures may cause changes within adjacent segments and 
hence the 'factors' may be interconnected. However, for clarity 
it is probably relevant to consider them separately here.
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In view of the issues raised in previous chapters and the 
descriptive work therein, it is considered that the 'environment 
of the firm' can be described in terms of the following factors. 
Internal pressures encompassing the role of strategic planning; 
company organisation; company culture; product profiles and 
technological skills. External pressures include market constraints 
and opportunities; forms of competition; the availability of*venture' 
funding; societal and cultural factors and lastly, government 
policy. It is suggested that any stimulus to the utilisation of 
TL may arise from one and be affected by several of these factors.
The 'segments' of the diagram are considered below. In view of the 
substantial descriptive and empirical work in previous chapters 
which is also covered by the headings here, references are made 
to these chapters where necessary, to avoid repetition within the 
text, as is reference to previous evidence upon which hypotheses 
are also based. The hypotheses were derived through a process of 
induction from the theoretical and empirical work described in 
previous chapters, and deduction from the evidence of a small number 
of preliminary case s t u d i e s b u t  tested against a previously 
untouched sample of cases.
1. See page 314
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Figure 6.1
Factors Impinging upon Product Policy and the Use of Licensing 



























Since smaller firms are likely, because of their size, to be less
'functionally specialised' than larger firms, it is unlikely that
a majority of such firms would have a 'licensing manager.' This
might suggest the lack of a previous culture of TL within the
firm. Licensing might therefore, only be used if it was
triggered by a stimulus arising from outside or within the
firm. Such a trigger signal could arise as a perception that
new products were required or through pressures to change
(2)
organisational activity. A possible framework for modelling
this process is suggested in Figure 6.5 below (Licensing Trigger 
Signals). Internally founded signals could arise from the 
following sources.
(a) Strategic Planning
It was suggested a b o v e t h a t  many smaller firms develop
product and market strategies in a relatively unplanned manner.
Such strategies may frequently arise as a reaction to rather
(4)
than in anticipation of events. In the utilisation of TL,
1. Thomas, R.E. Business Policy, op.cit.
2. See for example Norburn, D and Grinyer, P. 'Directors
without Direction'. Journal of General Management, Vol.l
No. 2, 1973/74
3. Chapter 2
4. Johnson G and Scholes K, op.cit.
The authors suggest that "it is highly unlikely that 
sophisticated strategic models will be used in small 
companies where less time consuming approaches may 
prove valuable."
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purchase or sale of technology might indicate a willingness on 
the part of management to relinquish some control over either its 
product line development (in the case of purchase) or its market 
development (in the case of sale). Clearly, such development 
could arise as a result of recognition by management that it did 
not possess the resources effectively to carry out such functions 
•in-house'. Alternatively, the use of TL might arise as the 
result of an ad hoc event or from impetuses arising from the 
organisational or cultural type of the firm. Consideration of 
the work carried out in Chapters 2 and 3 above, suggested that 
many smaller firms approached policy formulation in a relatively 
unstructured manner, but that a smaller sub-set had developed 
into new, diversified product/market areas as the result of 
more positive decision taking.
If progressive small firms had diversified and developed new 
products proactively, it is relevant to consider if equivalent 
use had been made of TL. The first of the hypotheses to be tested 
here can therefore be expressed as:-
'Technology Licensing is used Proactively by many Small Firms in 
their New Product/Market Development Strategies.'
(b) Company Organisation and Growth Factors 
The quality and structure of the organisation of any small 
company is likely to be defined by both company history and 
objectives of current Directors. The organisational structure
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may be an important factor in the successful introduction of new 
ideas, techniques or development into new areas of expertise. 
Attempts to change from traditional to radically new strategies 
may be resisted if sufficiently strong 'coalitions of interest' 
exist within the firm.
The organisational structures of many smaller firms may reflect 
such pressures. However, in the case of owner managed companies, 
such pressures might be less powerful. However, in such cases, 
failure to develop from an autocratic to a more delegated 
management structure may also inhibit g r o w t h . I n t r o d u c t i o n  
of new techniques, such as the use of TL, may therefore also be 
affected by internal organisational structures.
Organisational development may frequently lag behind the growth 
in company size, particularly in fast growth companies. In such 
instances ineffective organisational structures could become a 
constraint upon the development of the company. This could 
occur at the change from 'small' to 'medium' size. TL might
1. See for example Cyert R and March J. 'A Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm Prentice Hall, 1963
2. Johnson and Scholes, op.cit.
3. Curran J and Stanworth J. 'The Way of the Small Businessman' 
New Society, August 1971
The authors suggest that some small firms become 'frozen' 
at a particular size because of lack of management skills 
and a disinclination by owner managers to delegate.
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have a role to play here, in assisting small firms to break 
through growth barriers by reducing the amount of management 
resources that might have to be expended on the development of 
a new product or market. By utilising TL effectively to 
sub-contract the development or export functions, smaller firms 
might be able to overcome such barriers. Inward licensing, by 
providing, in principle, more resources per unit of Research and 
Development expenditure, could lead to more 'complex' products 
being developed. Conversely outward licensing, by allowing more 
effective exploitation of current product lines might also allow 
turnover related to those products to increase. Thus TL could 
be seen as a resource conservation process. Clearly, this 
would also have implications in assisting the firm to obtain 
products or enter markets that it would otherwise be unable to 
exploit. This leads to a second hypothesis, that:-
Technology Licensing Assists Small Firms in Overcoming Managerial
(1)and Technological Threshold Barriers.
(c) Cultural Factors
Describing and understanding organisational behaviour and 
investigating the 'culture' of the firm appears to be assuming 
a greater importance in attempts to understand the development
1. See also 'e' 'Technological Skills' below
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processes of firms than h i t h e r t o . T o  an extent, such a
( 2 )
change in emphasis builds upon earlier work in the field.
Company 'culture' may be an important factor in the use or 
non-use of TL by small firms. Clearly, the use of technology 
licensed 'in' from outside or licensed 'out' to others, suggests 
a willingness on the part of management to accept outside 
influences in the development of its business. Clearly some 
firms do have 'cultures' more accesible to outside influences 
than others: hence previous classifications of firms as 'parochial', 
'progressive' or 'adaptive' or as thrusters and sleepers.
Introduction of new techniques such as the use of TL could, 
therefore, arise in response to the recruitment of particular 
individuals, changing the culture of the firm. Conversely, the 
introduction of new technology through the use of T1 or other 
techniques could itself have a powerful effect upon the firm's 
c u l t u r e a s  old demarcation lines for particular functional
1. See for example.
Miles, R E & Snow, C.C. 'Organizational Strategy Structure 
and Process. McGraw Hill, 1978
Berry, D. 'The Perils of Trying to Change Corporate Culture' 
Financial Times, 14.12.83
2. See for example, Cyert R and March J. 'A Behavioural Theory 
of the Firm' op.cit.
3. Carter, S.F. and Williams, B.R. Industry and Technical Progress 
Oxford University Press, 1957
4. Political and Economic Planning ^Attitudes in British 
Industry. Penguin Books, 1956
5. See for example Heller, F.A. 'Financial Times' letter 5.9.83
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activities within the firm changed. Resistance to such change 
might, in the case of TL, manifest itself as the Not Invented 
Here (NIH) effect.
(d) Product Portfolio Factors
The balance of products within product portfolios can clearly
cause important pressures for strategic change within smaller
firms, as can the type of industry within which that firm is
operating. A high level of technological innovation within
particular industries may lead to pressures at the company level,
to innovate, diversify or change the balance of current product
portfolios. Where licensing is used within an industry as a 
(2)
matter of course this may lead the firm to consider it at an 
early stage in its development.
Product portfolios can be analysed, as suggested in Chapter 2, 
through a consideration of the cash inputs and outputs accruing 
to particular p r o d u c t s . H o w e v e r ,  a consideration of the 
product and technology life cycles in conjunction with such an 
analysis may also provide a particularly useful framework in any 
consideration of the use of inward or outward licensing by 
smaller firms. The cash flow implications of utilising inward 
and outward licensing can be demonstrated diagrammatically, as
1. See for example - Purkis, A 'Observations on Understanding
and Absorbing New Technology'. Paper given at conference
on Buying and Selling Technology. Bath University, 9.83
2. The extent and use of TL varies widely between industries.
See for example Davies H and Rosser N. 'International Trade
in Technology - A Survey* op.cit.
3. Boston Consulting Group, op.cit. Chapter 2
-289-
in the two Cost Revenue Models below. (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
The first Cost Revenue Model suggests that the cash flow 
implications of inward licensing can be highly positive, early 
in the product development cycle. However, a penalty is paid 
later as royalty levels increase with sales of the product.
The implication of the first cost revenue model is that inward 
TL can lead to reductions in Research and Development Costs, an 
improvement in Cash flows and to the faster introduction of new 
products. This might suggest that TL could assist small firms 
to diversify into new areas, particularly where resource constraints 
existed.
Outward licensing, as modelled in the second Cost Revenue Model,
could occur at one of up to six points, as an idea, prototype,
pre-production or production model or during the growth or decline 
(2)
of that product. At each of these points the potential
revenue from TL might be anticipated to increase. However, the 
potential revenue from 'in-house' manufacturing and marketing 
might also be anticipated to increase.
1. It is suggested that it might be illuminating to compare 
discounted cash flows for paired samples of inward licensed 
and 'in-house' developed products. This has not been 
attempted here however.
2. Possibly paralleling 'Research and Development', 'Star' 
'Problem', 'Cash Cow' and 'Dog' under the Boston 
classification as explored in Chapter 2.
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Figure 6.2 Cash Flow Implications of Inward Licensing
Cash
Flows
Cost Revenue Model I
  Royalty Costs
Typical cash flow 
profile for 
licensed product
Typical cash flow profile for 






Figure 6.3 Cash Flow Implications of Ouward Licensing






A - Idea 
B - Prototype 
C - Preproducticjji 
D - Production 
E - Growth 
F - Decline
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The second Cost Revenue Model suggests that licensing 'out' 
might be attractive if both manufacture in home markets and 
licensing out to other markets could be achieved simultaneously. 
The model suggests that if research and development costs 
become too high for continued support, a return could still be 
achieved from that product through licensing. It is therefore 
pertinent to consider the pressures upon a smaller firm to out- 
license at each of the 'decision points' A-F in the second model.
Licensing a product idea 'out' might occur because the 'idea' 
did not fit in with current or potential skills, or because the 
costs of development and manufacture were considered too high. 
Without patent protection however, an 'idea' would be likely to 
be relatively valueless. However, once patented and produced in 
prototype, the product would be likely to become a more valuable 
intellectual property. Licensing 'out' could then be attractive 
as a means of obtaining a return on development costs. The same 
situation could apply both to the pre-production and production 
stages of the product. High production or marketing costs might 
force the small licensor to consider selling his technology.
Once again, any buyer would be effectively purchasing the sunk 
R & D resources that had been expended on that product.
At the 'production' and growth stages (D and E), the attractions 
of licensing out in home markets would be low, since these stages 
correspond to the 'star' and 'cash cow' classifications under the 
Boston terminology. However, since the product would then have 
a 'track record' the potential for licensing 'out' into other
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markets may increase. The licensor may, therefore, be able to 
seek a higher price for his technology. In the final or decline
stage, the licensor may once again find difficulty in finding
potential licensees.
One implication of the two Cost Revenue Models is that smaller 
firms might utilise TL to enter new home markets with products 
licensed 'in' from abroad, and to exploit overseas markets with 
current products licensed 'out'. By utilising cash flows from 
successful products to cross subsidise such developments, the 
smaller firms could, in principle, develop strategies to develop
their markets utilising TL.
Consideration of the Cost Revenue Models therefore suggests a 
third hypothesis, that:-
Technology Licensing Allows Small Firms to Obtain Products and 
Enter New Markets at Lower Cost and Reduced Risk than through 
other forms of Development.
The hypothesis is also suggested by the observation in Chapter 3 
(Diversification), that some small firms do enter new markets 
as they grow in size, and that this process may also occur 
more in small than medium or larger f i r m s . C l e a r l y ,  if the 
costs of entering new markets could be reduced this would be
1. See also Hankinson, A. 'Investment Behaviour of Small 
Firms.' op.cit.
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likely to be advantageous to smaller firms intent upon a growth 
strategy through product development, but restricted by resource 
constraints.
(e) Technological Skills
In previous chapters it was suggested that lack of resources 
might prevent small firms capitalising on strengths in inventing 
new products. Such resource constraints might also prevent some 
smaller firms from developing balanced product portfolios.
However, within narrowly defined technological areas, smaller 
firms may be able to build high levels of skills. In endeavouring 
to compete with larger firms in wider markets, the high cost of 
achieving threshold research expenditures might preclude such 
firms from effective c o m p e t i t i o n . T h u s  some smaller firms 
might have no option but retreat from such technological
(2)
thresholds unless means could be found to overcome them.
Purchase of technology through inward licensing might provide 
smaller firms with a method of overcoming threshold barriers 
through the avoidance or reduction of development costs. Thus 
smaller firms with limited Research and Development facilities 
might be able to obtain products through TL that they would be 
unable to develop themselves. The suggestion that small firms 
do utilise TL in this manner is explored in the second hypothesis 
(above).
1. Steed, G op.cit.
2. See Chapter 4
-294-
2. External Considerations
The 'external environment' can also probably be viewed as a 
series of stimuli impinging upon the firm. In Chapter 2, it 
was suggested that such external stimuli may have a greater 
effect on smaller than larger firms. While larger firms may be 
able to exert certain quasi-monopolist pressures upon the 
environment, in the case of smaller firms this may only be true 
for very small market niches. Environmental effects may be 
difficult to describe or measure. However, consideration of 
external factors is likely to be important in developing successful 
strategies. It has been suggested that environmental factors 
can be modelled within a framework of 'competitive rivalry'.
This suggests that many external stimuli arise from competitors 
or from sources that may become competitors.
An understanding of the response that competitors will make to 
any decision to utilise TL is likely to be an important factor in 
making that decision. Indeed, undertaking inward licensing 
could be a means for entering a market more quickly than a 
potential competitor or reacting quickly to the introduction 
of a product by that competitor. In the context of such 
considerations, the Competitor Analysis Model reproduced below 
is particularly useful in considering TL. While larger firms
1. Porter, M.E. 'Competitive Strategy'. The Free Press, 1980 
See the 'Competitor Analysis Model' below.
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Figure 6.4 The Competitor Analysis Model (1)
What Drives the 
Competitor
FUTURE GOALS
At all levels of Management 
and in Multiple Dimensions
What the Competitor 
is Doing and Can Do
CURRENT STRATEGY
How the Business is 
Currently Competing
COMPETITORS RESPONSE PROFILE
Is the competitor satisfied with his current position 
What likely moves or strategy shifts will competitor make 
Where is the Competitor vulnerable
What will provoke greatest retaliation from competitor
I
ASSUMPTIONS




Both strengths and 
weaknesses
1. This model is reproduced from Porter, M.E. op.cit.
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might be prepared initially to sacrifice profitability to 
increase market s h a r e , s m a l l e r  firms would be unlikely to 
be able to follow this strategy. Hence information on the 
intentions of larger potential competitors could be crucial in 
the licensing decision.
While competitive rivalry is clearly important in the decision 
to utilise TL, other environmental factors may also impinge 
upon this decision. These are now explored under the headings 
of Market Constraints; Forms of Competition; Funding Availability; 
Societal and Cultural Factors, and the potential impact of 
Government Policy.
(a) Market Constraints and Opportunities
It was postulated in Chapter 2 that some small firms may be able 
to survive through exploitation of comparative advantage in 
developing expertise in small market areas. In such 'market 
niches' smaller firms may be able to become dominant suppliers. 
P o r t e r s u g g e s t s  that this strategy may be a key factor in 
overcoming competitive pressures. Identification of suitable 
market niches in which to concentrate could be crucial however, 
and the number of such niches might be limited.
1. See for example, Buzzel, R.D, Gale, B.T. and Sultan, R.G.M. 
'Market Share - A key to Profitability'. Harvard Business 
Review, Jan/Feb 1975
2. Boston Consulting Group, op.cit.
3. Porter, M.E. op.cit.
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Diversification into other small market niches might be restricted 
by entry barriers which could include lack of technological 
expertise or the market strength of already existing suppliers. 
However, TL might offer a means of exploiting such niches, 
particularly in the case of inward licensing. Licensors might 
be prepared to subsidise their licensees to break into such 
markets. New technological developments might also facilitate 
entry to such niches in some instances.
(b) Forms of Competition
Two methods of exploiting markets by small firms were considered 
in Chapter Four. These were described as development of 
technology for small niches, and competition through concentration 
of marketing and other skills. In the former instance entry by 
larger firms might be unattractive in view of the small size of 
the market. In the latter case, competition might be based upon 
enhanced flexibility and service based skills.
Porter suggests that five competitive forces may exist within 
a market. Namely - Entry; Threat of Substitution; Buyers' Bargaining 
Power; Suppliers' Bargainining Power; and Current Competitor Rivalry 
(explored briefly above). The potential for entry to new markets 
by smaller firms was suggested to be restricted by development 
cost factors and high threshold R & D levels. However, other 
factors may also apply. The 'expertise' of companies operating 
within the market may preclude entry by competitors as modelled
1. Porter, M.E. op.cit.
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in the 'Experience Curve' in Chapter Two. However, such 
'experience' could become a disadvantage if technological 
development led to substitute products' becoming available. Such 
substitution might provide a smaller firm with the opportunity 
to attack a new market niche.
The threat of substitution for firms within market niches may be 
more crucial for smaller than larger firms. The latter might be 
able to devote larger resources to prolonging product lines. 
However, smaller firms might be anticipated to be able to react 
more quickly once such a threat had been identified. In such 
instances inward TL could be a potential tool in assisting such 
firms to launch new products quickly.
While suppliers’ and buyers’ bargaining power may affect the decision 
by smaller firms to enter new or lea/e old markets, such factors 
are probably unlikely to impinge upon any decision to utilise TL 
per se. Possibly more relevant to such a decision would be the 
state of current competitor rivalry within current markets and in 
markets under consideration for entry. Cross-licensing 
agreements between potential rivals within particular industries 
may have the effect of reducing such competition in some 
i n s t a n c e s . I n  other industries, competition from outside 
particular geographical areas may be reduced because short product
1. See for example. Contractor, F. International Technology 
Licensing, op.cit.
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life cycles or high transport costs mitigate against direct 
e x p o r t . S u c h  factors might be anticipated to lead to an 
increase in TL levels.
(c) Availability of 'Venture' Funding
One corollary to the availability of funds for development
purposes within the firm is the availability of external
'venture' funding. Clearly, in those cultures where ample
funds and potential investors are available for the development
of new products/technologies, the potential for small firms to
diversify into new areas through 'in-house' development may be
high. Conversely, if development funds were difficult to obtain,
smaller firms might be forced to consider obtaining new technology
through the use of TL or other joint ventures if they wished to
enter new markets. However, availability of funding suggests
a matching demand for that funding. Several commentators
have highlighted the reluctance of some smaller firms in raising
venture capital from outside sources where this involves sale 
(2)
of equity. In some instances the use of TL might overcome
such objections. It is suggested therefore, that low availability 
of venture funding could be a factor in the decision by some 
smaller firms to utilise TL.
1. As explored in Chapter Five
2. See for example, Boswell, J. 'The Rise and Decline of 
Small Firms' George Allen and Unwin, 1973
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(d) Societal and Cultural Factors
While funding availability could be one constraining factor in 
all new product development, societal and cultural factors may 
also have an effect upon such d e c i s i o n s . T e c h n o l o g y  licensing 
may be affected by such factors at both licensor source and 
licensee destination. While larger firms may be able to devote 
sufficient resources to overcome societal/cultural problems in 
TL, it seems likely that smaller firms may find it more difficult 
to overcome them. Translation costs, expenditures on product 
redesign and different national standards may impose severe 
barriers to simple technology licensing. This might suggest 
that TL in smaller firms would be most likely to be carried out 
between companies in their own markets, or to/from markets where 
there was a high degree of cultural affinity. This leads, 
therefore, to a fourth hypothesis, that:-
Cultural and Societal Differences Restrict Licensing Agreements
(2)
between Small Firms in Different Cultures.
The hypothesis is also suggested by consideration of the opportunity 
costs involved in carrying out the TL function. It is suggested 
that this may be higher for small than for large firms. As the
1. See for example, Hofstede, G. 'Cultures Consequences'
Sage Publications, 1980.
Hofstede concludes that cultural differences affect employee 
motivation, management style and organisational structure.
2. The 'culture variable' used here was use of the English 
Language.
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complexity of the new task (such as TL) increased, the propensity of the
small firm to carry out that task might be anticipated to be
reduced.
(e) Government Policy
Government policy on the use of TL varies widely. Particular
countries, such as Japan, have utilised inward TL in a highly
proactive manner to develop indigenous industry. Other
countries have acted to restrict the inward flow of technology
as a means of retaining ,or restricting,outflows of foreign 
(2)
currency.
Many governments appear to view TL, particularly multinational 
cross licensing, in an unfavourable light, as reducing competition 
and restricting trade. Agreement through the EEC or other bodies 
to outlaw market sharing agreements may also reduce the 
attractiveness of TL for smaller firms. Fear of setting up 
competitors might, in these instances, militate against the sale 
of technology, particularly to companies in adjacent markets, 
unless restrictions of licensees to particular markets could be 
made.
However, the value of TL to smaller firms also appears to be
1. See for example Mifune, R 'R & D and Licensing in Japan' 
Les Nouvelles, June 1978
2. India for example
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recognised, particularly by the EEC. Government policy can
probably therefore, have an important effect upon the volume and 
success of TL by smaller firms.
The rationale for inward and outward international licensing
was explored in detail in Chapter Five. It seems clear, 
that governments have regarded international TL mainly in the 
context of the multinational firm when drafting legislation in 
this area. The effects of such legislation on the smaller firm 
do not always appear to have been considered.
1. See for example 'Grants from Europe for Small Firms'.
Department of Trade and Industry 1984. This scheme utilises 
European funding to support inward and cross TL by small 
firms.
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c. MODELLING THE LICENSING PROCESS IN SMALL FIRMS
Having considered the influences affecting any decision to utilise 
TL in smaller firms, it is also pertinent to attenpt to model the 
result of those influences in practice. It is suggested that 
there are three areas which could be modelled in this way. First, 
the factors that might lead to a smaller firm reaching a decision 
to utilise TL as an alternative to other forms of development. 
Second, consideration of the factors that might facilitate or 
provide barriers to the utilisation of TL. Third, consideration 
of TL at the product level, within the firm, and in relation to 
both existing and potentially new products.
1. Licensing Trigger Signals
Some of the internal and external factors and forces impinging 
upon the licensing decision have been explored above : in 
particular the trigger s i g n a l s w h i c h  may initiate any decision 
to utilise TL. If a company is considered as an organisational 
system, open to both internal and external pressures as suggested 
in the 'wheel' diagram above, recognition of a new product need, 
might arise fran either of these sources. Development of 
appropriate responses to trigger signals might then be considered
1. Thomas, R.E. Business Policy, Philip Allan Publishers, 1977
A trigger is defined as an 'event which does not conform 
to expectations.'
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in the light of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats affecting the firm at that time .
Threats and opportunities may be more likely to arise as external 
factors affecting the firm, while strengths and weaknesses clearly 
relate more to internal factors. Consideration of the potential 
for TL might, therefore, be seen in the context of the alternative 
strategies of 'in-house' development or direct export in the 
cases of inward and outward licensing respectively.
Recognition of a threat or opportunity might suggest that the 
firm would react by seeking information to define it. In the 
case of smaller firms, consideration of TL might be from a base 
of incomplete i n f o r m a t i o n . The opportunity cost of obtaining 
that information might be high, in light of the lower level of 
functional specialisation in the management of small firms, as 
suggested above. The Licensing Trigger Model below therefore, 
suggests a 'multi-stage' process prior to any final decision 
to utilise TL.
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K. 'Technology Licensing and the Growing 
Firm.' Pergamon Press, 1984.
The 'Leverhulme' research suggested that many small firms 
that had utilised licensing had done so only once (particularly 
in the case of inward licensing).
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Figure 6.5 Licensing Trigger Signals
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2. The Operation of Licensing Markets
The easy operation of licensing markets might be anticipated to 
be restricted by the poor and/or incomplete nature of the information 
available to, and knowledge contained within the firm, of potential 
licensing opportunities available to it. This might be particularly 
important to smaller firms unable to devote large resources to 
exploring potential information sources. Even within narrow 
industry sectors it might be difficult for small company management 
to keep track of all new developments. For larger firms, full 
time licensing departments might provide the necessary 'in-house' 
expertise. In attempts to diversify into new areas, knowledge of 
available technology is clearly necessary. As sectors beyond 
current skills are considered, such knowledge may be less easy 
to obtain. Where diversification utilising TL is proposed 
therefore, the small firm may have to seek such knowledge^ utilising 
outside expertise.
It is clear that firms can endeavour to overcome information 
problems in many ways. Many larger firms employ company librarians 
or information officers, in addition to full time licensing 
executives. For smaller firms, such executives may not be cost 
effective, particularly if only a small number of licences are 
negotiated. Private consultants offering alternative information 
sources might be anticipated to be helpful in view of the 
potential scale economies involved. However, such consultants 
may be of varying effectiveness.
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It is suggested that the operation of licensing markets can be 
broadly divided into three segments describing the suppliers, 
facilitators and users of transferred technology. The different 
sources and roles of each of the parties are examined in the 
'Licensing Market Model' diagram below. Clearly, information 
is a key aspect of TL, and hence contact and knowledge of 
licensing markets may be crucial in its effective use. It might 
be anticipated that smaller firms could be at a disadvantage in 
acquiring such information in view of resource constraints 
impinging upon them.
An imperfect operation in the flow of information through 
licensing markets could also be due to the nature of the 
information sought and offered by potential buyers and sellers. 
Commercial secrecy could introduce a barrier to the provision 
of information detailed enough for buyers to evaluate 
effectively. Conversely, buyers might also be reluctant to 
make known their interest in acquiring particular new technologies 
or products in view of competitive rivalry.
Facilitators of the licensing process may also have several 
objectives. Commercial facilitators clearly have an interest 
in obtaining fees and commissions which could conflict with the 
interests of their clients. Non-commercial facilitators however.
1. See for example Lovell, E.B. 'Licensing, Reasons, Royalties 
and Dangers' Domestic Licensing Practices, NY 1968
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may have less interest in obtaining quick results and may also 
have other, social o b j e c t i v e s w h i c h  may conflict with some of 
the objectives of the client firm. The operation of licensing 
markets, and consideration of the role of buyers, sellers and 
facilitators is therefore central to the propensity of smaller 
firms to utilise TL.
3. Licensing in Small Firms - A Decision Model
The factors that might lead to a decision to utilise inward or 
outward TL as an alternative to other forms of market realisation 
have been explored in the previous chapter. Construction of a 
model to consider the implementation of such a strategy is, 
therefore, important in considering why smaller firms might 
follow this course. Since smaller firms have less resources to 
devote to specialisation in particular functions than larger 
firms, TL might be anticipated to be attractive to them in 
principle.
(2)
The 'Strategic Licensing Model' described in Figure 6.6 
was developed to endeavour to take account of the various 
factors impinging upon the firm in reaching a decision to 
utilise TL. The objective of the model is to suggest a
1. For example - job creation, training, etc.
2. The 'Strategic Licensing Model' has been published in
amended form in Lowe J and Crawford N K 'Technology 
Licensing and the Growing Firm' Pergamon Press
1984
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1. The Licensing Market Model has been published in amended form 
in Lowe J and Crawford N K 'Technology Licensing and the 
Growing Firm'. Pergamon Press 1984
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'decision matrix' whereby potential options can be explored. 
Consideration of the product portfolio under the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) product classification is made in an 
attempt to integrate BCG theory irto a practical consideration 
of licensing.
The Strategic Licensing Model may be useful in defining possible 
alternative strategies for technology exploitation in smaller firms. 
However, it is clear that its use could not be indiscriminate.
The value of this, or any model, is suggested to be in the 
provision of a framework within which other pertinent information 
couild be more readily evaluated. Significant 'in-house' and 
company specific information would be required before the model 
could be used in practice.
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D. THE STRATEGIC LICENSING PROCESS IN SMALL FIRMS - Empirical Evidence
1. Introduction
Following the review in previous sections,of some of the strategic 
issues involved in smaller firms' utilisation of licensing, and 
the construction of models to describe this process, it is now 
an objective to describe the data sources upon which empirical 
work was carried out within this study. The hypotheses generated 
above can then be tested against the empirical results.
The empirical work upofi which this chapter is based is drawn from
several sources. Many of the case studies which make up a majority
of the field work, and are used as evidence here, were carried
out as part of a research project funded by the Leverhulme Trust.
This was a joint study carried out by the author and Julian Lowe
and under the direction of the latter. The 'Leverhulme' study
was designed to investigate the practical use that smaller
(2 )
manufacturing firms had made of technology licensing. This 
essentially 'bottom up' approach to the use of licensing in 
smaller firms is contrasted to the approach here where TL has 
been considered from a Business Policy perspective. This more 
'top down' approach considers TL as part of the strategic decision 
making process in smaller firms.
1. See Chapter 1. Introduction
2. The results of this research are reported in the several papers 
and book chapters referred to below.
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Forty small and medium sized companies which had utilised TL were
visited in the course of the research and senior executives
interviewed. Detailed case studies were written to define the
strategic, cultural and organisational factors involved in the
decision by case firms to use TL. The case studies and case
summaries comprise appendices to this c h a p t e r . O t h e r  case
studies of the use of licensing in smaller firms have been
(2)
utilised to provide supporting data where applicable.
Published data has also been drawn upon where relevant.
2. RESEARCH EVIDENCE
The research evidence utilised in the empirical work carried out 
for this thesis, and for the studies from which other evidence is 
drawn was as follows:
1. Forty cases are examined in detail below. Of these,
twenty eight were visited under the 'Leverhulme' project. 
In sixteen early cases, (denoted by a star against the 
case number in the appendices) a joint visit was made by 
the author and Julian Lowe, although all cases in the 
form presented in this thesis are the work of the author 
alone. From these early exploratory cases, a crude model 
of the strategic licensing process in smaller firms was 
constructed. The author then looked at a further twenty 
four cases (two of which had previously been published 
elsewhere and ten of which comprised 'Leverhulme' cases) 
to test the hypotheses generated above.
2. Notably Svensson, B. 'Success and Failure Through
Technology Import Through Licensing in Smaller Firms. 
University of Linkoping (Sweden) 1982
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(a) Licensing and the Small Firm (Leverhulme Project)
The empirical work carried out under this programme which is 
used as supporting evidence in the testing of hypotheses below, 
was based on the use of intensive questionnaire analysis and 
structured interviews. The research methodology, data presentation 
and analyses are described in detail in the papers published as a 
result of this r e s e a r c h a n d  will not be explored 
further here.
(b) Case Study Data
The case studies comprise the major fieldwork carried out in the
course of the investigation. Initial identification of potential
case study companies was problematical because of the apparently
small percentage of smaller companies which had carried out
(2)
technology licensing.
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K
(a) 'Technology Licensing and the Small and Medium Sized Firm' 
European Journal of Small Business, Vol.l, No.4, 1983
(b) Technology Licensing and the Small Firm (Chapter 1)
Gower Press, 1984
(c) Innovation and Technology Transfer for the Growing Firm 
Pergamon Press, 1984
(d) New Product Development and Technology Licensing for the 
Smaller Firm. Industrial Management and Data Systems 
July/August 1984
2. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit (a)
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A number of sources were therefore used and these included:
- Questionnaire returns from the 'Leverhulme' study
Companies advertising for or offering products under 
licence
Personal contacts with industrialists
Press and other journal reports
Companies identified through consultancy work.
The case studies and case summaries comprise appendices to this 
Chapter.
The initial respondent in the case studies was usually the 
Managing Director. In as many cases as possible other respondents 
such as the Technical and Marketing Directors were also interviewed. 
In order to obtain as much detail as possible, annual reports/ 
accounts, publicity and product promotion literature were obtained 
where possible. Companies were asked to provide access to their 
files of correspondence leading to licence agreements. In some 
cases, copies of these agreements were also obtained. The cases 
aimed to elucidate the physical characteristics of the firms and 
the behavioural factors impinging upon them. Exploration was made 
of why licensing had been used in preference to other forms of 
product and market development. The course of negotiations and 
the success of the agreement(s) in the longer term were also explored.
1. Appendix 6.1 'Inward* Licensing cases A - M
6.2 'Outward' Licensing cases N - X
6.3 'Inward and Outward' Licensing cases AA - KA
6.4 'Random' cases LA - VA
2. Appendix 6.5 Case Study Summary Sheets A - VA
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It was considered that face to face interviews would be more 
likely to elucidate behavioural factors than questionnaire data 
or published sources. The interviews proved particularly valuable 
in identifying conflict within organisations, pertaining to the 
use of licensing. Conversely however, it was also recognised that 
individuals being interviewed were likely to give 'their view' of 
the course of negotiations and agreements. Much of the data was 
therefore of a subjective nature, and hence had to be treated with 
a degree of caution in analysis.
A major objective of the interviews was to identify why firms had 
chosen to incorporate licensing into their new product/market 
strategies as an alternative to other forms of market realisation. 
The results of such strategies and the course of negotiation and 
implementation of licensing agreements were also considered in the 
light of the inevitable learning processes involved in utilising 
technology purchase or sale.
Lastly, the success of technology licensing as a strategic tool 
in the longer term development of the company was considered. In 
some instances, the product or process involved had only recently 
been licensed 'in' or 'out' or was still under negotiation, and 
its long term effect could not be assessed. It was felt important 
to include such cases, however, because of the closeness of 
management to current activities and hence to a more accurate 
recollection of events leading to the use of licensing.
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(c) Published Data
Although published statistics on the use of technology licensing 
appear to be relatively sparse, the UK Government does produce an 
annual return of receipts and expenditure on 'Technology Royalties'. 
An investigation of trends in these statistics has been made by 
Davies and R o s s e r f o r  a fifteen year period. It is not 
considered relevant to describe this work in detail here, but 
reference is made to it as necessary below.
A useful proxy source of statistics on companies and those employed
in carrying out licensing functions, is the annual membership
(2)
register of the Licensing Executives Society (LES). This body
comprises the largest professional body for licensing executives 
worldwide. In the UK there are more than four hundred members of 
the Society. The 1984 membership register was analysed to define 
the functional background of licensing executives and to identify 
those from small firms.
(d) Other Studies on Small Firm Licensing
The fourth source of data drawn upon for the study was results 
from other empirical investigations into the use of licensing by 
small firms. The single major study recently undertaken was 
carried out in S w e d e n . T h i s  study relates to the success of
1. Davies H and Rosser N. 'International Trade in Technology 
A Survey' in Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit. (c)
2. Licensing Executives Society (UK). Camden Chamber of Commerce 
London WC7R 4AX
3. Svensson, B. op.cit.
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importing technology under licence. No study was made of outward 
licensing in this work. The investigations concentrated on the 
process of licensing and its practical use rather than upon the 
strategic issues involved. However, these case studies do provide 
a potentially important extra database for comparison with the UK 
case studies here. Short 'precis' versions of the case studies are 
appended to the chapter.
3. Data Presentation and Analysis
Data generated and used in this study is presented as follows:
(a) Licensing and the Small Firm. (Leverhulme Study)
The data collected and analysed in this study has been published 




The case studies forming appendices to this chapter have been 
analysed and described in the summary s h e e t s a l s o  forming an
1. Appendix 6.6
2. The case studies are reported using 'blind' identities in all 
but two cases (previously publicised). Anonymity was guaranteed 
to case respondents in view of the frequently sensitive or 
commercially valuable nature of much of the information 
supplied by them. This included provision of copies of 
licensing agreements, information on royalty rates, 'up front' 
fees, and turnover accruing to the agreements. Information on 
'gentlemen’s agreements' providing for exploitation of particular 
markets by particular firms was also provided in some instances.
3. Appendix 6. 5
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appendix to this chapter. The case companies were described under 
twenty headings. These are briefly explored below and in more 
depth under section D4 of this chapter - Testing of hypotheses.
The objective of the summary sheets and analyses was to describe 




The first heading 'Company Type' comprises a subjective description 
of each company, and is not analysed further here. The nature of 
the information on each summary sheet precluded such analysis.
TABLE 6.2
2. OWNERSHIP No %
OWNER MANAGED 17 42
PRIVATELY OWNED
(not owner managed) 6 16
SUBSIDIARY OR 'GROUP' COMPANY 17 42
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A majority of the case companies, 58% were privately owned. These 
companies were, therefore, not subject to strategic decision 
making by managers remote from the company. Of the 'Group' 
companies, a large majority (eleven out of seventeen) were subject 
to little interference in their decision making structures by 
'Group' management. The remainder of the firms were subject to 
some measure of control at Group level.
TABLE 6.3
3. COMPANY SIZE Nos %
0 - 5 0 Employees 9 22
51 - 100 Employees 4 10
101 - 200 Employees 19 48
200+ 8 20
A majority of the case companies (80%) employed less than 200 
people. Of the remainder, only two companies employed more than 
500 people. These companies were included within the sample 
because at the time of the licensing agreement they had employed 
less than 500 people.
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TABLE 6.4
^ AGE (years) Nos %
Old Established (> 20 years) 27 67
Newly established (< 20 years) 13 33
A majority of the case firms were 'old established', the oldest
being founded in 1 7 6 0 . These statistics did not suggest that
(2)
it was only the young 'growth' companies that utilised 
technology licensing. Several of the older established firms 
had diversified away from initial product groups and had 
developed into completely new 'core' areas two or three times 
during the life of the company.
TABLE 6.5
5 CLASSIFICATION Nos %
Specialised Non Diversifying 15 37
Specialised Diversifying 8 20
Non Specialised - Product/ 
Technology Oriented 7 18
Non Specialised - Market oriented 10 25
1. Company AA
2. See Table 6.5
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The 'classification' heading refers to the suggested framework 
for classifying companies in Chapter Four of the thesis. Under 
the 'specialised' (or small market segment) sub-heading, a majority 
of firms appeared to be developing strategies to further exploit 
their current markets. Only a minority of this sample appeared 
to be actively developing diversification strategies. Of the 
non-specialised (or already diversified) companies, a majority 
identified marketing skills as their major strength, while a 
minority of the sample considered that technological skills were 
their major strength.
TABLE 6.6




Management type may be an important factor in the propensity 
of companies to utilise technology licensing. Defining and 
classifying such 'types' may, however, be more problematical 
and must, to an extent, be a subjective study. The classification 
used here divides firms into centralised - chiefly those companies 
subject to some degree of control from holding company managements; 
autocratic - where one individual, usually the chief executive
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was stated to make all major decisions, and participatory - 
where lower level management and other employees were encouraged 
to submit ideas to top management. The largest group of case 
companies in the sample fell into the latter group.
TABLE 6.7




The level of competition that each case company was subject to 
was ascertained through discussions with case respondents. Twenty 
per cent of companies stated that they were subject to 'low' 
levels of competition. To an extent this reflects the market 
position of case companies. In at least two instances, the 
companies enjoyed a quasi-monopolist position in their main 
markets. A majority of case companies were, however, subject 
to either 'medium' or 'high' levels of competition. Many of 
those companies subject to 'high' levels of competition had 








Respondents were asked if their company's turnover (after 
inflation) had expanded, contracted or remained roughly static 
over a one year period prior to the case study. The results 
of this analysis suggested that a majority of TL companies 
were 'progressive' rather than 'parochial'.
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TABLE 6.9
9 INDUSTRY Nos %
Food, Drink/Tobacco - —
Coal & Petroleum products - —
Chemicals & Allied industries 6 15
Metal Manufacture 1 2
Mechanical Engineering 11 28
Instrument Engineering 4 10
Electrical Engineering 5 13
Shipbuilding/Marine Engineering 1 2
Vehicles 1 2
Metal Goods 5 13
Textiles 2 5
Leather Goods and Fur - -
Clothing & Footwear - -
Bricks/Pottery and Glass - -
Timber Furniture 1 2
Paper, Printing & Publishing - -
Other Manufacturing Industries 3 8
The industries from which case companies were drawn are classified 
under the standard industrial system. The sample was drawn from a 
number of industries of which mechanical engineering provided the 
largest number (28%). The case sample was not drawn up with the 
intention of identifying companies from particular industries and 
hence, the analysis above is provided for information purposes only,
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TABLE 6.10




The 'market type' of licensing firms was also ascertained from 
respondents. A majority of the firms ( 67^ were operating in 
either mature or contracting industries, suggesting that a major 
reason for the use of technology purchase or sale was in attempting 
to overcome the pressures imposed by low market growth.
TABLE 6.11
11 LICENCES Nos
Licences In 17 42
Licences Out 12 30
Licences In and Out 11 28
The number of companies licensing 'in','out' or 'in and out' was
a reflection of the method by which case studies had been
(1)
identified. The number of firms licensing both 'in' and 'out'
1. This was based upon the 'Leverhulme' study noted above
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was the smallest sub-group. This reflected the small number of 
firms in the total population carrying out both inward and outward 
licensing. The largest group of licensing companies were those
licensing 'in'. This reflected the larger number of such firms 
in the 'random' sample noted above.
TABLE 5.12
12 NUMBERS OF LICENCES (1) Nos %
1 9 22
2 - 5 20 50
5+ 9 22
None (currently negotiating) 2 5
A majority of the companies in the survey sample had carried out 
more than one licensing agreement. To an extent this reflects 
the preponderance of multiple licensing agreements in outward 
licensing firms. A small minority of firms (22%), had carried 
out a relatively large number of agreements. Several of these 
could be described as utilising licensing as their central 
strategy.
1. For an analysis of the number of firms in the total small 
firm population carrying out inward/outward licensing, see 




The information under '13' was for descriptive purposes only,
TABLE 5.14
14 'BOSTON' CLASSIFICATIONS (1) Nos (2) %
Research and Development 9 19
Stars 19 40
Problems 2 5
Cash Cows 15 35
Dogs - -
The 'Boston' Consulting Group classifications'^^ provide a 
framework to analyse products being licensed 'in' or 'out'. The 
classification suggests that 'star' products requiring large 
amounts of market development resources and 'cash cow' products.
1. Boston Classifications from Chapter 2
2. Nurabers total more than 40 because some companies licensed 
more than 1 class of product.
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generating such resources were overwhelmingly the largest two 
groups of licensing products. Products and processes at the 
'Research and Development' stage also provided a substantial 
proportion of licensed products. 'Problem' products and 'Dog' 
products appeared to be rarely licensed, as might be anticipated 
by the nature of such products.
TABLE 6.15
15 PRIMARY POLICY OBJECTIVE OF CASE MANAGEMENT
Nos %
Survival 9 23
Growth Through Development 20 50
Growth Through Diversification 11 27
The primary policy objective of case companies was ascertained 
through respondent questioning. Although a minority of case 
companies identified survival as their current primary policy 
objective, a majority of firms suggested that growth was their 
objective. A majority of firms were pursuing a policy of growth 
through development of current products and markets. Only a 




16 COMPANY PRODUCT PROFILE (1) Nos %
M Mainly Mature Products 18 45
B Balanced Product Portfolio 14 35
N Mainly New Products 8 20
A large number of case companies (45%) had a majority of product 
lines that could be described as 'mature'. This would indicate 
a need for the development of new products or new activities. 
However, it was also clear that a smaller number of licensing 
companies (20%) had mainly new, young products, suggesting that 
the latter were also utilising licensing in a proactive manner 
to retain portfolios with a majority of such products.
TABLE 6.17
17 FUNDAMENTAL NEW PRODUCT/TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY
Nos %
D In house Development 6 15
H In house development and 
technology purchase 22 55
P Technology Purchase/Sale 12 30
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As might be anticipated, a majority of the case companies had 
utilised technology purchase or sale as one, rather than the major 
part of their new product/market development strategy. However, 
an important sub-set of twelve respondents stated that their 
companies saw technology purchase or sale as the major method 
of product/market development. Many of these firms were utilising 
outward licensing to exploit markets they would have otherwise been 
unable to enter because of resource or other constraints.
TABLE 6.18
18 INITIAL USE OF LICENSING Nos %
Reactive 24 60
Proactive 16 40
The initial factors leading to the use of licensing were considered 
to be an important factor in considering licensing in a strategic 
sense. Where companies were approached by others or obtained 
licences from other ad hoc sources, these were considered 'reactive' 
'Proactive' licensing companies were those where a decision had 
been made, prior to search, that licensing could be a valid 
method of market realisation. A large majority of the sample 
(60%) appeared to have utilised licensing in a reactive manner.
Of the 'proactive' licensors, a majority appeared to have utilised
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it as one part of their new product and market development 
strategies (see also Table 6.17).
TABLE 6.19
19 CONSIDERATION OF LICENSING IN PRODUCT/MARKET DEVELOPMENT
Nos %
A Always Considered 28 70
I Considered Infrequently 10 25
N No Longer Considered 2 5
A majority of case company respondents stated that they 'always 
considered' licensing in developing new products/markets. This 
might suggest that previous use of technology licensing had been 
mainly successful. An important sub-set of companies however, 
suggested that licensing was either no longer, or infrequently 
considered, suggesting a degree of dissatisfaction in those cases.
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TABLE 6.20
20 PROCESS OF LICENSING
Descriptive
The summary under number '20' was for the purposes of 
description only - see summary sheets in appendices.
The brief analysis of case studies above is intended to supply 
background information for the testing of hypotheses below. 
Definition of case study companies in terms of the factors used 
above is considered important in classifying the support that 
particular cases give to each hypothesis.
(c) Published data
The analysis by Davies and R o s s e r o f  UK licensing receipts 
and payments provides a useful exploration of the background of 
licensing activities carried out across UK industry. The study 
suggested that the import of technology through licence agreements 
(as measured by payments for that technology) had shown an increase
1. Davies, H and Rosser, N. op.cit.
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during the late 1950s and early 1970s but had slowed during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. However, the authors suggested that the 
UK manufacturing sector is "very open to the importation of foreign 
technology". However, it seems likely that a majority of the 
payments reported were between subsidiaries of multi-national 
groups, and hence would not be relevant in the context of the 
sutdy made here. However, analysis of the statistical data does 
provide a background for the study of smaller firms, in suggesting 
a relatively strong licensing 'culture' within the United Kingdom.
The second major published data source analysed - membership of 
the UK Licensing Executives Society, broken down by size of 
sponsoring company and industry type^^^ is made below in 
Table 6.21 (1).










COMPANY SIZE (EMPLOYEES) %































+ Small = 0-200 
employees
employees. Medium = 200-500, Large = 500+
* 'Service' includes consultants, patent 
lawyers and unclassified headings.
agents, licensing
The membership statistics were also broken down by functional 
group, as shown below in Table 6.22.
1. Analysis made of LES membership register for 1984
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TABLE 6.22
MEMBERSHIP OF THE LICENSING EXECUTIVES SOCIETY (LES) 
BY FUNCTIONAL GROUP*





Development Agencies 51 11
Law 38 9
Patent Agents 46 10





Retired Members NIL -
Unclassified 28 6
TOTAL 447 -
Analysis made of LES membership register for 1984
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The results of the LES analysis show that few small firms' 
executives are members of the Licensing S o c i e t y . T h i s  would 
suggest that few small firms carry out licensing activities.
This result would be supported by the results of the 'Leverhulme' 
research noted above, suggesting that less than ten per cent of 
all small manufacturing firms carry out any licensing activity. 
However, it is probable that these results should be treated 
with a degree of circumspection. As noted above, it seems clear 
that technology licensing is frequently carried out as a 'one- 
o f f  situation in smaller firms. This situation should, perhaps, 
be contrasted with the case in some larger firms where the 
licensing function is carried out by personnel dedicated solely 
to that task. This might suggest that such individuals would 
be more likely to become members of a professional society than 
small firm executives with multiple functions.
The large numbers (more than fifty per cent) of 'non industrial'
society members suggests that TL is both highly activity
specific and skill intensive. Patent agents and licensing lawyers,
each with approximately ten per cent representation, clearly have
an important catalysing and advising role in the use of licensing.
However, the number of consultants,representing only seven per
cent of the total membership,might suggest that the role of such
facilitators is relatively minor in the operation of licensing 
(2)
markets.
1. That is, excluding 'service companies'.
2. Once again this statistic was supported by the 'Leverhulme' 
research, where few questionnaire respondents reported the 
successful use of a new product consultant.
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The analyses suggest that a large majority of members of LES are
sponsored by large companies in the manufacturing sector or are
solicitors, patent agents or other professionals, with small
manufacturing companies poorly represented. This suggests that
a majority of licensing activity is carried out by large companies,
and this is supported by the evidence from Davies and Rosser.
However, the figures for smaller firms may be understated for
two reasons. First, it has been suggested that small firms carry
out licensing on a 'one-off basis initially, and therefore may
not have access to technology networks making them aware of such 
(2)
bodies as LES. Second, it seems probable that larger firm
managers may have a greater propensity to become involved in 
institutions such as the LES.
The second major factor highlighted by the analysis is the large 
percentage of patent lawyers and consultants who are members of 
the society. This would suggest the importance of a high skill 
level within licensing practitioners and might explain the 
perceived reluctance of many smaller firms to utilise licensing 
where 'in-house' legal skills were lacking.
1. Davies H and Rosser N. op.cit.
2. see for example Videm, J. Communicating Technology 
Knowledge to Small and Medium Sized Companies' International 
Small Business Journal, Autumn, 1984.
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(d) Other Data
Research carried out in S w e d e n i n t o  the import of technology 
into smaller firms, comprises a study of twenty two separate 
cases. These studies were carried out over a period between 
1981 and 1983. Of these, nine had been deemed to be successful, 
four had been unsuccessful, three had been launched but had not 
yet succeeded, while six had not been launched but were still 
under development at the time the studies were carried out.
The Swedish cases suggest that a majority of inward licensing
to small firms can be successful, although in many cases
substantial development work may be required before the product
can be launched or the process used in local conditions. In a
minority of cases, however, the inward licensing product was
a failure. In these failures, a major factor appears to have
been poor identification of the market that the licensed product
(2)
or process was intended to supply.
4. TESTING OF HYPOTHESES
Following the presentation of case study and other data, it is 
now possible to consider the hypotheses generated in 'B ' above ,in 
light of the strategic use of licensing by smaller firms. The 
disparate data sources are useful in considering the hypotheses
1/2 Svensson, B. op.cit.
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from several angles and in the light of both statistical and 
non-statistical data. One major problem of a case study approach 
is suggested to be the choice of respondent(s). In a functional 
field such as TL, where the strategic objectives and decision 
making processes of the firm may be subsumed within one 
individual, such a choice may be crucial. Definition of why 
TL was used, how it was used and the success or failure of the 
licensing process may be subjective to the respondent. Managers 
may be reluctant to admit to the failure of any strategy, however 
impartial the observer, and collection of data may, therefore, 
be made more difficult. A variety of data sources might appear 
to be advantageous, therefore, in hypothesis testing. The 
statistical data provided by the 'Leverhulme' research, carried 
out under a separate study, is therefore a valuable extra 
source of information here.
A second major difficulty in a 'case' approach lies in 
interpreting the replies made to particular questions to 
respondents and evaluating these in the light of hypotheses 
generated. A summary of such support is therefore made below.
(a) Summary of Cases/Hypothesis
The form in which the cases were carried out and the subject 
matter under discussion led to a certain degree of difficulty in 
defining the strength of support for each hypothesis. The 
table below (Table 6.23) was therefore drawn up in an endeavour 
to summarise the support provided by cases for each hypothesis.
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Cases were considered to provide strong, medium, low or no 
support to the hypothesis under consideration. Where a case 
provided no relevant data for a hypothesis this was also stated. 
Cases were classified as followed.
HYPOTHESIS 1 - Proactive Use of Licensing
Strong Support Company had developed the use of 
TL (where this had initially arisen 
reactively or proactively) and had 
integrated it into a formal new product/ 
market development strategy.
Medium Support Company had recognised the value of TL 
and had taken some steps to integrate the 
use of TL into its formalised or less 
formal development strategy.
Low Support Company had utilised TL reactively 
following an external or internal 'trigger' 
signal, but had taken no positive steps to 
develop any strategy around the use of 
TL per se.
No Support Company utilised TL as a 'one-off or 
highly reactive process in response to the 
offer of a licence from outside the firm.
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HYPOTHESIS 2 - Threshold Barriers
Strong Support Company had purchased or sold technology 
as a means of overcoming 'in-house' 
déficiences which it did not have the 
resources to solve itself.
Medium Support Company had purchased or sold technology 
to augment or develop 'in-house' strengths
Low Support Company had utilised TL as an alternative 
to 'in-house' development and for other 
reasons, such as speed of development, but 
not for resource related déficiences.
No Support Company had utilised TL solely to augment 
other forms of development, because of 
problems such as patent cover on technology 
it wished to develop. Such licensing was 
utilised to overcome a particular problem 
rather than through shortage of resources 
'in-house'.
HYPOTHESIS 3 - New Products/Markets
Strong Support Company had utilised TL proactively to 
develop into new, diversified product areas 
or into new markets.
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Medium Support Company had utilised TL to assist it to 
diversify into new areas, but this had 
not been its main method of development.
Low Support TL had been used by the company to develop 
new products/markets but these had been 
close to existing skills or areas of 
operation.
No Support TL had only been used by the company to 
extend its product line or to obtain 
replacement products for existing lines.
HYPOTHESIS 4 - Cultural/Social Differences
Strong Support Company had endeavoured to license to/from 
a company in another culture and had 
failed successfully to do so. Alternatively, 
no agreement had been attempted after 
consideration of the possibility of TL 
to/from another culture.
Medium Support Company had experienced difficulties in TL 
to/from a company in another culture, but 




CASE STUDY SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES
CASE H Y P 0 T H E S I S
STUDY 1 2 3 4
A +++ ++ 4-4- N
B ++ +++ 4-4- N
C +++ +++ 4-4-4- —
D + + - -k-|—I-
E - +++ 4-4-4- -
F + +++ 4- 4-4-4-
H + + 4- 4-4-4-
K - + 4- 4-4-4-
L ++ - - 4-4-4-
M +++ +++ 4-4- N.
N +++ - 4-4-4- —-
0 +++ ++ 4-4-4- —
P + +++ 4-4- —
R ++ - - 4-4-4-
S + +++ 4- 4-4-4-
T + +++ 4- —
U ++ +++ 4- —
V + + - 4-4-4-
W - + - 4-4-
X +++ 4-4-4- 4-4-4- —
AA ++ 4-4- 4-4-4- +
BA ++ 4-4- 4- -
CA + 4-4-4- 4-4- 4-4-
DA +++ 4-4-4- - 4-
EA + 4-4- 4- N
FA ++ 4-4- 4-4- 4-
GA +++ 4-4-4- 4- -
HA + 4-4- 4-4- 4-4-
JA ++ 4-4-4- 4-4-4- 4-
KA +++ 4-4- 4- 4-
LA 4-4-4- 4-4-4- -
MA +++ 4-4-4- 4-4-4- N
NA + 4- 4- N
PA - - 4-4-4- N
QA +++ 4-4-4- 4-4-
RA - - -
SA + 4-4-4- 4-4- -
TA ++ 4-4-4- 4-4-
UA - 4-4- 4- N
VA ++ 4-4-4- 4-4-4- 4-4-
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TALE 6.24
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY DATA
HYPOTHESIS 1 2 3 4(1)
Strong Support ■
Nos 11 20 11 8
% 27 50 27 26
Medium Support
Nos 10 9 10 4
% 25 22 25 13
Nos 13 6 12 5
Low Support
% 33 15 30 16
Nos 6 5 7 14
No Support
% 15 13 18 46
Nos - - - 9
Not Relevant
% - - - 22
(2)
Support (Points) 66 84 65 35
TOTAL POINTS 120 120 120 93
1. Nine cases were not relevant to hypothesis '4' and hence 
have been excluded from the analysis.
2. From Table 6.23 (i.e. +)
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Low Support Company had licensed to/from a company in 
another culture but considered that any 
difficulties encountered were easily 
overcome.
No Support Company had experienced no difficulty in 
licensing to/from a company in another 
culture.
The analysis in Table 6.23 suggested the following support for 
each hypothesis. (Table 6.24)
The summary analysis of each case study data suggested strong 
support for Hypothesis 2, since more than fifty per cent of 
case companies appeared to have utilised TL to break through 
threshold barriers. However, the other hypotheses seemed less 
well supported. The analysis above is now considered in 
conjunction with other data utilised as part of this study in 
a detailed discussion of the support for each hypothesis.
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(b) HYPOTHESIS 1
Technology Licensing is used Proactively by Many Small Firms in 
thier New Product and Market Development Strategies.
The first hypothesis was suggested by a consideration that TL 
could be used proactively by small firms a^ part of their 
development of strategies to develop new products and enter new 
markets. Clearly, TL could be used in this manner. However, it 
is also probable that a majority of smaller frims carry out no 
formal strategic processes rather developing strategy
formulation as a more informal process. The subject under 
consideration here, therefore, usually relates to such informally 
developed strategies.
(2)
Other research suggests that only a small proportion of
small companies had utilised or had considered utilisation
of TL. However, case study respondents suggested that following
initial, frequently 'reactive' consideration of TL, a majority
had utilised it and now always considered it in the development
(4)
of their new product/market strategies. This might suggest
an information barrier to the use of TL or the operation of a 
long term learning process before it could be used effectively.
1. See for example Hankinson, A. op.cit.
2. Notably the 'Leverhulme' research. See for example Lowe J 
and Crawford N K. op.cit. (A)
3. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit. (A).
Less than twenty per cent of small firms had considered utilising 
TL and less than ten per cent had done so.
4. See Table 6.23 and Tables 6.17,6.18, 6.19 above.
-348-
Within the minority of the total population of small firms 
using TL, it is relevant therefore to consider which of the case 
studies here supported the first hypothesis put forward above.
Of the forty cases considered, only eleven could be said to 
'strongly support the h y p o t h e s i s ' . O f  these, companies N,
X, MA and QA are considered to be particularly relevant.
Company N had become involved in technology licensing in reaction 
to an outside threat. However, although the initial impetus to 
licensing was reactive, the company had developed a highly 
proactive strategy around the use of outward licensing, recognising 
it as an alternative method to fulfil company objectives which 
had been undermined by problems with developing markets through 
'in-house' manufacture and export. The company, based in a 
relatively traditional field had utilised licensing extremely 
satisfactorily.
Company X also appeared to have developed a highly successful 
strategy for the utilisation of outward licensing to exploit 
technological leadership. Management recognised that its resources 
were insufficient to exploit foreign markets through joint 
ventures, while the use of direct export was also inappropriate 
because of the nature of the technology involved. To this 
extent, therefore, the company was also reacting to an outside 
factor. The only rational method of market realisation was 
recognised to be through outward licensing. However, the company
1. See Table 6.23 and Tables 6.17, 6.18, 6.19 above
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had developed its strategy in a highly proactive manner to exploit 
its technology successfully.
Company MA had used inward licensing as part of a planned 
diversification strategy away from its current service based 
skills. In this it was one of a small minority of cases utilising 
inward TL in this manner. The company had carried out an evaluation 
of its strengths and weaknesses and decided to enter manufacturing 
following this evaluation. However, even in this case, the 
company arrived at the initial decision to license, as the result 
of successful franchise operations which it had undertaken to 
diversify from service activities. Once again the initial decision 
to license had been triggered from outside the company, although 
the company then went on to build upon its first licence and to 
develop a stratety proactively for the further use of inward 
licensing.
Company QA developed its strategy for the use of 'outward' 
licensing as the direct result of a strategic decision to develop 
its business through the sale of technology rather than the sale 
of goods. In this instance, either strategy might have been 
anticipated to be successful, since the company had technological 
leadership in its field. It chose the licensing route because 
it believed that this strategy would allow it to develop faster 
and further than would the sale of goods.
The few cases explored briefly above did not appear to be typical 
of the majority of small firms interviewed in the course of this
-350-
investigation, but comprised particular examples of a minority 
of them. Two factors became apparent with regard to Hypothesis 1. 
First, more firms appeared to develop strategies for outward 
TL in response to their development of high demand innovative 
products, than for inward TL in response to a requirement for 
new products. This might suggest that it was the more fundamentally 
'go ahead' or 'outward looking' companies that had considered the 
use of TL prior to its implementation. However, even in those 
cases quoted above, the initial impetus for the use of TL had 
usually arisen in response to a 'break through' technological 
development, and recognition by management of its potential, 
rather than as part of any strategic planning process. Secondly, 
particularly in the corresponding process of inward TL, those 
firms which had developed its use as part of their strategic 
planning processes had generally been forced to develop strategic 
plans initially in response to an external threat, rather than 
as part of a longer term and planned process.
TL appeared therefore to be used most frequently as a reactive 
process, particularly in the case of inward licensing. However, 
a small sub-set of small companies clearly had utilised inward 
and outward TL to develop new products and markets. On the 
basis of the numbers involved however, the first hypothesis 
cannot be said to have been strongly substantiated.
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(c) HYPOTHESIS 2
Licensing Assists Small Firms in Overcoming Threshold Barriers
The second hypothesis was suggested by a consideration that TL 
could be utilised as a resource conservation process. In principle, 
it might appear that more research and development activity per 
unit of expenditure could be achieved through the purchase of 
already developed technology than through 'in-house' development. 
This might be particularly crucial in smaller firms. Conversely, 
the use of outward TL might also allow smaller firms to enter 
larger numbers of new markets. It was suggested, therefore, that 
TL might allow both product threshold barriers in home markets 
and export market barriers to be overcome. This proposes that 
firms utilising licensing would not have developed those 
products or entered those markets if TL had not been used.
Other r e s e a r c h s u g g e s t e d  that very small firms carried out
less TL than larger small firms (100 employees and more). This
would suggest that the former firms may not have sufficient
'in-house' resources to benefit from the use of TL effectively.
(2)
Licensing firms appeared to be more research intensive than 
non-licensing firms and also had faster growth rates. They also 
appeared to be more d i v e r s i f i e d . T h i s  might suggest that 
typical licensing firms were utilising the technique to develop 
and to diversify. The research results from Chapter Three of
1. See Lowe J and Crawford N K. 'Leverhulme' research, op.cit.(A)
2. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit (A) Table 4
3. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit (A) Table 5
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this thesis also suggested that larger 'small' firms carried out 
diversification into new product/market areas more than either 
very small firms or large firms. Clearly research intensive 
firms of this type are likely to reach threshold barriers 
relatively quickly if growth rates are continued. Since such 
firms appeared more diversified,this suggests that the only way 
growth had been continued was by development into other, small, 
market niches. It is a proposal of the hypothesis stated above 
that once this form of lateral development had been continued into 
several new product areas, the firm might begin to lose its core 
strengths and become overdiversified. This could lead to 
renewed pressure to utilise licensing to strengthen core skills 
and grow into larger markets where competition levels might 
be likely to be higher.
A strategy of enhancing flexibility and developing into a number 
of new markets might therefore lead, as size increased, to the 
necessity to overcome threshold barriers if growth was to continue. 
However, breaking through such thresholds might incurtigh risk 
levels which might also be reduced through l i c e n s i n g . T h u s  
licensing could enhance the chances of breaking through such 
threshold barriers both by reducing costs and reducing risk.
The case study analysis suggested that many of the sample companies 
were subject to a high degree of competition, and were also
1. See for example, Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit (D)
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seeking high growth l e v e l s . T h i s  might suggest that such 
firms were utilising inward TL to provide suitable products for 
such growth. Of the products licensed, more than 40% were 
stated to be of the 'star' variety under the Boston Consulting 
Group C l a s s i f i c a t i o n . D e v e l o p m e n t  of such products on a 
consistently successful basis might be problematical for firms 
to achieve 'in-house'. In such instances TL might be a means 
of obtaining successful products to break through such threshold 
barriers.
The case studies tend to give support to the hypothesis proposed 
above. Notable cases included E,F,M,JA,X,SA and TA.
Company E as a marketing company without products of its own 
wished to move into production of its own product line through 
the initial use of sub-contract manufacture and 'in-house' 
assembly. However, there was very little production skill 
'in-house', although the company did possess a small research 
and development department. This department however, did not 
possess the necessary resources to develop a new product from 
design to implementation. The company was therefore unable to 
overcome this R & D threshold through the use of its own 
resources. The use of licensing however enabled it to move into 
a large and expanding market where its marketing expertise gave 
it a competitive advantage. Without costly production facilities
1/2 Tables 6.7 and 6.8 
3 Table 6.14
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the company was able to obtain its products through sub­
contracting at a highly competitive price and was able to 
undercut rival products which were being imported into its 
market.
Company F utilised TL because it had inadequate resources to 
develop a product for diversification into a new market it had 
identified as having great potential. In this instance the 
research threshold could not be overcome at an acceptable level 
of risk and hence licensing was used to enter the new market. 
Although the product was not a great success it did allow the 
company to develop a new expertise, and the technology (as 
distinct from the product involved) that was transferred to the 
company was utilised in developing other products within that 
market.
Company M had utilised licensing as a means of continuing its 
strategy of uninterrupted growth. The Managing Director of this 
company admitted that without licensing the speed of development 
could not have been maintained, since the company had a relatively 
small technology base. Licensing was being used to bring in 
technological skilLs which could then be used in further product 
development. This highly proactive use of licensing to overcome 
research constraints was perhaps, the best case example of a 
company utilising licensing as part of its strategy to grow and 
develop into new markets.
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Company JA had reached a technological plateau. While its 
'in-house' research and development skill was high, a result of 
its contract research expertise, it had no manufacturing base.
With its small size it was unable initially to obtain sufficient 
resources to enter its target market. Development costs for 
products in that market were extremely high. In response to 
these pressures, company JA developed a strategy to enter home 
markets on the basis of a product licensed 'in', and to develop 
that product further so that it could be licensed 'out' on 
completion of development. This strategy was successful and 
allowed the firm both to overcome its research threshold, but 
also to break into new markets overseas, thus also breaching a 
marketing threshold.
Company X adopted technology licensing as a means of increasing 
turnover without the necessity to grow in size. Company management 
wished to stay at roughly current size levels since they believed 
that further growth in numbers would make the firm more difficult 
to manage. Once again the licensing process was successful and 
Company X was able to license the process in question both 'in' 
and (after improvements) 'out'.
Company SA had small financial resources, strong 'in-house' R & D 
capabilities, and wished to move into new product areas. It 
recognised however that it did not have the capability to 
diversify both its production and its marketing structures 
simultaneously. Management, initially, accepted technology 
licensing on an agency/franchising and assembly route basis
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followed by 'in-house' manufacture. This allowed it to move 
into a new market segment utilising a 'gradualist' approach. It 
would probably otherwise not have been able to fund initial 
development of the product in which it is currently virtually 
a monopoly supplier in its field, even though it recognised the 
market opportunity. Consequently, inward licensing enabled it 
over a three year period to overcome the threshold barrier it 
had encountered.
Company TA had developed a strategy to provide a complete range 
of metal surface hardening treatments. However, much of the 
technology currently replacing obsolescent techniques would have 
required an expenditure which, in view of the size of the firm 
would probably have been unwise and would also have been unlikely 
to have been funded by the parent company. By utilising technology 
licensing. Company TA was able to obtain the technology at much 
reduced cost, but possibly more importantly, at a greatly reduced 
risk profile. Although the development is still relatively 'high 
risk' in view of company resources, failure would not be a 
catastrophic experience for the company in the opinion of 
management.
The case studies and other evidence cited do suggest that smaller 
firms are able to utilise technology licensing as a method of 
overcoming threshold barriers in some cases. In the Boston 
Consulting G r o u p C a t e g o r i s a t i o n ,  many of the case firms
1. See Chapter 2
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had licensed in 'star' products, where the major development 
cost of converting those 'stars' to 'cash cows' was borne by 
the licensor. The firms were effectively purchasing the 
accumulated experience of their licensors, allowing them to 
compete successfully against, in many cases, much larger 
companies within new and diversified markets. The Swedish 
case studies, notably cases number 1, 2, 3, 7 and 2l/^^ 
also support the proposal that smaller firms can utilise 
technology licensing to overcome threshold barriers, and 
grow beyond the limitations, sometimes self-imposed, of 
managerial structures developed at an earlier stage of 
company growth. It is suggested therefore, that Hypothesis 
2 is generally supported by the case study and other data.
(d) HYPOTHESIS 3
Licensing Allows Small Firms to Obtain Products and Enter New 
Markets at Lower Cost and Reduced Risk than Through Other Forms 
of Development
Hypothesis three was suggested by the evidence, presented in 
Chapter Two, that small firms appeared to be more diversified 
in the 100-200 employee size range than in smaller or larger 
companies. This suggests that many small firms enter new 
diversified markets as they develop. The hypothesis here
1. Svensson, B. op.cit. 
See Appendix 6.6
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suggests that smaller firms utilise TL in their product and 
market diversification strategies. If this was the case, it 
would suggest that some smaller firms are explicitly or implicitly 
utilising techniques similar to those proposed by the Boston 
Consulting Group matrix to develop or dispose of products and 
enter or leave markets.
Consideration of the 'Leverhulme' study s t a t i s t i c s s u g g e s t e d  
that TL companies were more diversified than non-licensing 
companies. Twice as many licensing companies operated in two 
or more markets than non-licensing companies. The sample firms 
did not, however, quote diversification as a major reason for 
inward licensing (only nine per cent of cases). This would 
suggest therefore, that most small firms do not utilise licensing 
in this manner but that a minority of firms do use licensing 
proactively in this way. This would be supported by the 
evidence of diversification by smaller firms presented in 
Chapter 3. Clearly, a small number of 'progressive' firms do 
both license and diversify more proactively than the majority 
of the population of firms.
The major use for inward licensing appeared to be in extending 
product lines. This sometimes led to technology being purchased 
which later formed the basis for diversification into other product 
areas however. Inward licensing had, therefore, acted as a 
bridge in these cases, allowing later development into areas 
outside current skills.
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit. (A)
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The case study analysis also suggested that case companies were 
utilising technology licensing to obtain new products for new 
markets> 43% of companies were of the 'non-specialisedj i.e. 
diversified type under the classification made in Chapter 4^^^ 
and twenty seven per cent quoted growth through diversification 
as a primary policy objective. However, since more than fifty 
per cent of the sample quoted growth through development in 
current product areas as their primary policy objective, it 
seems clear that most case companies had utilised inward 
licensing mainly to complement existing skills. Companies E,
M, CA and VA were good examples of this.
Company E had licensed a new product 'in' which built upon 
its existing marketing skills, but encompassed diversification 
of its technological skills into a new area. Company M had 
diversified into new areas of the market close to its current 
strengths. Company CA had utilised inward licensing to extend 
its product lines into new areas of application. However,
Company VA provided possibly the base case study example of 
a company which had utilised inward licensing to endeavour to 
develop into entirely new and diversified areas. In this 
instance TL was seen as the only realistic method for the company 
to develop into higher technology areas in which it currently 
had few skills, while building on existing strengths. Alternative 
strategies that had been considered included the use of 
franchising, to market products first before manufacturing 
them 'in-house', but this strategy had mainly been rejected
1. Table 6.5 above
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in favour of the licensing option. All the four case studies 
quoted supported the hypothesis that smaller firms can utilise 
licensing to obtain products and enter markets at relatively lower 
risk than would be the case utilising 'in-house' development. 
However, the quoted cases were typical of only a minority of 
the case studies with regard to inward licensing.
In contrast to the somewhat unclear picture of inward licensing 
and product diversification, the situation of outward licensing 
and market diversification was much more clear cut. Both the 
Leverhulme study and the cases suggested that a large number of 
firms proactively utilise outward licensing to diversify into new 
markets. Company N,for example, utilised outward licensing to 
provide high cash flows for developing product lines, allowing 
development of the company out of manufacturing and into the 
service sector. Company O also utilised outward licensing to 
obtain maximum returns upon a successful product line. Company X 
utilised outward licensing to obtain a return on costly research 
and development programmes, allowing it to retain market 
leadership in its own market. In contrast. Company NA had 
utilised outward licensing to overcome price constraints restricting 
it from certain export markets. Through the use of licensing 
it had also been able to compete with overseas competitors in 
third markets and hence to build upon its initial technological 
success by further enhancement of its products. Without the use 
of licensing the firm would probably have been unable to enter 
those markets, or raise the finance to develop its product lines.
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Under the Boston Consulting Group analysis of cash flows between
products, several of the case companies could be classified as
exploiting 'cash cow' products as the case analysis suggests.
Thirty five per cent of c a s e s h a d  licensed products that
could be described in this manner. Clearly, income accruing
from such exploitation could be utilised to fund other activities.
That some firms do, at least implicitly, adopt this approach, is
also supported by evidence of the returns accruing to a sample
of companies studied in conjunction with the Leverhulme analysis
noted above, which suggested that returns in the hundreds of
(2)
per cent could be achieved.
In conclusion, it did not appear that TL is generally used by 
small firms to diversify into new product areas, although a small 
minority of case companies had utilised TL in this way. It is 
postulated that the diversification observed in the small firm 
sector and explored in Chapter 3, arises more frequently in an 
incremental manner out of areas in which that firm is already 
operating. A large majority of case companies considered that 
their primary policy objective was either 'survival' or 'growth 
through development of current activities', rather than 
diversification into new o n e s . T h o s e  diversifying companies 
appeared mainly to be those which had outgrown current small
(4)
market niches . In addition, several of the case companies had
1. Table 6.14 above
2. Lowe J and Crawford N K. 'Outward Licensing as a Marketing 
Strategy -An Analysis of Returns'. Paper presented to Conference 
on 'Buying and Selling Technology', September 1983
3. See Table 6.15 above
4. See Table 6.5 above
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extended product lines throughTL which could be classified as 
diversification. Licensing appeared to act in some instances 
as a 'bridge' or catalyst to diversification processes. In 
outward licensing however, smaller firms had clearly made 
extensive diversification into new markets through the use of 
TL. It is considered therefore, that hypothesis three is 
supported in the case of diversification into new markets by 
outward licensing, but is less strongly supported in the case of 
diversification into new product areas through inward licensing. 
Inward TL appeared to encompass more incremental development, 
i.e. a low risk approach however.
(e) HYPOTHESIS 4
Cultural and Societal Differences Preclude Licensing Agreements 
Between Different Cultures by Small Firms
The last hypothesis was suggested by a consideration of the 
potentially high opportunity costs of carrying out TL by small 
firms. While larger firms may have specialist personnel to 
undertake the TL function,in smaller firms executives unversed 
in the use of TL may be involved. Licensing to or from 
culturally different markets may impose greater difficulties 
on such executives than licensing to or from culturally similar 
markets.
The results of the Leverhulme s t u d y g a v e  an important
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit. (A)
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insight into the source and destination of licensed products/ 
technology in small firms. Companies were asked to denote the 
nationality of their licensing partners. The results of this 
survey comprise Table 5.25^^^.
TABLE 6.25
SOURCE /DESTINATION OF LICENSED PRODUCTS





UK 20 28 5 9
USA and Canada 28 40 9 16
Europe 18 25 18 32
Japan 1 1 6 11
Other English 
speaking 2 3 17 30
Other non-English 
speaking 3 4 2 3
TOTAL LICENSES 72 - 57 -
The data in the table suggests that licensing 'in' by small 
firms is overwhelmingly from the UK, the USA, or from other 
English speaking countries. (71%). While this might suggest
1. Lowe J and Crawford N K. op.cit. (A)
The full analysis was not included in the paper noted above, but 
comprises part of the report made to the Leverhulme Trust.
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that the best technological opportunities exist in these countries, 
it is interesting to note that inward licensing from Japan only 
occurred in 1% of cases. For outward licensing however, English 
speaking licensees only accounted for 55% of cases, although a 
much larger proportion of these occurred in the non-American 
English speaking countries (30%). This might suggest that 
outward licensing to the USA is subject to substantially greater 
barriers than inward licensing. However, in the light of the 
cultural similarities between the two countries, it can also be 
postulated that these are predominantly economic and technological 
barriers. Outward licensing to non-English speaking countries 
accounted for 46% of all licensing activity. This suggests that 
outward licensing firms may be more prepared, or able, to overcome 
cultural barriers in their search for new markets.
The case study data also supported the view of a major difference 
between inward and outward licensing. Of those companies which had 
successfully utilised outward TL to markets in non-English speaking 
countries, companies O, P, BA and QA appeared to be particularly 
relevant. However, the licensing activity carried out by these 
companies should probably be considered in light of the central 
role that outward licensing was playing in the marketing strategies 
of these cases. All the four case companies had developed 
'in depth' skills in the use of outward licensing and saw it as 
their major activity. It is suggested therefore, that these 
cases may be atypical of the majority of smaller licensing 
firms.
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In those cases of companies with no, or little prior experience 
of outward licensing, it was apparent that breaking into 
culturally different markets using licensing was frequently 
difficult. In the case of companies R and V, 'one-off outward 
licensing negotiations had failed to provide a successful outcome. 
In the case of company R, although the product involved appeared 
to be highly suitable for the market into which it was aimed, 
problems in negotiating with African companies had precluded 
success. In the case of company V, negotiations were commenced 
with a number of companies in countries with very different 
cultures without success. Part of this failure may relate to 
internal 'firm specific' factors militating against the success 
of any 'external' activities of this kind. However, it was also 
clear that methods of doing business, the nature of the 
technology involved and failures of communication between the 
different parties had also obstructed success.
The case studies of inward licensing suggested that obtaining 
technology from firms with similar cultures was substantially 
more simple than from dissimilar cultures. Thus, in the case of 
company K, no successful agreement resulted from preliminary 
negotiations with a German company. Even in the case of inward 
licensing from a relatively similar culture, problems could 
arise as a result of cultural differences however. Thus in the 
case of company F which was licensing 'in' from an American 
company, differences in UK and American standards led to major 
problems in sourcing components for the licensed product.
However, it was also clear that where smaller firms had approached
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licensing with companies in different cultures, success could 
be achieved with a professional approach. Thus companies LA,
SA and TA had licensed products and technology 'in' from non- 
English speaking countries. In each case, the impetus to 
and necessity for, an agreement, had led to success.
In conclusion, the evidence to support Hypothesis four is 
somewhat confusing. While the 'Leverhulme' evidence suggested 
that small firm TL to or from different cultures was restricted, 
the case study data in total suggested that numbers of small 
firms had successfully licensed to/from different cultural 
areas. However, it was clear that in many of these cases, of 
which a larger number were outward than inward TL, it was the 
professional and long term approach that had succeeded in 
overcoming sometimes substantial barriers to TL. In the 
light of this it is concluded that hypothesis four is broadly 
correct. Important barriers do exist to the easy use of TL 
to/from different cultures. However, it is also clear that 
where small firms are prepared to attempt to overcome these 
barriers, success can be achieved.
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E. CONCLUSION/DISCUSSION
The major objective of this chapter was to draw together the 
results from previous chapters and to integrate those results 
with the case study and statistical data presented above. The 
role that technology licensing might play in the new product 
and market strategies of smaller companies was explored. Models 
were constructed in an endeavour to define the external and 
internal environmental effects that might impinge upon smaller 
firms in this regard.
It is clear from the empirical studies that technology licensing 
does play an important role in the technology strategies of 
some smaller firms. However, the use of such licensing 
processes must necessarily be considered in the context of 
the major objectives of smaller firms and the pressures affecting 
them. A large majority of the case studies suggested that 
technology licensing was utilised by smaller firms in a highly 
reactive manner, as the response to a product crisis within 
the firm, or for other 'survival' reasons. In the case of 
inward licensing, this strategy frequently appeared to have 
met with success. Most of those smaller firms which had 
utilised outward licensing had also done so reactively.
Frequently this had occurred because of the success of the 
firm in developing particular products for its own home 
market. Success in this home market had then led to approach 
by other, foreign, manufacturers wishing to utilise licensing 
to obtain the product for exploitation within their own market.
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Once again, many of the case study companies appeared to have 
utilised outward licensing successfully, following such initial 
approaches.
Although the 'trigger' to the use of licensing had frequently 
operated in a reactive manner, many of the case companies had 
then apparently developed licensing strategies in a highly 
proactive manner, as the potential for the use of the technique 
became apparent to them. This might suggest that many smaller 
firms may be able to accept new ideas relatively quickly and 
exploit them successfully.
Of the four hypotheses proposed within this chapter, it is 
suggested that the first, suggesting the proactive use of 
licensing by smaller firms is clearly unproved. The second 
hypothesis, suggesting that threshold barriers can be overcome 
by the use of licensing is generally supported, although as 
suggested above, few case firms appeared to have utilised 
licensing explicitly for this purpose. The third hypothesis 
suggesting reduced risk and cost in entering markets through 
licensing, also appeared to be broadly supported. Lastly, the 
fourth hypothesis, exploring the effect of national cultural 
barriers to the successful use of licensing also appeared to 
be supported. The small number of agreements between small 
UK licensors and licensees and counterparts in non-English 
speaking countries also suggested this.
In conclusion. Chapter Six has endeavoured to explore the
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strategic use of licensing in smaller firms in depth. It is 
an objective of the final chapter briefly to integrate the 
findings reported above into the context of the other subjects 
of this thesis, namely diversification and the development of 
business policy in smaller firms.
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Company A^^^ is a small (50 employees) independent company 
producing equipment for public utilities, and testing equipment 
for major manufacturers of electronic components. At the time of 
the case study the company had had a recent record of relatively 
fast growth as the demand for integrated circuit testing equipment 
had grown. However, the company had been constrained by problems 
of recruiting suitably qualified staff, since the skill levels 
utilised in the design and construction of integrated circuit 
testing equipment require graduate or postgraduate level staff.
This problem had been overcome to an extent by sponsoring some 
students on electrical engineering courses at several UK 
Universities, but this had been a costly programme and had not 
provided sufficient trained manpower for the company's requirements
The company which currently employs fifty people was founded in 
1966 when the present Managing Director left one of the major UK 
electrical manufacturing conpanies where he had been a senior 
research manager. The development work he had been carrying out 
had led him to realise that there was a market opportunity in the 
field of 'Weston' Standard Cells. This was a relatively mature 
product which could not be described as 'high technology' but
(1) Company A was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
described in Chapter 6.
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there was a continuing steady demand for the product which was not 
being met adequately by current suppliers. Following the formation 
of the company and the obtaining of several major contracts for 
supply of the 'Weston' Cells, the company diversified into other 
low technology, small market niches in the field of electrical 
components. From this base, the company has steadily expanded 
both in size and in its technological capabilities, by moving into 
sub-contract work for Original Equipment Manufacturers, technological 
leaders in the electronics field. Several of the Utilities are 
now major customers for its range of testing and allied equipment 
and the company is recognised both for its technological expertise 
and the high quality of its products.
Company A has utilised inward licensing in two cases. The first 
case arose in 1974 when the Post Office suggested to the company 
that it might consider developing a new method for locating 
underground cables and pipes, since current methods for achieving 
this were relatively unreliable. In this case, the Post Office 
supplied a great deal of technology to the company from its own 
laboratories, on the basis of a sub-contract agreement whereby the 
rights to the new product belonged to the Post Office. The product 
was a success and following supply of a large number of locators 
to the Post Office, the company obtained an agreement whereby the 
product was 'licensed' to it for a ten year period. This gave the 
company the rights both to develop the product further and to market 
it inside and outside the UK. This was a very advantageous agreement 
for Company A since a 'captive' market was supplied and competitors 
were excluded from that market by Utility purchasing policies. The
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product proved to be extremely profitable.
Three years after the first licence, the company sought proactively 
for a similar agreement with another Utility, the United Kingdom 
Atomic Energy Authority, for a portable 'dosemeter' to measure 
radiation levels within nuclear installations. Once again 
technology was transferred to the company from the Utility on the 
basis of a sub-contract whereby the company supplied the Utility 
with the product, in return for the rights to use it for other 
markets and to supply it to other customers in the UK (although 
this was a very small market in world terms). The second product 
was also a success for Company A in strengthening its technological 
base and allowing for development of the company into diversified 
fields outside its own current strengths. The licence has been an 
important plank in the success of Company A and has led to a 
continuing search for similar inward licensing agreements with UK 
Utilities and with large companies seeking long term suppliers for 
particular sub-assemblies incorporating technology in which 
Company A has strengths.
At an early stage in its development, the conpany management decided 
upon a strategy of utilising easily available technology to attack 
small market segments in which it could build up an expertise. The 
licensing agreements allowed it to continue to develop small 
market segments utilising the technology of others, to become the 
dominant supplier, indeed the monopoly supplier of particular types 
of equipment. Company A has therefore utilised licensing to 
overcome some of the dangers of competition by co-operating with
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much larger concerns which, by their size and monopoly strengths 
had previously reduced the possibilities of effective competition. 
This has been most important in the development strategy of Company 





Company is a subsidiary company of a medium sized engineering
group employing about 200 people. The company produces sub- 
assemblies for the engineering industry that are to be incorporated 
into products by Original Equipment Manufacturers. At the time of 
this case study the company employed approximately one hundred 
people and had been increasing its volume sales by an annual average 
of twenty per cent during the previous four years. The use of 
licensing has been an important factor in this growth and has been 
utilised over an extended period of time by the company.
Company B has two experiences of licensing: the first dates back 
to 1964, and was in the area of automatic control valves. At the 
time the parent company produced sophisticated control systems and 
was seeking to diversify into new areas of operation. It used 
Company B to identify and develop into new market segments. Company 
B employed marketing consultants to look àt possible areas of 
diversification and identify potential licensors in the area of 
sophisticated control systems. In particular it specified that 
any technology to be licensed 'in' should have synergy with the 
technological side of what the company was doing. The consultants 
recommended that of the options of licensing or purchase of another
(1) Company B was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
described in Chapter 6.
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subsidiary company, licensing was the most cost effective, and 
likely to prove the most technologically effective method, since the 
continuing resources of the licensor could be utilised in the 
further development of new products. Following the consultants' 
advice the company took on a fluid control system from the USA 
which had many similarities from a technical point of view with 
existing company products. However, the product involved very 
different markets in which Company B had little experience. In the 
short run the product was a success and indeed in the longer term 
the product could be deemed to have been successful. However, a 
major problem that arose was that Company B came to rely heavily 
on its licensor’s R & D expertise and when the licensor decided to 
end further development in this area. Company B found itself with 
a technologically obsolescent product which it did not have the 
resources to develop further itself. This problem did not occur 
until 15 years after the original licence was signed, but it did 
mean that after 15 years with developmental work on the product 
being carried out by the licensor. Company B was left with a 
product that was not technically advanced.
At this point the company decided it had to have new products, and 
accepted several agency agreements, to act as distributors for 
other companies' products. The result was that the agencies became 
the most important aspect of the conpany's business, leading to an 
even greater diminution of its R & D capability and manufacturing 
base. However, the agency agreements were very profitable, and 
the company continued to achieve a satisfactory return for the 
parent group.
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Company B did not stop manufacturing completely, however. In the 
late 1970s a rew Managing Director identified an opportunity in the 
electronics market caused by a requirement for load-cells for 
electronic cash registers. At a trade fair he met an Israeli 
producer who had a product available for license which fitted the 
specific requirement he had in mind. Company B took on the licence 
for this load-cell which was extremely successful. The only 
problems have been in communication between licensor and licensee. 
Current production levels are approximately 2000 units per month 
and à new factory has had to be set up to deal with the extra 
production. The Managing Director suggested that the only 
alternative to licensing in, in this case, would have been 'in- 
house' development which could have cost the company half a million 
pounds and would have required a long term research and development 
effort. This would probably have been unrealistic in the light 
of the company's lack of R & D facilities consequent upon its 
previous decision to end manufacturing and related activities.
Both the first and the second case of licensing were successful. 
However, the two cases were dealt with in very different ways. In 
order to prevent licensing causing the company to become solely 
reliant on other people's technology, as happened on the previous 
occasion, the company recruited its own scientists and engineers 
to develop the product further, such that it has now made many 
substantial changes and improvements to the product, at the same 
time building up 'in-depth' R & D experience and facilities.
The improved product is being sold in Israel through the original 
licensors distribution outlets.
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Following its own two successful cases of licensing, the company 
is convinced that licensing represents a good strategy to pursue 
and consequently it is currently negotiating with a European 
company for a water-flow meter under licence. Management suggests 
that the new product will fit well with existing marketing skills 
as well as conforming to skills on the production side.
Company B has had a long history of the use of licensing and hence 
it appears to be an accepted strategy within the company. In 
general. Company B has reacted to its technological strengths and 
changes in the market in an interesting way. The first product it 
licensed augmented existing production and market skills, but 
recognition by the company that it was losing its competitive 
advantage in this area led it to take on agencies and become a 
marketing company alone. This strategy was successful and the 
firm moved out of manufacturing, but returned to it, through the 
use of a licensing agreement, again, highly successfully.
The case suggests that Company B acted in a highly flexible manner. 
However, it was a recognition by the company of where its comparative 
advantage lay, that is probably the most important factor in this 
case. Company survival was, probably rightly, seen as the most 
important factor, with the way that survival was achieved as a 
secondary consideration. The company did not consider itself as 
a "manufacturing concern" or as "a marketing operation", just as 
an organisation, that needed to survive. The use of licensing was 




Respondents: Managing Director and Sales Director
Company Cs^^^ origins lie in the need, during the Second World War 
to manufacture wood panels used in the aircraft industry. The 
company was set up by a large company to take account of this 
requirement and developed its expertise under contracts from the 
UK defence department. Following the war the company continued to 
manufacture plywood and other wood composite panels. However, this 
activity was never very profitable and the company survived by 
contracting out its expertise in R & D in wood products.
In the late 1950s, the present Managing Director, then a management 
trainee in the parent company, met at a trade fairthe representative 
of a German company which wished to license its innovative and 
patented wood particle moulding technology 'out'. The German firm 
had recognised that, although its process produced wood particle 
boarding at a cheaper price than the competition, it would still be 
unable to compete against local manufacturers in other markets, even 
those using less effective, outmoded technologies, because of the 
high weight/value ratios of its products. Transport costs made the 
exploitation of foreign markets very difficult for it and therefore 
it turned to licensing agreements for its technology. Following 
agreement between the UK company and the German licensor. Company C
(1) Company C was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
described in Chapter 6.
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has developed and expanded, becoming market leader in its own 
market segment in the UK. It currently employs nearly 200 people 
and has a turnover of more than four million pounds per annum.
The company is currently seeking to grow at a faster rate by taking 
on more licensing agreements and developing its own new products 
'in-house'.
From one licence (to the UK company) the German firm has expanded 
its licensing activities so that several dozen countries are now 
covered by licence agreements. The licensees have formed an 
association with the licensor for the free flow of ideas between 
them. Any new idea thus gets quickly passed around the group 
(at no gain to the instigator). This is clearly advantageous 
to the licensees who are not competitors with other licensees 
because of the nature of the products they are producing, as 
suggested above.
Company C is very skill intensive. The Managing Director thinks it 
unlikely that a competitor could break into the market however #uch 
money he spent on trying,because of this skill intensity. The 
licensor/licensee relationship is such that the resources of all 
licensees would be available to any licensee company fighting against 
an endeavour to break into its market.
Conpany C now has three licences from its German licensor (with more 
being negotiated). Until recently it had not considered the use of 
any other sources of technology (i.e. other licensors), but now is 
actively seeking ideas from other sources such as Contract Research
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and Development companies and from other manufacturing concerns.
Although the company had made extensive use of licensing, the 
Managing Director had not utilized the large number of licensing 
journals that were available, nor had he made use of licensing 
consultants. He considered that consultants might be useful in 
finding new products in some cases, however.
One problem that Company C had recognised in its use of licensing 
was that the licensor may make more money than its licensee out 
of an innovation. It was suggested that in its own case, a payment 
of four per cent of turnover (the royalty rate) might be 50% of 
profit, because of the highly competitive environment in which it 
was operating, and low margins. In Company ck case, the licensor 
has used these profits to plough back into R & D within the business 
and had clearly used its licence income to retain its technological 
lead, which resulted in further licences accruing to it.
The Managing Director made the point that there was a difficulty in 
finding suitably qualified staff to recognise new licence opportunities 
Although technical staff might visit Germany to see the main licensor 
they might not recognise a potentially transferable technology. He 
suggested that the sort of person required needed to have some 
technical background but also a commercial "eye" and in his experience 
the two were not often combined. This is possibly a relevant point 
in the context of the current search by the company for new product 
opportunities through licensing.
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The Managing Director considered that Company C was an innovative 
growth oriented company and looked forward to expanding his company 
both through diversification and by expanding the company's share 
of its own market. The company has had a steady record of growth 
and profitability under the umbrella of the parent group and this 
was expected to continue into the future.
Company C was based upon a licensing agreement. In that sense its 
whole strategy has depended upon the use of licensing. However, 
this case is probably particularly important in demonstrating how 
technological dependence upon 'bought in' technology can in some 
ways act to the long term competitive disadvantage of the company. 
Company C appears to be locked into a network of licensing 
agreements with its main licensor. Licence payments account for 
a substantial proportion of the profits of the company, which 
therefore has less resources to devote to its own research and 
development programme. It has therefore, been forced to seek new 
technology through further licence agreements (with other licensors) 
rather than developing its own technology.
In general. Company C appeared to be developing its new product 
strategy solely through the use of inward licensing. It does not 
export its products and would probably find it difficult to do so, 
both because of their size/weight and because of restrictions on 




Company D^^^ was established in the early 1960s as a small 
independent company supplying glass reinforced plastic (GRP) 
products to (usually) trade customers. About twelve years after 
being set up and following a sustained period of growth, the 
company was taken over by a medium sized, diversified company, 
comprising several semi-autonomous companies. The company was 
allowed to keep a great deal of independence within the group but 
benefited from access to the Research and Development, managerial 
and financial facilities within the group.
Following the takeover the company gradually began to specialise 
in development and manufacture of large complex shaped products in 
GRP and in long-run production items where economies of scale 
could be made. This led to a narrowing of the number of markets 
in which Company D was operating and a reduction in the number of 
product lines. The company's main market now, in which it is one 
of the market leaders, is the supply of cladding panels and other 
structural and non-structural products to the building trade.
The company has developed its production and development expertise 
such that customers can specify a design and the company's staff
(1) Company D was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
described in Chapter 6.
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can then define whether this will be possible to make economically. 
At present, the company has a production facility in excess of 
8000 square metres and employs a staff of just less than one hundred. 
Of these, about 20% are employed on R & D and customer design/ 
support services. It is the company'sphilosophy to be in the 
forefront of GRP technology and to this end it is always actively 
seeking new products and/or techniques to make those products.
The company has licensed’in'three products, in one case because 
they were approached by einother company, and in the two other cases 
because they approached others who had technology to offer. The 
company actively advertises for potential licensors as part of its 
new product search process. This is mainly done through various 
technical journals at approximately six monthly intervals and 
according to the respondent usually brings in about 25 responses, 
most of which describe potentially valuable products, but very few 
of which lead to the licensing'in' of a particular product. The 
company's policy towards licensing is very much affected by the 
Managing Director's experience some years ago with a process which 
he developed through 'in-house' R & D but which it was later 
discovered could have been obtained under licence from a French 
company for a relatively small licence fee. In this case, over 
£50,000 worth of development money was spent and nothing tangible 
resulted from the work. A licence to use the similar process 
could have been obtained for less resources if the company had 
not decided to try and develop the process itself. The other 
important reason for the company being interested in possible new 
product opportunities via licensing was stated to be because the
-386-
industry is, in the words of the respondent, a "young industry 
where innovation is occurring all the time, and where it is 
important in order to maintain competitiveness with other firms to 
sometimes consider licensing as an alternative to new product 
development based on 'in-house' research". The company has had 
few problems with the licensing agreements that it has been involved 
with, and is therefore keen to continue this form of new product 
development and acquisition.
According to the respondent,Conpany D s ' success in licensing is 
mainly because the technology concerned is essentially a simple 
technology which involves a low level of skill. However, it is 
interesting to note that in the case of the first licence agreement 
signed by the company (which is now null and void) the technology 
that was transferred concerned a large item of capital equipment 
and licensing of know-how in utilising this equipment. Consequently 
the agreement necessitated the licensor bringing the equipment on 
stream before the deal was concluded. The central feature therefore 
of that agreement was not the licensing of a particular product but 
the satisfactory installation of a piece of equipment. This might 
support the hypothesis that licensing can be facilitated when 
processes are capital intensive and where that capital intensity 
has replaced "on the job" skills which themselves may be very 
difficult to transfer.
Another aspect of licensing in the industry was stated to be large 
primary producing companies developing new processes which can use 
the intermediate products that they produce. Consequently compeinies
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like Shell and ICI might develop processes for downstream use which 
can use the polystyrene foam that they produce in large quantities. 
Indeed they were stated specifically to go out of their way to do 
that and in this context may license out up to 50 potential licensees 
who would use that particular licence process. Company D has not 
been involved in this type of licensing, however, although one 
potential licence was evaluated but discarded after evaluation.
In such instances, the costs of evaluation and negotiation in terms 
of management time had generally been relatively low for the 
company although the respondent did recognise that such costs could 
be high in some cases.
Negotiations had taken the form, in one of the licensing agreements, 
of a contract and sets of heads of agreement, "toing and froing" 
between licensor and licensee until a satisfactory set of heads of 
agreement had been achieved for both parties. This had been a long 
term (15 month) process and although a satisfactory agreement had 
been reached, valuable time in introducing the product had been 
lost.
The company had also considered alternatives to licensing in 
acquiring technology. One case concerned the potential takeover 
by Conpany D of a firm which was involved in selling 'turn-key' 
operations for a plastics based process outside the UK. Company D 
wished to obtain part of this technology and consequently was 
prepared to consider acquisition in this case, since the owners 
of the firm were not prepared to consider a licensing agreement.
In this negotiation Company D used a firm of solicitors who had
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been associated with the company since its inception but who 
were not recognised or specialised licensing solicitors. They 
feel that the service they got from this group of solicitors in 
this case and in other licensing agreements has been satisfactory 
and has not caused problems. Once again, this may possibly reflect 
the type of technology involved and the relatively accepted part 
that licensing plays within the industry.
Although licensing only accounts for 5% of turnover in Conpany D, 
it has, and continues to be, an important factor in the conpany's 
new product policy. Few problems appear to have been encountered 
in this process and this possibly reflects the low technology 
profile and the formulât!ve aspect of the products concerned.
However, the company has neither considered nor attempted to 
license 'out' its own technology, and cannot therefore be considered 
to be using licensing as part of its strategic management of technology. 
Conpany D appeared to be satisfied with the success of licensing 
however, and provides an example of a successful inward licensing 
company in the context of this study.
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COMPANY E
Respondents: Managing Director and Technical Director
(1)
Company E is a company in the industrial filtration supply industry.
It provides a range of approximately one hundred products to mainly 
industrial companies and also has important products in the 
horticultural and agricultural industries. The company was originally 
the UK marketing subsidiary of an American filter manufacturer. 
However, the US conpany decided to divest itself of its European 
subsidiaries and utilise agents rather than rely upon direct sales 
with its own sales force. Company E was offered to its managers 
on the basis of a bank funded management buyout. It was agreed 
that the ccmpany would continue to act as agent for its original 
American parent. At the present time the company enploys forty 
people with a 12 million pound turnover.
Soon after its formation as a private limited company, management 
made the decision to broaden the company's product range. At this 
time it had no manufacturing facilities at all, although a small 
percentage of the conponents for the US equipment it sold were 
produced on a sub-contract basis within the UK. These were 
generally spares and small parts. The company also had a small 
R & D (rather development) department which had previously been 
utilised in getting type approval for US equipment.
Following its decision to diversify, the company took on agencies
(1) Company E was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research 
described in Chapter 5.
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for other American and European products. However, this was seen 
as only the first step in a major expansion scheme that management 
had undertaken. Following this decision, a consultant approached 
the company and was contracted to seek further suitable products 
which might be produced by the company. Management had an open 
mind on the type of products that might be made and the consultantes 
brief was therefore fairly broad.
The consultant identified several products that might be suitable 
for the company, and one of these was a system for drip feeding 
plants, developed by an Israeli company. The system ccmprised a 
porous hose that delivered a measured amount of water to plants 
along its length, based upon the pressure of water impinging upon 
the hose. The company recognised the potential of the product, 
although it had no skills in either the market or the production 
of the product. Agreement was therefore reached to.import the 
product from Israel initially. This process worked well, and 
Conpany E built up a large and increasing market for the product.
It was a company policy to carry out no manufacturing 'in-house' 
although the firm did carry out a small amount of final assembly 
work. The production of the product after transfer to the 
UK was therefore carried out through sub-contractors in the UK.
This policy was successful and production of the product is now 
wholly carried out in the UK. Company E has developed a completely 
new market in a diversified manner and at present is seeking other 
products which can also be produced in a similar manner. The 
company has increased its R & D facilities to be able to develop 
any future products that it licenses 'in'.
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Company E utilised licensing in a very proactive manner, recognising 
the role that technology transfer could play in its diversification 
processes. By utilising both the R & D and the marketing facilities 
of its licensor conpany it developed into a new market in an 
incremental manner, building on previous marketing strengths and 
developing sub-contract manufacture at the same time. Licensing 
has been an integral part in the company's development from an 
agency operation to its present position as an intermediary 
manufacturing/assembly operation. However, the company recognised 
at an early stage the value of some 'in-house' R & D expertise and 
therefore developed such expertise to allow it to develop bought 
in technology for its own markets.
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COMPANY F
Respondents: Managing Director and Technical Director
Company was set up in the mid 1960s as an entrepreneurial
venture and collaborative agreement between a venture capital 
company, an already established medium sized engineering firm, and 
a group of three engineers. Working capital was provided by the 
venture capital company,premises and some managerial skills by the 
engineering firm,and technological skills by the engineers. The 
objective of the new enterprise was to enter the, then fast growing, 
heating, ventilating and air conditioning market. After a somewhat 
problematical first year, when substantially greater losses than 
anticipated were incurred on operations, the company entered a 
period of sustained growth and profitability, doubling its sales 
every year over one five year period. In 1972 the conpany passed 
sales of a million pounds a year at which time it attracted the 
notice of a large conglomerate engineering company, seeking to 
diversify its interests into fast growing smaller companies. At 
this time the original venture capital company sold its majority 
stake to the conglomerate.
Following the change in ownership a number of key staff left the 
company which, however, continued to grow, albeit at a slower rate 
than previously. In 19 76 however, the conglomerate company
(1) Company F was identified through the Leverhulme research
reported in Chapter 6.
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incurred heavy losses as a result of problems in one of its largest 
subsidiaries and went into liquidation in early 1977. Compeiny F 
as a profitable subsidiary, was sold as a going concern to another, 
smaller conglomerate, which has owned the company ever since. Over 
the last eight years company F has been treated as a profit centre, 
subject to extensive autonomy in its strategic development.
At the time of its first experience in licensing. Company F had a 
range of six major product lines, with on average ten separate 
products within each line. Following its last change of ownership 
the company was rationalised, three of its factory units were 
closed and production concentrated in Southampton, suitably placed 
to service its main markets in the South of England. It currently 
employs nearly two hundred people at two locations in this area.
As market leader in two of its product lines the company has had 
to innovate continually in what is not, generally, a high 
technology industry. Heating and ventilating products are not 
very amenable to export, particularly to very distant markets, 
because of their high weight:value ratio, although within Europe 
the company has had success, particularly with one air 
conditioning product which it has exported to most countries in 
Europe. Since the industry is very fragmented, company F's 
strategy has been to concentrate its operations in particular, 
small, market segments, where it has been able to become a 
market leader. New product development has generally been 
incremental, in the context of industry norms. However, in the 
mid 1970s, the company decided to diversify and enter a new
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market segment in which it saw great potential, but had no 
suitable technology.
Following its decision to enter the new market. Company F 
considered whether to develop technology 'in-house', through 
research under contract, or through a licensing agreement. Its 
'in-house' R & D facilities were relatively poor, restricted to 
draughting, design and carrying out incremental improvements to 
existing products. Use of contract research to develop a new 
product was seriously considered, but ultimately discarded because 
the costs were considered likely to be too high. The third 
option, a licensing agreement, was chosen as the best way of 
proceeding, stimulated by a visit by several company personnel to 
a trade fair in the United States, where several innovative 
products had been seen. Approaches were made to three American 
manufacturers and agreement was reached for the technology for 
a heavy duty, large air conditioning product to be transferred to 
Company F. The American company was agreeable in principle to 
a licensing agreement, since it carried out no exporting and was 
not a competitor in Company Fs market. The technology involved, 
also made it unlikely that there ever would be any conflict 
between the two parties. Company F felt^however, that the US 
company was not really interested in the agreement, seeing it 
simply as a method of making a 'windfall profit' rather than as 
part of a long term collaboration. Possibly as a result of 
this, the negotiations leading to the signing of an agreement 
took much longer than had been anticipated (eleven months) and 
necessitated several costly trips by senior company managers to the USA.
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As part of the agreement, the American company provided detailed 
product drawings and patents to Company F. It was not realised 
until after the agreement had been signée^, however, that all 
drawings would have to be re-drafted to take account of the 
different measuring systems (Imperial and Metric) employed by the 
two companies. To this end, Southampton University was employed 
to provide extra draughting expertise (this was provided privately, 
and cheaply, by the individuals concerned). Another problem, 
which at one point nearly caused abandonment of the project, was 
the difficulty in finding component suppliers in the UK. This 
problem was solved by having components sent from the United 
States in the short term, with a UK manufacturer tooling up to 
provide the conponents in the longer term. (For one particular 
conponent however, this solution proved impracticable and it 
is still being imported). A further problem involved the size 
of the product housing which had to be galvanized. No sub­
contractor able to galvanize such a large unit could be found 
and eventually a special tank had to be paid for by Company F.
When the product did go into production. Company F discovered 
that the marketing literature provided by its licensor (and which 
it had intended to use 'verbatim' ) was unsuitable for 
distribution in the UK and had to be reprinted.
The problems with the product delayed its launch (by about a year) 
and added substantially to its cost. By 1983, the new product 
had still not achieved the potential originally hoped for it.
As a result, the company does not feel it has had a successful 
licensing experience and is dubious about repeating the experience.
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In summary. Company F realised that it had the choice of licensing, 
'in-house' development or employing contract research consultants 
at an early stage in its new product process. It decided on a 
licensing strategy as a result of its perception that it did not 
have the resources to carry out the other options. Thus it saw 
licensing as a method of obtaining a product cheaply. In its 
initial evaluation. Company F made a rational decision. It would 
probably have been unable to enter the market segment in question 
without the use of licensing. However it was perhaps unlucly 
in first choosing a licensor with no real interest in a long 
term agreement and second, in encountering substantial problems 
in transferring the technology. However, the latter problems, 
at least, could probably have been foreseen and the company now 
recognises several of the decision points at which it should 
have required further information and assistance from its 
licensor.
Coup any F has had only a partial success in transferring technology. 
This appears to have been due to its lack of experience in the use 
of licensing per se. The Managing Director implicitly recognised 
this and suggested he would use licensing in a different way, 
if the situation arises again, by obtaining a more 'clear cut' 
undertaking from the licensor to assist in overcoming initial 
technical problems associated with an agreement. However it was 
clear that the poor result of the first licence agreement had 
made the company unwilling to consider the use of licensing again.
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COMPANY H 
Respondent : Managing Director
Company was set up more than fifty years ago as a division of
a medium sized engineering group, to manufacture and distribute 
domestic and industrial fluid and electrical control systems. The 
company's present status as a limited company, however, dates to 
the mid 1970s when the original parent company sold the division 
to another group as a going concern. At that time, the company was 
restructured and functions previously carried out by 'group' 
personnel were transferred into the company. The company now 
operates in an autonomous fashion, with control being exerted by 
the new owners through a financial regime. At the time of this 
case study the company employed approximately two hundred and 
fifty people.
In 1978 there was an extensive programme of reorganisation within 
the company which led to a number of small manufacturing facilities 
in remote parts of the UK being closed, and key staff transferred 
back to the main site near London. A disproportionate amount of 
time had previously been spent by management in endeavouring to 
run a disparate group of factories, a legacy of the original 
divisionalised company structure. This rationalisation allowed 
management more time to concentrate on the company's 'core' 
activities, its most important markets, and developing product
(1) Company H was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chpater 6
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portfolios to be sold into those markets. The company's products 
are 'traditional' (in the sense that there has been only a small 
amount of technical change over the past twenty years) and the 
company has a large number of repeat customers who incorporate 
company H products into their equipment. Recently, however, new 
control technologies developed in Japan and the United States, 
have brought new threats to Company H. This situation has been 
exacerbated through market entry by other, aggressive competitors 
within the UK. Company H is currently struggling to protect its 
market share while endeavouring to meet technological changes 
which threaten to make its current products obsolelecent.
The Managing Director of Company H recognises that his company's 
current generation of products relies on high skill levels in 
manufacturing operatives. However, new technology is threatening 
to make these skills redundant. Company H has recruited more R and 
D personnel in an endeavour to increase the pace of technological 
development within the firm and to develop new product lines. At 
the same time, the method of manufacturing operations is changing, 
with fabrication utilising micro-chips replacing the previous 
manufacturing processes in some cases. The process conforms to the 
change from an electromechanical to an electronic range of products 
Company H is therefore, changing rapidly in response, to the 
technological threats and changes around it. However, recognition 
of these threats was delayed. The company has been forced to with­
draw from some markets and halve the workforce to its present 
figure. The company has made substantial losses in the past two 
years and this reflects, in part, the contribution of products
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that are likely to be superseded within the next five years. It 
was therefore a priority for the company to develop new products 
quickly. It is in this area that licensing has been considered.
Company H turned to licensing in a very reactive manner. The major 
objective of the licence research was to identify products that 
would take up spare capacity within the current manufacturing 
facilities rather than as part of any integrated new product 
strategy. The company sought products to inward license in two 
ways. First, it employed a licensing consultant to identify 
possible opportunities. Secondly, it carried out its own 'in 
house' research utilising previous contacts in the United 
States and a broad based literature search in the United 
Kingdom.
At the time of this case study,approximately eighteen months after 
the search process had been instituted, the company was making no 
products under licence. The consultant employed by the company had 
made a relatively large number of contacts, and company personnel 
had also made contact with a number of companies in North America. 
Although several visits to the USA had been made, and agreement 
nearly secured in two cases, no licence agreements had been reached 
The Managing Director suggested that the main reasons for the 
failure of the company to identify suitable products, were twofold. 
First, a major problem had arisen in identifying products that 
would be suitable both for Company H's manufacturing facilities 
and for incorporation into its customers’ products. A second problem 
had involved a lack of management time. The Managing Director
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carried out a majority of the licence negotiations himself and had 
had problems in delegating the licence function to others. A 
majority of his own time had had to be spent in the rationalisation 
process that the company had undertaken. As a result of this process 
the company was now breaking even and it was hoped that it would 
move into profit shortly.
In conclusion, Company H had developed its inward licensing 
strategy in a very ad hoc manner and as a reaction to a lack of new 
products developed 'in house'. It had approached the practical 
business of obtaining licences without committing sufficient 
resources to it. As a result, although it had identified several 
potentially profitable projects it had been unable to carry them 
through to fruition. It appeared that Company H may also not have 
been particularly attractive as a partner for potential licensors, 
since the company was in the middle of reorganisation. During the 
licence search period. Company H had substantially strengthened its 
'in house' R & D facilities. The Managing Director suggested that 
his future licensing strategy would be to concentrate on products 
that the R & D department could adapt and develop rather than 




Company K is an old established firm in the hydraulic engineer­
ing field. The company was founded in 1860 and has continued to 
specialise in manufacturing heavy hydraulic equipment. This com­
prises heavy duty presses with a maximum pressure of 3000 tons.
The company has occupied a small market niche for most of its 
existence, and this has provided a secure though unremarkable 
profit level for more than one hundred years. The company is well 
known within its industry, and has been a market leader within its 
own market segment. However, as new sources of technology have 
been developed, the company has gone into a long period of decline. 
This followed sale of the firm by the original family shareholders 
in the late 1950's.
Twelve years ago, a large conglomerate purchased the company and 
has since attempted to rationalise the firm and turn it round from 
its loss making position. This has led to a number of different 
managing directors being appointed for short periods. This pro­
cess has reduced the morale of the company workforce. Company 
management attempted to change the style of the company by moving 
out of 'one o f f  heavy presses with the objective of developing 
a range of lighter presses. Two product areas were identified as 
potential growth markets. Management considered that development 
of standard ranges of machinery would strengthen the company's
(1) Company K was identified through the 'Leverhulme' project 
reported in chapter 6.
—402 —
position in relation to its market and in relation to the Group.
The two product areas chosen for diversification were extrusion 
presses and concrete presses. Both of these product lines were 
'batch* machines, rather than the individually designed machines 
of previous product lines.
The rationalisation process involving production of standard 
machines developed slowly. Each of the Directors had particular 
projects they wished supported and this led to a failure to agree 
on one overall strategy. As a result of this, the rationalisation 
process proceeded relatively slowly.
It was clear during the case study interviews that there was con­
siderable friction between company managers. The Technical 
Director, for example, clearly felt that the current Managing 
Director, while a fairly dynamic character, was likely to diversify 
into areas away from the basic strengths of the company. He 
suggested that this situation may be common in subsidiary companies 
where group headquarters try to control subsidiaries by putting 
their 'own men' in at the top.
In 1979, management realised that a further rationalisation had to 
take place; the Technical Director was made Special Projects 
Director and new product/market development became his full time 
responsibility. As a result of this he developed a strategy to 
build up ranges of the two product lines mentioned above, i.e. 
powder metal presses and concrete presses. First of all, a licence 
was taken for a powder metal press and process, which was being
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relinquished by another UK company. This product and process was 
approximately 40 years old and the technology was well understood. 
The press was sold under the name of the 'Stokes' press and the 
brand name itself had a certain value within the UK since it was 
recognised by customers as a particular type of technology in a 
generic sense. There was only one other producer of similar 
machines in the UK, two European companies and three United States 
companies. Company K used the technology acquired to develop a 
range of machines around the original Stokes press. This process 
is still continuing with the objective of creating a range from 
very small to very large presses (up to approximately 100 tons).
The lOO ton press is large in relation to the powder metal process 
but not in relation to hydraulic presses in general. Products that 
can be produced utilising this technology include automotive com­
ponents and locks, and it is used as an alternative to casting 
processes. A much better finish is produced than castings can 
provide however, although die casting and investment casting can 
be competitive in some cases.
The new process also allowed company K to produce exotic alloys, 
since a mixture of several different metallic powders could be made 
with the pressing action causing them to melt together into an 
alloy. Quite qomplex components could be made using this process.
A major problem of the new range of machines that the company 
produced however was in marketing. The marketing department was 
skilled in negotiating projects with clients up to a million 
pounds in value but was not so effective in selling a semi-mass- 
produced range of products. New people were therefore recruited 
to handle the sales of these new products.
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The other major product line which the company licensed 'in' was 
concrete block making machines based on the 'wet concrete' system. 
The new concrete process had many applications in the Middle East 
and third world countries, particularly where there was a lack of 
water for mixing concrete since much of the water involved in the 
process could be re-cycled. However, the concrete block making 
technology was very new and there have been problems associated 
with it.
The licence was taken from an American company that did not wish 
to export to Europe and although the technical backup provided by 
the licensor has been relatively poor, the product has now been 
launched in the UK and is proving relatively successful. However, 
its long term future still does not appear completely secure.
In conclusion, although company K has utilised licensing in a pro­
active way, its role within the development of company strategies 
has been somewhat haphazard. The new product lines that the
company has decided to produce have arisen more as the result of 
individuals wishing to enter markets than within any corporate plan 
However, the effect has been positive in that the company has 
diversified away from its previous narrow product lines and into 
products with a good potential in the medium and longer term.
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COMPANY L
Respondents: Managing Director and New Product Manager
Company L is part of a major, British based, diversified 
international group of companies, mainly concentrated in the 
aerospace and other defence industries. Group compcinies supply 
sophisticated components for aircraft and other products. The 
company was founded more than thirty years ago as a private 
concern, by two entrepreneurs,and has had a history of regular 
although modest expansion both in turnover and the fields in which 
it operates. At the end of 1982 the company employed just over 
one hundred and fifty people, having grown from slightly less 
than one hundred employees in the ten years following its takeover.
The company has major divisions based upon its skills in three 
product groups, metal stampings, flexible electrical harnesses and 
printed circuit boards, and electro mechanical components. Many 
products are produced in close co-operation with the UK Ministry 
of Defence, a major customer. This category of work comprises 
the largest section of the company's business. Although the three 
divisions carry out some common contract work, they are based upon 
three different technological competences and, while this has been 
a company strength, it has also caused problems in making decisions on 
which of the divisions should receive investment funds.
(1) This case study in amended form was published in Lowe, J and 
Crawford, N K 'Innovation and Technology Transfer for the 
Growing Firm', Pergamon Press 1984.
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The company's concern for licensing began in 1980 when there had 
been a moratorium in defence spending by the UK government and 
this had meant that companies such as company L, for whom defence 
work accounted for a large proportion of their turnover, were 
likely to be under some commercial pressure. Consequently, the 
managing director set out on a policy of actively trying to license- 
in products for the company to make, which would utilise existing 
manufacturing and marketing skills and would substi tute for some 
of the electro-mechanical work that was done for defence contracts. 
His objective was to diversify the company from its current 
product range. His first alternative had been to carry out new 
product development 'in-house' and indeed, the company had a 
sophisticated research and development section, set up to work on 
substantial defence contracts the company had acquired. However, 
the Board of Directors realised that it could not use this 
facility as a sole way of bringing in new products because it 
would take too long. Whilst the company, at that time, did not 
have a cash flow problem, it did recognise that there were likely 
to be severe problems in future. The first action that the 
managing director took was, therefore, to employ an independent 
licensing consultant who abstracted information on a regular basis 
from the London Patent Office and other sources of new products.
The licensing consultant had been given a checklist of criteria 
by which the company wished to have potential products and 
licensors selected.
In addition to using a consultant the managing director also 
embarked on investigations of his own, looking for companies which
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were near to bankruptcy because of lack of cash but had good ideas 
and good products. His objective was to purchase the whole of the 
company, discard the pieces that were not required and integrate 
the parts that were useful into his own organisation. He 
approached Dunn and Bradstreet but this company was unable to 
find him companies about to go into liquidation in specific 
industries in which he was interested. However, he managed to 
locate several companies in which there would be an interest in 
acquiring either part or all of the company, but in none of these 
cases was he able to persuade the shareholders to sell, or the key 
employees to move. Consequently he changed his strategy and 
decided to license a product in, while continuing his interest in 
acquisition as an alternative.
In order to execute his licensing policy the managing director 
recruited a recent engineering graduate (with two years industrial 
experience) as his New Product Development Manager, to search out 
and find potential licensing partners. The major task of this 
individual was with the licensing aspect of the business. For the 
first 18 months of his employment with the company he was concerned 
with identifying information on licensing opportunities and learn­
ing the licensing business. His usefulness to the company over 
this period was, therefore, rather low. The New Product Develop­
ment Manager pursued the objectives of finding a licensee in 
various ways. He continued to employ the licensing consultant for 
the rest of his first year's contract. He used the set of criteria 
drawn up by the Board of Directors to help evaluate the ideas that 
came from the licensing consultant and other sources. These were
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then passed on to members of the Board of Directors for further 
evaluation. In addition, he carried out research himself. He 
accessed the 'Dvorkovitz' databank, he got in touch with several 
licensing consultants and accessed numerous publications. One 
major source was the various trade journals at the American 
Embassy which were used to identify the names and addresses of 
American manufacturers who had production and marketing expertise 
in the areas in which the company would like to become involved. 
Subscriptions were taken out for various of these journals. On 
the basis of the data collected, a large number of companies were 
approached, to ask if they would be prepared to consider dis­
cussing the possibility of licensing a particular part of their 
product range out to company L. No conclusive agreements had 
been reached at the time of this case study. It appeared that the 
New Product Development Manager was not able, from an organisation­
al point of view, to make an impact in this area. He was not 
really a strong product champion for a role such as the one he had 
been given.
The company's intention was to diversify out of its electro­
mechanical MOD market as soon as possible. This could be either 
on the basis of its marketing or production strengths. One major 
constraint was that the new product should fit in with the exist­
ing production skills of the company which were not always suitable 
for the new products under consideration. A further problem was 
that any new product would also, initially, have to be sold by the 
company sales force which had extensive skills in selling to major 
companies and organisations such as the MOD but was less skilled
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in selling to a larger number of smaller customers.
Management in company L saw technology licensing as a key item 
in its strategy to diversify out of current product areas and into 
other fields where all its technological strengths could have a 
bearing on company performance. However, the approach to licens­
ing was carried out in a relatively haphazard manner with many 
different products, from several technological areas, being con­
sidered at one time. While this was clearly advantageous in 
seeking diversified products, measures of those products against 
technological skills did not appear to take place early enough in 
the search process for obviously unsuitable products to be dis­
carded.
Company L attempted to use technology licensing in a highly pro­
active manner, but the results of this approach had been disappoint­
ing. The strategy appeared to be weak in not recognising the limit­
ations of the licensing approach and setting specific objectives 
early enough in the search process. Where potentially successful 
products had been identified, entrenched coalitions of interest 
within the firm frequently overrode the strategic objectives set 
by top management, in failing to accept new product ideas.
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COMPANY M
Respondents: Managing Director aind Marketing Director
This case desribes company M a small innovative and
extremely fast growing company based in Oxfordshire. The company 
was set up in 1974 by the present Managing Director who has a 
background in civil engineering. At that time he was working for 
a Government research laboratory, the Transport and Road Research 
Laboratory (TRRL) where he met two other electronic engineers. 
They recognised that a variety of inventions and ideas were being 
developed by the laboratory but were not being developed into 
successful products but remaining in prototype form.
The engineers set up a company to exploit one of these products, 
a traffic flow monitor, under licence. The product was designed 
to count and record vehicle traffic flows for later analysis.
The prototype vehicle monitor was a very bulky instrument however 
which required several car batteries to operate and was therefore 
not very portable. The second generation instrument developed as 
a first product by company M, however, was extremely compact, 
worked from a small re-chargeable battery and was fully portable. 
On this product the initial success of the company was based.
Since 1984 the company has grown at an increasing rate and is 
currently expanding at a rate of approximately seventy percent 
per annum. The company now employs more than thirty people, of
(1) Company M was identified through consultancy work in 1983.
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whom eight are employed on Research and Development and four in a 
sales office in the United States. The R and D personnel are 
mainly employed in the development of new products for the company, 
but also carry out work under contract for other companies.
Following its initial success with the traffic flow monitor product, 
company M returned to its original licensor to seek new products.
Two more pieces of technology were identified that appeared to 
have potential, and one of these, an instrument for classifying 
vehicle types as they crossed an under-road sensor, was licensed. 
This product complemented the original product that company M had 
licensed from TRRL. The company also identified a second product 
from another Government laboratory, an instrument for measuring 
liquid flows in a pipe. In both cases the technology was licensed 
in, in prototype form, developed by the company, miniaturised and 
launched as a product. In one case the development of the product 
was initially carried out under a Government grant. In all cases 
the impetus towards the licence came from the company rather than 
from the publicly funded body in question.
Neither of the two licensors had outlicensed any technology before 
setting up agreements with company M. However, they recognised 
that licensing might be a useful method of commercialising some 
of the inventions coming out of their laboratories. The licensing 
negotiations were carried out in rather an ad hoc manner however.
The first agreement, for example, was based on a single sheet of 
paper and contained omissions which might have led to problems at 
a later date. However, both parties were already working together 
and committed to co-operation and so problems did not arise.
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A major problem in negotiations for the first licence was the 
royalty rate demanded by the licensor for the use of his technology. 
This was based on a non-exclusive licence and a 6-8% royalty rate, 
presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis. While the first 
licensor insisted on a non-exclusive licence in writing, in 
practice it had given undertakings (sometimes in writing) to 
provide an exclusive licence. The reason for this appeared to be 
pressures on publicly funded laboratories not to make technology 
available on a 'one customer' basis. Another problem was a 
requirement by the licensor that all inventions or developments 
of the technology undertaken at the cost of the licensee remained 
the industrial property of the licensor. This was clearly an 
onerous clause which was,entered into reluctantly by the company 
on the basis that it needed the technology at that moment more 
than it needed any developments that might come out of the techno­
logy. A third problem was a clause requiring company M to make 
equipment available to the licensor for disclosure to a second 
licensee, a competitor of company M.
Despite the problems noted above, it is the intention of the 
Managing Director to use licensing in the future as part of his 
planned strategy to develop into new areas both by diversifying 
vertically into the production of some of the component parts 
which are used in the present generation of products and horizont­
ally into new markets. One possible new area for this is in the 
development of a range of vehicle weighing machinery, the techno­
logy for which is available once again from a public utility.
The Managing Director makes the point that the fact that the company 
is presently acting as a contract research and development firm
-413- *
for the utilities gives it a number of possibilities for licensing 
technology in. This is particularly important where a client has 
had development work done and the company realises that a spin-off 
product from this technology is going to be possible.
It is also the intention of the company to use licensing 'out* in 
its market development policies. At the moment the company uses 
a number of agents on the Continent to sell its products and 
although this has generally been satisfactory the company now 
believes that licensing agreements might be more effective because 
licensee companies may be more likely to develop their markets 
than agents would. Company M considers itself too small to be 
able to devote a large amount of resources to export market devel­
opment and it considers, therefore, that licensing agreements may 






Company was set up in 1928 to supply heating and ventilating
products. The company built up a reputation over the pre-war years 
as an innovator within its industry. Following the 1939 - 1945 war 
in which defence contracts increased the company's turnover, the 
company turned increasingly to exports as a method of market 
realisation and as an alternative to the UK market. This policy 
was successful and by the early 1970s the firm was exporting in 
excess of 60% of its output from two factories. At the time of this 
case study, the company employed just over two hundred people.
In 1978, a national stike was called in the engineering industry,
(2)
by the AUEW . Most of the employees at company N belonged to this 
union and consequently, went out on strike for two days per week.
The strike came at a particularly critical period for the company, 
with a number of large export orders being fulfilled. The Managing 
Director of the company appealed to the workforce to show loyalty 
to the firm but this appeal went unheeded. He therefore closed the 
factories down and decided that the company would carry out no ■ 
further exporting. This led to the closure of one of the two factories
(1) Company N was Identified through the Leverhulme research 
reported in Chapter 6
(2) Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers
(3) Now Chairman
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and the rationalisation of the other, to approximately half its 
original workforce. The strike experience led directly to the 
decision by the company to substitute licencing for its previous 
policy of export.
Following the ending of its export business, the Managing Director 
visited a large number of countries where his company had previously 
exported. He had not previously had any experience of licencing, 
however, and this led to a number of problems initially in reaching 
agreements with potential licensees. The initial licence agreements 
were for the companies* full range of heat recovery plants, previously 
exported. Although this technology was not patented, there was a 
great deal of 'know how' involved in its successful implementation. 
Thus the technology was protected to some extent and this protection 
was also enhanced by the design copyright of the company on a 
number of components of the product range.
The company approached potential licensees to sell its technology. 
Frequently, previous importers of the technology took on the product 
on the basis that it could be made locally. In other instances, 
company N made the first approach to potential licensees. These 
were chosen on the basis of size. The largest company in a 
particular market was never chosen, but usually one that was smaller 
or wished to diversify into that market.
As a result of its efforts, company N now has licensees in more 
than twenty countries around the world. The policy of licensing has 
led to an increase in the number of countries in which the company
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is represented. Turnover has increased as a result of the change 
and the profitability of the company has also reached a new high.
The company has ploughed a large proportion of the income accruing 
from its licensing activities into a research and development 
programme which has resulted in a new generation of products which 
has also benefitted its remaining customers in the UK. Licensing 
has been a major benefit to company N and ceasing manufacture for 
export has allowed the company to reduce its overheads and increase 
its research intensity while increasing its profitability.
In conclusion licensing by company N arose in a very ad hoc manner 
and in reaction to an unusual situation. However, the company 
recognised that it had a technological advantage and that manufacturing 
was only one method of exploiting this advantage. Soon after commencing 
licensing operations, it realised that the sale of technology per se 
was a more effective method of doing business than its previous method 
of manufacture and direct export.
Company N acted in an extremely flexible manner to take advantage of 
oportunities that arose for it. It used technology licensing without 
having had any previous experience of the technique. However, its 
technological advantage meant that it had a very saleable product 
and this probably accounts in large part for its success. The company 
utilised licens ïng to generate income which it then ploughed back 
into R and D. As a result it has retained its position of technological 
leadership, although utilising a different method of market realisation.
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COMPANY O
Respondents : Managing Director and Marketing Manager
Company was launched in the late 1960s by an entrepreneur with
experience in the ferrous castings industry. This individual had 
patented a process whereby resin could be used to seal flaws, holes 
and voids in castings. The company set up a number of 'job shops' 
to process castings for the automotive industry. The process 
involved a stable polyester resin being impregnated into the casting 
being processed. This was done by immersing the casting in the 
liquid resin, with heat curing taking place after total impregnation 
was complete. The process was rather time consuming however, 
utilising a two hour production cycle.
Although the company was successful on a small scale, the volume 
of business available on a 'job shop' basis was limited. It was 
recognised by management, however, that a method of integrating 
use of the process into production lines would open up huge markets 
for the company, particularly in automotive foundries, where the 
failure rate for engine block castings (for example) was running 
at a rate of approximately thirty percent. Reduction in failure 
rate by the post casting impregnation of resin would be a substantial 
bonus to foundries. Development of a new generation of high pressure 
imprégnants was therefore set in hand by the company and after a 
two year development programme this resulted in a much improved
(1) Company O was identified through the Leverhulme research
reported in Chapter 6
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fast turnaround system. The major advantage of the system was its 
speed, compactness, high effectiveness, low capital cost and 
potential for incorporation in casting production lines as a 
standard process and not merely as a method of recovering 'failed' 
castings. The system was introduced into the company's UK 'job 
shop' operations and quickly demonstrated its effectiveness. As a 
result of this, a number of large companies purchased the process 
for inclusion in their plant. Following this success the company 
expanded, and currently employs 50 people.
At the time of developing its new patented system, company O did 
no exporting, since its 'job shop' operations were not amenable to 
this market. However, the company recognised the potential of its 
system for use by overseas manufacturers and therefore' considered 
how best to exploit its advantage. As a small firm, with few 
resources for capital investment in overseas markets, the company 
felt that it had no alternative to licensing if it was to obtain a 
quick penetration of all the markets in which it saw potential. The 
UK 'job shop' operations was continued, however, but on a smaller 
scale, with numbers of licensed operators given the right, within 
the UK, to use the company's process. These operators signed a five 
year agreement to obtain chemicals for the process from company O, 
which was able to charge a premium price for them. Process machinery 
was supplied to each operator as part of the 'package'. A similar 
formula was developed for export markets, although here, licensees 
were used, rather than 'licenced operators'. The company set up 
agreements in many countries. The form these agreements took varied 
from market to market, but usually the local licensee was given
-420-
assistance to produce plant/machinery to set up a treatment operation 
and sell process plant locally, providing the speciality chemicals.
It was in this way that the company made its return. Since the 
process was a very profitable one for licensees, company O was able 
to draw up extremely restrictive licence agreements. These were 
normally for a maximum of two years. However, clauses were included 
allowing the licensee to renew the contract if a reasonable rate of 
sales had been achieved during that initial period.
Following the policy change, and introduction of the new technology, 
company 0 became more of a marketing than production company. Senior 
executives spent a majority of their time travelling, either seeking 
new potential licensees for their product or in visiting existing 
licensees. The company sees a close relationship with its licensees 
as being extremely important in motivating them to produce the best 
possible results. This seems to have been a successful strategy and 
the company, as a result of these operations, has become extremely 
profitable. However, this profitability has led to competitor 
companies (with different processes) entering the market. A majority 
of profit has therefore been ploughed back into research and 
development to retain the company's technological lead.
In conclusion licencing has been the major tool for the company's 
expansion and success over the last ten years. The basis of the 
company's success, a patented process involving a great deal of 
secret 'know how', has allowed company 0 to become extremely 
profitable. The main product of the company has been used very much
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as a 'cash cow' (in BCG terminology) and has allowed the company 
to expand successfully into worldwide markets, even though it is 
very small. Company O has recognised that its one major product 
makes it vulnerable to competitors, however, and has used the cash 
from exploitation of this product in developing new process technology
The company has utilised the exploitation of both patents and 
trademarks as major plants in its product/market strategy. It now 
has a worldwide reputation as 'market leader' under its own trade 
name, and this has also allowed it to keep a certain control over
its licensees, since it has the option of recovering that tradename.
Patenting has also been used successfully to prevent competitors 
entering the market, although patent costs were initially a major 
strain on the company's resources.
Company O appears to be a good example of a firm which has recognised
an opportunity and exploited it through licensing. This has been in 
a very opportunistic manner, however, since it was the success of 
its initial process which led it to recognise the potential for its 
products on a worldwide scale and hence because of the constraints 
upon it, to make use of the licensing option.
(1) Boston Consulting Group
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COMPANY P
Respondents : Managing Director and Marketing Director
Company P^^^ was set up in 1965 by three individuals who saw an 
opportunity in the market for sprayed powder coating machinery. The 
company was the inspiration of the present Managing Director who 
was working, at that time, for an engineering firm which produced 
small numbers of similar machines (although this was not its main 
business). He recruited two colleagues and together they set up 
company P to compete with their former employer.
The company produces a range of sprayed powder coating machines 
which work by imparting a static charge to the product to be coated, 
onto which the powder is then imparted. Main markets are in the 
automotive and processed food industries and the number of uses for 
the technology, which is an alternative to other forms of painting 
and coating^ is increasing. By building upon its success in the UK, 
the company has become a world leader in the application of powder 
coatings and is now market leader with more than 50% market share. 
Since the technology is an improvement over competitive techniques, 
the company finds itself in an expanding market. It-has to invest a 
large amount in R and D to retain its competitive lead. It is company 
policy to patent as many techniques as possible and to patent in all 
its markets. This has proved expensive, but has allowed company P to 
protect itself from competition throughout the world. At the time
(1) Company P was identified through the 'Leverhulme' project
reported in Chapter 6
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of this case study, the company was still owned by the three major
shareholders and employed about 50 people.
Company P has utilised technology licencing as an alternative to 
the use of sales agents in many overseas markets. Generally it 
prefers to utilise direct export through agents where possible, 
but in may cases this has not proved to be feasible. In some
instances the company has been unable to export to a country because
of tariff barriers erected by Governments locally. In other cases, 
the size of the market justified a local manufacturing facility 
which company P did not have the resources to develop and hence it 
turned to licensing as an alternative method of market realisation.
The company has utilised licensing to enter markets through existing 
local companies with the longer term objective of entering the 
market as a producer itself. It recognises the danger of setting up 
competitors in those markets. However, the Managing Director 
considers that the amount of money spent on R and D within the firm, 
a large proportion of which is funded from licensing activities, is 
sufficient to retain a competitive advantage over other companies.
Company P has utilised licensing for the complete range of its 
products with the objective of providing local licensees with a 
total technological capability. This sets up local licensees in 
the most effective way for exploiting their markets. In many cases, 
the local licensee has been unable to produce all the component 
parts of the product 'in house' and in these cases, company P has 
been able to exert a degree of control over licensee operations
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by component supply. Company P finds this situation advantageous 
because it considers that a close relationship with its licensees 
is important in achieving maximum market penetration. However, the 
technology that company P licenses 'out' is usually one generation 
older than those products being sold in its own home and export 
markets. Company P has^therefore, been careful not to sell its 
latest ideas, until these have been successfully exploited in its 
own markets. Since a majority of the industrial property involved 
in its licence agreements concerns 'know how' rather than the 
transfer of patents, design etc (although these are also important), 
company P has set up a group of individuals within the firm whose 
major responsibility is to service the requirements of its agents 
and licensees around the world. This 'servicing' requirementalso 
assists in the control of its licensees and in identifying suitable 
technologies to obtain under the 'grant back' provision of its 
licensees.
Company P's management decided at an early stage in the growth of 
the company that they would endeavour to exploit their products on 
a worldwide basis. There were several reasons for this, but the 
major one was that the UK market for the technology was too small 
for them to generate enough income to be able to retain their 
technical lead. Exploitation of the technology had, therefore, to 
be made on an international basis and to this end, all forms of 
market penetration were used. Income from early licensing agreements, 
particularly with Japan, altered the thrust of their market 
exploitation policy and as a result of this, licensing took on a 
greater role in their operations.
-425-
Company P now has a mix of agency and licensing agreements, with 
direct investment through a subsidiary company in its largest 
market (the USA). Its use of licensing has been successful in 
nearly all cases, although there have been some problems in 
motivating licensees to develop their markets. The income from 
operations has been ploughed back into R and D, allowing the 
company to keep its competitive lead. The company is now considering 
how to develop its strategy for the further exploitation of its 
technology. R and D has become an increasingly important part of 
the company's operations, with that expertise marketed as a skill 
in its own right. In view of managements wish not to grow to a 
larger size, the company is now considering a long term strategy 





Company R^^^ is an old established family owned company employing 
approximately forty people, manufacturing pleasure and work boats 
to a displacement of up to ten tons. The company produces a large 
number of different designs, but these are usually of the one-off 
variety and built to the specifications of a particular customer.
In the early 19 70s, the company decided that it needed to diversify 
away from commissioned designs and into more standard products. 
Following this decision, it designed a revolutionary new product. 
The licensing history of this product comprises the basis of the 
case study.
The product concerned was a twin-hulled catamaran specifically 
designed for export markets. The original design was based on the 
perception that a market existed for a workboat to be used in the 
estuarial waters of various West African countries. The boat was 
designed so that it could deal with various adverse weather and 
handling conditions and could be sold to countries where only basic 
technical skills existed. The boat comes in a knock-down form 
ready for simple re-assembly. Initially the company intended 
selling the boats in kit form, as part of a total licensing 
package. Various component parts were designed to be substituted 
through locally sourced suppliers. For example the control cables
(1) Company R was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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could be standard lorry cables available in most countries. More 
effective but more complex hydraulic systems, were not incorporated. 
The company spent four years in research and development and 
getting the boat accepted by Lloyds* assessors. The stamp of approval
given by this regulatory body was perceived to be of value in 
the context of the licencing package decribed below.
The company registered the new design under a particular trade 
name and placed considerable emphasis in its strategy on its ability 
to sell the registered name. It was the company's view that this 
was an important aspect of a licensing package so the difficulties 
that ensued in registering the trade name were an important facet 
of this case. The company first marketed the product under its 
company name and sold one unit to Nigeria under that name in 1977.
At the beginning of 19 78 an application was made to the Trades 
Marks Registry to register the new trade name. This application 
was turned down on two grounds. First, that the company name and 
the trade name were both descriptive names that could not be 
registered. They argued that this precluded the company giving a 
trade name to a product that was in fact merely a physical 
description of that product. The second reason the trade name was 
rejected was that another company had already tried to register 
the same name the previous year. This company had copied the concept 
of the product and the trade name from company R. Company R employed 
a solicitor to defend the action for them. However, it was nearly 
four years before it won its case. The legal problems prevented 
proper exploitation of the product during that period.
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The firms motivation for wanting to license out the product were 
threefold. First, as noted above, the boat was designed so that it 
could be assembled locally. This was because high transport costs 
and specific local needs would determine the nature of the finished 
product. Secondly, it was suggested that in thoise markets for which 
the product was aimed., ie.developing countries, import of capital 
goods was subject to tariff barriers and also to non-tariff quota 
restrictions. The final reason for licensing was that the company 
had been unsuccessful in exporting the product. The Sales Director 
suggested that a lack of finance to develop overseas markets had 
been the major factor in this failure. The company had in fact 
obtained several further orders from Nigeria but these orders were 
not accompanied by irrevocable letters of credit and therefore 
lapsed.
The company developed a two tier marketing strategy. First, it 
attempted to sell boats through direct export to potential customers. 
This marketing effort was aimed mainly at developing countries. In 
addition however, the company tried to persuade American and Canadian 
companies to buy the product for use in North American estuarine 
waters. The second major strand of the company's strategy 
concerned its attempt to license out the design and registered name in 
licensing journals distributed on an international basis, seeking 
licensees. Advertisements were also inserted in specific marine 
journals. One tangible result of this process was a substantial 
reaction from licensing consultants who sought to assist the 
company in its licensing activities. As a result of these activities a 
Canadian company came to talk to company R but to date nothing has
-429-
come of this. As a strategy for exploiting the product, licensing 
has therefore been unsuccessful to date
In conclusion the way in which the company approached licensing 
negotiations appeared, for a small company, quite reasonable, 
although identification of specific market targets might have been 
appropriate. Whilst a strategy of licensing appeared to have been 
forced on the company by non-tariff barriers, transport costs and 
local market considerations, the company may have picked the wrong 
market to try to exploit. The developing countries with poor 
supplies of skilled labour and quality component parts do not appear 
to be a fruitful area for outward licencing and possibly more could be 
achieved in the Canadian, American, Australian and New Zealand 
markets. Attempts to license 'out' to Europe have also been largely 
ignored. The reason for this was stated to be the possiblity of 
competitors designing around company R's product. However, whilst 
imitation does present a problem it would appear that in view of 
the Lloyds' approval and the registered design the company has a 
licenseable product which could be protected. The problems 
presented to the company in registering the trade name could be 
symptomatic of the problems encountered by smaller firms trying 
to establish the legal rights to industrial property.
Company R has failed in its strategy of licensing. The company is 
now considering whether to endeavour to attempt licensing to other 
(eg. North American) markets of to consider other forms of co­
operation, such as joint ventures . It has received approaches from 
several companies to co-operate on this basis .
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COMPANY S
Respondent: Managing Director and Technical Director
(1)
Company S is a West Midlands based design consultancy with 'in- 
depth' experience in the fields of engineering, industrial design 
and new product development. The company is one of the largest 
'design' companies in the United Kingdom and acts for many of its 
clients as a research and development organisation. At the time 
of the case the company employed more than sixty people and was 
expanding fast, with a very diverse client list. Although the 
organisation was a partnership, effective control remained with the 
founder, and major shareholder^ who acted as Managing Director.
In the late 1970s the Company was contracted by the UK Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) to assist in the development of a new and improved 
oxygen mask for the use of aircrew in fighter aircraft. The new 
product had to be designed to very high specifications and 
particularly tight tolerances, to meet strict MoD specifications. 
This was a major project for the company which committed a 
substantial design team to developing a number of alternative 
designs for approval by the MoD. By the end of early 1981, the 
company had designed what it believed to be a world beating product 
that incorporated a number of innovative features. The technical 
base for these features was made the subject of various patent 
and registered design protections, both in the UK and overseas, 
particularly in the USA.
1. Company S was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
project reported in Chapter 6.
As part of its agreement with the MoD under which the development 
project was being undertaken, the company had obtained the right 
to exploit the intellectual property involved,in other markets than 
the UK. This was an important advantage that had been agreed to 
by the MoD in view of the wish of the company to exploit its skills 
in third markets. Following the success of the product in the UK, 
which had involved the company in producing prototypes and pre- 
production runs of the product. Company S turned to the possibility 
of either selling the product abroad or having it manufactured 
under a licence agreement. The latter option seemed the most 
logical since the largest potential market (the USA) was dominated 
by indigenous manufacturers. The USA Defense Department also had 
a policy of sourcing defence related products from local suppliers 
which made the possibility of successfully supplying the market 
with products from the UK, remote.
Following its decision to license its product out, the company 
approached a university based licensing consultancy to assist it 
in identifying the best method for exploiting its intellectual 
property. At the same time it carried out preliminary enquiries 
with a number of US companies that might be interested in the 
product. Three potential partners were approached. The first 
of these was a large company with nearly three quarters of the 
military oxygen mask market. The second had about ten per cent 
of the market, and the third was a company that wished to break 
into this market. The consultants were asked to recommend a 
suitable strategy for the product.
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The consultants recommended that the company should endeavour to set up 
an agreement with the US company that already had a small share of 
the market, since they would be likely to 'push' the new product.
The major supplier, would, in the consultants*view, be less likely 
to welcome a new product that competed with its already existing 
range. However, Company S decided that in view of the better 
Defense Department connections of the major supplier, it would 
endeavour to draw up an agreement with them rather than follow the 
consultants' recommendations.
The major supplier seemed enthusiastic initially, and as a result 
of this, several of Company S's executives visited the USA to draw 
up a draft agreement to license the product. However, after two 
such visits, the negotiations became increasingly involved in 
matters of detail, such as royalty rates and the ownership of 
any improvements to the product. Eventually, the major supplier 
announced that it would need to carry out further tests on the 
product, that these might take a year, and that it felt unable, 
over this period to make any form of payment to Company S.
Company S considered that the American company was 'playing for 
time' and that it had no long term objective of entering any 
licence agreement. The constant delays and negotiations had, however, 
given the USA company considerable time to undertake a programme 
of development around the design that Company S had created.
Following a series of increasingly acrimonious meetings. Company S 
broke off its negotiations with the major supplier and commenced 
negotiations with the other American company, with the small
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market share. However a period of nearly one year had elapsed 
before this happened. At the time of the case, preliminary 
negotiations were being undertaken with this second company.
In retrospect, the company realised that the major supplier was 
not interested in a licence, since it already had a product to 
serve the market in question. However, it seems likely that 
this company talked to Company S as a method of preventing a 
new competitor entering the market. This appeared to have been 
a relatively successful strategy in light of the history of the 
licence negotiations. It seems probable therefore, that a strategy 
of licensing a competitive product to the dominant supplier in 
a relatively small market with few competitors may not always be 
the most appropriate choice. Possibly an agreement with another 
company wishing to enter that market or expand its share would 
have been more appropriate in this case.
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COMPANY T
Respondents: Managing Director and Marketing Director
Company T was set up in the late 1950's as a division of a 
large electronics company. The objective of the parent company 
was to create a manufacturing facility for internal sourcing of 
components (magnets) for its main business. As a trading division 
of a large company, however, company T was encouraged to sell its 
products both inside and outside the group. In this it was 
successful, and by the early 1970's a majority of its turnover 
was accounted for by trade with companies outside the group. Many 
of these customers were foreign companies and a large proportion 
of output was exported. In 1975 the parent company carried out a 
review of its activities and as a result of this, company T was 
divested, by means of a management buy-out funded by three 
merchant banks and the National Coal Board Pension Fund. The 
present directors of the company retain a majority share of the 
company's equity however. At the time of this case study, the 
company employed approximately 150 employees and had a turnover 
of £4.5 million per annum.
The technological expertise of the company lies in the manufacture 
of specialist magnets of which it is one of less than a dozen such 
companies in the world. Prior to divestment, the company had 
established itself as a world market leader in this market. 
Following divestment, the company was able to take advantage of a
(1) Company T was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in chapter 6.
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growing demand for its products and over the past three years it 
has increased its turnover by more than 100%.
Company T has utilised outward licensing as a planned part of its 
strategy for exploiting its product lines. The use of licensing 
can be traced back to the foundation of the company, when an 
inward licence agreement was negotiated by company T (then a 
division of its parent) for a particular product. This licence 
provided the base for one of its major product families. The use 
of licensing was therefore an integral part of company policy 
from its inception. Recently, however, the company has carried 
out no inward licensing per se since its technological base is 
now very strong. As market leader in its main markets, it has 
not identified a need to purchase technology developed by others. 
However, it has obtained technology as a result of cross licensing 
agreements.
Outward licensing and reciprocal or cross-licensing agreements 
form the basis of the company's technology policy for exploit­
ation of markets where direct export is inappropriate. This 
situation usually arises from one of two reasons. Some markets 
are so competitive that company T is unable to exploit them 
effectively with the resources at its disposal (as in the case of 
Japan). In these instances, sale of technology on a reciprocal 
basis to the local market leader usually allows for a free flow 
of information between the two companies to the benefit of both. 
Agreements have been set up with both Japanese and American 
companies. The type of technology involved is usually of an
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advanced type, and frequently involves the application of 
particular techniques (or 'know how') rather than designs or 
patented technology for a particular new product. In some cases, 
part developed technology has also been involved, leading to 
collaborative efforts on further development. Company T has 
also collaborated to commercialise developments which have 
arisen in University research laboratories.
The second major destination for outward licensed technology has 
been in those markets which are protected by tariff barriers.
These markets have usually been in less advanced countries where 
the technology involved was less sophisticated than in the UK. 
Several agreements have been made with Indian companies to sell 
technology for the mass production of low technology magnets, 
but with a large volume manufacture potential. Company T has 
utilised these agreements both to provide it with a royalty income 
and as a source of product for particular market segments.
It is a policy of the company to concentrate its resources on the 
development of 'high technology' and specialist applications 
rather than in the area of low technology mass production of 
magnets, and licensing has allowed the company to move out of the 
latter markets, while at the same time continuing to obtain a 
return from them through the efforts of its licensees. The income 
from outward licensing operations has provided useful development 
funding for higher technology magnet applications.
It is a major objective of company policy to retain a technological
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lead in its market and to this end it has been necessary to invest 
heavily in further R and D. Such R and D is not always carried 
out within the company however, and several universities have 
received development funds for new applications of magnet 
technology. By subcontracting R and D and outward licensing,the 
company has also been able to confine its growth to an increase 
in turnover, rather than in number of people employed. The 
Directors consider that any growth in numbers of employees over 
two hundred is likely to make the company more difficult to 
manage, and have developed strategies to develop without an 
increase in size.
In conclusion company T has utilised licensing in a highly success­
ful manner to support its manufacturing and marketing operations. 
Licence income from obsolescent technology has been used to provide 
resources further to increase its technological lead in other areas, 
This, in turn, has led to other licence agreements with direct 
competitors on a technology exchange basis. Thus technology has 
been licensed in and out at several stages in the product life 
cycle including prototype, fully developed and obsolescent 





Company U is a subsidiary of a large, diversified group of 
companies in the paper, plastics and chemical field based in the 
West Country. The company makes plastic containers of many sorts 
and has particular skills in thermoforming and other production 
technologies. Development of these skills led to the patenting 
of several new processes which the firm was considering out- 
licensing at the time of this case study. The case explores the 
internal management implications of the decision to outlicense 
process technology.
Company U had been set up as a subsidiary of its parent company 
to fill in a gap in an area of the plastic container market that 
was not presently being exploited by the group. The company had 
been relatively successful in this market segment and had then 
developed, to employ more than one hundred people by the 
beginning of 1983. At the time of the case, the company was 
seeking to expand into a new, highly competitive market segment 
with a new and innovative product, subject of the new processes 
noted above.
The company had previously carried out some inward licensing, but 
the current interest was in the outward licensing of the new 
packaging product (a plastic can) and its associated production
(1) Company U was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in chapter 6.
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machinery. The product was deemed to be superior to other 
plastic products because it had a property that most plastic 
containers do not possess. It could be heated in a retort.
Thus vegetables or other foods could be 'cooked inside the can'. 
Metal containers had always possessed this property, but the new 
plastic product under consideration here, was unique in this 
respect. In addition to this advantage, the container was also 
the subject of a patented label bonding system which reduced the 
number of processes involved in production line technology.
Intrinsically, the product seemed an attractive one for exploit­
ation either through joint ventures or licensing agreements as a 
'technological package'. Direct export of the product appeared 
to be precluded because of the high transport costs involved. 
Although the product was more effective and lighter than metal 
cans, in export markets, this advantage would be more than offset 
by its higher cost.
Initially, company U set up a joint venture/licence agreement 
with an Italian food processing company. For an 'up front fee' 
of £50,000 company U granted exclusive rights for Italy, Spain 
and six African countries. The Italian company had incorporated 
the product into its processes and had made substantial cost 
reductions as a result of the new technology. Company U 
intended to use the Italian success as a demonstration for other 
potential licensees.
In the UK company U did not appear to have developed a satis­
factory strategy for the exploitation of its technology. It had
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considered two options. First, a licensing agreement with one 
of its current customers which was very interested in the new 
technology. However this company had only a small market share 
of the container market segment covered by the technology. 
Possibly a more promising strategy was the consideration of a 
joint venture with Metal Box pic which was a main competitor 
with company U. The problems with this strategy were twofold. 
First, company U did not have large resources to commit to a 
joint venture company. Secondly, although Metal Box appeared 
interested in the technology in principle, the product was a 
direct competitor to its own 'metal can' technology. At the 
time of the case study, negotiations had already continued for 
five months and company U suspected that Metal Box might not be 
willing to give any joint venture project total commitment. A 
joint venture agreement could be a method of effectively emasc­
ulating the new technology.
Company U had also considered how best to exploit foreign markets 
In terms of market needs and feedstock supply availability, the 
most promising target markets appeared to be the USA, Europe and 
the Middle East, in that order. However, company U had not 
previously carried out much exporting to these markets and was 
therefore undecided about the most effective way of exploiting 
them. Consequently, although they had, in principle, decided to 
follow the Italian model and license their technology 'out' in 
this way, they recognised a need for development of a credible 
strategy for market development.
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As with the UK market, two strategies have been considered.
First, to define the most promising licensee from a market 
viewpoint. While some of the American firms seemed to be 
attractive partners, company U also considered some of the smaller 
concerns. Its objective was to arrive at agreements with 
licensees who would exploit their markets most aggressively. At 
the time of this case study, preliminary negotiations were being 
carried out with several potential licensees.
In conclusion, the company recognised that it had a problem in 
devoting sufficient resources to the process of licensing 
to make a maximum return from it. Although previous experience 
of licensing had been generally good, company management did not 
appear to have reliable information on the most effective means 
of utilising licensing. This may have been due to the high turn­
over of management within the group consequent upon its central­
ised management style. However, company U had recognised that it 
did not have sufficient resources to tackle all those markets it 
would wish to. The decision of management was therefore to 
develop a strategy of cautious product sale within those markets 
where transport costs did not mitigate against the product and 
to license the process out into those other markets where direct 
sale was precluded. Licensing within home markets would be con­
sidered on the back of product sales. At the time of the case 
study this process appeared to have been relatively successful 




Company is a major subsidiary of a large holding company
divisionalised into wholly autonomous units. It was set up in 
the middle of the nineteenth century to exploit a new process 
for weaving small runs of personalised nametapes. The company 
was a family concern until the middle of this century and still 
has members of the original family on its board of directors.
At the time this case study was written, the company employed 
approximately two hundred people.
Although the company is a market leader in its field, it had, 
until recently, operated relatively antiquated production 
processes. Since it was effectively a monopoly supplier in 
the UK, however, management had not perceived any need to 
modernise and the company was therefore eventually subject to 
competition in its market by the introduction of new printing 
techniques which gave almost as good a result on nametapes as 
the company's woven product.
The external competition caused the firm to rationalise its 
production and by the mid 1970s more m o d e m  production machinery
1. Company V was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research 
reported in Chapter 6.
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had been installed. This led to a substantial reduction in the 
numbers of people employed in the firm. The new technology 
proved problematical in its operation, however, causing the firm 
to fall into deficit over a six month period during the 
introduction of the new technology.
As a result of its production problems the company approached 
its local University (Aston) for assistance. Through a teaching 
company scheme the company employed a postgraduate engineer who 
had skills in electronics, control engineering and computers.
This individual, over a period of eighteen months, developed an 
automated system that improved the productivity of the production 
system and transformed the manufacturing process. By 1979 the 
company had established a new computer based system which utilised 
a British made minicomputer. The success of the system led the 
company to regain its previous profitability and market dominance. 
In 1980, a new Managing Director was recruited to manage the 
growth of the company.
Even before the new automated system had been installed 
successfully, foreign buyers had approached the company with a 
view to buying the licensing rights to the process technology. 
Initial negotiations took place with Japanese, German, French 
and American companies. Several of the potential licensees 
sent technical personnel to visit Company V to evaluate the 
system and all of these expressed further interest in taking a 
licence. A major problem, however, was the UK minicomputer
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which had software which was incompatible with other, more 
readily available computers. This was a major problem in 
attempting to license the system 'out' since either a UK 
manufactured computer would have to be supplied with software 
as a package (and this was not very attractive to potential 
licensees in view of potential servicing problems) or the 
software would have to be rewritten for other machines. In 
view of the lack of management resources at Company V, this 
option was also somewhat unattractive.
It was apparent that the advantages of following the licensing 
option were not clear to top management within Company V. 
Although continuing royalties would flow to the company, much 
development work would have to be carried out before an 
exportable system could be completed. Management therefore 
compromised and proposed that a large (£100,000) 'up-front' 
fee be paid before the technology would be transferred to any 
licensee. This fee would cover developmental costs of the 
system to a 'portable' form while also providing Company V with 
a large return for its investment in management time and 
technical resources. The figure of £100,000 was deliberately 
pitched high to ensure a high return. The Managing Director 
who was responsible for the pricing decision had recently taken 
over from his predecessor who had been much more enthusiastic 
about licensing. However, in practice the size of the 
'up-front' fee appeared to be too high for potential licensees 
and negotiations were eventually broken off. As a result. 
Company V expended a great deal of management time but failed
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to benefit from a large number of potential customers.
Low priority was accorded the use of licensing within Company V.
All negotiations were delegated by top management to the production 
manager who had many other tasks to carry out. This individual 
did not appear to be a strong 'product champion' and was 
therefore unable to carry negotiations through. Licensing was 
not pursued as an integral part of company strategy, probably 
because of inertia at both top and middle management level.
As a result, although negotiations were carried out spasmodically 
with potential licensees over an eighteen month period, no 
agreement resulted.
In conclusion, top management at Company V perceived, probably 
correctly, that its 'core' skill was in manufacturing of 
its prime product, nametapes. It was not structured to provide 
a service to potential licensees, and it perceived intuitively 
that utilising technology licensing would be responsible for 
a diminution in management time devoted to its main business.
As part of a strategy of survival. Company V was possibly acting 
rationally in concentrating on core skills. However, at the 
time of the potential licensing agreements the company was 
once more becoming profitable and in retrospect management 
recognises that a potentially successful 'spin-off business 
could have been created.
A positive decision not to utilise licensing in response to 
resource constraints was not taken however. Rather, pricing
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policy was effectively used to deter licensees from taking 
advantage of the technology. It appears therefore that 
Company V developed its licensing strategy reactively rather 
than in a positive manner, but that this process was intuitively 
rather than explicitly developed.
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COMPANY W
Respondents; Managing Director and Technical Director
Company W is a relatively small private limited company based 
in the West Country. The company was set up in the late 1950’s 
and currently employs 140 people with a turnover of £3 million 
per year. Control of the company is in the hands of four exe­
cutive shareholder/directors with responsibility for sales, pro­
duction, technical development and finance. The production and 
technical functions however, overlap to a certain extent so, 
effectively, the firm is split into three functional divisions. 
Another major influence within the company is the merchant bank 
which provided a majority of the equity finance. This bank 
however, while providing the company with advice, carries no 
executive responsibility although one of its representatives sits 
on the Board of Directors. The company’s products are enclosures 
(cabinets) for housing equipment, and are used mainly in the 
electronics and computing field for computers, telephone exchanges, 
etc. While the technology is basically metal manipulation there 
is a large degree of skill involved in producing a high quality 
product at a price which is acceptable to the customer. The 
company drafts and registers its own industrial designs. Many 
of its products are, however,based on customer specifications and, 
in these cases, the intellectual property usually remains the 
property of the customer. Company is very production orientated 
in that its skills and facilities shape the range of products which
(1) Company W was identified through the ’Leverhulme’ research
reported in chapter 6.
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it makes and sells. The bulk (90%) of turnover is provided by 
products made on a ’one-off basis usually to the specific design 
of a client company. The remaining 10% of turnover comprises 
standard products manufactured from standard components and 
frequently incorporated into customers’ own equipment rather than 
sold as stand alone units. By the nature of the business, pro­
tection of products through patenting is not really relevant, 
although registered design portfolio remains an important and 
growing part of the company’s operations.
Patenting has only been considered in the past when long run, 
standard or innovative products have been considered. The 
Managing Director stated that outward licensing had also been 
considered on several occasions since the company’s inception. 
Transport costs of typical products tend to be high and licensing 
has seemed a potentially logical method of extending the business. 
Since the skill level within the company is high even though the 
technology itself is relatively simple however,the technology 
has proved to be somewhat difficult to transfer.
Outward licensing has been used in one specific instance. The 
product involved was a metal computer cabinet. Company W received 
an enquiry from a large European company which wished to manufact­
ure the product in some volume to fulfil orders in the European 
market. Company W ’s response to this enquiry was to agree to sell 
the technology and to draw up a license agreement in conjunction 
with a local solicitor. On submission to the European company 
however,it was agreed by both sides that the agreement as drafted
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was unsatisfactory. As a result of this the licensee company 
suggested that one of its own simple standard agreements should 
form the basis of the contract. The change in agreement caused 
a delay of three months in signing the agreement. The agreement 
was divided into three parts, namely, production, sales and 
technological exchange contracts. The agreement has until 
recently progressed reasonably satisfactorily from company W s  
point of view, providing a continuous though modest flow of 
royalties to the company. Company W has provided technical 
assistance as consultancy in response to the licensee's changes 
of design and other requirements. However it appears that the 
licensee company now poses something of a threat to company W's 
existing markets. These markets are 90% UK based with exports 
accounting for only a small proportion.
Royalties appear to have been a major contribution to company 
profit over the past 10 years in view of relatively low profits 
on subcontracted work. However, though the agreement appears to 
have been successful, company W has not attempted to license 
either the first or other products proactively in other foreign 
markets. Licensing does not appear to be a mainstream feature of 
the business. Management consider that because of the relatively 
simple technology and high skill levels involved in the production 
of the products, licensing is never likely to account for more 
than a small proportion of total turnover.
In conclusion, it appears that company W has treated licensing in 
a very opportunistic manner. The company, in a non technically
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progressive industry, appears to be content to develop its sub­
contracting business rather than develop a range of 'own brand' 
products. Where it was approached to license its existing 
products 'out', management was prepared to do so, but it appeared 
not to have developed a strategy to build upon the success of the 
initial agreement. It seems clear that technology licensing 
comprises only a peripheral activity for company W, although the 
Managing Director of the company did recognise that licensing 
could be a method for developing his business.
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COMPANY X
Respondents: Managing Director and Marketing Director
Company X is a small (42 employees) privately owned manufacturing 
company in the Glass Reinforced Plastics (GRP) industry. The 
company was set up in the early 1970s to manufacture and supply 
standard, small, GRP products, by an ex-manager of a large firm 
making GRP sheeting. Following first year losses the firm rapidly 
moved into profit and expanded quickly over the following five 
years. It began to build an expertise in particular types of 
GRP technology and this led to approaches from foreign firms 
wishing to buy its technology. Following these approaches 
Company X decided in 1976 to set up a subsidiary company (LPD) 
to carry on research and development work under contract, to 
develop new products 'in-house' and to handle any requests for 
the sale of technology. One major purpose of setting up LDP was 
to give two newly recruited directors the possiblilty of taking 
an equity stake in the conpany.
LPD has only 12 employees (4 directors and 8 others) but is 
probably the most valuable part of the firm. It has evolved a 
strategy for the development and sale of technology per se 
in preference to developmental work for future manufacturing 
turnover, accounting for 30% of company Xs total. In order to 
fulfil its research objectives the company recruited in 1978 a 
highly qualified engineer who has played a central role in the
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design of machinery required to make laminated GRP products on a 
mass production basis. This is important, since the essence of 
LPD's know-how agreements involve either the sale of machines or 
the sale of drawings and expertise for building machines. It 
may also be important to note that the pursuit of profit through 
high technology, capital intensive development work, has allowed 
the conpany to expand without taking on a large labour force 
and greatly increased managerial control over its technology 
while also increasing turnover. The Managing Director claimed 
that one of the main reasons for selling technology under licence 
was that the conpany could not obtain the capital to expand its 
manufacturing capacity and with its existing salesforce and 
production labour force it did not have adequate capacity to 
serve its market. Potentially lucrative contracts were being 
turned down because of this problem. However, another reason for 
selling technology was stated to be a desire for the company to 
remain at a small and manageable size.
In 1978 the company felt the need to diversify out of existing 
products, and investigated the problems posed by the Post Office (PO) 
of developing a lightweight glass fibre reinforced telegraph pole 
as a possible form of product and market diversification. A 
process to 'spin' GRP was developed. The process could not be 
patented however, since a similar process had been patented 
in the iron casting industry in 1941. Much of the company's 
R & D effort was directed towards this product and between 19 78 
and 1980 R & D expenditure increased approximately 500% from 
£20,000 to £100,000 per annum.
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The technology of spinning a GRP tapered pole was something 
several larger companies had already attempted, unsuccessfully.
On the basis of its prototypes the PO offered a development 
contract to LPD whereby both parties provided half the development 
capital for a production line. The company proceeded to develop 
a machine for mass production and now produces the poles 'in-house' 
in small numbers (up to 10,000 per annum). LPD does not wish to 
go into large scale production however. The total market for the 
poles in the UK and abroad is enormous but in the UK the PO 
insists on multiple (four companies) sourcing and in view of 
this competition LPD decided to exploit its process under licence. 
In any case, transport costs of the product preclude direct 
exporting except to markets very near to the UK (i.e. in Europe). 
Thus licensing is probably the only realistic strategy for 
exploiting the company's technology in worldwide markets.
As part of the agreement to provide development funding the PO 
required a 1.25% royalty on any sales to licensees. LPD was 
able to retain lump sum payments from licensees, however. LPD 
state that they are often involved in setting up turnkey 
operations - particularly in under-developed countries - as well 
as direct licensing. This method of market development however, 
is something the company would prefer to reduce because of the 
high manpower commitment on their part in setting up such 
agreements. Since their technical manpower resources are small 
this had led to resource problems in the past.
LPD have built up a good reputation and have not usually had to
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seek out licensees. Rather their problem has been too many 
potential customers and enquiries for them to handle adequately 
in view of the resource constraints mentioned above. Their use 
of professional advice has been limited to legal advice and the 
use of a patent agent.
LPDs marketing strategy is to sell technology as part of a broad 
package of drawings, machines, know-how and production techniques. 
With their sheeting products (which are relatively low technology, 
but high production skills) the company found sale of a broad 
technology package a viable strategy in producing a reasonable 
return while conserving scarce management resources. Much of 
their machine components, and all raw materials, are bought in 
from outside suppliers. This, together with an overall policy 
of selling technology rather than products has enabled the 
company steadily to increase its turnover and profitability while 
remaining small and manageable. However, Company X has encountered 
some cash flow problems in its licensing strategy. Although many 
firms wished to license the technology, only a small proportion 
of initial contacts led to agreements to sell the technology.
Even where agreements were reached, the mean time between initial 
contact and agreement was seven months. Company X had invested 
substantial resources in the acquisition of a long term return.
In conclusion. Company X recognised at an early stage that it 
had a choice between entering a mass production market with its 
new technology or selling that technology. The philosophy of 
the directors was that mass production with its consequent
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requirement for increases in the numbers of personnel employed 
and an increase in the resources required was likely to prove 
less attractive than development through the sale of technology.
The company developed an attractive package for sale to potential 
licensees in which training and back-up support was provided. 
However, this strategy had led to a greater demand upon the 
company's resources than had first been envisaged. Eventually, 
Company X compromised and carried out both licensing and 
production of goods. This appears to have been a successful 
strategy for the company to follow.
Company X has utilised licensing proactively from an early stage 
in the success of its major product. In this is has built on a 
particular past success. It was this success that catalysed the 
use of licensing. Before this however. Company X had not 
considered licensing as a strategy. To some extent therefore 






Company A A is an old established (1760) West Midlands spring
(2)
manufacturing company. Until 1978 the company remained in family
hands, but was then taken over by the Staveley group of companies.
As a result of the takeover the company was broken up, with non­
spring subsidiary companies falling under the management of another 
Staveley division. Currently, Company AA employs 370 people in 
three divisions: (a) High volume springs for the car and other 
industries, (10,000 item orders as a minimum); (b) High volume 
pressings, mainly for the electronic industry, including circlips 
and other stampings, (50,000 item orders as a minimum); and 
(c) Low volume springs and pressings. The last division might be 
considered the 'high technology' part of the company since it is 
here that specialist applications are developed for customers.
The technological advances made here can be utilised in other 
divisions. The company's products are defined as 'cold' springs,
i.e. they are mainly made from wire coil rather than from forgings. 
Effectively this means that Company AA operates in generally 
smaller precision spring market segments rather than in the very 
heavy segments, (e.g. truck leaf springs).
1. Company AA was identified as a result of consultancy work 
carried out for West Midlands Council in 1985.
2. Claimed to be the oldest in the world.
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The Managing Director of Company AA suggested that the company had 
become market leader through its ability to offer customers a 
complete spring design and manufacture capability for particular 
applications. Most other UK spring producers merely manufactured 
springs from customers'own designs. The company also uses only 
very high quality primary materials. Company AA has found increasing 
difficulty however, in UK sourcing of high quality wire used in 
spring production. A large proportion of the tempered wire it 
uses now comes from Japan and Sweden, although for less demanding 
applications it still has two major UK suppliers.
The company has utilised outside sources of expertise on an extensive 
and proactive basis over the last thirty years in its strategy to 
maintain market leadership within its market segments. This has 
involved it in the use of contract and collaborative research, the 
use of design consultants, university engineering departments and 
inward and outward licensing agreements. One of its main product 
lines, circlips, currently accounting for nearly twenty per cent 
of turnover, is based on an inward licensing agreement set up in 
the early 1950s.
The company had identified the (then) new technology of circlip 
springs in the American market and approached the US market leader 
to seek an agreement to collaborate to exploit the UK market in 
which there was then no British supplier. Initially, the agreement 
took the form of an agency with the American company providing 
supplies of its product for sale in the UK. However, sales volume 
quickly rose and Company AA then set up production in the UK.
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Under the licence agreement a two per cent royalty was payable on 
sales. The licence agreement provided the basis for an important 
new activity for Company AA and it has developed the technology 
involve'd using its own R & D facilities. Although there has been 
some 'grant back' of developments, the American company is now 
technologically inferior to Company AA and is not therefore a source 
of further licences. A further disadvantage of the licence agreement, 
has been a clause preventing export of circlips to the United States 
market by Company AA. The company, as part of its growth strategy, 
now wishes to enter this market, but to do so it will have to break 
clauses of the licence agreement. Company AA hopes this can be 
done through mutual agreement with its licensor. It is clear, 
however, that the American licensor has, in this case, set up a 
competitor which is now threatening its own markets.
While inward licensing has been successful for Company AA, the 
company has also developed strategies for utilising outward 
licensing. This has mainly involved the licensing of process 
technology and the company has a Swedish licensee for one major 
process. However, although Company AA considers that its technology 
is more advanced than competitors', it has not been very successful 
in its endeavours to out-license this technology to others, 
particularly in the United States. The Managing Director suggested 
that this may be because of the NIH (Not Invested Here) syndrome 
in many cases, but also because of Company AA's concentration on 
quality of production, rather than speed per se. He suggests that 
although his processes may not be the fastest (in number of press 
operations per minute) on the market in terms of usable springs
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per time period, they out-perform other technologies. However, 
the strategy to out-license this process technology cannot be 
claimed to have been a success, even though Company AA has 
proactively tried to sell the technology.
Currently, Company AA is considering the use of outward licensing 
for another piece of technology. This comprises an innovative 
door hardware mechanism and arose as a 'spin-off of R & D work 
that was being carried out for another product. The company 
developed the idea to prototype form but recognised first that it 
did not have the skill to develop the product for volume manufacture, 
second that the product would not fit with current product lines 
and third that it did not know the best way to market it. The 
company therefore developed a strategy to collaborate with others 
to exploit the product. It engaged an industrial design consultant 
to re-design the product for volume production and it commissioned 
Cranfield Business School to develop a marketing plan for selling 
the product. Following the reports of these consultants. Company 
AA recognised that the product could not easily be produced and 
marketed 'in-house'. It therefore decided to offer the product as 
a 'package' for joint exploitation with a licensee. It is the 
company's objective to utilise its own skills in stamping out 
parts of the product while licensing the assembly and marketing 
to others. It is currently carrying out negotiations with two 
potential licensees in the UK which it approached to sell the 
technology. The company's preferred strategy is to license the 
package to a local licensee and grant 'world rights' to this 
licensee.
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In conclusion. Company AA has used 'technology transfer' in several 
ways and as an integral part of its strategy for developing and 
exploiting new products and markets. Its status as market leader 
has been of assistance in this process, both in utilising outside 
expertise and in inward and outward licensing. High expenditures 
of R & D have supported its technology leader position. It 
appears to have utilised technology licensing proactively, but 
only as one strand of its technology policy, and in support of 




Company BA ^ is presently owned by a consortium of large companies, 
financial institutions and private investors. The company's origins 
as an independent concern date to the late 1950s when the company 
founders discovered and patented a new process for the utilisation 
of vinyl and textiles for the production of specialist printed 
PVC sheeting and coated fabrics. This product laid a foundation 
for the company's success and it built up strengths in designing 
particular chemical formulations for its customers in the plastics 
products industry. These strengths were enhanced by the company's 
research and development department, which concentrated on 
'development' rather than 'research' for customers. Much of the 
conpany's turnover during the period was attributable to 'contract 
R & D' .
From small beginnings the company grew quickly, having to chcinge 
its premises three times over a period of twelve years. In the 
late 1960s, the technical and production facilities which had 
previously occupied separate sites were brought together, with a 
consequent increase in empathy and efficiency. Following a 
period of sustained and increasing profitability, the owners of 
the company sold out to a large conglomerate group in the early
1. Company BA was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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19 70s. Seven years later the conglomerate sold a majority of 
its shareholding in the company to a disparate group of investors 
who comprise the present owners. The company at the time of this 
case study employed approximately four hundred people and had a 
turnover of about twenty five million pounds per annum. It 
therefore lies at the top end of the range of 'smaller' concerns. 
Although Company BA is profitable, increases in feedstock prices 
and world recession halted its previous high growth profile in 
the early 1980s. Currently, it operates in two major market 
segments of the PVC resin compounds supply industry. It ranks 
among the top three companies of that industry by market share.
Conpany BA has utilised licensing in a highly proactive manner, 
both in buying and selling technology. In part this reflects the 
culture of the industry, where technology licensing appears to 
be accepted as a normal method of business practice. The company 
has utilised licensing 'in' where it required particular 
technologies that would have taken too long or cost too much to 
develop 'in-house'. It has utilised licensing 'out' mainly to 
overcome tariff barriers or other restrictions.
The company currently has two major 'inward' licences, which lie 
at the heart of its manufacturing businesses. The first licence 
was purchased from one of the major oil companies that had 
developed, in its own laboratories, and patented a process for 
the utilisation of part refined oil feedstocks into polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC). The process was an important advance in the
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production of PVC, but was not of direct utility to the patentees 
since it was not part of their mainstream activity to produce 
dérivate oil based products per se. They were more interested in 
developing new uses for their main product (i.e. oil feedstocks).
The Managing Director of Company BA states that a process of 
development by the oil majors of new users for their primary products 
is a feature of the oil industry. The process, which was acquired 
under a non-exclusive licence, gave Company BA an important 
advantage in its export markets, although in its home markets both 
its major competitors had also licensed the process. The licence 
has proved to be extremely profitable.
The second inward licence accounted for a smaller amount of 
turnover. This was an exclusive licence to produce a speciality 
chemical polymer product, for which there was a large demand but 
no supplier in the UK. Company BA acquired the licence rights 
for the product from an American company which was not operating 
in the UK and quickly became the main supplier in this market.
The licence has proved profitable for both the licensor and 
licensee conpanies, although it accounts for less than five 
per cent of Company BAs sales.
Outward licensing has been used by the company on more than 
fifty occasions, mainly to third world countries. In almost all 
cases, the company has utilised licensing to overcome tariff 
barriers or in response to the geographical separation of its 
production facilities and its markets. The latter factor is 
particularly important in its mainstream activities, production
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of PVC sheet, and resins where costs of transport to distant 
markets would have prohibited market exploitation by export, in 
view of the relatively low profit margins of the products. The 
conpany has developed its licensing procedures so that it now 
has a 'standard package' and full time personnel employed upon 
the sale of technology rather than goods. Usually the terms of 
the licence agreement oblige Company BA to design and install 
equipment in the licensee's factory. Training of personnel in 
the use of the technology is also carried out and supply of 
initial batches of raw materials, and in some cases products, to 
allow the licensee to enter his local market at the earliest 
possible time is also undertaken. Licensing activities have 
been a successful part of company operations, and these presently 
employ a staff of approximately twelve people, with the part-time 
participation of other engineers and technicians who are 
seconded from the manufacturing operation as required. Profits 
from the licensing operations, which have been substantial, have 
been ploughed back into further R & D work on the applications 
of materials, in which the conçiany appears to have a competitive 
advantage. Licensing accounts for a large and growing part of 
the company's activities.
In conclusion it appears that Company BA has utilised licensing 
as an integral part of its marketing and new product development 
strategy over a period of years. Licensing is recognised as an 
important method of obtaining new process technology from other, 
larger companies, which may find the markets of Company BA too
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small to be worth entering. Company BA has therefore been able 
to obtain a degree of market leadership in its own market 
segments partly by the utilisation of inward licensed technology. 
At the same time, it has enhanced the value of purchased 
technology by committing substantial resources to Research and 
Development. This has allowed it to accept new technologies and 
improve upon them. As a result of its R & D strengths it has 
been able to license its own technology out in a highly proactive 
manner, and obtain a high return on licensing operations. These 
resources have generally been ploughed back into R & D thus 
increasing Company BA*s competitive ability and leading to large 
increases in turnover and its current status of market leader.
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COMPANY CA
Respondents; Marketing Director and Technical Manager
Company CA^^^ was set up in the early 1960s as a subsidiary 
company of a large group, initially to market, then manufacture^ 
telephone answering machines. It currently employs 150 people.
The company developed its technology and became a major supplier 
of equipment, mainly to the Public Telephone Utilities. Its 
main customer was the (then) UK Post Office, but it also carried 
out a small amount of exporting. Following a decade of expansion 
and technological development, the company entered the 1970s in a 
relatively strong position. At this time it also entered into 
an agreement with a major UK telecommunications manufacturer to 
collaborate through a joint venture in the production of a new 
range of equipment. In 1972, the company was sold to another 
UK conglomerate firm, not at that time involved in the tele­
communications industry. This led to some loss of direction for 
the company, which remained profitable however, mainly as a 
result of its position as a semi-monopoly supplier of particular 
items of equipment to the Post Office.
In the late 1970s numbers of new, competitive products based on 
micro-processors technology were introduced to the UK by several
(1) Company CA was identified through the Leverhulme research
reported in Chapter 6.
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Japanese companies, and the pace of technological change increased. 
In view of its large market share in the UK however, the company 
was slow to develop its own technology to meet this threat. At 
the beginning of the 1980s, the company was the subject of a 
management buy-out, largely funded by city institutions. This 
move coincided with 'deregulation' in the UK telephone industry.
The firm lost its semi-monopoly position as supplier to the Post 
Office. However, the company saw deregulation as an opportunity 
for it to expand, rather than a threat, since technological 
developments were reducing manufacturing costs and bringing prices 
down, thus increasing the size of the market. However, the 
company soon found its markets under increasing threat from cheap 
imported and technically superior products from the Far East.
The company has historically utilised inward technology licensing 
for acquiring new products and outward licensing for developing 
its markets. Licensing is usually considered in its new product 
and market policies as a potential alternative to the use of 
'in-house' development and as an alternative to exporting, in 
markets closed to it by tariff barriers or for other reasons.
The company's first experience of licensing was in 19 73, in the 
purchase of technology designed to improve the quality of its 
telephone answering machines. The technology was purchased from 
a UK company that had been considering entering the market.
This company was however, taken over by another group before it 
launched its product. The new owners of the licensor company 
decided to divest their telephone answering machine technology
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and exit the market. Although the technology in question was 
still in prototype form, it did have certain advantages over 
Company CAs technology and therefore was useful to it. The 
technology was further developed by Company CA utilising its 
research and development strengths (at this time it had an R & D 
complement of approximately twelve qualified scientists and 
engineers). After development, the product was launched and 
proved to be successful.
Inward licensing had proved useful in this case to Company CA 
not only in filling a gap in its product line, but also in 
increasing turnover of the company, thus using under-utilised 
space and other manufacturing resources. The company recognised 
this over capacity as a major problem. Technical advances were 
reducing their space and personnel requirements. Instead of 
divesting these resources however, the company sought and was 
initially successful,in utilising them by developing new products, 
through licensing and 'in-house' development.
Company CA had also utilised outward licensing and in a more 
intensive manner than inward licensing. Usually, however, this 
was in response to the company's inability to export its products 
to certain (particularly continental European) markets. This 
resulted from protectionism by local telephone authorities who 
stipulated (as in the UK at that time) that only national 
manufacturers could supply their Post Offices requirements for 
answering machines. To this extent. Company CA was forced to 
develop export markets through the use of licensing agreements.
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However, export income never accounted for more than ten per cent 
of total turnover and was effectively a fairly peripheral activity 
for the company. In addition, under its outward licensing 
agreements. Company CA provided not only designs, but technical 
and marketing back-up to its licensees. This was a drain on the 
resources of the company and the Marketing Director suggested 
that clauses in the agreements on support facilities for licensees, 
were probably not drawn up strictly enough.
However, the current case relates more to Company CAs search for 
inward licensed technology to overcome the 'Japanese threat* of 
the early 1980s. After deregulation, a 'flood' of cheap, 
technologically advanced. Far Eastern, products were imported 
into the UK market. Company CA began to incur heavy losses as 
its market share shrank. Management considered importing and 
marketing answering machines, but decided to endeavour to 
continue to develop its own technology through inward licensing 
agreements on top of its own 'in-house' expertise. Company 
executives visited Japan and the United States to seek technology 
to import. However, at the time of this case study, although 
negotiations had been commenced with several potential licensors, 
no agreement had resulted even though the licence search had 
commenced six months before.
The reasons for the failure to identify a suitable licensor were 
not clear to management in view of the effort that the company 
had invested in searching for such licensors. Different problems 
had caused the breakdown of discussions with different potential
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licensors. In one instance the royalty rates that the licensor 
was seeking seemed too high to the company. In another, local 
sourcing of particular components could have been a problem.
A third problem comprised Company CAs requirement that inported 
technology should 'fit' with its own existing skills. The 
company had been surprised by the collapse in its markets and did 
not appear to have developed a strategy that would provide new 
technology quickly enough.
In conclusion, although Company CA had substantial 'in-house' 
expertise in the area of technology licensing, it seemed to have 
been unable to utilise this expertise effectively in overcoming 
the technology crisis resulting from 'deregulation'. Morale 
in the company seemed low in view of the company's increasing 
losses and it was clear that numbers of key personnel had left 
the organisation. Development of a forceful strategy to obtain 




Company DA^^^'is an old established family owned company in the 
toy industry. The company was set up in the last years of the 
nineteenth century on the basis of an invention for a child's 
modelling material. This patented invention, for which there was 
then no competitive product,provided the company with a monopoly 
position which it exploited successfully over the life of the 
patent. For a period of more than fifty years, the company was 
profitable on the basis of its one product, but by the late 
1950s as a result of falling turnover, management recognised that 
it was necessary to diversify into new products. This decision 
appears to have been forced on an unwilling company, first by the 
increase in competition, particularly from foreign products, which 
steadily increased their market share at Company BAs expense.
The second major reason for the decline was a change in the type 
of product that comprised a majority of the toy market. Electronic 
based products began to be increasingly important. Allied to this 
an increase in the number of houses that were carpeted led to 
the product being less popular with parents because of the dangers 
of damage to those carpets.
The company diversified, initially by the purchase of two other 
companies, in comp]e.mentary market segments of the toy industry.
1. Conpany DA was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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However, the marketing skills of Company DA proved to be 
inadequate in an industry that was becoming increasingly competitive 
as imports, particularly from the Far East, took a larger share 
of the market. In the mid-1970s therefore, after a period of 
falling sales and mounting losses, the family sold their holdings 
to a toy company group which mainly bought the company for its 
trademarks and reputation. The company currently employs 
approximately one hundred and fifty people with a turnover of 
£3 million per annum, and is run by professional managers 
appointed at Group level.
Licensing was stated by the respondent to be an integral part 
of the toy industry. He suggested that there were probably 
several reasons for this. First product life cycles are very 
short, hence the time that a firm has to exploit any particular 
product may also be restricted. Second, the industry is heavily 
segmented into small market areas. Companies know the other 
companies in their market segment through the annual toy fairs 
and hence are aware of what may be available under licence.
Third, the technology is relatively easy to transfer, being 
'design' based and simple. Lastly, designs and characters are 
generally more easy to register and protect than is the case 
with the patents involved in more complex technologies. All 
these factors are stated to have led to licensing becoming an 
integral part of the industry.
In the case of Company DA, use is made of both inward and 
outward licensing. The company has a policy of both seeking new
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innovative products from foreign sources and also of licensing 
its own innovative products out. This policy has led to 
approximately fifty per cent of the company^s turnover accounted 
for by licensed products. Toy trade fairs provide a major source 
for Company DA to seek potential products for inward licensing.
These annual events are attended by most of the senior executives 
of industry companies. Company DA considers that it has a lot 
to offer potential licensors, particularly the skills of its 
marketing team. This team is able to generate large volume 
turnover on new products very quickly. Most licence agreements 
are signed in principle during meetings at the toy fairs, over a 
period of davs. Licensina is, therefore, a verv quick process, 
facilitated by the presence of senior executives from many 
companies.
Company DA also has a relatively large 'Research and Development' 
department althou<ÿi most personnel in this department are employed 
on product design and development rather than any basic research.
The success of this department has been demonstrated by the launch 
of a number of profitable new products over the past four years. 
Since industry product life cycles are so short, it is necessary for 
the conpany to innovate continually.
For successful new products the company has no need to seek 
potential licensees. These approach the company to request 
licences. For less successful products, the company makes no 
attempt to 'sell' the product under licence. The Managing 
Director considers that this policy would be counter-productive.
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Few companies are likely to want to license a product that has 
not been very successful in its own home market. To an extent, 
therefore. Company DA is reactive in its use of outward 
licensing, awaiting approach from licensees, but proactive in its 
inward licensing policies. This probably typifies the use of 
technology licensing in the industry, with licensees seekinq 
Dotential licensors.
In conclusion, licensinq is clearlv a manor part of Comoany D^s 
strateqv, coraplementinq its own in-house and marketinq skills. 
Company DA has utilised licensing in a somewhat more proactive 
wav than manv other case study companies. This may reflect 
the particular instance of the toy industry, where the technoloqy 
licensed is of a low level. As an inteqral part of company 
policy, licensinq has clearly played an important part in the 
recent qrowth of the companys' turnover. There does not appear 
to be a realistic alternative to the use of inward licensinq for 
the company, since the company's own 'in-house' facilities would 
be unlikely to be able to produce many products as successful 
as those that are licensed 'in'. Outward licensing is similarly 
necessary because of the short product life cycles in the 
industry and the company's small marketing resources.
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COMPANY EA
Respondent - Technical Director
Company EA^^^ was set up as a family concern in 1960 to supply 
equipment to public utilities engaged in construction work. 
Initially the company acted as an agent in supplying imported 
products, particularly specialist equipment for testing and 
other engineering applications. For the first six to seven 
years of its life the company concentrated on developing its 
marketing strengths. During this period both turnover and 
profits of the company increased. In the late 1960s the company, 
in response to an approach by the UK Gas Board, designed and 
developed a piece of equipment for tracing metal pipes 
underground. The objective of the equipment was to enable Gas 
Board engineers to identify the correct place to excavate, in 
repairing broken gas pipes. The company had been asked to 
develop the product under contract in response to its known 
skills and the small R & D department which it had set up, 
initially to service and customise equipment from its foreign 
suppliers. The new product proved successful, and following a 
change in policy the company commenced manufacture of the 
unit, initially on a sub-contract/fabricate basis, but 
eventually producing and assembling most components 'in-house'. 
Following this change of direction the company began to 
specialise in developing and manufacturing equipment for similar 
applications. The current philosophy of the firm was summed up 
by the Technical Director as producing products to cover all
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activities associated with 'digging holes'. At present the 
company employs about 120 people with a turnover of £3 million 
per annum.
As part of its search for new product lines, the company had 
established links with the Ministry of Defence. (MOD). This 
link was initially formed when Company EA became a supplier of 
equipment to the armed forces. Following MOD development to 
prototype form of equipment for detecting poison gas in the 
atmosphere, the company approached the MOD to request access to 
the technology for non-military and commercial uses. The 
company saw a market for the product within the public utilities 
particularly the Water and Gas Boards. The MOD were unable to 
grant an exclusive licence to Company EA due to public policy 
restrictions, and in response to this, a joint venture company 
was set up between Company EA, the MOD and another private 
company. The latter firm was not, at that time, in competition 
with Company EA so an agreement of this form was acceptable to 
the company. Under the agreement further necessary R & D 
work was carried out utilising Company EA's technical expertise 
but with financial and some further technical support from the 
other company.
Following development of the technology, and under the agreement, 
a new remote reading gas detector was developed. This was 
manufactured under the terras of the joint venture by the 
partner company. Company EA acted as the marketing arm of the
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venture since it had at that time no suitable manufacturing 
facilities. Profits were divided between the two companies.
The licence agreement has been a qualified success for the joint 
venture partners despite somewhat onerous clauses on the ownership 
of any further developments of the technology by the licensor.
As a licensor, the MOD has not been particularly helpful in 
providing back up R & D and other support facilities. However, 
it has proved to be a large customer for the product, which is 
now also being exported. The product has proved a useful, 
though not spectacular, revenue earner for the company.
Company EA has developed its R & D capabilities such that it has 
produced a number of developments that are not of immediate or 
direct applicability in the company's own markets. The 
unsophisticated nature of the technology involved has usually 
meant that these developments can be relatively easily patented 
or design protected as applications and enhancements of 
existing technology rather than fundamental developments.
Following the development of a security product for the building 
industry which it did not wish to manufacture. Company EA 
decided to license this product out to another firm in the UK.
At the time of writing the agreement is still in its infancy 
and the success of the licence cannot be gauged. However, the 
technical director regarded this licence as very much a 
peripheral activity, and was not anticipating receiving a large 
income from it. This may be due in part to the simple type of 
technology involved and the small amount of resources that the 
company had expended upon developing it.
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In conclusion. Company EA has not embraced licensing as a major 
part of its product/market strategy. However, it is clear that 
the company has benefited to an extent from inward licensing, 
particularly in the change from a marketing to a manufacturing/ 
marketing business. This change of emphasis is still at an 
early stage, however, and the Technical Director of the company 
believes that technology licensing is likely to play an 
increasing role in the development of the company. The current 
strategy of the firm is to identify new products for marketing 
and manufacture from any source that may be available. 
Consequently licensing searches have been instituted as one 
part of the new product development process. Company management 
now appears intent on increasing turnover and developing a 
strategy of growth. In this process licensing may have an 




Company FA^^^ was set up in the early 1920s as a small private 
company manufacturing unwelded and furnace welded steel tubing. 
The company operated a small strip rolling mill for production of 
steel for its tubes. At that time the company's main customers 
were electricity utilities who used the tubing in conduits. 
Company FA specialised in supplying black painted tube for this 
purpose. Following tlie 1939/45 war, the company was acquired 
by a steel processing group which was able to inject substantial 
resources into the company allowing it to modernise its plant 
and develop new technology for the production of precision tubes.
Following an increase in demand for specialty, coated, rust 
resistant, steel products (non tubes) the company entered this 
market segment in the early 1960s and gradually increased its 
market share. It became market leader in the field in the early 
1970s and presently dominates the market for coated products.
At the time of this case study the company employed six hundred 
people and can be described as a medium sized engineering company.
1. Company FA was identified through the 'Leverhùlme'
research reported in Chapter 6.
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The initial use of licensing in the company occurred in the late 
1950s when the chairman of the company, on a visit to the United 
States, came into contact with an American company which had just 
developed a new technology for the production of galvanized tubing 
on a 'production line' basis. Although the technology was not 
completely developed, it did appear to have important advantages 
over any of the competitive processes on the market. Since the 
cost of transporting steel tubing is high, exporting is usually 
uneconomic. The US company was therefore willing to grant a 
licence to Company FA on the basis that further development would 
be jointly funded by and be the joint property of the two 
companies. On this basis. Company FA obtained an exclusive 
licence for the UK market and non-exclusive coverage for other 
continental European countries.
Following its first licence agreement, the market for the 
galvanized tube both in industrial applications and as a semi- 
decorative product continued to expand. This led to a new 
satellite plant being set up to produce the product. (All 
production had previously been concentrated at its main site 
in Birmingham). The licence gave Company FA a competitive 
advantage in that a premium price could be charged for the higher 
specification product. The profits that accrued to the company 
were ploughed back into R & D on further coated steel products.
As a result of this strategy, a 'family' of products was developed. 
Following these developments and in-depth market studies, the 
company decided to endeavour to develop a product based on a 
plastic rather than a metal coating. This diversification away
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from its 'core' skills led to a further collaborative research 
programme between Company FA and its original licensor. This 
programme, carried out almost wholly in the UK but also 
utilising American technology, expertise and finance, led to the 
development of a durable, plastic coating process. This process 
was patented world wide and following exploitation, led to a 
large increase in the company's turnover. Company FA, as part 
of the agreement, obtained exclusive world marketing rights.
The new process further enhanced the reputation and increased the 
profitability of Company FA. Following approaches from a German 
and a French company, Conpany FA licensed its technology 'out' 
on the basis of further R & D collaboration. Once again. Company 
FA considered that the partners in this venture were unlikely 
ever to become competitors because of transport costs on the 
finished product. Further licences for the process were granted 
to companies in other markets throughout the world. Company FA 
has found little difficulty in identifying potential licensees 
both because of the relatively small numbers of companies 
operating in the field, and also because of the innovative 
nature of its technology. The income accruing from these agreements 
has been used by Company FA to increase its research and development 
efforts to retain, and improve, upor^ its competitive position in 
the UK and internationally.
In cônelusion, Company FA appears to have used technology 
licensing in a 'textbook' manner. Its initial inward licence 
increased its technological base and the new process generated
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a large and continuing income that has been used by the company 
to develop new and improved processes. Following this 
expenditure on R & D, the company was able to enhance its 
competitive position vis a vis other companies in the field, 
and was able to develop new products quickly enough to retain 
this position. Its outward licences have, once again, provided 
funding for developments integral to the production of products 
for its own home markets. While other collaborative, non­
licensing agreements, such as joint ventures and inward investment 
have been considered by the company, only the former have been 
used (in two cases) as an alternative to licensing. By this 
means the company has been able to remain highly profitably 




Company GA is an old established company, set up in the late 
1920s to produce fire safety appliances. Initially the firm 
developed skills in metalworking and fabricating and in applying 
specialist finishes to metal. It also built up expertise in 
manufacturing chemical propiilsants, designed and used in its 
range of fire extinguishers. Currently, the company is part of a 
medium sized chemical products group which took over the firm 
in the 1960s. Company GA no longer produces fire appliances 
but has retained many of the skills and technologies that were 
used in that market. Its present major activities encompass 
technology in metal finishing and paint bonding treatments.
The company specialises in the use of phosphate cleaners to 
remove grease and other unwanted matter from the surface of metal 
components. These can then be treated with rust-proofing and 
other compounds designed to protect the metal surfaces from 
atmospheric or liquid attack. The company's main markets lie in 
the food processing plant and automotive industries. The company 
is able to provide a complete plant for cleaning, degreasing and 
treating components. At present the company employs about 
one hundred and fifty people.
1. Company GA was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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In the early 1970s the company sought to develop its range of 
protective products. Although its current product lines provided 
a reasonable turnover and profit, it was seeking to expand its 
operation. Through industry publicity sources it became aware 
of several developments in the United States in the field of 
rustproofing and in 1972 licensed a new process 'in' from a 
United States company. The process, though compatible with 
already available technology within the conpany,. was fundamentally 
different from it, being based on a two stage chemical rust- 
proofing process for iron and steel. This was diversification 
'downstream' from its current product lines, and hence provided 
a good marketing 'fit' for the company. The process involved 
the application by immersion of suitably cleaned and de-rusted 
components in a chemical bath. The major attraction of the 
licence was in obtaining access to the speciality chemicals 
involved in the process. The process was a direct competitor 
to other protective processes such as galvanizing and provided 
a highly corrosion resistant surface superior to other treatments. 
The process does have a major limitation in that it can only be 
used for components that can be immersed. The chemicals cannot 
be painted on to surfaces. However, even large steel assemblies 
can be processed through being broken down into smaller sub­
sections. Around this process and the chemicals involved, the 
company has designed a family of process equipment comprising 
immersion tanks and/or rotary barrel units, which it installs on a 
contract basis within the UK and overseas. Over a five year 
period from 19 72 it provided total UK coverage for the process 
through the use of sub-contractors.
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The main advantage to the company of the licence was that it 
opened up a new market (for the treatment of small components) 
while at the same time providing direct competition to other, 
older processes (such as galvanising). The licence has been very 
successful in enhancing the range of processes the company can 
offer. Approximately thirty per cent of Company GA^ s turnover 
is now accounted for by the licensed process and derivations of it.
The licence agreement with the US firm gave Company GA the rights 
to exploit the process in all markets except the United States, 
Canada and South America. The company has therefore actively 
sought to sell its expertise in foreign markets. In view of its 
relatively small size. Company GA developed a strategy of 
promoting joint ventures where the company provides the technology, 
plant and 'know-how' and a local company provides the factory 
accommodation and (usually) the finance to set up a treatment 
plant. In view of the transport costs involved in moving 
components, it is usually cheaper to set up a treatment plant 
locally, rather than move components to it. Company GA has 
therefore been able to segment its market geographically with 
each joint venture partner being granted an exclusive licence 
to use the process within his own territory. Where a joint venture 
has been considered unattractive due to the small size of the 
potential market or through local laws preventing such collaboration. 
Company GA has also entered into other forms of licensing 
agreements with local licensees. Under these agreements.
Company GA provides the special chemicals to its licensee as well 
as supplying the plant and equipment for operations in their
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local markets, but does not take any equity participation in 
the licensee.
In conclusion. Company GA has utilised licensing in a proactive 
manner. Its initial inward licence gave it access to technology 
which it further developed such that it was able to utilise 
the same technology in outward licensing agreements. The 
licensed technology now forms a central part of its business. 
Company GA has retained control over its technology and exploits 
its markets mainly through sales of its speciality chemical 
products. The supply of these products have become a mainstream 




Respondent - Marketing Manager
Company HA^^^ is a medium sized engineering company in the 
fasterers’business. Most of the products of the company are for 
high technology markets where reliability is stated to count for 
more than the cost of the fasteier, which is usually a minor 
ccanponent in cost terms in most applications. The company is a 
subsidiary of a large engineering conglomerate which has recently 
used the company to 'cream o f f  profits to be used elsewhere in 
the group. The Group Management refused to allow profits to be 
directed to the development of new products within Company HA. 
Local management became concerned at the long term loss of 
competitiveness consequent upon this policy. At the time of the 
case the company employed more than five hundred people at its 
main site in Hertfordshire.
There was a long standing 'culture' of licensing within Company HA 
and most senior executives had utilised or had been involved with 
a previous project that had utilised inward licensing. This first 
venture in the licensing field had occurred some years before the
1. An amended version of this case appeared in Lowe J and
Crawford N K. 'Innovation and Technology Transfer for the 
Growing Firm' Pergamon Press 1984. The case was identified 
through the Leverhulme research reported in Chapter 6.
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case and had not been particularly successful. The product was 
licensed from a US company. However it presented problems both at 
the manufacturing and marketing stages. At manufacturing there 
were considerable initial problems in obtaining the right wire 
for making the product and even now the company is dependent on a 
single supplier. The material is also very expensive since it 
is difficult to fabricate. However, the marketing problems were 
worse. The product had many varied uses in the US but whilst 
similar industries and markets existed in the UK, local 
manufacturers seemed averse to using the product in their own 
products. This inertia by potential customers has meant that 
the product has had to be modified, but even with these 
modifications has not proved to be very successful.
In spite of a relatively poor result from the inward licensing 
venture, the company persevered in its use of the technique.
It appeared that this was due in major part to the junior 
executive who had been given the task of handling all licensing 
matters for the ccxnpany. This individual reported directly to 
the Managing Director and therefore was able to exert a degree 
of control over the strategic development of licensing within 
the company. This pressure led to the company becoming involved 
in two outward licensing negotiations.
The first of these was an agreement with a Russian manufacturer.
In this market. Company HA was unable to sell its products 
through export. In addition, it felt that Russian licensees 
were unlikely to become competitors in third markets and hence
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it felt more willing to license its technology. The technology 
involved comprised process equipment and 'know-how' for the 
production of high precision alloy fasteners, and although Company 
HA was not aware precisely what the products were to be used for, 
it seems likely that there were military as well as civil 
applications for the technology.
The agreements with the USSR while fairly comprehensive were 
simplified to some extent in that the amount of product to be 
produced by the plant was known precisely, since the Russian 
system of planned quotas allowed a very specific amount to be 
stated. For this reason and because there was little likelihood 
of any competition from this source. Company HA considered that 
it was able to reduce the price it would otherwise have charged 
for the technology. The Russians were also fairly hard bargainers. 
One result of the Russian deal was that Company HA considered 
further deals with the Soviet Union and had set up an agreement 
with a British based organisation with good contacts in the USSR. 
This organisation was able to identify further potential licensable 
technology. Consideration of the Russian market is now a matter 
of policy for the company. The Russian agreement also led to a 
possibility of agreements with companies in China. Agreement with 
Western countries, however, on the licensing 'out' side were not 
company policy because of the dangers of setting up competitors.
The only time this policy was not followed was in the case of a 
US company.
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Company HA had no intention of licensing American companies to 
produce its products. However, it received an approach from an 
American company which had already endeavoured to design around 
one of the company's products. The proposition it put to 
Company HA was that if it did not sell its technology under 
licence, the US firm would copy it with modifications. However, 
since there was considerable know-how as well as patents involved 
the US company would rather come to an agreement. Company HA 
eventually accepted this proposition with relative equanimity and 
a licence was agreed. However, transferring the technology occupied 
a great deal of management time. The US company had not used the 
technology correctly and had also developed its own technology.
The result of this was that the US firm tried to sell under the 
company trade name, products produced with their own process which 
were of an inferior quality to the UK product. Company HA also 
considered that its licensee priced these products in such a way 
as to undercut its own direct exports to the US, even though an 
element of price fixing had been a central, albeit informal, part 
of the agreement. This caused Company HA's market share to drop, 
although it was considered by the company that there was enough 
business for both companies if they had operated a collusive 
marketing policy. The pricing policy adopted by the US company 
eventually led to losses on the product line by the licensee 
and after a period of time they did raise their prices.
Company HA therefore regained much of its market share, but in the 
interim period had lost a great deal of profit. The licensing 
'out' agreement had not been a successful project.
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In conclusion. Company HA used inward and outward licensing 
in a more reactive than proactive manner. However, the use of 
licensing has become a part of the strategy of the company to 
overcome resource constraints in both its product and market 
diversification policies. The company has identified licensing 
as a means of entering markets that would otherwise be closed 
to it.
In the absence of potential competition from producers in those 
markets (i.e. the Eastern Block) it has deemed the use of 
licensing valuable as providing a return from an otherwise closed 
market. Its experience of outward licensing in markets where 
direct export was an alternative, however, have been relatively 
unsuccessful. It seems likely therefore that in future a 
strategy of outward licensing will continue to be employed only 
in certain restricted markets.
The company has utilised inward licensing as a method of over­
coming resource barriers that threatened to prevent itsdeveloping 
new products 'in-house'. Although this strategy was not 
particularly successful in producing a large profit for the 
company, this failure was deemed to be the result of poor 
marketing rather than through any failure of licensing per se.
The company is therefore still considering utilising licensing 
in future new product development projects.
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COMPANY JA 
Respondent - Managing Director
Company JA was incorporated as a private limited company in 
December 1975 when three members of a research team in a medium 
sixed engineering conpany decided to found their own company in the 
field of contract Research and Development. The company 
concentrated in its early stages on acting as a 'bridge' 
between the skills of local universities and 'in-house' expertise 
in materials testing and product development.
Following consolidation of initial company strengths, the company 
grew to employ over twenty people in the field of testing. In 1979 
following lengthy prototype development work, a decision was made 
to become the manufacturer of a modular enclosure system which 
had been developed within the conpany for high specification, high 
hazard areas. This product was only a limited success financially 
but provided the company with the 'weight' and the credibility to 
raise finance for its next major development. Management had 
recognised that there were sufficient 'in-house' skills to support 
the development of a range of much more 'high technology' products 
than hitherto in the field of 'soft' automation, building these 
skills around the knowledge of an engineer newly recruited to the 
conpany. At the time of the case, the company employed 40 people.
1. Company JA was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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Following its decision to enter the field of automation, the 
company sought, through the UK university system for a suitable 
product for it to license 'in'. This led to 'in-depth' discussions 
with several universities and eventually to the identification of 
a suitable product at Surrey University. This was, effectively, 
a robot device running on mini-computer hardware. The major 
intellectual property involved was the software to control the 
robot and it was this that became the licensable property. At the 
time of the licence agreement the product was not in a form that 
could be marketed immediately. however. The electronic and 
computer controls for the product occupied a space equivalent 
to a commercial road/rail transport container. It was therefore 
necessary for Company JA to develop and miniaturise the technology 
so that the product could be controlled by a micro-computer and 
would be able to be used for light assembly work in factories.
In this development, the company worked very closely with personnel 
from the licensor, Surrey University. Without this back-up it 
seems unlikely that the product could have been developed quickly 
enough to fulfil the marketing objectives the company had set.
By mid-1982 the new product had been developed and production 
commenced in small quantities in a new factory provided by the 
Welsh Development Agency.
According to the Managing Director, industrial robots have to be 
installed in such a way that they are able to carry out the 
particular task assigned to them yet be easily reprogrammed. 
Paradoxically, this comprises a highly labour intensive activity 
and hence a great deal of back-up is necessary to the purchaser
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of such a machine. This factor means that it is difficult to 
export robots unless there is a very high degree of support 
available locally from maintenance agents. Even then, however, 
it is often necessary for the manufacturers technical personnel 
to be present at installation and 'running-in' of the machine. 
These characteristics preclude easy export. The company was 
therefore prepared to consider any proposal for licensing the 
developed machine 'out' to participating companies in other 
countries and in January 1984 entered negotiations with a 
Japanese Company. Negotiations were prolonged, but towards 
the end of 1984 an acceptable agreement for the transfer of the 
technology to Japan had been reached. At the time of writing 
it is not possible to evaluate the commercial success of the 
agreement, although technically the licence agreement has been 
successful and the technology transferred.
It has been company policy at all stages of the development to 
consider 'technology transfer', in its widest sense, as a 
means of developing company skills and strengths. This has not 
always taken the form of licensing agreements per se, but has 
included close co-operation with Universities and other research 
organisations. Licensing is seen as a more formal tool to be 
used where an informal approach is not appropriate, as in the 
case of licensing out to the Japanese. It has been company policy 
to obtain technology in a relatively undeveloped form and to 
develop it and license it out to others. This has been achieved 
in several cases beyond the mainstream licence activity reported 
in this case.
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Company JA has used licensing highly proactively to break through 
technological and resource (or threshold) barriers in an endeavour 
to compete with much larger companies in the field of automation 
and allied development. As a result of its success in utilising 
licensing in this way, it was able in late 1983 to raise more than 
a million pounds in the City of London as equity and working 
capital. However, although the company has been very successful 
in a technical sense, commercially, sales of its robot based 
manufacturing systems have been disappointing.
Footnote
Company JA collapsed in May 1985 with debts of more than two 
nlillion pounds. The testing division (the only profitable part 
of the business) was sold for 110 thousand pounds.
-497-
COMPANY KA
Respondent - Managing Director
Company KA^^^ was set up soon after the 19 39-45 war as a subsidiary 
of a large, vertically integrated group in the paper and publishing 
industry. The main reason for setting up the subsidiary was to 
provide support products, namely inks, to customers in the industry. 
Initially, the company provided inks and associated chemical 
products to other group companies which were mandated to purchase 
their ink supplies from Company KA. The company therefore had a 
secure customer base. However, transfer pricing problems arose 
within the group and the company also found itself unable to 
supply all the specialist inks that were required by other group 
companies without importing these from the United States. For 
this and other reasons, it was eventually encouraged to diversify 
both its products and markets.
During its growth in the 1950s and 1960s the company developed a 
strong research and development emphasis, based in large part upon 
extensive investment by the parent company. Within the industry. 
Company KA developed market leader expertise in several specialist 
areas. This expertise was recognised as one of the major strengths 
of the company. When in the late 19 70s, the parent group decided
1. Company KA was identified through the 'Leverhulme' research
reported in Chapter 6.
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to divest activities that were not part of its mainstream 
business, Company KA quickly found a buyer. A large American 
chemical company purchased Company KA for its technological 
expertise and to supply its requirements for ink in the European 
market, into which it was then expanding. The buying company had 
previously been a customer of Company KA.
At the time of the case study. Company KA employed approximately 
one hundred people of whom nearly ten per cent were involved in 
research and development. The company had a turnover of approximately 
£4 million per annum and was growing at an annual rate of twenty 
per cent. On average, in its main markets, the company had a 
market share of between fifteen and twenty per cent, although 
in several specialist market segments it was the market leader, 
with more than forty per cent market share.
Technology licensing has been an integral part of company 
operations for nearly twenty years. To an extent this is 
because licensing is an accepted method of operation within 
the speciality chemicals industry, but the Managing Director of 
Company KA stated that his company probably utilised licensing more 
proactively than others in the industry. The first licence that 
was taken on by the company (in 1965) was in response to its 
desire to diversify away from its traditional product lines. The 
licence came about fortuitously when Company KA was approached 
by a medium sized American company which had just launched an 
innovative ink for floor coverings. The American corporation was 
not, at that time, intending to export its product to the UK
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(or European) markets, but was willing to grant Company KA 
an exclusive licence for Europe, mainly in response to a request 
from one of its US customers which was setting up a plant in the 
UK and needed supplies of the specialist ink involved. Company KA 
found that the product fitted into its product portfolio. Under 
the agreement, initial supplies of the product were supplied to 
Company KA as agent, until its own production line was able to 
commence operations. The Managing Director states that although 
the ink industry is basically a formulative industry, there is 
usually a great deal of 'know-how' involved in transferring 
technology. In this case, the formulation led to some problems 
which were, however, overcome. A longer running problem involved 
obtaining supplies of the speciality chemicals involved in making 
the inks, since no UK supplier could be found for one particular 
ingredient. Initially this problem was overcome by importing 
chemicals from the US but a more suitable source in Western 
Europe was eventually found. The product now accounts for just 
less than 10% of total turnover.
Recently the company entered into two further inward licence 
agreements. These were both arranged by the new owners 
who wished to encourage the optimum use of their own (US) technology 
in all subsidiary companies. The flow of technology has, 
however, not been only one way, and Company KA has provided 
technology for its parent firm also under licensing agreements and 
to other group companies. This process has given it experience in 
the outward transfer of technology and the company has made use 
of this experience in agreements it has set up with other firms in 
the industry.
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The outward licence agreements set up by Company KA have mainly 
been with third world countries and/or countries where the 
printing ink industry is less technically advanced than in the UK. 
However, inks, particularly specialty inks, are high value/low weight 
products, relatively easy to transport and hence, in most outward 
licence agreements, there is a danger of setting up competitors. 
Company KA has tried to overcome these problems by including 
restrictive clauses in its licence agreements. As a small company 
however,(although part of a larger group), it has been unable to 
police all its agreements adequately, and this has led to problems 
in enforcing its 're-export' clauses in some cases. However, the 
company has found that outward licensing can provide a useful 
method of exploiting markets from which it would otherwise be 
difficult to make a return.
In conclusion. Company KA has been relatively proactive in its 
use of technology licensing. The management of the firm 
recognised early that as a small concern it was unable to 
export to all potential markets. However, because of its R & D 
expertise built up over a long period of time, the company has 
been able to buy, ‘'.develop and sell technology successfully, both 
to augment its product portfolio and enhance its 'in-house'
R & D strengths and to obtain a return in distant markets.
Company KA has used licensing in a very professional manner. In 
part this clearly results from the resources available to it from 
its parent group services. However the company has also been very 
successful in managing the technology licensing process 'in-house'
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and clearly views licensing as an important part of its product/ 





Rathdown Industries is a medium sized engineering company that
has been forced by technological change to diversify away from 
its core strengths in mechanical engineering and into, new elect­
ronic skills. For more than twenty years, to the early 1980's, 
the company produced specialised springs and metal pressings used 
in the telecommunications industry for switching equipment and 
meters. Although it made sales to several industries which re­
quired specialised springs, its main customer was the then UK 
Post Office (now British Telecom) which utilised Rathdown springs 
in its telephone (Strowger) exchange equipment. Some subcontract 
work was also done for other major companies in the industry.
As a result of the gradual change from electromechanical to 
electronic switching systems, the market for the company's products 
had been contracting for some years. However, as a result of the 
recession and a decision by the Post Office to phase out its 
electromechanical exchanges more quickly than anticipated, orders 
for Rathdown equipment were reduced by almost fifty percent in a 
short space of time. The company was faced with seeking new 
business in a field where technology induced obsolescence had 
reduced markets dramatically. Rationalisation of the company was
(1) This case is a precis of two reports by Jason Crisp that 
appeared on the Technology Page of the Financial Times in 
1982 and 1983.
30/7/82 - 'A Painful Leap into the Technological Age'
22/11/83 - 'How Rathdown Built on a Technological Turnround'
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carried out, resulting in a loss of two thirds of the workforce of 
four hundred. Those with experience in the outmoded mechanical 
engineering skills comprised the largest proportion of these 
redundancies. The company was constrained to seek new products 
which would allow it to develop in the future.
Rathdown's Managing Director had been appointed several months 
prior to the crisis in order levels and had up to date experience 
in the electronics industry. He had been recruited from ITT and 
decided that the company must seek to develop new skills rather 
than find new markets for its old skills. As a result of this 
decision he approached the company's largest previous customer, 
British Telecom (BT) to identify a suitable product for sale to 
them, to endeavour to exploit the market the company knew.
British Telecom was, at that time, seeking suppliers for a new 
electronic microphone to replace its current carbon microphone. 
Several UK and one Austrian company had submitted prototypes for 
evaluation by BT. The Austrian microphone had performed well in 
field tests but was not anticipated to win the contract for supply 
because of its foreign origins and the preference of BT to 'Buy 
British'. Rathdown therefore approached the Austrian company to 
seek a licence to manufacture the microphone on the basis of 
winning the BT contract. Negotiations for the license continued 
for nearly a year before agreement was reached, and three months 
after that agreement, Rathdown won a tender from BT to supply more 
than £2 million worth of microphones. The order was sufficient to 
provide a continuing workflow for nine months. However, although 
the company had won the contract on the technological excellence
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of the product, it had little manufacturing expertise in the area 
of electronic assembly. Personnel with the requisite expertise 
were recruited to manage the project. Further recruitment, of 
predominantly young female staff, was carried out to provide a 
workforce for the new product.
As a result of the new expertise obtained from the Austrian company, 
and utilising the acquired technology, Rathdown commenced a new 
product development programme to provide a continuing stream of 
new products. Outside consultants were used to assist in the 
design and development of these products - a 'call logger' and 'call 
timer*were the first of these. The products were developed in 
close collaboration with BT which remains by far the most import­
ant customer for the company's products. Collaboration has been 
extended to include meetings with BT prior to any product develop­
ment. Rathdown suggests that BT finds a small supplier attractive 
"because it can make changes or meet different requirements quickly". 
As a result of the previous collaboration, Rathdown has developed 
products jointly with BT, licensing BT technology 'in' as required 
but licensing back the marketing rights of the products to BT in 
those markets outside the UK where it currently has no presence.
Rathdown initially utilised technology licensing in a reactive and 
ad hoc manner, as the result of a crisis within the firm. A strategy 
of licensing was then developed as a result of the success of the 
first license agreement. Inward licensing has assisted the firm 
in diversifying away from its previous base in outdated technology 
and to move into new areas of expertise. However, a major cause
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of the initial crisis within the firm was reliance upon one major 
customer, and the technological diversification embarked upon by 
the company has not been mirrored by a diversification in its 
markets. The company is therefore still vulnerable to changes in 
policy by its main customer. However, the broader product and 
skill base that the company has developed may allow market 
diversification to take place in the future. Several of the new 
products and those that are under development have a market beyond 
British Telecom and it is company policy to develop into markets 
other than BT.
Inward licensing possibly saved Rathdown from liquidation by giving 
the company enough time to allow it to develop new technological 
skills. However, possibly the major lesson of the case is that 
management was forced to recognise a requirement for development 
of those skills by outside events. As a result, the company has 
developed a long term strategy for its new product development 
programme, which did not exist before.
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COMPANY MA
Respondents: Several including Managing Director and Technical
Director
Company MA^^^ is a small company producing hardware and software 
in the electronics field. The company was set up in the late 
19 70s as the service and maintenance division of a large company 
which produced a proprietary software product. As a division, the 
company was not particularly successful, although it provided a 
useful service to the parent company in maintaining that company's 
software products after sale to final users. However, the costs 
of running this service as a separate division proved to be a burden 
to the parent and decision was made to close the division down and 
transfer the service function back to the parent company.
Several of the managers of the division had established their 
families in the Manchester area, where the division was based, and 
were loth to move. They proposed that the division be reconstituted 
as a separate company, providing a service to the parent and to 
other companies and be the subject of a management buyout. The 
parent company readily agreed to this arrangement, although it 
retained a minority (30%) interest in the new concern. The company 
became independent in 1982.
1. Company MA was identified through the author's involvement
with the company as a consultant in 1985.
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To generate an increased turnover. Company MA sought to build upon 
areas in which it perceived its strengths to lie. These included 
a sales force of two and four service engineers. Management 
decided to become agents for hardware and software products that 
complemented their existing skills and as a result of this decision 
visited several US computer trade fairs. Following these visits 
and the contacts that were made, company MA obtained agreement to 
sell five products in the UK. These were manufactured in the 
United States and shipped to the UK. The agencies provided an 
increased turnover for the company which became profitable shortly 
after becoming independent. Throughout 1981 and 1982 the company 
increased its size and by the end of 1983 employed ten people.
It was then outgrowing its accommodation and began to seek larger 
offices.
One successful product that the company sold on behalf of an 
American manufacturer was an integrated hardware and software 
teaching aid, which had been licensed 'in' from an American inventor. 
The product which was software controlled comprised an add on unit 
to a micro-computer and was used to teach unskilled personnel how 
to use computer packages. In late 1983 the American company was 
taken over by a larger concern, which sought its technological 
expertise in micro-computers. The teaching product did not fit 
with the new owners corporate plan and a decision was made to 
hive it off. The world manufacturing rights for the product were 
therefore offered to company MAy the largest distributor, in 
addition to current stock, which amounted to three months' average 
sales of the product in the UK. Company MA therefore had the
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opportunity to enter manufacturing with a product for which a 
substantial market already existed. The licence agreement granted 
rights to the product to Company MA on highly advantageous terms.
As a result of the agreement Company MA moved into larger office/ 
factory accommodation,north of Manchester, where it obtained 
substantial public sector support for setting up production and 
training new employees in light assembly work. In this it was 
substantially aided by its former parent concern which provided 
some manufacturing expertise in addition to a substantial amount 
of working capital. Sales of the product continued to grow and 
more assembly workers were recruited.
As a result of the success of the teaching aid product Company MA 
undertook a search for further products it could produce under 
licence. It commenced negotiations with those American manufacturers 
for whom it was acting as an agent. At the time this case was 
written two further products appeared likely to be produced under 
licence in the UK as the result of Company MA's expertise in 
manufacturing, as well as marketing products in the software/ 
hardware interface field.
Company MA developed its new product and licensing strategy as a 
result of circumstance rather than as part of any pre-conceived 
plan. This was particularly true early in the growth of the 
business. As the Managing Director remarked, the company's success 
had been based mainly on "being in the right place at the right 
time". The formation of the firm, its development into agency
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agreements and its diversification into manufacturing resulted 
from events external to the firm. However, the success of the 
initial licence agreement pointed the way to development of a 
strategy of new product development based upon the licence option, 
The firm sought products produced by reputable and fast growing 
US firms for sale under agency agreements and then sought to 
extend this co-operation into the licence field. This strategy 
was intended to reduce any necessary R & D expenditure to a 
minimum while obtaining 'state of the art' technology. R & D 
was restricted to customising American products for the British 
and European markets. This was crucial in the case of the 
first licensed product where development work led to an early 
improvement in the performance of the product and a reduction in 
its price through reducing the number of printed circuit boards 
involved in its manufacture.
Company MA initially utilised licensing in a reactive rather than 
proactive manner but has developed the use of licensed products 
as a method of maintaining technological leadership in its field. 
It is now an acknowledged market leader in the provision of 




Respondents: Managing Director and Financial Director
Company NA is a medium sized, West Midlands based, engineering 
company. The company's main business is in supplying components 
for the automotive industry. The company was founded in the 
early 1930's during the first great expansion within the motor 
industry, by an individual who identified the potential for 
supplying particular parts to the larger car manufacturers. Over 
the following years the company expanded to its current size. It 
now employs approximately 200 people, with a turnover of £6 million 
per annum.
In the late 1950's the company lost its independence and was 
purchased by the Bowden Group of companies, and it was during this 
period that the company grew, in line with demand for its products 
and a general increase in economic activity. Its current parent 
company is the Adwest Group, a holding company which purchased 
company NA in 1970. The group gives a large amount of operating 
freedom to its companies and company NA is therefore able to 
develop its own strategies for expanding the business.
Currently the company produces in three areas - Hinges, Couplings 
and Seat Reclining Mechanisms. The Hinge product line accounted 
for more than 70% of turnover in 1984 although this proportion is 
falling as the company diversifies away from its current 'core'
(1) Company WA was identified as a result of research being carried 
out for West Midlands County Council in 1985.
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expertise. It is in the Hinge product area that the company has 
traditionally been involved . Company customers nearly all lie 
in the motor assembly business, and include both large and medium 
sized UK manufacturers and several of the smaller foreign car 
makers. As a result of strict application to quality control, 
induced in part as the result of the recession, company NA has 
developed a reputation for high quality products and for con­
sistency and reliability within its field. Because of this, the 
company now lies near the top of the list of 'preferred' suppliers 
for several of its major customers. However competition from 
West German suppliers has proved difficult to overcome in markets 
outside the UK.
Product development has become increasingly important to the 
company during the past seven years as a result both of increasing 
competition due to recessionary pressures, and the determination 
of company management to grow through development into new market 
areas. Product development has occurred in three major ways. 
First, through in-house development and improvement of existing 
products. Second, through defining with customers and potential 
customers, new product needs, and designing to them. The third 
method has arisen as a result of approaches by customers offering 
company contracts for production runs of products which the 
company does not currently produce. The company is committed 
both to improving its current product range and developing into 
new areas of expertise and into new markets both through new 
product development and new product acquisition via purchase of 
othe r compan ie s .
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The company has utilised outward licensing extensively as an 
alternative to export for its seat reclining mechanism. This 
product was developed 'in-house' about seven years ago and arose 
as the result of a request by a customer for an alternative to 
its current (West German) supplier's product. Company NA designed 
around the West German supplier's patents and has built a strong 
patent position on its own product. However, the company found 
it difficult to compete on price with West German companies within 
Europe because of the high value of the pound sterling and has 
therefore resorted to outward licensing for export markets. The 
licensing option was, in any case, attractive to the company 
because of the high transport costs associated with the product. 
Currently, licence agreements account for more than thirty per­
cent of the turnover on the seat reclining mechanism and for 
approximately five percent of total company turnover.
The first license agreement for the product was with an Australian 
company who approached company NA for the product licenc e rights. 
The company had already done a small amount of exporting to this 
customer, so an agreement was quickly reached to license the 
technology. This reactive licensing strategy has also character­
ised the company's approach to utilising outward licensing. ITie 
company has now also licensed its product into South East Asia, 
Canada and the United States. A majority of the management and 
negotiation of the licence agreements has been done 'in-house' 
although the company has also utilised licensing consultants to 
advise it where necessary.
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Following success with its licensees the company decided to 
become more proactive in its search for overseas partners and, in 
this regard, sought a consultant to assist it to break into the 
Japanese vehicle market. Negotiations for this license are con­
tinuing. Company NA has found that the use of licence consult­
ants for this market has been useful in making the first approach 
to potential licensees, but also recognises disadvantages in their 
use. Defining to the consultant precisely what the objectives of 
the company are, has proved to be problematical and management 
now considers that the direct approach may be more effective for 
future negotiations.
In conclusion, company n a  has built a reputation for technological 
excellence and reliability and is now searching for strategies to 
build upon that reputation and upon its 'in-house' technological 
strengths. Licensing is considered to be likely to beccaue increas­
ingly important to the company as it seeks to develop new products 
for its existing markets and new markets for its existing products. 
The company is currently seeking to become more broad based through 
a strategy of diversifying into new areas through a mixture of 
licensing and direct export. This process, and the research/devel­
opment capability that the firm has built up, may lead, in manage­
ment's view, to the company becoming more of a research and devel­
opment organisation in the medium term, with manufacturing and 




Company PA (1) is a small West Midlands company, operating in a large 
number of product and market sectors. The company has developed to its 
current diversified situation through a series of changes over the last 
fifteen years, forced upon it by technological developments, the impact 
of the recession and through a policy of diversifying into new areas. 
The company's base technological expertise appears to be in its ability 
to make low technology metal based parts for a wide variety of 
applications. Currently it operates in the vehicle accessories, house­
hold goods, materials handling and luxury consumer goods markets.
Company PA was an old established family firm operating in the 
industrial chains market for nearly two hundred years. By the mid 
1960's however, chain making had become a highly automated process and 
the company had diversified into heavy duty presswork and metal 
fabrication, producing parts for the motor industry. During the 1960's 
the company was profitable and this led to a takeover of the company by 
the Harrison Sheldon Group in 1969. The group had a philosophy of 
devolving control to the group companies and although the takeover had 
removed the influence of the family, the philosophy of the company 
remained virtually unchanged.
(1) This case was identified as the result of work being carried out 
under contract to the West Midlands County Council in setting up 
the West Midlands Technology Transfer Centre.
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In the late 1970's, the recession hit company PA very hard and 
substantial losses were incurred. This led to a major reorganisation at 
both company and group level. The company reduced its workforce from 
more than two hundred to less than one hundred employees. As a result 
of the recession the parent company also decided to merge another of the 
group companies with company PA. This company had been involved in the 
manufacture of motor vehicle and caravan accessories and had a very wide 
range of products from luxury picnic hampers to car and lorry 
wing mirrors. Although several of these products were very different 
from company PA's skills, others fitted in with their metal presswork 
and fabrication skills. Nevertheless, more than two thirds of the 
personnel of the second company had to be made redundant as a result of 
the merger.
In 1982 company PA started carrying out the construction by subcontract 
of a range of custom designed pallets for another local company. The 
pallet product fitted in well with company skills in metal presswork and 
fabrication. As a result of the financial problems that the customer 
company was experiencing, the pallet product range, including the name, 
drawings, patents and in two key cases, key personnel, was sold to 
company PA on its suggestion. Shortly thereafter, the original pallet 
manufacturer went into liquidation.
At this time. Company PA is divided into four divisions, each
with its own sales/marketing force, but utilising central production
facilities and a central management team. The divisions are as follows:
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Division one - Motor Accessories 50% of total turnover
Division two - Picnic Hampers 10% of total turnover
Division three - Pallet Manufacture 20% of total turnover
Division four - Commercial Vehicle 20% of total turnover
Fittings
The company is, therefore, highly diversified, although this diversif­
ication appears to have come about in a very ^  hoc manner rather than 
through the development of strategies to move into new markets per se.
In 1983/84 management decided to change its strategy towards new product 
development, which had, until that time, depended to a large extent upon 
the development of 'in house’ design skills. It commenced a search for 
external sources of technological expertise. This led to a reallocation 
of the 'in house' design staff to other functions, although a small 
product development team was retained. Subcontract R & D was to be used 
to fill in gaps in skill levels where necessary.
As a result of the change, company PA commenced a search for new 
products both within and outside the company. The search was based upon 
the perceived skills of the company in being "able to make any stamped/ 
pressed/fabricated product from a design". This led to the development 
of several new products including a roof rack for gutterless cars and a 
new hitch mirror design for caravans. The first of these products was 
an 'in house' idea, but the development of the product was then 
contracted out to a commercial R & D company which produced designs and 
prototypes for the company This product is currently being brought into 
production with a target of 2000 units per year.
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The second product arose as the result of an approach by an outside 
R & D company which wished to out license its design for a caravan hitch 
mirror. This product was based upon the application of new design 
principles and materials to an old problem (of aligning a towing vehicle 
to its load) and following negotiation, and further development, company 
PA took out a licence for the manufacture of the product. The agreement 
gave the licensor a small 'up front' fee and a six percent royalty on 
sales. The product was well received by both retail outlets and final 
customers, and sales are currently building up to the planned ten 
thousand units per year level. The company has had few problems in 
integrating the licensed product into either its manufacturing or 
marketing strategies. In the case of manufacturing, the workforce is 
highly flexible and able to turn to new products very quickly. As a 
result of the rationalisation programme, labour demarcation is not a 
problem. The company's sales force is also able to adapt to new 
products relatively easily, particularly, as in this case, where the new 
product line fits in with the current product portfolio.
Company PA has developed a strategy for the use of licensing, contract 
Research and Development and the use of design consultants, that 
complements its own 'in house' skills and expertise. Although the 
strategy has been developed in a rather reactive manner, in the light of 
the company's very diversified nature, and its breadth of skills, it has 
been able to utilise external technology relatively easily. However, 
the 'technology' concerned is of a rather low level, comprising the use 
of registered design copyright rather than the patenting of new ideas to 
protect intellectual property. The company sees its major strength in 
being able to make and market relatively low technology products
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competitively, rather than endeavouring to become a technological 
leader. Following its successes utilising outside technology it is now 
committed to develop such strategies in its longer term search for new 
products.
The case study suggests that for a smaller, non 'high technology' 
company, the use of outside skills can be an important factor in 
developing product lines. As a result of its new policy it is now being 
approached by other companies wishing to license products to it.
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COMPANY QA
Company QA is a small German Research and Development company 
that has grown out of manufacturing into marketing its technical 
expertise to larger companies in the rubber industry. The company 
dates from the late 1940's when the present Managing Director 
purchased the assets and goodwill of a small rubber stamp manufact­
uring company that had become bankrupt. Initially, the new owner 
continued to manufacture the products that the previous company 
had manufactured and this provided a reasonable return on the 
capital and effort employed.
Two years after the formation of the company, company QA purchased 
the rights to use the 'Semperit' process for the production of 
rubber stereo plates. In acquiring this process as licensee, 
company QA received very little assistance from the licensor in 
setting up the process. Although the technology was transferred, 
obtaining the requisite quality of final product proved to be 
difficult. Conditions within the industry were extremely compet­
itive and obtaining assistance to develop the technology from 
sources within the rubber industry proved to be problematical. 
However, some of the suppliers of material, particularly the 
larger concerns, assisted company QA to overcome its technical 
problems, on the basis that the company was a small customer, 
likely to grow bigger.
(1) The company QA case is the precis of a case study that appeared 
in Les Nouvelles, Journal of the Licensing Executive Society, 
September 1984.
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Following success with the acquired technology and development of 
it, company QA developed a new technique for manufacturing rubber 
faced rollers for the printing, packaging, textile and other 
industries. The technology involved development both in the 
manufacture of the rubber compounds used in facing the steel 
rollers and, also, a more efficient method of applying the facing. 
Company QA recognised that it had an improved process that could 
be applied across a range of industries and hence would tend to 
undermine the current structure of its industry. At that time, the 
rubber roller industry was based on a large number of firms supply­
ing small geographical markets. At the suggestion of a supplier 
company QA patented its technology on the basis of protecting its 
own manufacturing rights.
As a result of publicity within the industry, company QA received 
approaches from several major rubber roller manufacturers for the 
rights to utilise its technology under licence. The company 
recognised that it could exploit its technology either by manufact­
ure 'in house' or under licence agreements, and in view of the 
large size of the market cind its highly competitive nature, decided 
to follow the 'out' licensing route. The decision was reached in 
part because of the difficulty of identifying any infringement of 
patents that might be taking place within other manufacturing plants
As a result of its decision to outlicense its technology, company 
QA approached one of the largest producers of rubber rollers for 
the paper industry, in West Germany, to offer its technology. 
Management recognised the advantage of the new technology and an
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agreement was quickly reached to install the process in its plants. 
However, one result of the new technology was a dramatic reduction 
in the numbers of personnel required to produce rubber rollers.
This led to opposition, and even sabotage, from shop floor workers 
who perceived, rightly, that the new technology was a threat to 
their jobs. However, after some major problems, the technology 
was installed and the license was a success. Output was maintained 
at its previous level with a workforce reduced to a tenth of its 
previous size.
Following its first outward license, company QA drew up agreements 
with several large European companies in the industry. These agree­
ments were negotiated by the company utilising its own 'in house' 
expertise. As a result, several of the agreements were not 
particularly 'professional' and, in retrospect, this could have 
led to later infringement of patents or licences but, in fact, no 
problems arose. Company QA rapidly increased the number of its 
licensees and the scope of the technology covered. The company's 
success led to imitation by several competitors in Europe, the 
United States and Japain. However, the original patent for the 
technology appears to have been particularly well drafted, and 
company QA has been able to protect its technology from encroach-
I
ment.
The income from its licence agreements allowed company QA to further 
refine and develop itsjtechnology and, as a result, it has become 
a contract research/development company, concentrating on techno­
logy for the rubber industry. At the time of the case, the company
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had a total of sixty-nine licensees worldwide. The company's 
worldwide contacts have also allowed it to diversify into other 
technological areas and to other methods of operating. The 
company now also carries out a substantial business in buying, 
reconditioning and selling machinery for the rubber industry.
Company QA has utilised licensing in an extremely proactive manner 
worldwide although its first licensing agreement was reactive.
The small size (40 employees) of the company forced early consider­
ation of the use of licensing as the only feasible method of ex­
ploiting worldwide markets. As a result, company QA is now a world 
leader in its own technological field, and is able to retain that 
position by re-investing licence income in its Research and Develop­
ment programme. Although the original patents, upon which the 
success of the company was built, have now lapsed, company QA has 




Respondent ; Managing Director
Company RA (1) is an old established (1868), small (168 
employees) West Midlands firm in the 'black ironmongery' field 
(latches, bolts etc.). The current phase in the company's 
development occurred in 1974 when the present Managing Director 
and a partner purchased the company from its original family 
shareholder. At this time the company was making 'reasonable' 
though not particularly high profits. The new management 
developed the range of builders' hardware that comprised the main 
product line of the company such that turnover increased 
threefold from its one third of a million pounds level in 1974.
In 1982 Company RA acquired two other similarly sized companies 
from the receiver. These companies produced goods in the field 
of metal enclosures (i.e. boxes) and in pallet racking and 
shelving systems. Since the first of the two acquisitions had
occupied larger,more modern premises than Company RA, the three 
companies were combined on this site in 1983. Company RA also 
took advantage of the recession in purchasing a substantial 
number of machine tools, presses and other equipment which it 
stockpiled against future upturns in demand. Currently the 
company is divisionalised into four product areas as shown below.
1. Company RA was identified as a result of consultancy work 
carried out for West Midlands Metropolitan Council in 1985.
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- Black ironmongery - Elm turnover
- Metal enclosures - Elm turnover
- Engineering products E3/4 m turnover 
Pallet racking and shelving - E3/4m turnover
The company therefore manufactures a very wide range of goods 
including traditional mining hardware such as cast iron conveyor 
rollers and more 'high technology' products such as computer 
enclosures. The highly diversified nature of the company has 
made it difficult to market the whole range of goods through 'in 
house' resources. Agents are therefore employed both in the UK 
and overseas, although Company RA recognises that there may be 
substantial disadvantages in foregone profits in exploiting 
markets in this manner.
The Managing Director of Company RA suggested that his company 
had a unique set of skills including drawing office and drafting 
facilities, accurate metal forming capability, small and large 
assembly expertiæ and in depth knowledge of exporting procedures. 
However as a resultof the acquisitions the company had obtained a 
largp amount of 'excess capacity,' and hence technology licensing 
was being considered as a method of utilising this capacity.
The company had two current experiences in the use of technology 
licensing. The first of these had arisen as the result of the 
metal closure company acquisition, when the purchased company was 
found to have the licence rights to produce a range of patented
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racking from a small American company. Although the product was 
technically advanced, the previous licensee had never made 
particularly effective sales penetration of the UK market in the 
product. The main reason for this appeared to be that a large 
amount of second hand racking had become available soon after the 
licence had been signed, because of the recession, and hence 
demand for new racking systems had slumped.
Company RA had resolved to develop the licensed product but 
encountered problems in this, since the original licence 
agreement did not contain clear clauses on assignment of licence 
rights if the original licensee ceased to trade. This also 
applied to the several sub-licensees in Europe who had continued 
to produce the product after the licensor’s collapse but had 
failed to remit any royalty income to the new owners. Company RA 
was taking legal action against one sub-licensee to enforce these 
rights. However in view of the small ^rcentage of the company's 
turnover attributable to the product in the UK (less than 2%) 
action to clarify legal position had not been pursued very 
strongly. This position was anticipated to change as the company 
developed a new marketing strategy for the product. A further 
potential problem arose when the American licensor was purchased 
by another company. Although the legal position on the use of 
the licence is still not entirely clear, the licensor has not 
taken any steps to prevent Company RA from manufacturing its 
product. The Managing Director believed that if the new 
marketing campaign for the product was successful and substantial 
turnover began to be generated on the racking product, the
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licensor might endeavour to enforce his rights through recourse 
to law. This would be resisted.
The second licence agreement was still being negotiated at the 
time of the case study. As part of its search for new products 
and activities to utilise its excess capacity, Company RA had 
approached various contract research companies and facilitating 
agencies, to identify other opportunities. One of these agencies 
was the British Technology Group (BTG). Company RA had spcified 
the type of products it was seeking and in late 1984 the BTG 
approachai the company with an innovative electronic security bolt 
system. This product had been developed at the Building Research 
Establisment (BRE) at Garston and appeared, in principle, to be 
suitable for manufacture by the company. However, the new 
product would require skills in electronics that the company did 
not currently possess, as well as expertise within its current 
areas of competence. The company had decided to take a licence 
for the product and negotiations were continuing towards that 
end. However, the company was concerned that it may lack the 
particular marketing expertise to exploit the product 
successfully. It recognises that a more proactive marketing 
strategy than the use of agents will have to be developed.
Company RA has decided to utilise technology licensing as a means 
of employing its spare manufacturing capacity. Although the 
company is covering its overhead costs, its profit levels are 
relatively low and hence it is seeking to increase turnover both
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quickly and by a large percentage (30%). Its current product 
lines are unlikely to be able to generate this level of growth, 
although they provide a continuing steady turnover from low 
technology markets. As a result of this the company has
increasingly considered sources outside the company to provide 
new product opportunities (including licensing). The company has 
a small drafting and R & D capability and the Managing Director 
believes that it would be able to redevelop and assimilate any 
new product technology relatively easily. His major objective is 
to reduce the current reliance on sub-contracting for original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and substitute 'own brand'
products of a higher technological profile than currently.
In conclusion. Company RA is now developing strategies to develop 
its business after a major period of acquisition and
rationalisation of historical activities. Inward licensing is 
recognised as a potentially important method of developing into 
new 'higher technology' market segments, to build upon current 
'in house' strengths. However, the company appears to have a 
rather 'ad-hoc' strategy in this area, following up licensing and 
other new project leads in a rather haphazard manner across a 
wide range of technologies and disciplines rather than 
identifying particular market segments into which it wishes to 
develop. Company management recognises that it has a fairly 
unstructured approach to diversification but considers this to be 
more of a strength than a weakness, in exposing the company to a 
wide variety of potential projects. This approach has mainly 
arisen from the Managing Director's previous business experience 
and his belief that his ability 'to pick winners' from a large 





Company SA^^^ is a small, old established family business. The 
company was set up in the late eighteenth century (1776) to make 
whip thongs for carriage horse whips. In the early 1900s and 
following development into other areas, the company diversified 
into the production of tube bending and other special purpose 
machines on a 'one-off basis. Currently, four members of the 
family remain directors of the company, holding a large majority 
of the equity. The company currently employs just over one 
hundred people, and has a turnover of about £4 million per annum.
In the early 1950s a design engineer in the company designed a range 
of special purpose heavy duty cast steel purpose clamps for use 
within the manufacturing facilities, to hold components being 
worked on. Following the suggestion by a supplier that these 
could find more general applicability, the company began to 
market the clamps as an adjunct to its range of purpose built 
machinery. Over the following twenty years the clamps grew to 
become a significant part of the company's business. In 1972 
following several years of falling sales for specialist machine 
tools, the machine tool business was sold off to a larger concern
1. Company SA was identified as a result of consultancy work 
carried out for West Midlands Council in 1985.
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in the West Midlands. Of this side of the business only the
Researach and Development function was retained. The sale had 
been foreseen by management which had concentrated upon building 
up the 'clamp’ side of the business. However, it had been clear 
that clamps alone would not provide a sufficiently large turnover 
for the business, and hence a search had been instituted for 
products into which the firm could diversify.
In 1969, one of the directors, a keen caravanner, had visited a
caravan exhibition in Oslo (Norway). At this exhibition he had 
met the German manufacturer of a range of caravan space heaters, 
equipment not then widely available in the United Kingdom. This 
individual was seeking agents in other European countries for his 
products. Following negotiations, company SA came to an 
agreement to market the heaters in the UK. It soon became clear, 
however, that UK assembly of the heaters under licence would be 
more appropriate thanimport of complete units, and in 1975 Company 
SA commenced assembly using mainly German components. In the
ten years prior to the case. Company SA progressively reduced 
the amount of German components in the product and currently only 
the heat exchanger is provided by the German licensor. Patents 
and design copyright on this sub-unit precludes Company SA from 
manufacturing the component, although the costs of setting up 
dies for manufacture in the UK at a estimated £60,000 are also 
considered prohibitive.
The changes in the terms of the agreement with the German
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licensor contingent upon the change from franchisee to licensee, 
led to the necessity for several re-negotiations. As the company 
developed the UK market for caravan space heaters (in which it is 
now market leader with more than 80% market share) it was able to 
reduce progressively the proportion of the ’market profit' going 
to the licensor. Currently Company SA pays a royalty rate of 
about 2 1/2% on turnover on the product. This represents a fixed 
charge on each heat exchanger purchased from the licensor and is, 
therefore, a constantly reducing charge to the company as 
inflation increases the unit price of the complete product. It 
seems clear that the licensor would prefer to obtain a higher 
return on his licence agreement, but is unable to do so because 
of the danger that if the agreement is broken and Company SA 
produces its own heat exchangers, the company will be in a strong 
position to commence export operations into the licensors own 
market. Effectively, by granting a manifacturing licence, the 
licensor has set up a competitor company in the UK.
The caravan space heater provided the basis for a family of 
products in the caravan heating and other caravan accessory 
field. Company SA utilised extensive 'in-house' R & D 
capabilities (it currently has eight staff out of one hundred, 
employed in this field) to develop other, parallel products, such , 
as caravan water heaters, boat heaters, shower heaters, lights 
and other accessories. The company is now the overwhelmingly 
dominant monopoly supplier in its own market segment within the 
UK. The caravan heater range now accounts for more than seventy 
five per cent of turnover, with the clamps business providing the
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other twenty five per cent.
However, Company sA management recognises that the possibilities 
for developing in their own market are now restricted, since the 
products account for such a large proportion of that market. The 
company is, therefore, currently considering how it can best 
diversify into other fields. Two major strategies have been 
proposed. The first of these is to develop completely new 
product ranges for the caravan accessory market. However, in the 
UK the caravan market is fairly static and in view of their 
current dependence on that market, management considers that 
further development in it could be a relatively high risk option. 
The second potential avenue for development is considered to be 
entry into other markets with current product ranges. This would 
involve Company SA in producing domestic and industrial through 
wall heaters. This strategy is also considered relatively high 
risk, since the domestic heating market is dominated by companies 
much larger than Company sA. Company management has decided to 
follow the second alternative however, and is currently 
developing its current products to attack this market.
Company sA has also utilised outward licensing on two occasions, 
for its range of clamps. Neither of these instances was a great 
success however. The first outward licence was to a South 
African company which approached Company SA for the rights to use 
its registered designs to produce a range of clamps for that 
market. Negotiations were conducted on an 'arms length' basis
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following one initial visit by the licensee to the UK. However, 
the South African licensee failed to develop the business 
successfully, and the agreement never became profitable and has 
now lapsed.
The second outward licence was to a New Zealand company and once 
again was a failure. In this case, quality control was a 
problem. Although the clamp range was relatively 'low 
technology' being based on traditional cast steel techniques, it 
was clear that a great deal of 'know-how' had never been 
transferred. The agreement transferred detailed drawings and 
mould patterns to the licensee. Following a year of poor quality 
production the agreement was terminated by mutual agreement. 
However, it seems apparent that the New Zealand licensee had made 
the technology available to another local company without company 
STfe permission. Soon after the licence lapsed a range of clamps 
was introduced to world markets by another New Zealand company. 
Company sA decided to attack this competitor on quality grounds 
and has not lost major market share to the competitor. However 
the company's experience of outward licensing has made it very 
wary of using the technique again.
In conclusion. Company SA has utilised both inward and outward 
licensing on a proactive basis. Its success in inward licensing 
has allowed the company to move over a period of ten years away 
from its traditional 'core' strengths and into new areas. It is 
currently considering the use of licensing again in its search 
for new products. However it has not carried out a search for
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new licences in a particularly positive manner. Its experiences 
of outward licensing have been unsuccessful, and it is unlikely 
that the company would consider this strategy again.
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COMPANY TA
Respondents - Sales Director, Technical Director and Marketing Manager
Company TA (1) is a small/medium sized West Midlands based company. 
The company provides a range of electroplating, metal finishing, heat 
treatment and thermo-chemical surface treatments at fourteen plants 
throughout the UK. The company is split into four divisions, each one 
providing one of the above services. The company was set up as a 
family concern before the Second World War but is now owned by a 
conglomerate company. Company TA currently employs three hundred and 
sixteen employees in the UK. Four of these are employed in the 
company's R & D department in Birmingham.
At the time of this case study the company was growing fast, having 
expanded from a base of three plants in 1981 to its current fourteen 
plants. This process has been developed as part of a growth strategy 
by company management to provide a 'countrywide' service to its 
customers. The strategy has been supported by recruiting 'high 
iflying' executives with exceptional track records to manage the growth 
of the company.
1. Company TA was identified as a result of consultancy work carried 
ut for West Midlands Metropolitan Council in 1985.
-536-
Growth has been achieved in a number of ways. First, quality control 
procedures have been improved. The respondents state that Company TA 
is now market leader in the UK in its field with a reputation for high 
quality, a large range of processes offered, and keen pricing. It has 
thus been able to compete successfully with other locally based 'job 
shop' chromium plating and metal treatment companies.
Secondly, Company TA has grown by acquisition. Its latest acquisition 
was another small company, purchased in 1984 for its special expertise 
in electroplating This company now comprises one of the divisions 
noted above. It is Company TAs objective to develop the range of 
skills it offers by further acquisition.
Thirdly, the company has developed the range of metal treatments that 
it can offer. Although its original 'core' technologies of chromium 
and nickel plating still account for fifty per cent of total turnover, 
the company now offers a range of more than fifty different 
treatments. Where these treatments cannot be offered locally, the 
company's efficient distribution service allows for components to be 
treked at its Birmingham works. As a result of the range of services 
on offer. Company TA has been able to obtain a large amount of work on 
a sub-contract basis that customers had picvicmcly carried out 'in- 
house' . Recessionary pressures in the early 1980s accentuated this 
process as customer companies closed 'in-house' facilities in favour 
of processes that could be carried out more cheaply under sub-contract 
outside. The company has also developed its 'in-house' skills in 
engineering, allowing it to provide a design, prototype and 
development facility for customers. This complements its treatment
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facilities. The company also produces its own chromium plated bars 
for use in the hydraulic industry. This manufacturing activity, 
however, comprises only a small percentage of company turnover, but 
complements its main sub-contract treatment business.
The last method of growth has been through inward licensing 
agreements. Company TA has two substantial agreements of this type. 
The first of these comprises a nitriding treatment for hardening iron 
and steel components and was licensed from a French company in 1978. 
The company was at that time seeking to develop its skills in this 
area. The technology was licensed in, in preference to alternative 
technology from a German competitor. Company TA carried out extensive 
research into the potential of the technology before it took out a 
licence. This process and the negotiations leading to the agreement 
being signed took more than 18 months. Company TA considered that it 
could improve the process, and following agreement it further 
developed the technology utilising its own ’in-house’ expertise. In 
view of the substantial changes made to the technology, the French 
licensor agreed that no ’up front’ fee be paid. Royalties on turnover 
accruing to the process were paid however, at four per cent of 
turnover. Currently the process accounts for approximately three 
hundred thousand pounds of turnover per annum, or about three per cent 
of total turnover. Of this, about one third comprises work carried 
out ’in-house’ and about two thirds comprises sub-contract work. 
Company TA has substantially improved the technology since it was 
licensed, and has patented some of these improvements. Although the 
initial agreement did not haave any formal ’cross licensing’ or ’grant
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back' the company has, in practice, transferred technology back to the 
licensor, and further developments have also been transmitted ^  it by 
the licensor. The licence has been responsible for giving Company TA 
a small though useful turnover in a new market segment.
The second licensed product, the main subject of this case study, is 
likely to prove to be a very significant diversification for the 
company. The company is to launch the licensed process in the UK in 
June 1985 at a press conference which three hundred UK engineers are 
expected to attend. In late 1983 the company in its capacity as a 
(the) major metal treatment company in the UK, was approached by 
Toyota Research and Development Division (Japan). The Japanese 
company was seeking to obtain UK coverage for its Toyota diffusion 
(DF) process. The process provided an effective method for hardening 
ferrous components, particularly tools for machining other metals. 
Toyota saw Company TA, with its (then) 12 plants and nationwide 
coverage, as a potentially successful partner to exploit the 
technology. In the UK, the Japanese had twelve patents protecting 
their technology, hence it would have been difficult to develop 
parallel technology.
Following the initial approach. Company TA sought advice on the 
potential of the process from its local (Aston) University. It 
discovered that staff at Aston had been working on the process under a 
development licence from Toyota for three years. It also discovered 
that several of the major motor manufacturers and engineering 
companies in the UK had been offered and had considered the process, 
but had rejected it. Company TA therefore approached the licence
-539-
negotiations with a degree of caution. It found that the process had 
been extremely successful in Japan, where the technology had been 
extensively used to harden tools used in many industries. The process 
had also been licensed to other countries.
After twelve months' negotiation, during which Company TA carried out 
extensive market research and technical feasibility studies, the 
company signed an agreement to utilise the technology in January 1985. 
Under the agreement no equipment was provided, only blueprints, 
patents and some technical expertise. Company TA paid the licensor a 
’substantial' up front fee and agreed to pay royalties on a sliding 
scale commencing at eight per cent for low volumes and reducing to 
five per cent at higher volumes. It expended more than £60,000 
building a prototype treatment plant. The total project cost was 
about £100,000. At the time of this case study (May 1985) the company 
has a small plant operating in Birmingham. First orders for sub­
contract work utilising the technology will be accepted in June 1985 
and the company anticipates that demand for treated components will 
outstrip the capacity of its first plant. If demand follows the 
pattern of that in Japan and other markets, larger facilities will 
have to be built quickly. Company TA anticipates that the technology 
will become a central part of its UK operations.
Company TA does not have an exclusive licence for the technology in 
the UK. If demand does become very large. Company TA does not have 
the right to prevent a large customer (for example) from also 
licensing the process 'in' from Toyota. Company TA has, however.
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received verbal and written assurances that if this situation arises 
it will either be able to veto further licences or receive payment for 
lost business. In view of the perceived advantages of sub-contracting 
treatment services rather than carrying them out 'in-house* the case 
respondents did not see this situation as a major threat.
In conclusion, Company TA has used inward technology licensing to 
enhance and support its growth and development strategies. It has not 
been highly proactive in its use of licensing however. Following its 
first licensing success it did commence a small scale search for other 
licences, but this was never followed through. Subscriptions to data 
bases and licensing publications (for example) were taken out, but 
this process did not identify potentially attractive propositions. 
Company TA has, therefore, been willing to consider the use of 
licensing when good propositions were put before it. It does not, 
however, see licensing as the central part of its development 




Company UA^^^ is a small/medium sized company in the carpet 
industry, located in Kidderminster. The company carries out 
manufacture of yarn and weaves, finishes, distributes and markets 
carpets, so it is relatively highly vertically integrated. 
Currently the company produces and sells to the following markets 
(a) Retail - 45% of turnover, (b) Contract Office and Shop 
fitting - 35% of turnover and (c) Export - 20% of turnover.
The company was founded in 1869 and remains in the hands of 
family and other small shareholders. It employs three hundred 
and sixty eight people.
Company UA is the market leader in its own market segment of 
patterned broadloom tufted carpet. The Managing Directors 
suggest that it has attained and retained this position through 
purchasing the latest technology either as machinery or under 
licence agreements, and through co-operation with technological 
leaders in the field, mainly in the United States. The company 
has also made extensive use of outside design consultants to 
provide 'fashion' patterns for its carpets, and has used several 
UK universities in developing its own technology. It is company
1. Company UA was identified through a seminar run by Bath 
Management School, in Aston University, in April 1985
-542-
policy to recruit numbers of University graduates every year. 
University students are also encouraged to work within the company 
on industrial placements for six month periods.
Company UA has made use of inward technology licensing and is 
also currently evaluating a proposition to license its technology 
'out' to India. The first inward licence came about when the 
world leader in carpet technology, an American company called 
Deering Milliken, introduced a new process for rapidly building 
up carpet designs based on a computer controlled die injection 
nozzle machine. This process injected a pattern to the base of 
the tufts in tufted carpets and hence was a major advance over 
printed patterns where tdie pattern does not reach the base 
material. The technology had been developed from rocket nozzle/ 
fuel injection techniques originally designed by the National 
Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) in the Apollo Moon 
Programme. The technology made use of a 'Hydra Shift Machine' 
to produce a narrow (1 metre) carpet.
Under the terms of the licence. Company UA received a production 
machine from the licensor, plus some technical back-up in 
achieving volume production. The American licensor was willing 
to license its technology because the cost of transporting 
carpet to the UK was uneconomic. However, the technology had 
several disadvantages. First, one metre width carpet was 
relatively narrow and the company therefore wished further to 
develop the technology 'in-house' to increase this to three 
metre width. Secondly, each pattern making design was incorporated
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into a microchip based in the micro-computer controls of 
the machine. For every new pattern. Company UA had to obtain 
another microchip from its supplier, although it could specify 
what that pattern should be. This allowed the licensor to control 
his technology but the costs of obtaining new patterns, and more 
importantly, the time involved, led to production delays in 
producing samples for customers and hence was not completely 
satisfactory to Company UA. The agreement was also somewhat 
onerous in restricting use of the technology to Company UA. No 
sale of the technology to others was allowed.
As a result of these restrictions Company UA embarked on a 
strategy of developing its own technology, based on the licensed 
technology, but improving oh it. This involved, as suggested 
above, an increase in carpet widths produced, but more importantly 
comprised a computer based technological development. The Company 
designed a system whereby patterns could be built up on a screen 
and transmitted direct to the carpet making machine. This was 
effectively a computer aided design/computer aided manufacturing 
system. In this development the company also made use of 
technology bought in from another UK manufacturing company.
In this case the licence agreement was non-exclusive and company 
UA was less restricted in the use it could make of the technology. 
Once again the technique was based on 'embodied' technology in a 
micro-computer software system, but the company was able to 
develop this 'in-house' relatively easily.
Company UA further entrenched its market leader position through
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the use of its licensed and 'in-house' developed technology. In 
1984 it was approached by an Indian carpet manufacturer seeking 
a licence to set up a tufted carpet operation. Company UA was 
reluctant to consider licensing its newly developed technology 
out. However, it offered to license its more traditional production 
technology to India on the basis of a 'turnkey' operation rather 
than a licence of technology per se. It considered the 'turnkey' 
approach to be more appropriate because (a) it would receive a 
'package' price for the technology rather than royalty income 
on production which it believed would be difficult to monitor,
(b) it would be better able to control the transfer of technology 
and ensure the success of the venture and (c) it would be able 
to use the out-licence process for its existing (obsolescent) 
production equipment, allowing it to re-equip its UK factories with 
the new process machinery it had developed. At the time of the 
case study the company had been negotiating with its potential 
partner over a period of six months and negotiations were 
relatively far advanced. The Managing Director believed that 
an agreement would be signed 'within the next three months'. 
Negotiations had intensified following the simplifying of the 
Indian Government 'licensing' system for the import and 
exploitation of foreign technology.
In conclusion Company UA recognised the value that inward and 
outward licensing could play in its product and market development 
policies. In view of the complexity of the technology involved 
and because of the company's status as a producer of carpets rather 
than production machinery, the technology transferred in both
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inward and outward cases was basically 'embodied' within machinery. 
However, Company UA had developed extensive 'in-house' skills in 
taking such technology and further developing it for its own 
carpet production processes. The Managing Director believed 
that in this the company had advantages over the machine 
manufacturers in building up expertise in production technology 
in conjunction with mechanical engineering skills. It had been 
his policy therefore to seek out and recruit individuals with such 
skills from the machinery manufacturers to complement his existing 
labour force skills. This mix of bought in skills, licensed 
technology and development of in-house expertise appeared to have 
been highly successful. In 1983, the company had made a profit 
of 7% on turnover of £13 million at a time when a majority of the 
other UK carpet producers were either merely breaking even or 
were incurring large losses.
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COMPANY VA
Respondents: Managing Director and Manufacturing Director
Company VA^^^ is one part of a small, old established West Midlands 
group of companies. The company was founded in the early nineteenth 
century to produce forged and other forms of ironwork. By the 1970s 
the group had passed through a number of hands and them comprised 
three main subsidiaries. These were as follows:
Subsidiary A - Presswork (for the motor industry)
Subsidiary B - Precision Engineering (mainly for the aircraft 
industry)
Subsidiary C - Metal Cabinet Making and other high quality 
presswork (Company VA subject of this case)
In the early 1980s the group decided to set up a fourth subsidiary.
This was built around a joint venture with an American company to 
develop and utilise composite materials as an alternative to pressed 
metal components. The new division commenced development of ’high 
technology' carbon fibre and other materials.
By the beginning of 1983, the composite company had still not made a
profit and, indeed, was acting as as a cash sink for profits from the
other subsidiaries. Company VA, the most profitable subsidiary, found 
that it was being used as a 'cash cow' to provide development funding
1. Company VA was identified through consultancy work carried out for
the West Midlands Council in 1985.
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for the composite company. Company VA management became unhappy at this 
situation and suggested to the group that it become subject of a 
management buyout which would both release funding for further 
development of composites and also give Company VA management a chance 
to develop their business into new areas, free from group control. 
This was agreed in principle as part of the reconstruction of the group 
and in conjunction with group bankers. The West Midlands Enterprise 
Board is to take a major stake in the company. It is anticipated that 
company VA will become independent in mid 1985, although it has had de 
facto independence in all areas except finance, for more than ten years. 
At the time of the case study, company VA had a turnover of 
approximately four million pounds per annum, and employed one hundred 
and twenty people. The company had an order book of six months'
production equivalent and was producing a good profit from its 
traditional product lines. These comprised high quality metal pressings 
for cabinets and casings, mainly for the telecommunications industry. 
The company's major customers are British Telecom and other large 
electronics companies.
However, although the company was profitable, management recognised 
threats from two separate directions. First, deregulation of the 
Telecommunications Industry and denationalisation of British Telecom had 
opened a previously protected market to foreign competition and hence 
the market was changing. Although company VA believed that it would be 
able to prosper because of its technically excellent products, 
management recognised the need to diversify away from reliance upon its 
previous major customer(s). and away from its somewhat concentrated 
product lines. A second, possibly longer term, threat recognised by
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executives comprised the emergence of new materials as alternatives to 
metal pressings. These included moulded glass reinforced plastic, and 
new ’high technology' materials such as carbon fibre which were, as 
noted above, also being developed by another group company.
Company VA developed a strategy to counter these threats in three ways. 
First it undertook a major modernisation and re-equipping of its 
traditional manufacturing activities. Computer aided design and 
manufacturing equipment was purchased and quality control procedures 
improved. Second, the company set up a small unit to develop downstream 
into producing more than 'boxes' for products, but also to provide the 
electronics to go in those boxes. The company recruited two experienced 
electronic engineers for this purpose, one from British Telecom, and one 
from Westinghouse. These individuals obtained work in subcontract 
assembly, including wiring harnesses, and in component insertion for 
printed circuit boards. The company also retained PA Technology Centre 
to design a product in response to a call for tenders from British 
Telecom. Although a product design was completed successfully, the 
company failed to obtain the tender because the price it quoted was too 
high. Lastly, the company set out to seek products that could be made 
under license and which would complement, but be different from, current 
product lines. This process has been developed through the use of 
industry contacts, the use of the Centre for Innovation in Industry and 
the services of a consultant. However, although the company currently 
receives an average of ten 'product offers' per week, very few of these 
have proved suitable in practice, for exploitation by the company. A 
major problem lies in 'Anglicising' foreign products for the UK market.
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This has been particularly important in the case of American products 
with their different standards. The company is seeking tele­
communications products that it will be able to sell to its existing 
'box’ customers. However, the company has had some success in this 
area. Over the past year it has completed two licence agreements and is 
negotiating a third.
The first licence agreement took the form of a franchise/licence 
agreement with Phillips in Holland. The latter company had developed a 
new housing for a range of electronic telephoneexchange equipment and was 
seeking to market the product in the UK. Company VA approached 
Phillips, initially on the basis of a franchise agreement, to market the 
equipment. However, in view of the transport costs involved in moving 
what was effectively an empty box from Holland to England, the company 
quickly sought to produce the product under license. Although 
negotiations were protracted, and involved several visits by executives 
to Holland over a six month period, agreement was finally reached. The 
company is currently setting up manufacturing facilities to produce the 
product.
The second agreement involved a 'carrying case' for large electronic 
test equipment. This was a market the company knew well, but was a 
diversification for it, since the material involved in the 'box' was 
reinforced plastic, not steel sheet. Once again, the franchise/licence 
route was adopted. Company VA is currently marketing the cabinets and 
is tooling up to produce them 'in house'. Plastic moulding is to be 
subcontracted out, while internal metal housings will be manufactured 
and all assembly carried out 'in house’.
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The third product, for which negotiations had, at the time of the case, 
been carried out for about six months, is a new racking system, designed 
by the General Electric Company. Company VA has negotiated the UK and 
European rights to manufacture and market the product. It is 
anticipated that an agreement will shortly be signed. The product 
complements company VA’s current skills, while developing them into new 
areas. The ’racking’ system encompasses a degree of electrical work, 
particularly in the provision of wiring harnesses, produced integrally 
with the racking. An integral cooling system is also incorporated to 
remove heat produced by the operation of components in the ’rack’.
Although the three licensed products are all new to the company, 
management believes that they will provide a ’significant’ turnover 
(i.e. more than ten per cent) within a two year period. The company is 
committed to identifying other, similar products for it to divorsifyinto, 
through the use of licensing.
In conclusion, company VA has developed a long term strategy to 
diversify away from its ’core’ but relatively low level technological
skills and to build its business through incremental movement into new
areas. Management believes that it has a major strength in its market 
contacts with end users of sophisticated electronic test and similar 
equipment. The company wishes to carry out joint exploitation of this 
market with other companies, with complementary skills. In this 
development, it has used and intends to use technology licensing as a 
strategic tool to assist it in the acquisition of such skills. Other 
methods of technology transfer are also under consideration. The
company is considering further use of new product design consultants
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(such as PA Technology) and is also considering approaching local 
universities for technical assistance in product development. Its new 
product strategy has, therefore, been based on following a variety of 
new product options built around the use of technology licensing and 
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Close links with public utilities 
- its main markets
IN
2
Cable detector, portable dosemeter
Product 1 - Star 
Product 2 - Problem
To grow within its current management 
capabilities. To develop key skills 
in particular technologies.
High technology, small batch products 
for large customers. Highly 
profitable products.
- Code B (3)
To obtain part developed technology 
from public utilities and build 
upon this base.
- Code P (3)
Proactive
Considered as the major source of 
new technology.
- Code A (3)
Inward licensing through close 
contacts with major customers
1. * Denotes case company initially visited jointly by the
author and Julian Lowe
2. Classification of Company - See Chapter Four
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Mechanical engineering - valves
Main market hard hit by recession 





To be a market leader in its own 
small market segment, but not to 
grow so large as to become 
uncontrollable.
Control valves. Two product lines 
Highly profitable but investment 
required in others.
- Code M
To achieve technological leadership 
through a continuous process of 
developing small numbers of new 
products at rate of 1 - 2 per year.
- Code D
Proactive
Always considered, following initial 
ad hoc use of licensing via the use 
of consultants. Licensing not a 
major part of strategy.
- Code A
Purchase of technology to fill gap 
in product line, then further 
development. This was a highly 
successful, proactive use of 
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Entrepreneurial company set up to 








Furniture - wood particle, moulded board




Wood particle moulding process
All products 
'Stars'
To grow as fast as possible, following 
previous development patterns
Small range of profitable products. 
Development work on new lines 
continuing.
- Code M
To retain and extend present 
technological leadership through the 
introduction of new products based 
on existing licensed technology 
and improvements to this.
- Code P
Proactive
Licensing as central core of company 
strategy, with extensive cross 
licensing agreements.
- Code G
Cooperative agreement with licensor 
and other licensees to exchange 
technological advances has been 
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Plastics - maintenance free building 
products





All products 'Cash Cows'
To grow larger in diversified ways 
within the GRP and maintenance 
free buildings products industry
Large range of mature though profitable 
products. Good mature; developed ratio
- Code M
To utilise existing skills. Not to 
become involved in high technology 
but to grow through exploitation of 
marketing flair and to introduce a 
large diverse range of new products.
- Code H
Reactive
Always considered and utilised as a 
matter of course where available. 
Opportunities sought as a continuous 
process.
- Code A
Technology transfer relatively simple 
within the industry because of 
technology type. Licensing of designs 
rather than processes in most cases.
Licensing has been a useful addition 
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Slow growth but increasingly 





To grow fast and increase profitability 
through any avenue that might be 
successful
One major profitable product line. 
Several minor products being developed.
- Code M
To market high technology, high value, 
high growth potential products and to 
introduce new diversified products on 
a regular basis through product life 
cycle and other analysis.
- Code P
Reactive
Not usually considered except where 
licences offered to the company.
- Code I
Ad hoc generally reactive, but seen 
in context of other techniques. Has 
been very successful in introducing 
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High volume mechanical ventilator
Cash Cow
To survive through reduction in size 
and costs, and overcoming recession 
related problems.
Major product line mature, scarcely 
profitable. Poor new product 
development.
- Code M
To purchase technology rather than 
develop it 'in house' because of high 
costs of R & D. To introduce new 
products to maintain market position 
rather than in a competitive manner.
- Code H
Proactive
Following initial ad hoc use, always 
considered but in a very reactive 
manner.
- Code A
Costly process which took longer than 
anticipated led to problems for firm. 
Not enough leadership from top 
management. Licensing was therefore 
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18 Initial Use Of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part of 
Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Small subsidiary. Recent loss of 








Instrument engineering. Domestic 
and industrial controls






To survive, having heavily rationalised 
in recent past.
Range of mature products not 
generating sufficient income for 
investment.
- Code M
Low rate of technical change in company 
led to requirement to update existing 
product line. Strategy to obtain 




Considered as a method of augmenting 
internal skills but in reaction rather 
than as planned strategy.
- Code A
Several products evaluated on 
ongoing basis. Transfer of technology 
difficult to fit in with present 
structure. Licensing unsuccessful 
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Mechanical engineering - hydraulic 
presses




Small powder metal and concrete 
hydraulic presses
Problem
Survival following continual process 
of reduction over ten years
One off large ’designer' presses.
New ranges of smaller presses being 
developed.
- Code M
To retain its heavy engineering 
skills in time of recession while 




Considered reactively as means of 
overcoming gap in product portfolio.
- Code I
Active search in the UK for products 
being outlicensed from rationalising 




















15 Policy Objectives 
of the Company
16 Company Product 
Profile
17 Technology and New 
Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Small subsidiary company but with 








Electronics - defence related
Insecure due to vagaries of ministry 
purchasing policy
IN (none yet finalised)
0
Research and Development
To diversify away from present 
product lines and customers to make 
company more robust.
Highly profitable product range but 
too dependent upon one major customer.
- Code B
To become market leaders in particular 
technological niches through the 
introduction of new products. To 
develop and obtain new technologies 
to attack new markets.
- Code H
Proactive
Always considered as method of 
augmenting 'in house' skills.
- Code A
Through in house search utilising 
untrained personnel. This process 
unsuccessful to date due to internal 



















15 Policy Objectives 
of the Company
16 Company Product 
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Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
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19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing








Electronics - control and measuring 
equipment
Growing, as increased numbers of 




Vehicle Logger, Flowmeter 
Vehicle Classifier
All 'stars'
To grow as fast as possible while 
diversifying into new market areas 
and new products to service existing 
markets.
Very well balanced portfolio of 
highly profitable and high potential 
products
- Code B
To retain market leadership in present 
market areas and to obtain new 
technologies allowing the development 
of new products as quickly as 'in house' 




Licensing as the major core of the 
company's strategy for new products 
in new areas, and to augment 'in 
house' skills.
- Code A
Close links with technology suppliers 
leading to opportunities arising 
frequently. Generally successful use 
of licensing as providing a pool of 
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18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part of 
Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Previously old established family 








Mechanical Engineering - 'HEVAC'
Previously fast growth, currently 
static due to recession
OUT
20
Range of 'HEVAC' designs
Cash cows and stars
To move, in the long term, out of 
manufacturing and to act as a 
contract R & D company
Extensive range of market leader 
designs. Balance of manufacturing 
and R & D changing.
- Code M
To generate income through the exploitation 
of company technology by sale of goods in 
home markets and sale of technology 
abroad. Continuing high R & D expenditures, 
to produce new products/technologies.
- Code P
Reactive
Outward licensing used to exploit 
technology in foreign markets. The 
major method of obtaining a return 
in these markets.
- Code A
Choice of medium sized, fast growth 
companies, not necessarily market 
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Mechanical engineering - automotive/ 
castings




Casting and sealing process
Cash Cows
To obtain worldwide coverage for 
product by entry into new markets
One product, market leader in its 
field. Profitable.
- Code N
To exploit their technology through 
the sale of know-how and the development 
of processes to use that technology. 
Technology development of new products 
funded by the old.
- Code P
Proactive
Outward licensing used as sole method 
of marketing abroad. Licensing in 
UK by geographical area.
- Code A
Sale of technology to companies. 
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19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
29 Process of Licensing









Mechanical engineering - electrostatic 
coating equipment
Fast growing as applications for spray 




Electrostatic powder coating machinery
Stars
To maintain growth speed by retaining 
market leadership in current market 
segment
Full market coverage of electrostatic 
coating equipment. Profitable 
product lines.
- Code N
Incremental development of technology 
such that competitors would always be 
behind. Fast pace of technical change 
allows development of new products and 
into new markets on ongoing basis.
- Code H
Reactive
Used where other methods of market 
realisation not possible due to 
tariff or other barriers or lack of 
resources.
- Code A
Licences granted on a strictly 
geographical basis to fast growth small 
firms. Income from licensing ploughed 
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Boat building. Design and build 
facility
Traditional market, currently very 
competitive. Low profit margins
OUT
None at time of case 
Boats (none to date)
Cash cow
To grow through the development 
of new products and new markets
All product lines in depressed 
market. Barely profitable
- Code M
The utilisation of new designs and 
techniques to develop out of previous 
one-off boat designs and into a batch 
process product which could also be 
exported or sold under licence agreements
- Code P
Reactive
Intended to be important market 
strategy but generally failed due 
to lack of resources to exploit 
product, and economic conditions.
- Code N
Choice of local licensees restricted 
by skill availability in third world 
markets, leading to lack of 
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Market characterised by large 
numbers of small competitors - Growing
OUT
1
Registered designs and patents for 
oxygen mask
Research and Development
To become the largest UK design 
consultancy and to diversify into 
new product development
Product comprised series of designs 
for innovative defence product.
- Code B
Technological developments usually 
carried out for particular clients. 
Hence technology and new products 
are clients' property. However, in 
some cases overseas rights obtained 
by Company S .
- Code D
Proactive
Licensing used on 'one-off basis to 
exploit a particular product. Does 
not form part of general company 
strategy.
- Code I
Attempt to license to market leader 
failed, hence further negotiations 
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Electronics - Rare earth magnets
Market characterised by high 




Rare earth magnets 
Stars and Cash Cows
To exploit monopoly position in the 
UK market and to attack foreign 
competitors on their home territory.
Highly profitable specialist products. 
Good balance current products:new 
development.
- Code B
To develop 'in house' expertise to the 
greatest possible extent in developing 
new products by seeking out and 
exploiting new technologies within 
and from outside the firm.
- Code H
Proactive
Outward licensing to those markets 
where normal exporting is not possible 
because of tariff or other barriers.
- Code A
Cross licensing, particularly of 
outmoded products has been very 
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Plastics - containers for food, etc
Highly competitive market characterised 
by small market niches - large and 
small producers in market
OUT
1
Plastic pack production process 
Stars
To develop existing skills and 
increase strengths within main market
Full range of plastic containers. 
Strength lies in process skills within 
the company.
- Code M
To develop new technological 




To optimise return on technology 
developed 'in house' by entering new 
and foreign markets.
- Code I
Approach to potential partners in the 
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19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing









Textiles - specialist labels
Competition from other technologies 
in market. Small but profitable market
OUT
1
Weaving process (none to date)
Cash cow
To survive in an increasingly 
competitive environment through 
modernisation not expansion
One product company based upon 
monopoly of particular weaving 
process.
- Code M
To develop new production technology
- Code D
Reactive
Very ad hoc use of licensing.
Reactive and passive rather than 
proactive.
-Code I
Response to approaches from potential 
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Small job shop 'metal bashing' company 
Private - not owner managed 
140 
28




Metal goods - steel cabinets 
Traditional skill based market 
OUT 
1
Metal cabinet design 
Cash cow
To survive the recession and to become 
more competitive, ready to expand 
when recession ends
Low technology, skill intensive 
products, commissioned not mass 
produced - Code M
Low technology industry, relies very 
much on skills of operatives.
Strategy of company is to develop 




Licensing of a particular design to 
a European company. Licensing not 
a major part of company strategy but 
an ad hoc process.
- Code N
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18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing









Plastics. Plastic product for 
construction industry
GRP market characterised by large 




Glass fibre moulding/spinning process
Star
To remain at a small size but to 
expand turnover, to give directors 
capital gains
Product highly skill intensive.
Market leader, highly profitable 
'star' product.
- Code N
To develop and exploit new technology 
through sale of patents and know-how. 
To utilise cash flows resulting from 




Licensing utilised to generate 
cash flows
- Code A
Licensing to one company in a 
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Mechanical engineering - springs
Market characterised by high competition 
in cheap substitutes. Low competition 
in high quality products.
IN & OUT
4
Inward licensing of metal circlip 
technology.
Outward licensing of process technology 
Product 1 - Star
Product 2 - Research & Development
Controlled growth through incremental 
development of current products strengths
High volume 'medium technology' springs 
Low volume 'high technology' springs
- Code B
To build on 'in house' strengths to 
develop new products utilising 




Always considered as part of new 
product development and exploitation 
process.
- Code I
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Chemicals/plastics. - PVC supplier - 
sheeting etc.
Market subject to large price and 




PVC conversion process licensed 'in'
PVC base technology licensed ^out'
Product 1 - Research and Development
Product 2 - Research and Development
To survive in market where falling 
sales have increased levels of 
competition
Mature product in main market provides 
resources to fund new developments
- Code M
To utilise technology developed by 
others and 'in house' to compete in 
mass markets. To develop its own 
technology and products for exploitation.
- Code H
Proactive
To license technology 'out' to those 
markets where tariffs preclude direct 
sale. To license technology 'in' where 
this gives competitive advantage.
- Code A
Licensees are smaller firms in foreign 
markets. Many of those deals have led 
to joint ventures or inward investment 
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Electronics - answering machines
Market characterised by increasing 
competition from foreign manufacturers
IN & OUT
4
Inward and outward licensing of 
answering machines
Cash cows
To survive in increasingly competitive 
environment. To develop new products 
to augment declining product range
Dependent upon one mature product 
threatened by technological advances
- Code M
To utilise technology developed 'in 
house' and from other sources to 
quickly develop new products. To 
reduce overheads by becoming less 




Purchase of technology to augment 
product range. Sale of technology 
to other quasi independent companies, 
- Code A
Generally successful but utilised 
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20 Process of Licensing
Small, low technology toy company 
Subsidiary of small group 
153 
55





Market characterised by short product 
life cycles and 'fashion' products
IN & OUT
Large number
Inward and outward licensing of 
toy designs
Cash cows
To survive against increasingly 
strong competition from Asian 
suppliers
Range of low technology, high profit 
market oriented products. Very 
short life cycles.
- Code B
To develop innovative new products 
quickly enough to take advantage of 
seasonal changes in the market.
To devote resources to R & D to 
develop these new products.
- Code H
Proactive
Inward and Outward licensing of 
low technology products as integral 
part of company strategy.
- Code A
Licensing normal in industry through 
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16 Company Product 
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19 Licensing as part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Small, diversified company - service 
based
Private, not owner managed 
118 
23




Mechanical engineering - provision of 
tools/equipment to construction industry
Market characterised by small market 
niches and low competition
IN & OUT 
5
Inward - gas dectector 
Outward - security products
Inward - Research and Development 
Outward - Cash Cows
To continue to expand its activities 
for utilities
Range of low technology, low 
profitability products.
- Code M
Not to become involved in high technology 
but to develop a range of medium tech 
products based on utility specification.
- Code H
Reactive
Purchase of rights from the MoD as 
part of an ongoing relationship with 
that body.
- Code I
Technology licensed both in and out, 
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of the Company
16 Company Product 
Profile








Metals - tube manufacturers
Market characterised by high skill 




Inward and outward licensing of 
Coated Tube Technology
Research and Development
To consolidate its position in its 
own market sector by a degree of 
concentric diversification
High technology tube coating process 
market leader but requires investment
Code N
17 Technology and New 
Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
To spend a high proportion of its 
turnover (in industry terms) on R & D 
to develop and improve its products. 
To obtain through 'in house' or 
external sources, technology allowing 




Licensing used as an integral part of 
company strategy obtaining developing 
and selling technology.
- Code A
Purchase and Sale of technology from 
companies in markets distant enough 














12 Number of Licences
13 Licensed Products
14 'Boston * 
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15 Policy objectives 
of the Company
16 Company Product 
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18 Initial Use of 
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19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Old established small engineering and
chemical company
Private, not owner managed
147
56




Chemicals - provision of special processes 
Small market sectors. Diverse type 
IN & OUT 
Large number
Inward - rust proofing process 
Outward - Speciality chemicals
Cash Cows
To survive recession related reduction 
in business. To diversify into new 
areas.
Speciality chemicals and processes 
for their use. Highly profitable 
products supporting R & D
- Code B
To incrementally improve present 
range of products and processes by 
purchase of technology. To utilise 




Highly proactive and strategic use of 
licensing both 'in' and 'out'
- Code A
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Fastenersin steel and aluminium




Inward and outward licensing of 
fastenertechnology
Stars
To generate high profits to subsidise 
other loss making companies in the 
group
Mature products providing high return.
Low investment in new product 
development.
- Code M
To obtain new technology and new 
markets as quickly as possible 
through purchase of expertise, rather 
than 'in house' R & D.
- Code H
Reactive
Both inward and outward licensing 
utilised, to develop new products and 
markets, where direct export not possible
- Code A
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18 Initial Use of 
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19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy
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Research/Development mechanical and 
electrical engineering
Research market not very competitive. 
Product niche highly competitive
IN & OUT
3
Licensing 'in' and 'out' of robot 
technology
Inward - Research and Development 
Outward - Star
To grow through development of own 
'in house' products and expansion 
of R & D activities.
Mainly contract research, moving 
into manufacture of high tech 'star' 
products.
- Code N
To obtain or develop new technology 
of a highly innovative type which 
could be manufactured or licensed 'out'
- Code H
Proactive
Licensing both in and out to maximise 
scarce resources within the firm.
- Code I
Licensing 'in' from Universities, 
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20 Process of Licensing








Chemicals - speciality inks
Major market is other companies in 




Licensing 'in' and 'out' of speciality 
chemicals
Stars
To provide a service for the parent 
company, but to reduce dependence on 
this as a major market
Range of mature and developing 
products. Balanced portfolio of 
products.
- Code B
To spend large amounts on R & D and to 
obtain technology where available to 
develop stream of new products. To 
become more R & D intensive and act 
as a research company.
- Code H
Proactive
Highly proactive use of both inward and 
outward licensing. Cross licensing 
with overseas competitors.
- Code A
Search for new technologies and 
partners on an ongoing basis, 
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Product Strategy
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Licensing
19 Licensing as Part 
of Company Strategy









Electronics - telecommunications switches




Inward licensing of telecommunications 
products to service major customer
Cash cows
To survive and regain former 
stability
Mix of traditional, obsolescent 
electro-mechanical products and newly 
acquired electronic products.
- Code M
To replace outdated product portfolio 
with new product range.
- Code H
Reactive
Central part of survival strategy 
to obtain new products 
- Code I
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Fast expanding markets 
IN 
1
Inward licensing of educational hardware 
and software product
Cash cows
To grow, through product acquisition.
Service based, currently exclusively 
concerned with mainframe computer 
maintenance.
- Code N
To develop existing skills but to 
build on these skills to diversify 
and enter new markets.
- Code P
Reactive
Central part of change from service 
to manufacture via agency/franchise/ 
licence agreements.
- Code A
Proactive use of licensing through 
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Outward licensing of seat tilting 
mechanism
Star
To improve 'quality' image, to 
diversify into new markets.
Range of components and 
sub-assemblies for cars
- Code B
To develop new products 'in house' 
To acquire new products through 
collaboration with customers.
To exploit its technology abroad
- Code H
Reactive
Central part of strategy for 
exploitation of one major product 
line.
- Code I




















15 Policy Objectives 
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Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part of 
Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Very diversified traditional West 
Midlands 'metal basher'
Private - not owner managed
180
200









Inward licensing of caravan accessory 
designs
Star
To increase turnover through acquisition 




- commercial vehicle fittings
- metal pallets
- caravan luxury hampers
- Code B




Proactive/reactive strategy to encourage 
others to approach the company with 
technology to offer 
Code A
Licensing of 'low level' technology 
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Mechanical engineering - printing 
machinery




Outward licensing of process technology 
for printing industry
Cash cows
To maintain and build upon current 
technology leadership. To remain 
small scale
Mainly licensing out of one process 
and associated machinery
- Code N




Highly proactive, the central core 
of company product strategy 
- Code A
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Markets characterised by high levels 
of competition until recession reduced 
such pressures through closures
IN
2
Inward licensing of patented racking 
and security products
Stars
To survive, to obtain further products 
to increase turnover to cover overheads
Range of mainly traditional products.
Few 'new' technology substitutes.
- Code M
To obtain new products through purchase 
and 'in house' development to 
utilise existing capacity better.
- Code H
Reactive
Reactive but opportunistic. Licensing 
seen as one small strand of new 
product strategy
- Code A
Inward licensing from overseas companies 
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Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
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Diversified - metal tools, caravan 
accessories
Stable, low growth market. Company 
is monopolist in major market sectors
IN & OUT
3
Inward licensing of caravan heaters 
Outward licensing of steel clamps
Inward - Star
Outward - Cash cow
To grow slowly, but under control 
and to diversify into new markets
Range of traditional cast steel clamps. 
Caravan accessories (heaters) for UK 
caravan market.
- Code B
To identify new products for current 
markets. To utilise current products 
for attack on new markets.
- Code D
Proactive
Previously proactive but currently in 
abeyance. Reactive in sense of considering 
new product ideas.
- Code A
20 Process of Licensing Licensing 'in' on ad hoc basis without
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Metal process plant and treatment
Traditional markets currently subject 
to fast technological change
IN
2
Inward licensing of chemical hardening 
process
Star
To grow to provide countrywide 
service network and to become market 
leader.
Large range of metal treatments, more 
than competitors.
- Code B
To develop new treatments more 




Proactive consideration of licensing 
in seeking new products.
Code A
Carried out in a highly professional 
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the Company
16 Company Product 
Profile
17 Technology and New 
Product Strategy
18 Initial Use of 
Licensing
19 Licensing as Part of 
Company Strategy
20 Process of Licensing
Medium sized independent carpet company 
Private - not owner managed
368
116





Highly competitive generally, less 
so in particular niches
IN
3
Inward licensing of carpet process 
and production technology
Stars
To maintain market leadership and to 
grow into other market segments
Company dependent on one major process 
for carpet production. Product sold 
into three major markets 
-Code B
Industry tends to be very skill 
intensive. Company has tried to 
reduce its dependence on such skills 
and to modernise production processes.
- Code H
Proactive
Proactive in embodied technology 
which has then been further developed.
- Code A
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19 Licensing as Part of 
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20 Process of Licensing
Old established 'metal bashing' company 













Inward licensing of racking for 
electronic products and process 
technology for new materials
Stars
To build on existing profitability 
and diversify into new markets
Metal cabinets, plastic cabinets, 
small amount of electronic assembly
- Code M
To obtain new process technology for 
the use of new materials. To obtain 
new products through acquisition 
Code P
Proactive
Proactive and successful search and 
integration of licensed products into 
portfolio.
- Code A
Licensing from similar European 




SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN TECHNOLOGY IMPORT
THROUGH LICENSING IN SMALLER FIRMS
by B Svensson (University of Linkoping)
The Success Cases;
Case No 1 Experienced businessman/technician generally
interested in business options accepts when 
offered the licence rights of an established 
product. Establishes a new firm to exploit the 
acquired licence.
Case No 2 Internationally experienced managing director and
owner of a recently established firm searches 
actively on the continent to find a soluti>n to 
a customer need. In-house development is 
consciously avoided. Licensing is seen as an 
ideal complement to sub-contracting.
Case No 3 Partner of a firm engaged in sub-contracting travels
in the US to find suitable product within the 
present field of competence. Obtains an agency 
which within three years is transformed into a 
licence.
Case No 4 New methods recently introduced on the market
threaten one of the key products of the firm. High 
preparedness to new signals from the market. Unique 
method presented in an international magazine and 
at a fair,triggers off activity.
Case No 5 Owner of a small firm looks for alternatives to
expand present business to be able to offer his 
children employment. Reacts to an advertisement 
through which a Danish firm seeks partner on the 
Swedish market.
Case No 6 New business concept introduced in sub-contracting
firm by new managing director. Acquires licence 
through a previously established business relation 
in the US. The licensed product becomes core 
product in a turn-key systems.
Case No 7 Managing director of a small mechanical workshop
with in-house developed products in the decline 
stages of their product life-cycles, starts 
looking for new products in the US to avoid too 
much dependence on sub-contracting. Responds to 
an advertisement in a trade magazine through 
which a US firm seeks licensee on the European 
market.
— 594—
Cases Agencies converted into licence agreements due
Nos 8 - 9  to high transportation costs.
The Failures
Case No 10 Managing director of a small firm contacts a
MNC to get access to a new technology presented 
in a trade magazine. Intended field of use not 
accepted by the MNC. The MD accepts other fields 
of use unfamiliar to his firm.
Case No 11 Firm experienced in international licensing responds
to an advertisement in a US trade magazine, where 
a new technology, applicable to the firm's current 
products, is offered.
Case No 12 Licensor offers managing director new, unproven
technology to satisfy a well-known need on the 
current market.
Case No 13 Regional body connects community officials looking
for a replacement industry with a Swedish firm 
seeking a firm interested in obtaining the 
manufacturing rights for a German product for 
which the Swedish firm holds the marketing rights. 
An entirely new production unit is built.
Cases under development, "on the market"
Case No 14 Consultant firm finds interesting technology by
putting an advertisement in Wall Street Journal. 
"Marries" the US licensor with Swedish firm in 
need of new products.
Case No 15 Swedish firm oriented at expanding its present
market turns to consultant firm to find new 
products.
Case No 15 Swedish bank acts as intermediary to connect a
smaller firm of its clientele, heavily 
dependent on one big customer, with British firm 
looking for a partner on the Scandinavian market.
Cases under development, "not on the market"
Case No 17 Regional body connects managing director of a
small firm with a Swedish consultant representing 
a US small firm that offers a unique, unproved 
technology.
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Case No 18 Former MD of a US subsidiary in Sweden establishes
in cooperation with a sub-contracting firm, a new 
manufacturing firm to exploit an unproved 
technology obtained from an old business friend.
Case No 19 Licence object is identified through screening of
existing technical solutions within the firm's 
field of operation.
Case No 20 A researcher draws his friend's, a managing
director of a smaller firm, attention to a new 
technology within the firm's field of operation, 
presented at a symposium in Japan. The Japanese 
firm is contacted by letter.
Case No 21 Facing a market threat a small agency firm searches for
technology to become competitive as a manufacturer. 
Former employee of the commissioning firm assists 
in the identification and evaluation of the 
technology.
Case No 22 New product area identified after reformulation
of the business concept. German firm in possession 







The major objective of this work has been an exploration of the
role that technology licensing (TL) plays in the product and market
diversification strategies of smaller firms. For simplicity, a 
modular approach to the study was adopted in the consideration of 
small firm policy making, diversification and the use of technology, 
leading to the empirical studies in Chapter 6 into TL per se. The 
conclusions are therefore presented as follows. First, the use of 
TL in diversification within a business policy context is reviewed 
in light of the results presented in the early chapters. Second, 
review is made of the success of adopting a case approach to the 
collection of data on TL. Third, the results and conclusions of 
the empirical work in Chapter 6 are reviewed in light of the 
hypotheses generated and tested there. Lastly, as a result of the 
conclusions reached, certain proposals for smaller firms considering 
the use of TL are put forward and suggestions for further work in 
the field are made. It is hoped that the thesis conclusions may
provide a base for further work in this area.
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B. REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN A BUSINESS POLICY CONTEXT
The integration of the different issues involved in the development 
of policy within smaller firms and the use of TL within strategies 
to fulfil those policies was explored in the early chapters of 
the thesis. The major objective of the work was in consideration 
of how TL was integrated by such firms into strategies to develop 
and diversify into new products and new markets. Initial aims 
were therefore to explore the formulation of policy in smaller 
firms, the diversification strategies of such firms, and the 
technological pressures and environments within which such strategies 
were carried out. This led to the modular approach of the work 
adopted in Chapters 2,3 and 4, where these issues were considered 
separately, providing a base for the empirical studies into TL 
described in Chapter 6. Specific research objectives were therefore 
identified as, identifying policy formulation processes in small 
firms; measuring the extent of diversification in such firms; 
investigating the ability of such firms to act flexibly in accepting 
new techniques such as TL and lastly, measuring the extent and 
success of the use of TL in small firms in practice, the major 
empirical part of the study.
It was a major conclusion within Chapter 2 that the formulation of 
policy within smaller firms usually took place as part of an 
implicit rather than an explicit process. This was clearly 
important in attempting to understand how the use of TL might be 
incorporated into such policies. Clearly, the use of TL can most 
appropriately be viewed as a business or operational strategy.
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rather than as part of the corporate level policy making process 
and offers only one alternative approach to the several different 
strategies that could be adopted by smaller firms in developing 
their technology portfolios and their markets. However, the 
studies in Chapter 2 also suggested that market entry by such firms 
may frequently arise outside any formal strategic context and owe 
more to expediency than to planning per se.
It was deemed important therefore, to attempt to classify smaller 
firms in terms of their approach to the practical formulation of 
policy objectives. Various classifications were proposed, including 
'thrusters' and 'sleepers', those developing small niche or more 
broad based markets and those exploiting comparative or absolute 
advantage in their business strategies. However, if policy making 
is generally an implicit process in smallerfirms, identifying the 
mechanisms and level at which TL was incorporated into those 
policies could be problematical, in view of the large number of 
industries and technologies in which TL appeared to play a part.
It was clear therefore, that in the context of this study, data 
collection was likely to be difficult. It was for this reason that 
a case approach to the main empirical work was adopted. The 
implications results and conclusions of adopting this approach 
are explored below.
If smaller firms can act flexibly as suggested in Chapter 2, it 
might be anticipated that diversification into new areas as a 
result of competition, growth or other pressures, might be 
facilitated by the use of TL, as a resource conservation process.
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However, in the context of this study, defining 'diversification' 
led to problems of definition. Clearly, any development from 
current product lines or markets is a form of diversification,as 
the exploration of the work of Ansoff and other authors in Chapter 3 
showed. A relatively restricted definition was adopted here, 
therefore, based on Ansoffian concepts as - development into 
entirely new products, or new geographical markets using existing 
products (for inward and outward TL respectively).
The results of the empirical studies in Chapter 3 led to the 
conclusion that many smaller firms did diversify into new areas, 
particularly in 100-200 employee size range with less diversification 
at both the smaller and larger size ranges. This is suggested to be 
an important conclusion in the context of this study, since it 
suggested that such firms were experimenting with new forms of 
business development, of which TL is clearly an important alternative. 
It might be anticipated however, that the use of TL in diversification 
of the sort described might be subject to barriers including 
cultural factors,a paucity of 'in-house' R & D facilities to amend 
licensed products for local markets and the 'Not Invented Here' 
syndrome. Conversely, TL might be promoted as a less risky method 
of market entry than other forms of development or because it 
allowed technical,financial or managerial thresholds to be overcome. 
However, previous workers in the field, and early case study 
evidence suggested that many smaller firms were using TL effectively 
and successfully in transferring technology both into and out of 
their companies across many industries. Collection of data on 
the use of TL by such firms, using the case study approach was
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therefore used, with the objective of defining the use of TL 
within small firm strategy, when and how it was used, and its 
success in practice as a business strategy.
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C. CONCLUSIONS OF ADOPTING A CASE APPROACH
A major conclusion of Chapter 5 where the use of TL in all firms 
was reviewed, and previous case and other empirical work in this 
field, suggests that TL in general, and in smaller firms in 
particular, usually arises as a highly technological,situation and 
people specific p r o c e s s . M e t h o d s  of classifying such processes 
into a rational methodological framework were therefore required 
which would allow analysis to be made of numbers of small firm 
TL users across several industries, firm sizes and management 
structures. A case approach appeared to offer the most relevant 
method of obtaining data on licensing situations within smaller 
manufacturing firms and was therefore adopted for this and the 
following reasons. First, the major objective of the study was a 
consideration of the use of TL in a strategic sense. To this end, 
approach to those responsible for the strategic decision making 
processes within the sample firms was deemed important and the 
case study framework facilitated this method of data collection. 
Second, use of a case approach allowed for a manageable 
number of companies to be analysed 'in depth'. In view of the 
proposal in Chapter 6 that behavioural factors are particularly 
important in the use of TL, this was suggested to be crucial. 
Thirdly, it was a study objective to build upon the research 
carried out under the 'Leverhulme' project described above. That 
study encompassed a highly structured analytical approach to the
1. See Lowe J and Crawford N K. 'Innovation and Technology 
Transfer for the Growing Firm' op.cit.
The industries and technology types where TL appears to be 
particularly important are listed here.
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use of TL by smaller firms. The approach adopted here was intended 
to complement that work through consideration of the strategic 
objectives of small company managements. It is considered that the 
approach adopted was generally successful in elucidating particular 
detail on the use of TL across several industries.
It is clear from the results of the case study analysis that a 
case approach is subject to both advantages and disadvantages.
A major advantage of such an approach is that a somewhat less 
'structured' format has to be used in obtaining information about 
the firm such that non standard information can be included. 
Endeavours to question case respondents on a structured basis 
were generally unsuccessful in obtaining all relevant information.
A major benefit of talking to top company management lay in 
elucidating the firm's commitment to the licensing process. It 
was clear that many firms had considered but not utilised TL, 
where other, similar, firms had made use of it in similar 
situations. Another advantage of the 'case' approach lay in the 
extent of co-operation that was offered by many firms in furthering 
the course of the research. Provision of information on confidential 
details of agreements, royalty rates and other information was 
frequently obtained which, it is considered, would not have been 
obtained by, for example, a questionnaire study where no face to 
face interview had taken place.
However, it is also concluded that there are major disadvantages 
in adopting a case approach. In the time available, the number 
of firms upon whom 'in depth' case studies can be carried out is
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clearly limited. Forty case studies of the use of TL in small 
manufacturing firms were completed and this was considered to be 
the minimum number from which conclusions could realistically be 
made. Case respondents also clearly had 'their view' of how 
the use of TL had been adopted in their companies which conflicted 
to an extent with the views of others within the same company, in 
some cases.
As far as the case approach is concerned, therefore, it can be 
concluded that in elucidating behavioural and strategic decision 
making processes in small firms, this approach was a success in 
complementing the other empirical work carried out in the earlier 
chapters. Obtaining detail on the process and practice of TL 
within this strategic framework was, possibly, more problematical 
however.
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p. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND BUSINESS STRATEGY IN SMALL FIRMS -
CONCLUSIONS
1. The Use of TL as an Alternative Strategy
Although a main conclusion of Chapter 2 was that smaller firms can,
in principle, act in a highly flexible manner in developing their
new product and market strategies, few case firms appeared to do so
in practice. Previous workers in the field of Business Policy
have suggested that before the use of new techniques such as TL
are incorporated into business strategies, a trigger signal, or
incentive to change may be required. The implications of this were
also discussed above. If the concept of classifying firms as
'thrusters' or 's l e e p e r s o r  as 'parochial', 'progressive'
(2)
or 'adaptive' is considered valid, then the idea of a 'trigger' 
signal may be important in understanding the way the study sample 
of companies incorporated the use of TL within their businesses.
TL generally appeared to be used in a very reactive manner, at 
least initially.
Other workers have suggested that growth is normally a major 
objective of organisations. Although many case companies cited 
growth as their principal policy objective it was clear from the 
case studies that prior to the use of TL many firms had been, and 
continued, to follow a satisficing role in small market niches 
where they had been operating for a considerable time, and in
1. Political and Economic Planning, op.cit.
2. Carter, S F and Williams B R. op.cit
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which conditions of competition were frequently low. It is 
pertinent to consider, therefore, first the number of firms which 
did in fact have growth as a major objective. Second, to define 
how such growth was managed within the firm and third, to 
identify how technology licensing had been used initially and 
was later integrated in these processes.
A majority of case companies stated that growth was a major 
objective and that they were in expanding markets. As far as 
outward licensing firms were concerned it was clear that many firms 
were utilising TL to overcome management time and other resource 
constraints to develop into new markets and achieve growth that 
might have been unattainable through other forms of market 
realisation. It seems clear that such firms could be classified 
as 'thrusters' under the first convention noted above or 'progressive' 
under the second classification. A major conclusion of this work 
is, therefore, that for firms with a successful product but 
restricted resources, outward TL can be a highly effective strategy.
In such firms, the 'trigger' signal appeared to have frequently 
been the success of the product in home markets leading to approaches 
by potential licensees for the rights to sell that product in other 
markets. To an extent it can therefore be concluded that such use 
of TL is also generally a reactive rather than a proactive process, 
since the initial stimulus for its use arose from outside the firm.
The number of case firms citing TL as their major means of market 
realisation was low however.
Inward licensing firms appeared to conform much more closely to the 
definition of 'sleepers' under the PEP convention mentioned above
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or as either parochial or adaptive under the Carter and Williams 
definition. It was a striking conclusion of the case studies that 
where inward licensing was being used it was frequently in response 
to a previous failure of the firm either to develop its own 
products 'in-house' or as the result of a crisis involving already 
existing products. Its use as part of a formally developed strategy 
to diversify into new areas seemed generally absent. However, 
although the use of TL did not usually appear to have been previously 
integrated proactively into a strategic framework prior to its use, 
but appeared to be generally adopted on an ad hoc basis, its success 
as a strategy once adopted, both in incremental and diversified 
development, seemed high. This supports the conclusion that 
smaller firms can act in a highly flexible manner, using TL where 
a trigger signal stimulates such use. Thus the first hypothesis 
in Chapter 6, that TL is generally used proactively by smaller firms 
appears disproved, but the parallel examination of its use in an 
ad hoc way demonstrates it success as a strategy where it is 
adopted.
Previous work, notably the 'Leverhulme' study described above and 
the analysis in Chapter 6 showing that only 8% of the membership 
of the Licensing Executives Society is drawn from small firms. This 
suggests that only a small minority of small manufacturing firms 
carry out TL activities. This would suggest substantial information, 
organisational and managerial barriers to the successful use of 
TL by smaller firms. The case studies strongly suggested that 
such barriers are an important factor in the low incidence of TL 
usage in such firms. The conclusion under the first sub-heading
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is therefore that TL is under used by small firms. Its success 
as a strategy once adopted however does not appear to be in doubt, 
if the case study evidence is considered. In view of this conclusion, 
suggestions for its practical use by smaller firms are made in the 
relevant section below.
2. When Technology Licensing is used by Small Firms
Having considered the use of TL as one alternative method in the 
strategic development of the smaller firm it is now also pertinent 
to consider when TL is used in relation both to the competitive 
situation of the firm within its markets and in terms of the type 
of products that are licensed in and out. As suggested above, TL 
is only one of the options that are available to the firm. The 
competitive situation of the firm was considered in Chapter 6 
and the internal and external factors making up that situation were 
explored from the point of view of trigger signals leading to the 
use of TL.
The competitive situation of most case companies was stated to be 
either medium or high in a large majority of instances. This 
suggests that high competition levels do make smaller firms consider 
the use of new forms of market realisation, as does the evidence in 
Chapter 3 that increased competition levels lead to pressures to 
diversify by small firms. Such pressures were considered to be 
reinforced in the case of those small firms with a small number 
of product lines. Since a significant minority of case companies
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stated that 'survival' was their current primary policy objective, 
it is reasonable to conclude that competitive pressures had stimulated 
the use of TL. A further conclusion must therefore be that TL is 
frequently a 'crisis' strategy, particularly in the case of inward 
licensing.
Acquisition of existing products in this manner may allow the firm 
time to develop into new areas of expertise. It is pertinent to 
consider therefore at what stage of the product life cycle firms 
had licensed products 'in' or 'out'. For those firms integrating 
the use of TL as a strategy it might be anticipated that products at 
different stages of the product life cycle would be licensed to 
fulfil differing objectives. However, this did not usually 
appear to be the case.
Consideration of a more formal approach to the use of inward TL 
rather than as an ad hoc strategy suggested that few case companies 
had considered TL in terms of developing their product portfolio 
from the product life cycle viewpoint. A large majority of the 
inward licensed products conformed to the 'star' or 'cash cow' 
classifications of the Boston Consulting Group analysis
however, also lying within the current product competence of the 
firm rather than comprising new products in which the company 
currently had no skills. Diversification seemed largely absent.
This result might be anticipated if firms were using TL in an ad hoc 
manner to fill product line déficiences rather than as part of a
1. Boston Consulting Group (BCG) op.cit.
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planned strategy and supports the conclusion that most such companies 
were seeking already successful products that would fit with their 
existing portfolios and skills, whether this was as part of a longer 
term strategy or in response to a product crisis. However, it was 
also clear that a minority of smaller companies had also used TL to 
overcome significant growth or competitive barriers to reduce risk 
levels in entering new markets. The implications of this conclusion 
in terms of a more formal consideration of the use of BCG analysis as 
one model for identifying cash utilisation and flows within the small 
firm are discussed at more length below. The low incidence of 
technology being licensed 'in' at the research stage or prior to its 
success as a product in other markets also supports the conclusion 
that inward TL is not normally used by smaller firms as part of an 
underlying strategic process but is more usually adopted in an ad hoc 
manner.
The situation for outward licensing small firms gave more support to 
the value of the product life cycle as a means of identifying products 
suitable for exploitation by TL. Many case firms had considered and 
used other forms of market realisation at several stages in the 
development of a particular product. TL had usually been chosen 
either to reinforce these other methods in difficult markets, but more 
frequently as the most appropriate mechanism for profit maximisation 
on a particular product line when the success of that product line 
had already been shown. Resource limitations in the exploitation of 
successful products had frequently led to the use of TL, while 
tariff barriers in particular markets had also led to its use in some 
instances. Once again therefore, TL appeared to be used in a 
significantly reactionary way. With a degree of caution it can be
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concluded that the use of TL usually arises in a relatively 
opportunistic manner in the case of outward licensing. However, it 
was also a clear result of the research that having adopted the use 
of outward TL, most firms used it highly proactively both for the 
initial product and for other product lines.
A major conclusion under the second sub-heading is therefore that 
competitive pressure is a useful means for considering the use of 
TL by smaller firms. The case study evidence strongly suggests that 
such pressure, leading to a fast requirement for new products, fosters 
the use of inward TL as a form of crisis management in many smaller 
firms, also suggesting support for categorising many such firms as 
'sleepers' as noted above. Outward TL appeared to be used mainly 
opportunistically by sample firms but was then frequently integrated 
into the strategy of the firm in a more formal manner. Once again, 
this would conform to the 'thruster' categorisation noted above, as 
companies identified a potentially attractive form of market 
realisation and exploited it to the full. These conclusions 
pertaining to the use of TL in smaller firms can be contrasted to 
those reached in Chapter 5 regarding the use of TL in larger firms.
It was suggested there that TL had been used explicitly as a competitive 
weapon in market sharing agreements with other firms, particularly in 
such instances as the pharmaceutical industry.
A final conclusion under this heading is that the use of TL is subject 
to substantial learning processes. Companies that had used it once 
appeared to use it again in many instances, suggesting that such 
learning barriers could be overcome. Learning and other barriers 
could explain the low incidence of TL in the small firm population
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generally but would also suggest that once adopted, TL can act as a 
flexibility enhancing mechanism for the small firm.
3. How Technology Licensing is used.
It was previously postulated that TL could be an important alternative 
strategy to 'in-house' development or other forms of market realisation. 
Acquisition or sale of products by smaller firms could mirror the sale 
or acquisition of companies by larger concerns. This would suggest 
a portfolio approach to the use of TL in the development of new 
product and market strategies, conforming to consideration of the 
relationship between different products within that portfolio and the 
barriers preventing better exploitation of those products. Three 
questions arise therefore: First, do firms consider their product
portfolios effectively as investments and do they therefore seek to 
reduce risk by diversifying into new products and new markets using 
TL. Secondly is a 'cash flow' relationship between products within 
the portfolio recognised,as the Boston Consulting Group matrix would 
suggest, and do firms consider the implications for their portfolio 
in developing the use of TL. Lastly, in view of the 'threshold' 
barriers proposed in Chapter 4, is TL used to overcome such barriers.
A major conclusion of Chapter 3 was that small firms did carry out 
substantial diversification into new products and markets. However, 
the evidence presented in Chapter 6 suggests that in the case of 
product line diversification, TL was rarely used. This is, possibly, 
a surprising conclusion in view of the postulated advantages of TL 
in overcoming resource and other constraints explored above.
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However, the use of inward TL did usually appear to be more of an 
incremental process through development into new areas, but utilising 
already existing skills and in assisting the development of current 
activities. Its use as a crisis response mechanism was also high­
lighted. It is therefore a central conclusion of the thesis that 
inward TL is not normally used in diversification strategies in 
entering new product areas. It is postulated that the problems 
involved in incorporating new technology, production and marketing 
methods at the same time may lead to too great problems for smaller 
firms to overcome.
In the development of new markets however, outward TL appeared to be 
valuable as a means of diversifying into new areas. Many case 
companies had entered foreign markets in which they were previously 
not represented through the use of TL. Clearly it can be 
concluded that TL in this instance was only one variable factor, 
allowing the firm to develop its use successfully.
The use of the BCG model to analyse companies product and market 
development strategies was suggested to be a potentially valuable 
tool in understanding why particular products were licensed 'in' or 
'out'. BCG analysis would suggest a highly proactive measure of the 
profitability of particular products leading to a decision to develop 
them in a different way or divest them. None of the case companies 
identified BCG explicitly as a means by which such decisions were 
made, although it was clear in several cases that such decisions 
were being made implicitly upon an analysis comparable to that 
proposed by BCG. Outward licensing to obtain a return on products 
that would otherwise have been of little value was used by several
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case companies. Only one of the sample companies identified the use 
of royalty flows for the development of new ranges of its products as 
important, however. TL did appear to be used proactively by many 
case companies to overcome threshold or other barriers, to develop 
into geographical markets they could not otherwise have entered, as 
the discussion in Chapter 5 suggested. This was more generally true 
of companies using outward TL to overcome resource constraints than 
for inward licensing companies overcoming technological barriers. 
However, as a risk reduction process, it did also seem valuable in 
inward TL as a major supplement to 'normal' R & D expenditures in new 
product development. This would suggest that such use of TL might 
allow smaller firms to act as if they were bigger in competing with 
large firms with more extensive resources.
The conclusions to the question of how small firms utilise TL must 
therefore lie in a consideration of its practical use in relation to 
its anticipated use. TL did appear to be useful in overcoming threshold 
barriers, as the conclusion to the second hypothesis in the previous 
chapter suggests. Its general adoption as a more formal strategy in 
business development in most smaller firms is clearly more open to 
doubt however. In this regard, the small sub-set of case firms which 
had utilised both inward and outward TL seemed particularly relevant, 
if atypical, of the case firms as a whole. These firms did appear to 
have formally integrated the use of TL into their business strategies.
4. The Success of Technology Licensing as a Business Strategy
If survival, followed by profit maximisation are considered to be
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two major objectives of the smaller firm^^^, consideration of the use 
of TL in achieving those objectives might be valid. In the case of 
inward licensing, several firms had clearly used TL to overcome 
substantial difficulties, and in at least two cases it was suggested 
that they had survived as a result. As a survival strategy therefore 
the use of inward TL did seem valuable. However, a majority of inward 
licensing companies had used TL more as a resource conservation process 
than for survival per se. The use of TL in such instances had allowed 
the release of resources for more profitable use elsewhere. TL had, 
therefore been used as a 'stepping stone' towards new product development 
'in house' conforming to the incremental development of new markets 
noted above. While this process could be considered as allowing for a 
greater number of activities to be carried out it could not be formally 
described as profit maximisation per se. It is a main conclusion 
therefore that inward TL can be a highly successful strategy, as the 
very small number of case failures show. Its success in assisting 
both survival and development seemed clear. As part of a policy of 
profit maximisation was concerned however, its value in reducing 
development costs was evident but its use in practice as an identifiable 
objective in this role seemed less clear.
Conversely, the value of outward TL as a survival strategy seems less 
important while its use as a means of profit maximisation seemed 
more evident and it was in this way that a majority of case firms 
appeared to use it, in exploitation of an already successful product. 
This strategy had led to high returns on a transaction cost basis 
as shown in Chapter 6. As an alternative to other forms of market
1. Subject to the objectives of smaller firms proprietors 
explored in Chapter 1.
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exploitation, outward TL seemed to be attractive to case companies 
either for resource related reasons or behavioural ones. Most 
outward licensing companies were exploiting a larger number of 
markets than would have been possible utilising direct export or 
other means of market entry. The value of the intellectual property 
to the company was therefore maximised, although the costs, in 
terms of personnel required, were also a substantial burden in some 
instances. Several case companies had utilised TL as a means 
of retaining a small size, without the necessity for growth that 
an increase in overseas marketing and sales would have required. It 
is possible to conculde therefore, that outward TL is generally a 
highly successful strategy for firms to follow, where they have an 
already existing successful product. For firms with less highly 
successful products, outward licensing appeared to be less attractive. 
A conclusion of this process is, therefore, that outward TL is mainly 
of benefit in reinforcing success, hence its use by mainly 'thruster' 
firms under the PEP classification also noted above.
In conclusion therefore, TL does appear to be a successful strategy 
for firms to follow in particular circumstances. Classifying the 
use of TL within a 'Business Policy' framework may be problematical 
however in view of the varied rationales involved in its use.
However, as one of a number of methods of overcoming product and 
market constraints, its use in the technology policy of most 
smaller firms appears to be under utilised. The following section 
therefore endeavours to suggest how the use of TL in SFs could 
be stimulated in practice.
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E. THE PRACTICAL USE OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN NEW PRODUCT 
AND MARKET STRATEGIES
It has been a major conclusion of the research that companies did not 
usually use TL initially until an external trigger stimulated its use. 
Once used, however, it appeared to be generally a successful strategy 
to follow. This suggests substantial information barriers to the 
more widespread use of TL both in exposure to potential licensing 
opportunities and in knowledge and application of TL techniques 
within the firm. However, it was also a major conclusion of the 
study that the rationales for the use of inward and outward TL were 
often very different. As far as practical recommendations are 
concerned therefore, these are treated separately below. If TL is 
generally successful in practice it is reasonable to propose that its 
use should be considered by a larger number of firms than do generally 
use it. Development of specific mechanisms to promote its use at a 
company, industry or society level may be more problematical however.
1. Inward Technology Licensing
A major conclusion of the study was that TL appeared to be used highly 
reactively, often as a damage limitatic»nstrategy to overcome a crisis. 
Its success in this role appeared to be high however, suggesting 
that earlier consideration in a more planned new product development 
programme could be valuable in stimulating the adoption of new 
products prior to a crisis arising.
A first proposal is therefore that the consideration of TL should
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form an integrated part of the new product development process in 
smaller firms. Such an approach would suggest a complementary use of 
TL to the development of new products 'in-house', the use of sub­
contracted research and development facilities, or the acquisition of 
other companies as a means of obtaining new product lines.
However, an ability to identify suitable sources of information on 
the availability of TL opportunities and methods by which TL could 
be utilised within the firm could prove to be barriers to its more 
widespread use. An important sub-set of inward licensing small firms 
appeared to have carried out extensive and detailed searches for new 
licensed products, leading to success, while other firms had obtained 
their products as the result of chance meetings or other ad hoc factors 
Those firms which had used inward TL on a continuing basis had clearly 
developed longer standing means of licence search than had the 
others. A major recommendation flowing from the research is 
therefore that for manufacturing companies with long term product 
development strategies, search for potential new technology to 
license should be a continuing process, with sources of information on 
potential opportunities being continually assessed. Such a strategy 
might be anticipated to be more successful than a 'one-off 
approach.
Several public and quasi public agencies appear to have reached 
similar conclusions with regard to the provision of information on
1. See Lowe J and Crawford N K op.cit. Proposals for integrating 
the use of TL in new product development techniques
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TL o p p o r t u n i t i e s . I f  information availability is an important 
barrier to the use of inward TL it might be anticipated that such 
agencies would be successful in promoting the use of TL in smaller 
firms as part of a more proactive strategy of product development. 
The value of enhanced information availability could be measured 
empirically and some suggestions for practical examination of the 
success of public initiatives in this area are suggested under 
'Further Work' below.
As a strategy for diversifying into new a$^as, inward TL did not 
appear to have been widely used, as shown above. The problems in 
introducing a product from a different culture seemed high if that 
product required skills that were not already available 'in-house'. 
As a strategy for small companies to use in entering very diverse 
new product areas, therefore, TL does not seem to be a generally 
successful strategy and its use cannot be recommended for this. 
However, in introducing a new product to build upon existing skills, 
its use appeared highly successful. For small firms seeking to 
fill product line gaps therefore, the use of inward TL seemed a 
highly useful technique to consider.
In conclusion therefore, for smaller firms requiring new technology 
the use of TL seemed advantageous, subject to the objections noted 
above. If the sample firms used in this study are typical, its 
use might be anticipated to increase in the future in light of an
1. For example, the Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies, the 
London Enterprise Agency, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands 
Councils have all recently set up agencies to promote 
provision of such information in an attempt to stimulate 
local economies.
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increasingly competitive environment for the smaller manufacturing 
firm and increasingly sophisticated means of publicising the 
availability of TL opportunities.
2. Outward Technology Licensing
Most of the case sample companies had developed the use of outward 
TL as a means for enhancing returns on products that had already 
been successful in their home markets. The trigger to the use of 
TL in these cases had frequently been approaches from potential 
licensees wishing to market the product in their own markets. In 
other cases, outward TL had been used more proactively, in overcoming 
tariff or other barriers to the exploitation of overseas markets by 
direct export. Most of the products concerned appeared to have been 
'star' or 'cash cow' products under the BCG convention, which the 
firm wished to make the maximum benefit of quickly, with the limited 
resources at its disposal.
In consideration of the lessons that smaller firms might draw from 
this work therefore, it is pertinent to consider whether such firms 
generally are able to utilise other forms of market realisation in 
exploiting foreign markets. Clearly, case companies had generally 
used TL because of the lack of such resources. For companies with 
highly successful products in home markets therefore, it seems clear 
that a strategy of TL can be advantageous in developing the returns 
accruing to that product and hence enhancing the return on the 
investment involved. For less successful firms with fewer 'market 
leader' products however, a strategy of outward licensing to
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advanced country export markets seems more open to doubt as a 
successful strategy. TL of less advanced technology to developing 
countries seemed more successful here, although the management and 
administrative costs of doing so also seemed higher.
In conclusion therefore, outward TL for non 'brand leader' products 
does not usually appear to be a suitable strategy for small 
companies to follow. The costs and problems of finding licensees 
where these do not approach the licensor initially may be 
prohibitive. However, for smaller companies with brand leader 
products, outward TL does appear to be a strategy allowing profit 
maximisation on particular product lines.
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F. POSSIBLE FURTHER WORK
The studies carried out for this work have been constructed within 
a framework of the strategy developed by smaller firms using TL. 
However, the case study approach adopted has highlighted at least 
two areas in which it is suggested that further work could usefully 
be carried out to elucidate other aspects of TL and build upon the 
research reported here. First, a direct comparative study of the use 
of TL compared with other forms of market development could be 
valuable in elucidating more of the behavioural factors and the 
barriers involved in the use of TL. Second, if, as postulated above, 
there is a relationship between the amount of information available 
on TL opportunities and its use by smaller firms, measures to 
clarify this relationship could also be useful. Thirdly, in view 
of the frequently complex relationships between licensor and 
licensee that the case studies suggested, further research into 
these relationships to elucidate behavioural and economic implications 
over time would clearly be valuable. Lastly, in view of the 
suggestion above that TL was being used as an alternative to 
acquisition in development, further exploration of this factor 
would be valid.
A comparative study of the use of TL and other strategies could 
involve the use of twinned companies, where one company used TL and 
the other another form of product or market development. In the 
case of inward licensing 'twins' could be drawn up for companies 
using TL and 'in-house' product development, sub-contract 
development or company acquisition as a means of developing product
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portfolios. It is suggested that such a study could be valuable 
in evaluating more accurately both the success and possibly more 
importantly the financial implications of adopting a strategy of 
licensing 'in' over a longer period of time in comparison with 
other strategies.
The use of outward TL by companies could be examined by comparing 
'twins' using TL and direct export, the use of local agents or local 
company acquisition as a method of market entry and development.
Such a twinned study could demonstrate whether the use of the Boston 
Consulting Group matrix as a means of drawing up and formulating a 
marketing strategy was valid in terms of developing 'cash cows' 
as resource providers for other product developments. Once again 
the financial implications of following the different strategies 
could be measured.
However, in light of the small number of companies utilising TL it 
must be recognised that identifying such twins could be problematical, 
Firms in similar industries, with similar products and resources 
would be required and such studies would have to be carried out over 
an extended period.
The role of 'information' in the scope and scale of TL was mentioned 
above. It was concluded that information availability, particularly 
in the area of potential products available for licensing 'in' was 
crucial. Various public agencies have recently set up services 
dedicated to the provision of information on technology that might 
be available for transfer. Provision of such information.
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particularly in view of the localised nature of its availability 
provides an opportunity to measure whether enhanced information will 
increase the quantity of TL among small firms. If such an increase 
could be demonstrated this could be an important finding in the 
formulation of technology policy at both a local and national level.
The relationships between licensor and licensee developed during 
the course of a licensing agreement have been explored only briefly 
in the course of this research into the use of TL as a business 
strategy. It is clear however, that many licensing relationships 
are of a long standing nature and provide benefit to both parties 
over extended periods. Research to elucidate the relationships 
developing within what could be termed a 'symbiotic' development 
between large and small firms and small firms per se would clearly 
be valuable in understanding how two frequently very different 
company cultures cooperate over time to the benefit of both 
parties. It is suggested that such research could be carried out 
within an organisational behaviour structure with the objective of 
both understanding how cultural barriers light preclude successful 
longer term cooperation and in understanding those factors leading 
to its successful use.
Fourthly,company acquisition has been suggested as an alternative to 
the use of technology licensing. It is clear that many larger companies 
do use acquisition as a means of market entry in diversification and
1. Since most of the agencies referred to have been set up by local 
authorities or development agencies, only companies within 
particular geographical areas can obtain access to the 
information made available providing the potential for a 
'matched' study with other companies outside the agency 
areas.
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development. Such acquisition does effectively cause a transfer 
of technology into the acquiring organisation, although the process 
and result is clearly somewhat different than such transfer under 
a licensing agreement. It is suggested that a comparative study of 
the use of TL and acquisition as alternative methods of development 
and market entry could be valuable in elucidating the mechanisms 
whereby companies maintain development momentum in managing growth. 
Such a study could also highlight any relationship between size and 
proclivity to utilise TL or acquisition, an investigation which has 
not been attempted here, but could build upon the empirical work 
reported above.
It is concluded therefore that there are several major opportunities 
for further work in this field, which appears to be becoming of 
increasing importance, as governments seek to stimulate the extent 
and pace of technological change in, and development of, small firms, 
Although it is hoped that the work reported here will clarify some 
of the strategic implications of the use of TL amongst smaller 
firms, it is also clear that substantial further work is required 
before all aspects of the use of technology licensing by small 
firms is fully understood.
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G. FINAL THOUGHTS
The original 'trigger signal' for this study was a practical 
situation within one company seeking to diversify into a new market 
with an untried product in which it had very little production 
technology. Although substantial marketing strengths were available 
the project was abandoned before market entry, even though the 
technical problems of the product had been solved. In light of this 
study the question can be asked 'would technology licensing have 
been a more appropriate method for market penetration'. To this, 
the answer may have bean a qualified 'yes'. Although substantial 
diversification was involved, the success of the company was based 
upon its marketing strengths, and in this area little diversification 
would have been involved. The researcher feels reasonably sure, 
therefore, that success in this case could have been achieved.
Finally, the research was commenced on the basis that TL could, in 
principle, be used as a universal technique for small firms 
development. This is clearly not the case. Probably a majority of 
smaller manufacturing companies have neither the managerial resources 
nor the inclination to utilise techniques which fall outside their 
previous experience, and what might be termed 'normal' or 'in-house' 
techniques for product and market development, unless forced to do so.
Therefore in answer to the question 'Is Technology Licensing a Valid 
Business Technique', the only conclusion that can be reached is 'In 
Certain Circumstances'. Its value both as a crisis management strategy 
and in profit maximisation has been shown above. Clearly TL can
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be used as a 'one o f f  process in both these cases. However, in 
light of early conclusions on the relatively ad hoc nature by which 
many small firms develop new products or enter new markets and the 
equally ad hoc nature of TL adoption in such firms, it is probably 
pertinent to conclude that a fundamental advantage of its use 
lies in opening the firm to a larger number of new business 
opportunities than would otherwise be the case.
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